05000305/FIN-2010004-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Barrier Control Procedures Result in Exposed Service Water Pumps |
Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors for the failure to have adequate procedures to address the removal of the screenhouse traveling water screen covers, an activity affecting quality. Consequently, the covers were removed and safety-related equipment was exposed to the environment without adequate planning of mitigation actions in the event of inclement weather. The licensee initiated condition reports CR394670, CR395541, and CR395717 to document the issue. At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was performing a causal evaluation and developing corrective actions to address the issue. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Tables 3b, 4a, and 4b for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors determined that the screenhouse covers were designed to prevent tornado missiles from damaging the safety-related equipment housed inside the screenhouse and that two trains of the service water system would be degraded; therefore, the inspectors answered yes to the Table 4b seismic, flooding, and severe weather screening criteria questions 1 and 2. The inspectors contacted the RIII senior reactor analyst who determined, using NUREG/CR-4461, Tornado Climatology of the Contiguous United States, and the number of days the covers were removed that the performance deficiency risk was of very low safety significance (Green). The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, Decision Making, because the licensee failed to make safety-significant or risk-significant decisions using a systematic process to ensure safety is maintained. Specifically, the licensee applied an incorrect evaluation to a situation that resulted in the multiple trains of service water pumps being unprotected from tornado missiles (H.1(a)). |
Site: | Kewaunee ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000305/2010004 Section 1R12 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
Inspectors (proximate) | R Winter J Jandovitz J Cassidy M Kunowski R Krsek K Barclay P Cardona-Morales |
CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Kewaunee - IR 05000305/2010004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Kewaunee) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Kewaunee)
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