05000285/LER-2006-006, For Fort Calhoun Regarding Inadvertent Start of Emergency Diesel Generator 2
| ML070170373 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/2007 |
| From: | Bannister D Omaha Public Power District |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LIC-06-0130 LER 06-006-00 | |
| Download: ML070170373 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 2852006006R00 - NRC Website | |
text
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- - _J,/1946 - 2006 Fort Calhoun Station P.O. Box 550 Fort Calhoun, NE 68023 January 8, 2007 LIC-06-0130 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station P 1-137 Washington, DC 20555
Reference:
Subject:
Docket No. 50-285 Licensee Event Report 2006-006 Revision 0 for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2006-006, Revision 0, dated January 8, 2007. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). If you should have any questions, please contact me.
Sincerely, D. J. Bannister Plant Manager - Fort Calhoun Station DJB/DKG/dkg Attachment c:INPO Records Center
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMA APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007 (6-2004)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and RegulatoryAffairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the (See reverse for required number of information collection.
digits/characters for each block)
- 3. PAGE Fort Calhoun Station 05000285 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Inadvertent Start of Emergency Diesel Generator 2
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 11 08 2006 2006 006 00 01 08 2007 05000
- 9. OPERATING
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
MODE El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
El 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 5 El 20.2203(a)(1)
[I 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
[I 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
E3 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
ED 73.71(a)(5) 0 El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
The operating crew was aware that ground fault testing was to occur on bus 1A4 and that during the testing the bus was going to be de-energized. All loads and equipment, with the exception of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump (SI-1B) providing shutdown cooling, had been shifted and supplied by bus 1A3. The crew successfully rotated to the LPSI pump (SI-lA) being supplied by bus 1A3, but never recognized the need to remove DG-2 from auto-standby status when the bus was de-energized by opening breaker 1A44. A contributing cause to this event was that the operators failed to recognize the interrelationship of de-energizing bus 1A4 and the affect on DG-2 with it aligned in auto-standby.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1) A revision to EM-FT-EX-1403 will include steps to prevent an inadvertent diesel generator start. In addition, a review of procedures EM-FT-EX-1400, "4160 VAC Bus 1A1 Ground Fault Locator Functional Test" and EM-FT-EX-1402, "4160 VAC Bus 1A3 Ground Fault Locator Functional Test" will be completed to ensure adequate guidance exists in these procedures. These procedures are only performed during refueling outages. These changes will be completed by March 30, 2007.
- 2)
Training outlining the details and cause of this event has been developed. This material emphasizes the need to acquire proper verification and validation and cross functional review. This training will be tracked by the corrective action system.
In addition, enhancements are being administered through the Corrective Action Program (CR 200603965).
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
DG-2 is a mitigating component that is designed to assist during an accident or transient condition. De-energizing bus 1A4 was a planned evolution and DG-2 responded as designed. DG-2 continued to be available.
Both diesel generators remained available. Minimal operator actions were needed to have DG-2 supply bus 1 A4.
Fort Calhoun Station was defueled at the time of the event. The power for the spent fuel pooling cooling was not affected. Therefore this event had no impact on the health and safety of the public.
SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE This event does not result in a safety system functional failure in accordance with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline".
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
There have not been other events involving inadvertent starting of an emergency diesel generator at Fort Calhoun Station for the past three years.
NR. FUOM 3b6A (1-2U01