05000285/LER-2006-003, Re Technical Specification Violation of Containment Air Coolers Due to Untimely Corrective Actions
| ML063190333 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/2006 |
| From: | Reinhart J Omaha Public Power District |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LIC-06-0122 LER 06-003-00 | |
| Download: ML063190333 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 2852006003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
UHHU Omaha Public Power District 444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha NE 68102-2247 November 6, 2006 LIC-06-0122 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1I-13 7 Washington, DC 20555 1'
Reference:
Subject:
Docket No. 50-285 Licensee Event Report 2006-003 Revision 0 for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2006-003, Revision 0, dated November 6, 2006. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR5O.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
This letter contains no commitments to the NRC. If you should have any questions, please contact me.
Site Director Fort Calhoun Station JAR/EPM/epm Attachment c: INPO Records Center B. S. Mallett, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV J. D. Hanna, NRC Senior Resident Inspector A. B. Wang, NRC Project Manager Employment with Equal Opportunity
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMA APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007 (6-2004)Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-1 0202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. It a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the (See reverse for required number of information collection.
digits/characters for each block)
- 3. PAGE Fort Calhoun Station 05000285 1 OF 6
- 4. TITLE Technical Specification Violation of Containment Air Coolers Due to Untimely Corrective Actions
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LEIR NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MOT A
ER FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NO.
MOT A
ER05000 IFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 9
5 2006 2006 003 00 11 06 20061 05000
- 9. OPERATING
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
MODE El 20.2201 (b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
El 20.2201 (d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 177 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
IEl 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
[El 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El73.71 (a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El73.71 (a)(5) 100 El1 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
ElOTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
E 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
El1 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The hydrogen generation in containment section of the FCS design analysis credits operation of the containment air coolers for 30 days following a design basis event. However, based on revised regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 50.44 (Standards for Combustible Gas Control Systems), the generation of explosive amounts of hydrogen in a (dry large) containment building (FCS) is not considered to be a risk significant event and the evaluation of this event is no longer required.
Following a loss of coolant accident when the supply of make-up water from the normal source is complete, the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pump suction is automatically aligned to the containment sump. Station documents refer to this realignment signal as the recirculation actuation signal (RAS).
The containment air coolers are not credited post-RAS for heat removal. Therefore, a loss of containment air cooling post-RAS (which occurs approximately 1/2 to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after a large break loss of coolant accident event initiation) has no effect on radiological consequences analyses. A review of station corrective action documentation was performed to ascertain the potential backup nitrogen leakage rate for the affected valves.
Following the review of leakage rate and the sizes of the attached backup nitrogen bottles, Engineering has determined that the affected valves should maintain their accident positions for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Therefore, this event had minimal impact on the health and safety of the public.
SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE This event does result in a safety system functional failure in accordance with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline".
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
No previous LERs have documented inadequate operability determinations on valves caused by inadequate corrective action to a previous condition.