05000281/FIN-2014005-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Unit 2 Trip Due to Loose RPS Wire Connection |
| Description | An NRC-identified, non-cited violation (NCV) of Surry Technical Specification (TS) 6.4, Unit Operating Procedures and Programs, Section A.7 was identified because Surry procedure 0-ECM-1801-01, Westinghouse Type BF BFD or NBFD65NR Relay Replacement did not include a torque value for the reactor protection system (RPS) relay terminal screws to a field wiring connection. Subsequently, Unit 2 tripped on October 13, 2014, when a field wire connection became loose from the terminal end of a RPS trip relay and caused a reactor trip breaker to open. The issue was documented in Surrys corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 561820. The licensees failure to specify a torque value in procedure 0-ECM-1801-01 was a performance deficiency (PD) that was within the licensees ability to foresee and correct. Specifically, the licensee removed the correct torque value from the procedure based on a licensee procedure action request (PAR) that was incorrectly implemented. The inspectors determined that the PD was more than minor because it was associated with the procedural quality attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the procedure that controlled the connection of electrical termination to RPS relays did not specify a torque value and therefore, left it up to the technician to determine the tightness of the connection. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Table 2, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to affect the Initiating Events Cornerstone. The inspectors screened the finding using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at-Power dated June 19, 2012, and determined that it screened as Green because the deficiency did not cause a loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant to a stable shutdown condition. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the documentation component of the human performance area, H.7, because the organization failed to maintain complete, accurate and up-to-date documentation for the replacement of RPS relays. |
| Site: | Surry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000281/2014005 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2014 (2014Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Butcavage C Jones D Bacon P Mckenna S Rose |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Surry - IR 05000281/2014005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Surry) @ 2014Q4
Self-Identified List (Surry)
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