Surry
TS 6.4.A.3 requires, in part, that detailed written procedures with appropriate instructions shall be provided for conditions that include: action to be taken for specific and foreseen malfunctions of systems or components including alarms, primary system leaks and abnormal reactivity changes. Contrary to the above, on September 4, 2014, the licensee discovered that the
annunciator response procedure, 0-VSP-M4, Flood Control Panel Trouble, used to mitigate
ESGR flooding, did not have specific steps to direct an operator on how to isolate a leak. This was revealed when the licensee discovered that their current
PRA model assumed an incorrect low flow rate for a break in
SW piping in mechanical equipment room MER-3. Consequentially, the licensee had to take compensatory actions to isolate the
SW flow path by shutting 1-SW-846, MER-3 chiller
SW to Unit 1 discharge tunnel, until the
PRA model was analyzed with the new flow rate and 0- VSP-M4 was changed. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the completed
PRA analysis did not affect the design or qualification of the
SW system and it did not represent a loss of system or train safety function. This issue was entered into the licensees
CAP as CR 557706 and the
annunciator response procedure was revised with the correct operator actions.
