A self-revealing non-cited violation of
Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.a, Procedures and Programs, was identified because
PSEG did not maintain adequate control of the system configuration for the Unit 2 chill water system during maintenance on the 21 chiller. Specifically, on May 27, 2008, all three Unit 2 chill water system chillers tripped due to an error in the safety tagging sequence specified by the work control documents for maintenance on the 21 chiller. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the
Initiating Events cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, unavailability of all three chillers increased the likelihood of a loss of control air that could result in a complicated plant trip. Per
Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Attachment 0609.04, initial screening and characterization of findings, the inspectors conducted a Phase 1 analysis and determined that this finding required a Phase 2 analysis because the finding contributed to both the likelihood of a
reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available. The inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) using the Salem plant specific Phase 2 pre-solved worksheets in accordance with
IMC 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because
PSEG personnel did not follow procedures
H.4(b). Specifically, revisions to the work control document for tagging the 21 chiller did not comply with the requirements of
PSEG procedure SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0051, Safety Tagging Operations. (Section 1R13
