The inspectors identified a self-revealing non-cited violation of
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, Procedures and Programs. The inspectors determined that maintenance procedures for the 25
service water strainer (
SWS) blow down valve (25SW24) were inadequate because they did not ensure proper alignment of the valve and actuator. This resulted in the 25
service water pump (SWP) being
inoperable for approximately
35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br />.
PSEG returned the 25
SW train to service following completion of corrective maintenance on the blow down valve and verification of proper alignment of the valve and actuator.
PSEG also revised the applicable maintenance procedures for future maintenance activities. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the
Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with
IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, the inspectors conducted a Phase 1 screen and determined that this finding was of very low safety significance. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because
PSEG did not implement and institutionalize operating experience, including internally generated lessons learned, through changes to station processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs
P.2(b). Specifically,
PSEG procedures did not incorporate internal operating experience to ensure proper alignment between the
service water strainer blow down valve actuator and valve stem. (Section 1R12
