05000263/FIN-2018003-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | This violation of very low safety significant was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Enforcement: Violation: The licensee identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50.49, Environmental qualification of electric equipment important to safety for nuclear power plants; which requires, in part, that equipment qualified by test must be preconditioned by natural or artificial aging to its end of life or a shorter designated life considering all significant types of degradation which can have an effect on equipment function. Contrary to the above, on June 2, 2018, the licensee determined that EQ evaluation 608000000032, of MO2034, MO2035, MO2075, and MO2076 (HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Isolation Valves) internal actuator cables, failed to consider the temperature rise due to the high temperature process fluid in the vicinity of the affected components when aging (preconditioning) them and the unaccounted temperature rise shortened the life of some components to the point that they were no longer EQ qualified to the end of planned life. The unaccounted for process fluid temperature increases were verified by the licensee when thermography of the associated valves was performed. The licensee performed a prompt operability determination, entered the issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as CAP 501000012766 and performed a thermal life analysis engineering evaluation. Long-term corrective actions include replacement of the internal actuator cables during the next refueling outage.
10 Significance/Severity Level: This finding was more than minor because the performance deficiency was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected its objective to ensure the availability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Isolation Valves are designed to provide reactor coolant pressure boundary, required for a safe reactor shutdown following a Design Basis Accident or transient. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of safety system, did not represent actual loss of a safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time, and did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for >24 hrs. Corrective Action Reference: 501000012766 |
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2018003 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2018 (2018Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Zurawski D Krause F Tran T Go G Hansen R Edwards N Fields K Riemer |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.49 |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2018003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2018Q3
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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