05000261/FIN-2016008-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Failure to Keep EOP FRP-H.1 in Conformance with Plant Specific Guidelines |
| Description | The NRC identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for the licensees failure to maintain emergency operating procedure (EOP) FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, in accordance with their commitment to implement EOPs based on plant specific technical guidelines. Specifically, the licensee was committed to upgrading their EOPs in accordance with the H.B. Robinson Unit 2 plant specific technical guidelines, and FRP-H.1 was not updated during implementation of engineering change (EC) 283171. In response, the licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as action request 2047575 and updated FRP-H.1 to bring it into conformance with its basis document. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it could lead to a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected. Specifically, the procedure would have been implemented as written during an event that required bleed and feed, and it was not demonstrated that one SI pump was adequate for core cooling. The finding required a detailed risk evaluation to be performed because the finding was not a deficiency affecting the design of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), and the finding would represent a loss of system and/or function, because it was not demonstrated that one safety injection (SI) pump would be sufficient during bleed and feed operations. A detailed risk assessment determined the increase in core damage frequency due to the performance deficiency was less than1E-6/year, a GREEN finding of very low safety significance. The team determined that the finding was indicative of current licensee performance, because the issue resulted from inadequate implementation of EC 283171, which was completed in 2014. A cross-cutting aspect of Teamwork [H.4.] in the Human Performance area was assigned because individuals and work groups did not communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety was maintained. |
| Site: | Robinson  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000261/2016008 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2016 (2016Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Ottenberg J Bartley O Mazzoni R Cureton S Herrick T Su |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.4, Teamwork |
| INPO aspect | PA.3 |
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Finding - Robinson - IR 05000261/2016008 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Robinson) @ 2016Q3
Self-Identified List (Robinson)
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