05000260/LER-2004-003, Regarding Inoperability of Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Pressure Switches Beyond TS Allowable Outage Time
| ML050250039 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/2005 |
| From: | Skaggs M Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 04-003-00 | |
| Download: ML050250039 (8) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 2602004003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
January 24, 2005 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 CFR 50.73 ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Stop OWFN, P1-35 Washington, D. C. 20555-0001
Dear Sir:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) -
UNIT 2 - DOCKET 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 50-260/2004-003-00 The enclosed report provides details of a failure to meet the requirements of a Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation due to inoperability of the main turbine control valve fast closure pressure switch inputs to the reactor protection system beyond the allowable outage time.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), TVA is reporting this event as any operation or condition prohibited by the plants Technical Specifications. There are no commitments contained in this letter.
Sincerely, Original Signed by:
Mike D. Skaggs cc: See page 2
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 January 24, 2005 Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
(Via NRC Electronic Distribution)
Ms. Eva Brown, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (MS 08G9)
One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 Mr. Stephen J. Cahill, Branch Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8931 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 10833 Shaw Road Athens, Alabama 35611-6970
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 January 24, 2005 TEA:PSH:BAB Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
A. S. Bhatnagar, LP 6A-C J. C. Fornicola, LP 6A-C R. G. Jones, NAB 1A-BFN K. L. Krueger, POB 2C-BFN R. F. Marks, PAB 1C-BFN F. C. Mashburn, BR 4X-C N. M. Moon, LP 6A-C J. R. Rupert, NAB 1A-BFN K. W. Singer, LP 6A-C M. D. Skaggs, PAB 1E-BFN E. J. Vigluicci, ET 11A-K LEREvents@inpo.org NSRB Support, LP 5M-C EDMS-WT CA-K S:lic/submit/lers/U2 260/2004-03.doc
NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-2004)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)
APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2007
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 1. FACILITY NAME Browns Ferry Unit 2
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000260
- 3. PAGE 1 OF 5
- 4. TITLE Inoperability of Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Pressure Switches Beyond TS Allowable Outage Time
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME none DOCKET NUMBER N/A 07 12 2004 2004-003-00 01 24 2005 FACILITY NAME none DOCKET NUMBER N/A
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §:(Check all that apply)
- 9. OPERATING MODE 1
20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
OTHER
- 10. POWER LEVEL 43%
20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
X 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) specify in Abstract below or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
V. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
As stated in Section IV above, the reactor never operated with an OLMCPR value less conservative than those specified in the analyses. In the event of an actual generator load-reject event during the interval with the PLU function disabled, with the additional conservatism assumed of no turbine bypass valve operation, the reactor MCPR limit would not have been exceeded. There were no consequences to the health and safety of the public caused by this condition.
VI. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
A.
Immediate Corrective Actions
The temporary modification that disabled the PLU function was removed.
B.
Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence(1)
BFN FSAR has been revised to clarify the PLU feature and its transient analysis significance.
Site personnel involved in 10 CFR 50.59 reviews have been briefed on this event.
VII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A.
Failed Components None B.
Previous LERs on Similar Events None C.
Additional Information
Browns Ferry Corrective Action document PER 65268 D.
Safety System Functional Failure Consideration:
This event does not involve a safety system functional failure which would be reported in accordance with NEI 99-02. During the period of Unit 2 reactor operation with the PLU function disabled, the OLMCPR value remained greater (more conservative) than the limiting value OLMCPR determined by analysis. No transient event occurred, and had one occurred, no reactor fuel thermal limits would have been exceeded.
E.
Loss of Normal Heat Removal Consideration:
The event being reported does not involve a reactor scram.
VIII. COMMITMENTS
None (1) TVA does not consider this corrective action a regulatory commitment. The completion of this action will be tracked in TVAs Corrective Action Program.