05000260/LER-1986-001, :on 851118,spent Fuel Pool Storage Gates Removed While Lead Shielding Blankets in Use.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Controls to Ensure Maint of Safety Evaluation Requirements.Procedures Revised

:on 851118,spent Fuel Pool Storage Gates Removed While Lead Shielding Blankets in Use.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Controls to Ensure Maint of Safety Evaluation Requirements.Procedures Revised

ML20137R596
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	01/31/1986
From:	Coots L, Robert Lewis TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
References
LER-86-001, LER-86-1, NUDOCS 8602130328
Download: ML20137R596 (4)

LER-1986-001, on 851118,spent Fuel Pool Storage Gates Removed While Lead Shielding Blankets in Use.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Controls to Ensure Maint of Safety Evaluation Requirements.Procedures Revised

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
2601986001R00 - NRC Website

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e, nei To minimize radiation exposure of personnel during the current unit 2 refueling outage activities, the use of temporary lead shielding blankets was evaluated and approved. These safety evaluations identified special requirements to be implemented and maintained while this temporary alteration is in effect. One of these requirements was that the spent fuel pool storage gates were to be maintained closed while the lead shielding is in use. The gates were, however, removed between November 18-27 while the lead blankets were in use.

Inadequate procedural controls to ensure maintenance of the safety evaluation special requirements were detennined to be the cause. The spent fuel storage pool gates were closed on November 27, 1985, with a hold order issued to assure they remain closed. All outstanding temporary alterations are being reviewed to ensure special requirements were controlled. In addition, the administrative procedure centrolling temporary alterations is being revised to assure special requirements are implemented and maintained during temporary alterations.

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.c, Units 1 and 2 were in a refueling outage, and unit 3 was in an extended maintenance outage.

The special requirement of safety evaluations for adding tceporary lead shielding to certain piping sections was not maintained.

Unit 2 was shut down on September 15, 1984, for refueling. To minimize radiation exposure of personnel, temporary shielding in the form of lead blankets is utilized on high radiation source rate piping sections. These piping sections included an equipment drain line, the control rod drive (AA) scram discharge header, residual heat removal (BO) line inside the drywell, reactor water cleanup (CE) inside the drywell, and specified horizontal runs of the recirculation system (AD). The plans for installing the tenporary lead shielding included a safety evaluation to access the impact of the additional loading on piping, supports, structural supports, and their seismic qualification status. These evaluations identified special requirements to be implemented prior to installing and while the temporary lead shielding was installed. These special requirements included; all fuel to be removed and stored in the spent fuel pool with the spent fuel pool gates closed, removal of the temporary lead shielding prior to fuel reload, and a special evaluation if a seismic event occurred while the temporary lead shielding was installed.

On November 25, 1985, the unit 2 spent fuel pool gates were discovered to have previously been removed. The gates had been removed on November 18, 1985, to allow transfer of spent incore monitors to the fuel pool. The gates were reinstalled by November 27, 1985, with a hold order issued to prevent removal without the shift engineer's approval. The above systems were not required to be operable during this time period since all fuel had been removed from the reactor (unit 2 core unloading complete on October 13, 1984) and stored in the spent fuel storage pool. During the time period that the spent fuel pool gates were removed (8 days), the possibility of a seismic event existed and could have occurred.

However, the probability of an operational bases earthquake ( 1g ground acceleragion at the site) occurring 'during this time period is on the order of 4 X 10- occurrences which is considered a low risk. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that a seismic event could have affected the system piping.

The primary cause is the lack of adequate procedural details to assure that the special requirements of safety evaluations for temporary alterations are translated into the proper administ,rative controls. Standard Practice BF-8.2, Temporary Alterations, will be revised to require that all the affected systems and equipment be identified and tagged, if necessary, to maintain the special requirements identified in a safety evaluation. Standard Practice BF-8.2 will be revised by February 28, 1986. Also, a review of all outstanding temporary alterations on unit 2 was conducted to ensure that similar requirements were controlled; and a review of the remaining temporary alterations is in progress.

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e w am..,nn The difference between the report date and event date is as a result of delayed discovery, and a reevaluation to determine if the spent fuel storage pool gates closed requirement was valid. This condition was determined reportable by the site staff on January 6,1986.

Responsible Plant Section - ENGR Previous Events - None

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d' TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

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Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35602 January 31, 1986 U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dociament "ontrol Desk Washingt wi, D. C.

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Dear Sir:

TENIFNF VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-260/86001 The enclosed report provides details concerning inadequate procedure leading to lapse in special requirements for use of tenporary lead shielding. This report is submitted in accordance to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v).

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY s

Plant Manager Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Enclosures' cc (Enclosures):-

Regional Administrator INPO Records Center U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 1500 Office of Inspection and Enforcement 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Region II Atlanta, Georgia 30339 101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900 Atlante, Georgia 30303

'NRC Resident Inspector, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant l

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