05000259/FIN-2016004-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Reassembly Procedure for HPCI Steam Line Inboard Isolation Valve Actuator |
Description | Green. A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" was identified for the licensee's failure to provide sufficient detail, in this case, appropriate to the work activity in procedure, MCI-0-000-ACT004, Maintenance of SMB-0 through SMB-4T Limitorque Actuators, which impacted the design features of HPCI valve 1-FCV-73-2. As an immediate corrective action, the valve was repaired and corrective actions initiated to address the quality and details of motor operated valve procedures. The licensee entered the violation into their corrective action program as Condition Reports (CRs) 1228056 and 1229289. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, the reliability of the valve was reduced due to the impending worm gear teeth failure. While the valve was full open, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) pump was able to fulfill its safety function of injecting water into the reactor. Since the valve was able to close upon entering outage U1R11, the HPCI system was able to isolate the HPCI steam supply line in the event of a HPCI steam line break. This finding was evaluated in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The inspectors determined the finding screened to Green as HPCI was not unavailable longer than its TS allowed outage time and the finding did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Procedure Adherence in the Human Performance area [H.8], because individual staff members did not review procedures and instructions prior to work to validate they were appropriate for the scope of work. |
Site: | Browns Ferry |
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Report | IR 05000259/2016004 Section 1R15 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2016 (2016Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Blamey A Ruh D Dumbacher D Terry-Ward G Ottenberg J Seat R Baldwin R Williams T Stephen |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Browns Ferry - IR 05000259/2016004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Browns Ferry) @ 2016Q4
Self-Identified List (Browns Ferry)
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