05000255/LER-2003-002
| Palisades Nuclear Plant | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 2552003002R00 - NRC Website | |
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On March 11, 2003, in conjunction with performance of fuel handling area ventilation system (FHAVS) [VG] surveillance testing prior to the 2003 refueling outage, it was determined that the FHAVS was not being tested in full accordance with the ventilation filter testing program specified by Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.10.
Review of the previous three years revealed that surveillance testing of the FHAVS specified by TS SR 3.7.12.1 had not fully met the ventilation filter testing program when the FHAVS was required to be operable during the April-May 2001 refueling outage. Pursuant to TS SR 3.0.1, failure to have met TS SR 3.7.12.1 is a failure to have met TS LCO 3.7.12 requirements for an operable FHAVS for core alterations and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies that occurred during the 2001 refueling outage.
This occurrence is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
Additionally, breaches in the FHAVS ductwork were identified that may have existed prior to the 2001 refueling outage. The ductwork breaches could also have rendered the FHAVS inoperable.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The FHAVS surveillance procedure did not adequately implement the ventilation filter testing program of TS 5.5.10.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Modifications were made to the FHAVS to facilitate testing in accordance with TS 5.5.10. The surveillance procedure was revised and the surveillance requirements successfully completed prior to entering the applicable conditions of TS LCO 3.7.12 for the 2003 refueling outage in March 2003.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
Operation of the FHAVS is not necessary in order to maintain offsite doses within the guidelines of 10 CFR 100 following a postulated fuel handling accident. Therefore, a total system failure would not impact the margin of safety as described in the safety analysis. However, analysis has shown that post-accident filtration by the FHAVS provides significant reduction in offsite doses by limiting the release of airborne radioactivity.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
None