05000254/FIN-2008003-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Unit 2 Restart of 2A Recirculation Pump in Mode 1 |
| Description | A self-revealing finding of very low safety significance and a NCV of Technical Specification 3.4.9, RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits, was identified on March 31, 2008, when operators exceeded the Technical Specification limit of U 50aF during the start of the 2A reactor coolant recirculation pump when trend information indicated a potential to exceed that limit. Specifically, operators did not establish effective controls to ensure compliance with the Technical Specification when they started the 2A reactor coolant recirculation pump with temperature in the 2A loop more than 50aF below the bulk temperature in the reactor vessel represented by the 2B loop temperature. Corrective actions for this event included verification that temperature had been restored inside limits within the 30 minutes required by the Technical Specification action completion time, performance of an engineering analysis to determine that the reactor coolant system was acceptable for continued operation, procedure revision for clarification, and training for operating personnel. The failure to implement effective controls to prevent exceeding the Technical Specification limit was more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of Human Performance and affected the cornerstone objective by challenging the physical design barriers intended to maintain the functionality of the reactor coolant system. Specifically, starting the pump with differential temperatures beyond the applicable limits exceeded design limits that provide a margin to brittle failure of the reactor vessel and piping of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the plant conditions were determined to be within the bounds of the existing analysis and therefore the issue did not result in degrading the reactor coolant system boundary, in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for any reactor coolant system leakage, nor could it have likely affected other mitigation systems to result in a loss of their safety functions. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance for the Decision-Making component because the licensee failed to communicate the decisions and the basis for decisions in a timely manner to personnel who had a need to know the information in order to perform work safely (H.1(c)). Specifically, planning decisions such as the compensatory actions for prompt restoration made during the dayshift for this repair were not effectively communicated to those individuals that were called upon to implement the plan in a safe and timely manner. (Section 4OA3 |
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000254/2008003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2008 (2008Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Matthews W Slawinski M Ring J Mcghee J Tapp R Jones B Cushman |
| CCA | H.10, Bases for Decisions |
| INPO aspect | CO.2 |
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Finding - Quad Cities - IR 05000254/2008003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Quad Cities) @ 2008Q2
Self-Identified List (Quad Cities)
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