05000245/LER-1981-032, Forwards LER 81-032/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

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Forwards LER 81-032/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted
ML20011A693
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 10/21/1981
From: Mroczka E
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20011A694 List:
References
MP-1-1930, NUDOCS 8110290297
Download: ML20011A693 (3)


LER-1981-032, Forwards LER 81-032/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted
Event date:
Report date:
2451981032R00 - NRC Website

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October 21, 1981 MP-1-1930 qs_ sl/ 4 Mr. Ronald C.,Haynes NL Director, Ragion I 8g Og g 8 JggI

  • 2 Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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'4c King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 7

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Reference:

Facility Operating License No. DPR-21 ui Docket No. 50-245 Reportable Occurrence R0-81-32/3L

Dear Mr. Haynes:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence R0-81-32/3L required to be submitted within 30 days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b.

An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY E.

. Mroczka Station Superintendent Millstone Nuclear Power Station EJM/TST:jf

Attachment:

LER R0-81-32/3L cc:

Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. (30)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control, Washington, D. C. (3)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch, Washington, D. C.

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' ATTACHMENT TO LFR 81-32/3L NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1-

- PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-21 L

DOCKET NUMBER 50-245

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Identification of Occurrence Operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for oper' tion-a occurred when the diesel fire pump failed to start.

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Conditions Prior to Occurrence s.

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Prior to occurrence the unit was operating at a steady state power level df 100 percent.

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Description of Occurrence e

On September 25, 1981, at 1030 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91915e-4 months <br />, while performing Fire Pumps Auto Start,

, i Test, the diesel fire pump failed to auto-start at the start pressure settihg of 75 pounds per square inch. Technica1 Specification 3.12.A.1 requires fire suppression. water system to be operable at all times with thye high pressure pumps supplying water to the system.

The-diesel fire, mump is gne of the three

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high pressure pumps required.to be cperable.

r Designetion of Apparent Cause of Occurrence Investigation revealed that the mercoid switch detecting fire water header" 5J' j

pressure did close at the desired setpint of 75 pounds per square inch.

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signal, however, never reached the start relay.

Failure of the controller prevented the start relay from picking up and starting the diesel engine

[, -. ' s Inspection of the controller showed no evidence of mechanical failure.

Presently the cause of the temporary failure is not determined.

s Analysis of Occurrence The operability of the fire suppression sy. stem ensures that adaq'uate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguishMees, occurring in any part of the facility where safety-related equipment is located.

Three

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high pressure pumps (two electric and one diesel) supply the fire system with the necessary pressure to maintain system reliability and requirements.

Failure of the diesel fire pump to start did not result in a condition that had not been previously analyzed.

Both electric fire pumps were found to be 1

operable and would have supplied the fire suppression system with water pressure.-

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Corrective Action

The controller was. disassembled for cleaning of the control relays, control:

relay, pins and all the contacts in the selector switch.

The surveillance was then performed successfully.

- Additionally,the preventive maintenance program was updated to include cleaning.

of'the' switch and relay contacts.every six months.

The controller,-a Universal Model DU, manufactured by Master. Control System Inc., experienced a similar problem June 6, 1975.

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