05000282/FIN-2017004-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | Prairie Island TS LCO 3.0.3 requires, in part, that when an LCO is not met and an associated ACTION is not provided, action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place the unit in MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.Contrary to the above, at 1556 hours0.018 days <br />0.432 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.92058e-4 months <br /> on May 4, 2016, the licensee failed to place Unit 2 in MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> due to no associated ACTION provided within TS 3.6.5, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems for two containment cooling trains not OPERABLE. Specifically, between May 4 and May 5, 2016, operators failed to recognize that with the ongoing unplanned inoperability of the 122 control room chiller, and the subsequent unplanned inoperability of the A train #23 CFCU, the 122 control room chiller was a required support system for the B train #22 and #24 CFCUs. Therefore, with both of the Unit 2 CFCU trains inoperable, LCO 3.0.3 was required to be entered to place Unit 2 in Mode 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. Because the supported system TS applicability was not recognized, LCO 3.0.3 was not entered as required and both trains of Unit 2 CFCUs were inoperable for approximately 35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br />.Because the inspectors answered No to questions B.1 and B.2 under Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green). The issue was entered into the licensees CAP as CAP 501000002726. Corrective actions included re-assessing shared system LCOs between Units 1 and 2, revising the LCO tracking database, implementing new standards for LCO 3.0.6 applications, and revisions to the Safety Function Determination Program. |
Site: | Prairie Island |
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Report | IR 05000282/2017004 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2017 (2017Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | L Haeg P Laflamme N Shah J Bozga P Zurawski K Barclay E Fernandez J Mancuso S Bell M Garza R Baker K Riemer |
Violation of: | Technical Specification |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000282/2017004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2017Q4
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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