|Entered date||Event description|
|ENS 54997||15 November 2020 06:11:00||At 0144 EST on November 15, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power and Unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) system occurred while transferring the 2A-A 6.9 kV Shutdown Board (SDBD) from the maintenance feed to its normal power supply. The reason for the 2A-A 6.9 kV SDBD failing to transfer to the normal power supply is under investigation. The EDGs automatically started as designed when the valid actuation signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the EDGs. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 54776||13 July 2020 17:10:00||On July 13, 2020 at 0831 (EDT), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined an SNC supervisory personnel failed their fitness for duty test. The employee has been removed from the site and their access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 54573||7 March 2020 13:38:00||On March 7th, Kumar and Associates, Inc. (Denver) License No. CO 778-01 reported a stolen truck at gunpoint from the technician. The truck had on board a Troxler 3440 series nuclear density gauge with a standard load of not more than 333 MBq (9 mCi) of cesium-137 and 1.63 GBq (44 mCi) of americium-241: beryllium; or 2.44 MBq (66 microCi) of californium-252. The event took place in Lakewood, Colorado. The Lakewood police have been notified and they are aware that the truck has a density gauge on board. The police department is currently searching for the truck. This event is still ongoing. Colorado Report ID Number: CO200016 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
|ENS 54767||9 July 2020 16:17:00||The following is a summary of information received from Piezotech, LLC: Piezotech possessed and used source material, in the form of depleted uranium, without applying for and receiving a specific license in accordance with 10 CFR 40.31. The depleted uranium was used to manufacture piezoelectric ceramics which contained an "Unimportant Quantity" of depleted uranium as defined in 10 CFR 40.13(c)(2)(ii). Piezotech transferred the piezoelectric ceramics to several customers without first applying for and receiving a license for initial transfer of items containing source material in accordance with 10 CFR 40.52 and did not file initial transfer reports as required by 10 CFR 40.53. Piezotech suspects that a formulation to manufacture piezoceramics, named K180, was developed in the 1970s or 1980s. K180 uses depleted uranium as one of the doping materials in the manufacture of piezoceramics. The formulation uses an amount of depleted uranium that is less than 1 percent by weight. In January of 2020, an engineer raised a concern to Piezotech's General Manager and to its Compliance Director that the company may need an NRC license to use depleted uranium in making the K180 piezoceramic. A review of NRC regulations showed that this was the case and at that time all activity regarding K180 was halted. All material used in K180 manufacturing and all existing inventory and intermediate stage materials were segregated from manufacturing and the container of depleted uranium was secured in a locked cabinet where it currently remains. In February 2020, Piezotech commissioned a radiation survey of the facility and sampling occurred in all areas where K180 and its component materials were stored or processed. This survey indicated that all processing areas were at background radiation levels and all areas where the depleted uranium and K180 ceramics had been stored were below the annual exposure levels for untrained personnel. Piezotech has decided to discontinue manufacturing the K180 material. The depleted uranium will remain sealed in the original container and shipping crate, having all the original markings and labels and secured in a locked flameproof cabinet. Piezotech is making arrangements with an appropriately licensed facility for the proper disposal of the remaining depleted uranium and intermediate stage and finished K180 product. If in the future Piezotech decides to resume manufacturing the K180 material or any material using NRC regulated substances, Piezotech will apply for the required licenses and will not initiate any regulated manufacturing or sales activities until all applicable licenses have bee issued. For further information, contact: John Churchill Piezotech Compliance Director Phone: (301) 216-3002 FAX: (301) 330-8873|
|ENS 54366||2 November 2019 23:03:00||At 1515 on November 2, 2019, the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) was declared inoperable due to a Low Head Safety Injection relief valve discharging to the Safeguards Sump during routine surveillance testing. The leakage from the Low Head Safety Injection system in conjunction with a postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA) Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) with transfer to Safety Injection Recirculation may result in dose exceeding the Dose Analysis of the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) and the Control Room, which is common to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. This condition may not be bounded by existing design and licensing documents; however, it poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The Low Head Safety Injection relief valve has been isolated to prevent further leakage, and makeup to the RWST completed. At 1602 on November 2, 2019 the RWST was declared Operable. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), (C), (D) as an Unanalyzed Condition and a condition that could have prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function." The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.|
|ENS 54368||3 November 2019 00:00:00|
The following was received from the Mississippi Division of Radiological Health via phone: A radiographer was exposed to a 100 Curie Ir-192 source for 8 minutes while changing film during a radiography shot. The radiographer was not wearing dosimetry and did not have a hand held radiation meter. While changing film, the radiographer realized the source had not been retracted and left the area. This was not an equipment malfunction, and the source was retracted when it was realized that the radiographer had been exposed. The radiographer reported the event to the Mistras Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). Estimated dose is 20 Rem to the hands and 19.6 to 19.7 Rem whole body. The radiographer was sent to a local hospital for bloodwork.
(A state of Mississippi Health Physicist investigator) interviewed the RSO on 11/7/2019 and investigated the incident. After reviewing and questioning the incident details, (the investigator) found the following evidence that may determine this may not have been an overexposure. The assistant radiographer retracted the source, but did not perform the bump test to fully retract the source into the locked position. This caused the assistant radiographer to believe the source was still in the collimator. When returning to change the film, he saw the red button on the camera instead of green which would indicate the source was in the locked position. The assistant was not using dosimetry, rate alarm or survey instrumentation. He appears to have panicked, came down the ladder, and couldn't get the crank to move in. The lead radiographer then grabbed the crank and cranked out and back in immediately to fully retract the source into the camera. (The investigator) reviewed compliant leak tests of camera and wipes along with maintenance and service reports before and after the incident and the RSO could not replicate any problems that would prevent them from retracting the source. There was no malfunction with the camera or the cranks. It appears that the source was in the end of the camera but not in the fully shielded position, which could allow some radiation out of the tube that the source enters. However, we do not know how much because the assistant was not wearing any dosimetry. The other assistant's dosimetry (assistant radiographer 2) only picked up 1 milliRem of dose but he was approximately 25 ft. away with steel shielding from the tank they were working on in between him and the source. (The investigator is) waiting on the emergency reading of the doses recorded on the OSL badges used by the crew and follow up doctor's visit. (The investigator) interviewed (the assistant radiographer on) 11/8/2019 at 1549 CST. (The assistant radiographer) reports that he had more blood drawn today and will provide results next week. He said he feels great and has had no sickness such as nausea, pain or redness and swelling in the hands. Will update again next week after receiving lab results.
(A state of Mississippi Health Physicist investigator) interviewed the assistant radiographer (who was not wearing dosimetry) on 11/12/2019. (The assistant radiographer) reported that lab was drawn on 11/3/2019 and 11/8/2019. Both labs results returned within normal limits and (the assistant radiographer) has no physical symptoms of radiation sickness. (The assistant radiographer) remains at regular work duties recommended in his physician reports that he provided to (the investigator). (The RSO) was interviewed on 11/11/2019 and provided the Landauer dosimetry report for the three RT crew members. The crew received new dosimeters on 11/1/2019 and they were sent for an emergency read the day after the incident. (The) lead radiographer received 109 milliRem, (assistant radiographer 2 who was wearing dosimetry) received 269 milliRem and (the assistant radiographer) received 150 milliRem although he was not wearing his dosimeter during this incident. (The assistant radiographer) is also on UT and other duties until the end of the year until his new annual dose limit year starts January 1, 2020. This is upon the recommendation of (the investigator) because although it has been determined that (the assistant radiographer) did not receive an over exposure equaling or exceeding the 15 to 25 RAD to cause radiation sickness, it does not rule out if he did or did not exceed his 5 rem TEDE. The licensee's personnel believe that the source was in the end of the camera, but not in the fully locked position because the red button was showing on the QSA 880 camera when (the assistant radiographer) returned from changing the digital film plate. Due to his elevation up on the tank and the tank shielding we cannot use any of the other crew members dosimetry to make any determinations. However based on the medical reports and physical evidence it appears that (the assistant radiographer) has no physical symptoms from radiation sickness. (The assistant radiographer) will have his last lab test on 11/22/2019, if it is normal, (the assistant radiographer) states that the physician intends to release him completely from all medical care related to this incident. Notified the R4DO (O'Keefe) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
As the investigation continued (a state of Mississippi Health Investigator) reviewed additional information received throughout the day on 11/18/2019, but sufficient time did not exist to thoroughly review the latest findings to include them on the 11/19/2019 update. The current additional findings are as follows: (the state of Mississippi Health Physicist Investigator) Re interviewed all personnel again, and requested all lab results and Physician findings from (the assistant radiographer). (The assistant radiographer) willingly provided all CBC and cytogenetic lab test results that were taken on 11/3/2019, 11/8/2019, and 11/22/2019. (The assistant radiographer) stated that the physician reported the lab results to be within normal limits and the physician released (the assistant radiographer) from medical care on 11/22/2019 that had resulted from this incident. (The state of Mississippi Health Physicist Investigator) also found during the second interview of personnel that the films that were with (the assistant radiographer) and located on the pipe during the 8 minutes that it took (the assistant radiographer) to change out the film were processed later and were acceptable images. (The state of Mississippi Health Physicist Investigator) attached the images in the file as evidence to support that (the assistant radiographer) was not overexposed. If the films had been exposed with an open source out for 8 minutes they would be blacked out from overexposure. The original exposure time to produce the radiograph with the film combination, distance and thickness of steel for this job was 1 minute. Even with digital radiography, an image receptor plate can be overexposed beyond acceptable exposure limits, and cannot be window leveled to make it an acceptable image, but this was not the case. The radiographer and RSO reported that an attempt to crank out and retract the source was made by each assistant and the radiographer when trying to retract the source after (the assistant radiographer) returned down the ladder. This would explain why the images produced were acceptable radiographs. There had been enough exposure to properly expose the film but not overexpose it. This appears to support the possibility that the source was not out the entire 8 minutes while (the assistant radiographer) was changing the film and moving the source tube on the jig. At this point (the assistant radiographer) was also down the ladder 25 feet away with the other radiographers who were wearing the required dosimetry behind the shielding of the tank. Three (3) violations were issued and corrective actions have been submitted to the Mississippi Division of Radiological Health All records are included in the 2019 Incident file at the Mississippi State Department of Health Division of Radiological Health. (The state of Mississippi Health Physicist Investigator) considers this investigation and incident closed. If you require any further information, documentation or have questions, please contact (The state of Mississippi Health Physicist Investigator). Mississippi Incident No.: MS-190005, NMED #190535 Notified the R4DO (Taylor) and NMSS (via email).
A review of the incident details represented a 'substantial potential for an exposure in excess of 10 CFR 20.' However, there was not enough evidence to definitively prove there was an overexposure due to the details listed throughout this investigation. These included the assistant who was allegedly overexposed. This individual never experienced any signs of radiation sickness or erythema or redness to the hands throughout the investigation period to its close date on 12/3/2019. None of the other crew members' dosimeter readings exceeded occupational dose limits. On 12/2/2019, Mistras also requested anonymity for the individuals involved in this incident. All documentation concerning this incident investigation is stored in Mississippi State Department of Radiological Health 2019 Incident File, under incident Report No. MS-190005. NMED #190535 Notified the R4DO (Taylor) and NMSS (via email).
|ENS 54091||26 May 2019 09:25:00||This is a 4-hour Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) notification due to a Plant Protection System (PPS) actuation. Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, automatically tripped from 100 percent power at 0512 CDT. The reactor automatically tripped due to 2P-32B Reactor Coolant Pump tripping as a result of grounding. No additional equipment issues were noted. All control rods fully inserted. Emergency Feedwater (EFW) actuated and was utilized to maintain Steam Generator (SG) levels. The EFW actuation meets the 8-hour Non-Emergency Immediate Notification Criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). No Primary safety valves lifted. Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) did lift initially after the trip. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dump valves to the main condenser. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Unit 1 was not affected by the transient on Unit 2. The licensee notified the State of Arkansas.|
|ENS 54089||25 May 2019 00:30:00||A licensed employee was determined to be under the influence of alcohol during a random (fitness-for-duty) test. The employee's access to the plant has been canceled. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
|ENS 53752||25 November 2018 02:47:00|
EN Revision Text: LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE DUE TO DOOR FAILURE On 11/24/18 at 2015 EST, a loss of Control Room Envelope (CRE) was declared due to failure of the control room boundary door, 204-36-008. (Abnormal Operating Procedure 8588A Mitigating Actions for Control Boundary Breach was implemented). The door was repaired at 2030 EST, restoring CRE to operable (status). A mechanical failure of the control room door latch prevented the door from closing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The purpose of this call is to retract a report made on November 25, 2018, NRC Event Number EN53752. NRC Event Report number EN53752 describes a condition at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) in which a control room envelope boundary door was discovered to not be able to fully close due to the latching mechanism being stuck in the extended position. The condition was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) via an 8-hour prompt report as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Upon further review, MPS2 determined that there was no loss of safety function. An engineering evaluation determined that even with the control room boundary door unable to be fully closed due to the latching mechanism being stuck in the extended position, control room air in-leakage would not have been sufficient to prevent the control room emergency ventilation system from performing its safety function. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number EN53752 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion has been provided to the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Carfang).
|ENS 53750||22 November 2018 03:56:00|
EN Revision Text: HPCI UNEXPECTEDLY TRANSFERRED TO ALTERNATE SUCTION SOURCE DURING TESTING At 2125 (CST) on 11/21/2018, it was discovered that U1 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. During performance of a routine surveillance, HPCI automatically transferred from its normal suction source to the alternate suction source. The control room operator then manually tripped the HPCI turbine. HPCI was already inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) 3.5.1, ECCS Operating, Condition C during performance of the surveillance. However, this condition was not expected nor induced by the testing. There was no impact to the safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. CR 1469109 documents this condition in the Corrective Action Program.
ENS Event Number 53750, made on November 22, 2018, is being retracted. NRC notification 53750 was made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) were met when the licensee discovered an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. During performance of a routine surveillance, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically transferred from its normal suction source to the alternate suction source. As a result, Unit 1 HPCI was declared inoperable. On December 20, 2018, a Past Operability Evaluation was completed which determined that the HPCI System remained operable. The evaluation determined that the HPCI System could have performed its specified safety function of vessel injection throughout the time that the suction path was aligned to the torus. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). TVA's evaluation of this event is documented in the Corrective Action Program in Condition Report 1469109. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).
|ENS 53393||8 May 2018 10:38:00||On May 8, 2018 at 0139 Central Daylight Time, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 declared containment inoperable due to total containment leak rate greater than technical specifications. The 1B containment cooler had seat leakage of approximately 30 gallons per minute from a service water drain valve. Though the containment cooler service water supply is not tested per the Appendix J program, a loss of the containment barrier is possible under accident conditions. The service water flow path to the 1B containment cooler has been isolated to exit the condition. The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.|
|ENS 53388||7 May 2018 16:31:00||On May 7, 2018, during an engineering review of mission time requirements for Technical Specification related equipment, a deficiency was discovered regarding the Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) guidance for natural circulation cooldown with a stagnant loop. This condition could be the result of a postulated Main Steam Line Break with a loss of offsite power. During a natural circulation cooldown with a faulted steam generator, flow in the stagnant reactor coolant system (RCS) loop associated with the isolated faulted steam generator (SG) could stagnate and result in elevated temperatures in that loop. This becomes an issue when RCS depressurization to residual heat removal system (RHR) entry conditions is attempted. The liquid in the stagnant loop will flash to steam and prevent RCS depressurization. In this condition, the time required to complete the cooldown would be sufficiently long that the nitrogen accumulators associated with Callaway's atmospheric steam dumps and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump flow control valves would be exhausted. The atmospheric steam dumps and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump would not be capable of performing their specified safety functions of cooling the plant to entry conditions for RHR operation. This issue has been analyzed by Westinghouse in WCAP-16632-P. This WCAP determined that to prevent loop stagnation, the RCS cooldown rate in these conditions should be limited to a rate dependent on the temperature differential present in the active loops. The WCAP analysis was used to support a revision to the generic Emergency Response Guideline (ERG) for ES-0.2 "Natural Circulation Cooldown." Figure 1 in ES-0.2 provides a curve of the maximum allowable cooldown rate as a function of active loop temperature differential which is directly proportional to the level of core decay heat. At the time of discovery of this condition, Callaway's EOP structure did not ensure that the ES-0.2 guidance would be implemented for a natural circulation cooldown with a stagnant loop. Callaway has issued interim guidance to the on-shift personnel regarding this concern and is in the process of revising the applicable EOPs. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) Shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) Remove residual heat, or (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this condition.|
|ENS 53230||27 February 2018 01:15:00||At 2247 Eastern (Standard) Time the Unit 1 Control Room was notified of a personnel injury in the Unit 1 lower containment. Unit 1 is currently in Mode 1 at 100 (percent) (Reactor) Power and the individual was working in lower containment. The individual's injury appears to be Heat Exhaustion. Site emergency medical technicians responded to the scene and the individual was transported to a local medical facility via ambulance. At the time of transport, the individual was considered to be potentially contaminated because complete surveys could not be performed while the individual was immobilized for transfer. The individual and clothing were surveyed at the hospital by a resident Radiation Protection Technician and no contamination was found. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii), 'Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 53229||25 February 2018 11:24:00||A non-licensed employee was found in violation of the sites Fitness for Duty Policy. The employee's access authorization to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 53090||25 November 2017 06:02:00|
At 0238 (CST) a manual reactor scram was inserted by placing the Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown. At 0149 (CST), with reactor power just above the point of adding heat, IRM (Intermediate Range Monitor) channels A, C, and D received a spurious upscale trip signal which immediately cleared. Upon investigation, operability of RPS (Reactor Protection System) scram function for Intermediate Range Detectors was placed in question. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), when the reactor is critical. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 0238 (CST) a manual reactor scram was inserted by placing the Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown. At 0149 (CST), with reactor power just above the point of adding heat, Intermediate Range Monitor neutron flux detector (IRM) channels A, C, and D received a spurious Upscale Trip signal which immediately cleared. Upon investigation, IRM channels A, C, and D were declared Inoperable. IRM G was already Inoperable for another reason. RPS scram function from IRM channels B, E, F, and H was always Operable and available. That event is being reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), when the reactor is critical. This Revised Statement to Event Notification # 53090 is being made to make it clear that only four IRM channels (A, C, D, G) were Inoperable and that the IRM RPS SCRAM function was still available from the four remaining Operable IRM channels (B, E, F, and H). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (O'Keefe)
On 11/25/17, at 0149 (CST), with reactor power just above the point of adding heat, Intermediate Range Monitor neutron flux detector (IRM) channels A, C, and D received a spurious Upscale Trip signal which immediately cleared. Upon investigation, IRM channels A, C, and D were declared Inoperable. IRM G was already Inoperable for another reason. At 0238 (CST) a manual reactor scram was inserted by placing the Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown. RPS scram function from IRM channels B, E, F, and H was always Operable and available. That event was initially being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), when the reactor is critical. After the trip alarms were received, the Operators spent approximately twenty minutes investigating possible causes and implications, and consulted with Reactor Engineering and the Shift Technical Advisor. The investigation showed that the plant was stable and the upscale IRM alarms were spurious. A review of plant technical specifications by the operators determined that a plant shutdown was not required. After further discussions, Operations concluded that a shutdown to allow further investigation of the issue was the prudent course of action. Prior to shutting down, Operations spent approximately twenty minutes reviewing procedures, notifying personnel to exit containment, and conducting a brief. The shutdown was then conducted by inserting a manual reactor scram by placing the reactor mode switch in SHUTDOWN. This was initially reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the RPS. Based on the sequence of events, and Operator actions in conducting the shutdown, the event is considered 'part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation' as specified in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). In accordance with NUREG-1022, Section 3.2.6, the event is not reportable as an actuation of RPS. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Taylor).
|ENS 53089||23 November 2017 02:54:00|
On November 22, 2017, at 2043 (CST), Unit I MCC (Motor Control Center) 18/19-5 overvoltage relay target was found actuated and would not reset. MCC 18/19-5 was powered from the normal feed, Bus 19. Bus 19 voltages were verified to be normal. The overvoltage relay actuation would result in MCC 18/19-5 being de-energized in the event of a DBA LOCA (Design Basis Accident Loss of Coolant Accident) in which the 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator fails to energize Bus 18, therefore rendering both divisions of the Low Pressure Cooling Injection (LPCI) mode of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system inoperable. Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition E was entered, requiring restoration of LPCI in 72 hours. The overvoltage target was subsequently able to be reset at 2114 (CST), restoring the LPCI function of RHR. Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition E was exited at that time. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The purpose of this notification today (01/11/18) is to retract the ENS Report made on November 23, 2017 at 0248 hours EST (ENS Report #53089). Upon further review, it was determined that the Unit 1 MCC 18/19-5 overvoltage relay target that was found actuated and would initially not reset was caused only by intermittent degraded DC control power. During this event, MCC 18/19-5 remained powered from the normal feed Bus 19, and Bus 19 voltages were verified to be normal. It was further determined from plant drawings that under this condition the degraded DC control power to the Unit 1 MCC 18/19-5 overvoltage relay has no impact to the Technical Specification 3.5.1 required capability to auto transfer power from the normal Bus 19 to the alternate Bus 18 should Bus 19 lose power such as during a DBA LOCA. This overvoltage relay was installed in the early 1990's only to support enhanced reliability of the power supply to the LPCI injection valves, and its actuation due to degraded DC control power would not impact the ability to auto transfer to alternate Bus 18. Therefore, both divisions of the Low Pressure Cooling Injection (LPCI) mode of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system would have remained fully operable under the as-found relay condition, and Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition E was not required to be entered. On December 6, 2017, it was determined that a loose fuse clip terminal had caused the DC control power to the overvoltage relay to become degraded which in turn caused the relay target and its reset to become erratic. This fuse clip terminal was repaired on December 6, 2017. Based on the subsequent reviews of this event, the LPCI system was not required to be declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications 3.5.1 during the period of the MCC 18/19-5 overvoltage relay actuation (i.e., 31 minutes on 11/22/17), and hence was not required to be reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. Therefore, based on this information, ENS Report #53089 is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. R3DO(Jeffers) has been notified.
|ENS 53015||14 October 2017 16:37:00||At approximately 19:48 Mountain Standard Time on October 13, 2017, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) staff confirmed a non-licensed supervisor tested positive for drugs during a random 'Fitness for Duty' test. The person's access authorization was terminated in accordance with station procedures. The NRC resident inspector has been notified by the licensee.|
|ENS 53008||11 October 2017 11:16:00||The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Service via email: On October 10, 2017, the Agency had an alarm system breach at 1135 CDT. Security called our program stating the alarm to the source room was alarming. I went down to the room to check it out. I checked the door and it was locked, turned off the alarm system by entering the code, and called the security company and provided information to stop law enforcement from responding to the location. The postal service technician was next door and I asked her who opened the door, she said the contractors asked her to open the door and she stated she went to building operations office and got the key and opened the door for the contractors. And she said when the alarm went off, the door was closed and security guard was informed. That is when our program received the call to go down there. An investigator from our program stayed with the contractors and set the alarm when they were finished. A complete investigation will be completed. Investigation ongoing. Update will be provided in accordance with SA300. Texas Incident#: I-9516|
|ENS 52977||19 September 2017 13:16:00|
The following information was received via fax: On September 19, 2017, the (Alabama Department of Public Health) received a phone call from Schlumberger, stating that they had failed to notify the Agency (Alabama Department of Public Health) upon entering the State, to perform a job on September 13, 2017, and that two sources (Cf-252 - 18.3 mCi and Cs-137 - 1.78 Ci) are stuck down hole. Schlumberger stated that the first fishing attempt had failed to recover the sources, and the second attempt is now underway. Gathering information is continuing. Alabama Incident: #17-26
On September 24, 2017, after several days of fishing for the logging tools, all recovery attempts had been unsuccessful and the sources were cemented in place down hole. The licensee will follow up with a written report and a picture of the plaque to be placed on the well head. Notified R1DO (Bower) and NMSS Events Notification via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9)
|ENS 52978||19 September 2017 16:54:00|
The following information was received from the State of Florida via email: (The State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control) received a call from (the licensee) RSO to report a stolen Troxler gauge. An employee from GFA International had the gauge stolen from the back of his truck while at a convenience store. Awaiting the police report for more information. The stolen gauge is a Troxler Moisture Density Model 3430, S/N 29415, containing two sources; 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am241/Be.
The following information was received from the State of Florida via email: (The State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control) received a call from (the licensee RSO) to report that the gauge has been found. A contractor onsite found the gauge on 9/19 and secured it until (the licensee RSO) could be located and took possession of the gauge on 9/20. The case has a small crack, but all radiation readings are normal. Incident Number: FL17-256 Notified R1DO (Kennedy) and NMSS Events Notification via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
|ENS 52975||18 September 2017 20:08:00||The following is a report emailed from the California Department of Public Health, Radiologic Health Branch (RHB): On 09/18/17, RHB received a call from an employee at an unlicensed facility (Clorox Company) in Fairfield, CA, regarding recovery of a lost/stolen moisture density gauge. The gauge is a Troxler Model 3450, S/N 1083 gauge containing approximately 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241. On Sunday afternoon (09/17/17) one of the Clorox employees noticed a locked container left on the side of the street in front of their facility. On Monday (9/18/17) morning, the locked container was noticed to have been moved farther from the road and closer to their facility. Clorox called Troxler and Fairfield Police, but neither could pick up the container. The Clorox employee then contacted RHB, and received instruction on how to safely store the container until RHB arrives at the facility. RHB picked up the gauge the same day and brought it back to the storage facility at the Richmond Regional office. A survey performed by RHB at the Clorox facility using a Thermo Scientific Rad Eye B20, S/N 30744, calibrated 03/09/17, indicated 0.4 mR/hr at one meter, which is a typical reading for a moisture density gauge in its transportation container. The type A transportation container appeared to be in good condition and was locked with two padlocks. RHB had the padlocks cut, and located a copy of a license indicating the gauge belongs to RMA Group in Rancho Cordova, CA (License # 7565-34). RHB has not received any notification from the licensee regarding a lost or stolen gauge. RHB will be contacting the licensee to follow up on this incident. California 5010 Number: 091817 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
|ENS 52865||20 July 2017 13:30:00||In order to address the concerns outlined in RIS 2015-06 'TORNADO MISSILE PROTECTION,' an evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and their potential impact on Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment was conducted. This evaluation concluded that the following Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) are potentially vulnerable to tornado generated missiles: The Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Fuel Oil Storage Tanks (FOST) (DB-Tl53-l, DB-T-153-2) support the EDG operation for 7 days. The vents on the FOST are necessary to support the transfer of fuel from the FOST to the EDG day tank. These vents are not protected and are vulnerable to a potential tornado-generated missile impact. This postulated strike could impact fuel transfer to the EDG day tank and, therefore does not support operability of both EDGs for Technical Specification 3.8.1. Tornado generated missiles striking the FOST vent piping could potentially affect pump performance and challenge the structural integrity of the tank. This would render both the FOST and corresponding EDG inoperable. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The potential vulnerabilities for the FOST vents (as discussed above) are being addressed in accordance with NRC EGM-15-002 Revision 1 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 NRC enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents. Immediate compensatory measures were taken to mitigate the potential consequences of an onsite tornado generated missile impact on the FOST vents. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
|ENS 52866||20 July 2017 15:40:00||At 1730 on 19 July 2017, HM-15 aircraft 13 had the Main Rotor Fairing, commonly referred to as the 'beanie', depart in flight. The 'beanie' cover is constructed of fiberglass, is circular in shape and 5 feet in diameter, weighing approximately 20 pounds. In addition to the beanie, we discovered that one of the In-flight Blade Inspection System (IBIS) Indicators also departed the aircraft. Loss of this IBIS Indicator is of concern because it contains strontium-90 which is radioactive material. Loss of this IBIS Indicator was not discovered until the aircraft shutdown on its line at Naval Station Norfolk. Location lost: Approximately 100 miles west of Norfolk, VA over the Roanoke River near Lake Gaston. The location is just north of the Virginia / North Carolina border over the Roanoke River approximately 3 miles east of the Kerr Lake Power Plant. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
|ENS 52624||20 March 2017 04:40:00||On March 20, 2017 at 0227, Nine Mile Point Unit1 was manually scrammed due to pressure oscillations. The Unit was offline and reactor shutdown was in-progress at the time of the scram. The scram was inserted at approximately 4% reactor power when pressure oscillations occurred exceeding the procedurally required limit for pressure oscillations. The cause of the scram was due to Operators manually inserting the scram. The cause of the pressure oscillations is being investigated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Gray).|
|ENS 52628||22 March 2017 08:10:00|
A PET scan was administered to a patient even though a CT scan was ordered by the prescribing physician. Initially the prescribing physician ordered a PET scan, but changed the order to a CT scan. An administrative error resulted in the order change not being implemented to reflect the change to a CT scan. The patient was provided all release forms for the PET scan and was aware that a PET scan was being administered. The patient received 1R of exposure. There was no harm to the patient.
The licensee has determined that this event did not meet reporting requirements. The licensee notified Region 3 (Craffey). Notified R3DO (Orlikowski) and NMSS Events Resource via email. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
|ENS 52073||8 July 2016 08:48:00||Oil reported in the vicinity of the station's circulating water system effluent after the start of 3rd circulating water pump. The source of the oil is believed to be from oil entrained in the discharge canal from oil leak previously reported in EN#52045. One circulating water pump was removed from service to mitigate the source. The United States Coast Guard Response Center, and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation have been notified. James A. Fitzpatrick Control Room was notified of the issue at 0645, off site agencies were first notified at 0743. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, and FEMA.|
|ENS 51932||16 May 2016 02:02:00|
At 0300 EDT on May 16, 2016, Seabrook Station's seismic monitoring instrumentation will be removed from service for a planned upgrade to the Seismic Monitoring Control Panel and its accelerometers. Modifications are expected to be complete on May 27, 2016. Proceduralized compensatory measures are in place and have been communicated to applicable emergency response decision makers. This preplanned action is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
At 2045 EDT on 5/26/16, the seismic monitoring system was returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl).
|ENS 51506||29 October 2015 10:38:00||At 0348 CDT, while Point Beach Unit 2 was performing outage activities, it experienced a Main Power Transformer lockout and associated loss of busses (2A-01, 2A-02, 2B-01 and 2B-02). The loss of the two non-vital 4160 V buses resulted in actuation of the Unit 2 undervoltage logic which resulted in actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The Auxiliary Feedwater System functioned normally upon actuation. This condition was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)(6), PWR auxiliary or emergency feedwater system actuation. This event did not affect the operating Unit 1. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 51345||26 August 2015 09:45:00||At 05:48 (EDT) BVPS (Beaver Valley Power Station) received notification that siren #6, Potter Township Municipal Building, was sounding intermittently. The fire department activation cable to the siren was severed by a motor vehicle. The ENS activation function remains functional. This event is reportable as a 4-hour Non-Emergency Notification 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'a News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency.' The Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 51137||8 June 2015 00:45:00|
At 2359 EDT on June 7, 2015, the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station declared a Notice of Unusual Event in accordance with Emergency Action Level HU4 for a fire in the protected area lasting greater than 15 minutes. The fire started in the wiring of a terminal box for Electro Hydraulic Pump C, the running pump located in the turbine building. The running pump was then deenergized by operators and the standby pump started. The site fire brigade responded and extinguished the fire. The emergency was terminated at 0030 on June 8, 2015. The licensee notified state and local agencies and will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, and FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA via email.
The notification of an Unusual Event is being retracted because the event did not meet the definition of 'fire' in NEI 99-01 Revision 5, 'Methodology of the Development of Emergency Action Levels'. The document was endorsed by the NRC on February 22, 2008 (see ADAMS ascension # ML080450149) and is part of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station's current licensing basis. Per the guidance, a 'fire' is defined as: 'Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute as 'fires'. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.' According to eyewitness reports from personnel, flames were not observed at any time and evidence of large quantities of heat and smoke were not observed. Additionally, the definition of 'fire' specifically excludes overheated electrical equipment. This information leads to the conclusion that the event did not meet the definition of a 'fire' per NEI 99-01 Revision 5. Therefore, the event is not an immediately reportable Unusual Event under 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the state and local governments. Notified the R4DO (Haire) and NRR EO (Morris via e-mail).
|ENS 51135||7 June 2015 05:46:00|
An individual approached the protected area and grabbed the fence. Local law enforcement assistance has been requested. The Security Team leader does not consider this to be hostile. An emergency declaration was made based on HU4.1, for a security condition that does not involve a hostile action. The licensee notified state and local agencies and informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, and FEMA NWC and NuclearSSA via email.
The individual was taken into custody without incident. Notified R2DO (Rose), NRR EO (Morris), and IRD (GOTT). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, and Nuclear SSA via email.
Update to correct description of where the individual was apprehended.
An individual approached the outside of the administrative fence near the circulating water intake structure. Local law enforcement assistance was requested. The Security Team Leader does not consider this to be hostile.
This declaration was made based on HU 4.1, a security condition that does not involve Hostile Action.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R2DO (Rose).
|ENS 50999||21 April 2015 12:06:00||Clinton Power Station (CPS) has completed a review of the station seismic monitor performance. The CPS seismic monitor laptop is currently operable; however, this review identified 3 times in the last 3 years that the seismic monitoring laptop was declared non-functional such that the capability to perform an EAL assessment in accordance with the Radiological Emergency Plan Annex would be adversely impacted. A loss of the seismic laptop computer prevents active seismic data from processing through the central recording unit and will not alarm in the main control room. The seismic monitor laptop became non-functional and unresponsive on the following dates: 1) January 4, 2013 2) July 19, 2013 3) November 2, 2014 The loss of assessment capability is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) This report is required per 10 CFR 50.72(1)(1)(ii) as an event that occurred within 3 years of the date of discovery. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Valos).|
|ENS 50519||8 October 2014 15:39:00||INPO-IER-L4-14-33 (Direct Current Circuits Challenge Appendix R Fire Analysis) was reviewed to determine applicability to ANO Unit 1 & 2. It was determined that 2P-21, Turbine Generator Emergency Seal Oil Pump, control cables are not fused and are routed through multiple fire zones containing safe shutdown equipment. A potential fire induced cable failure in any of these fire zones could result in a secondary fire or damage adjacent cables along the path of the unprotected cable. The concern is that under fire safe shutdown conditions, it is postulated that a fire in one zone can cause short circuits potentially resulting in secondary fires or cable failures in other fire zones where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. This condition is reportable as an 8-hour ENS report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected zones of the plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 49719||13 January 2014 09:24:00||The normal ventilation high range process radiation monitor, 3HVR*10A, was removed for service for planned maintenance. The radiation monitor will be returned to service following maintenance. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 49718||13 January 2014 03:28:00||A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Action 8.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 49714||11 January 2014 03:33:00||At 0205 CST (on 1/11/14), Xcel Energy Environmental Services made a report to the State of Minnesota due to cooling water return to the Mississippi River via the plants discharge canal dropping by more than 5 degrees F in an hour. The cause of the temperature drop was due to an emergent reduction in reactor power and generator load in response to a degrading condenser vacuum. This notification is being made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) based on a notification to another Government Agency. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 49710||10 January 2014 06:39:00|
During an engineering walk down inside containment a minor leak from a pipe fitting was discovered on the primary sampling piping connected to penetration M-45. There was previously identified minor leakage from a fitting on this same penetration outside of containment in the auxiliary building. The containment isolation valves are currently tagged closed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Additional testing was performed on penetration M-45 which determined that the penetration met the required leakage limits. Therefore this issue does not represent a degraded condition for the containment and is not reportable. The previous notification is being retracted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Kellar).
|ENS 49709||10 January 2014 02:14:00||Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure increased to above the Technical Specification Surveillance requirement of 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge briefly (two minutes or less) on two occasions. This is reportable as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radiation and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Reactor Building pressure has been restored to normal (greater than 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge) returning Secondary Containment to operable status. The cause of the event is under investigation. There were no radiological releases associated with the event. No safety system actuations or isolations occurred. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
|ENS 49704||9 January 2014 06:42:00|
At 0315 CST T.S. 2.0.1 was entered for all four Raw Water pumps being declared inoperable. The pumps were declared inoperable due to inability to close one of the sluice gates. There are six sluice gates and one is not functional. At 0518 the technical specification required shutdown commenced. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 0900 CST 1/9/14 Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1 was manually tripped and entered Mode 3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown to less than 300 deg F was commenced at time 1030 CST 1/9/14. The RCS temperature was less than 300 deg F at time 1433 CST. A press release has been issued. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hagar)
|ENS 49703||9 January 2014 06:42:00||At 2230 CST on 1/8/14 during operator rounds it was self identified there was a block of ice formed on the shaft and top of one of the intake structure sluice gates. This has bent the sluice gate operating shaft. At 0315 CST on 1/9/14 it was verified this gate could not be closed. There are six intake sluice gates that are required to be able to close to act as flood barriers. The other 5 sluice gates are not affected by this condition. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.|
|ENS 49700||7 January 2014 16:07:00|
At 1210 PST on January 7, 2014 the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor- Intermediate Range detector was declared non-functional due to scheduled maintenance on supporting equipment. The monitor is expected to be out of service for approximately 1 hour. Preplanned compensatory actions have been implemented. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 1238 PST on January 7, 2014 the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor -Intermediate Range detector was declared functional following scheduled maintenance on supporting equipment. Emergency Assessment Capability has been restored. Preplanned compensatory actions have been secured. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Licensee is retracting this event notification based on the following: Regulatory guidance in NUREG-1022 Revision 3 allows for not reporting EP equipment outages that are planned (i.e., maintenance) when outage time is not expected to exceed or does not exceed 72 hours, and when there are viable compensatory measures in place. Verification of the Control Room Logs indicates Columbia had viable compensatory measures in place during the maintenance outage and the outage duration was less than 72 hours. Columbia met the conditions in NUREG-1022; therefore, this event did not represent a loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Allen).
|ENS 48451||29 October 2012 18:15:00|
At 1700 EDT on October 29, 2012, Fermi 2 discovered a failure occurred with a data server within the Process Computer system at 0115 EDT on October 28, 2012. The failure of the data server affects data input to the server providing information to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). ERDS is currently not receiving updated information from Fermi data systems. This loss in capability is being reported as a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Indications of related plant variables are available in the Main Control Room. The Visual Annunciator System (VAS) and other portions of the Process Computer system remain functional. Meteorological and process effluent radiological monitor indications are available and dose assessment capability is available. Fermi 2 personnel will use normal phone communications to update NRC Operations Center in the case of an event declaration. Information normally provided by ERDS can be transmitted via the notification system as described in the Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. Fermi 2 will notify the NRC when ERDS is returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
This is a follow up to EN #48468 & EN #48451. On October 29, 2012, Fermi experienced a failure of a data server within the process computer system which feeds data to Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), and EN #48451 was made to the NRC. On November 1, 2012, planned maintenance for Cyber Security Modification began which removed ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS from service, and EN #48468 was made to the NRC. On November 9, 2012, planned maintenance on ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS is complete, restoring full emergency assessment capabilities to all onsite emergency response facilities (EN #48468). The maintenance also repaired the data server within the process computer system which feeds data to ERDS (EN #48451). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa).
|ENS 48450||29 October 2012 16:15:00|
On October 29, 2012, at approximately 1500 EDT, ANS, the licensee's provider of siren maintenance, reported a loss of 12 out of 43 sirens in the Oyster Creek Emergency Planning Zone, which exceeded the licensee's reporting threshold of 25 percent or more sirens out of service. At 1600 EDT, ANS, updated that the number of sirens out of service was 21 out of 43 sirens. ANS and the licensee continues to work to rectify the issue. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
As of 0320 EDT on 10/30/12, it was determined that 36 of the 43 Emergency Planning Zone sirens were out of service, and the licensee continues work to rectify the issue. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified R1DO (Caruso) and IRD (Marshall).
|ENS 47269||15 September 2011 14:45:00|
During a GNF-A Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) team walk-down of HVAC systems in the decontamination facility area, it was observed that a log entry for a waste-oil can mass was greater than the limit specified in procedural requirements. Upon further investigation it was determined at 3:30PM on September 14, 2011 that an operator had incorrectly processed a waste oil can with a gross weight in excess of the limit specified by criticality safety requirements. This resulted in a condition where one of the two controls on mass documented as being necessary to meet double contingency had not been maintained. The second criticality control on mass was maintained at all times. At no time was an unsafe condition present, however the decontamination oil processing area was shut down until necessary controls were available. This event is being conservatively reported pursuant to GNF-A internal procedure reporting requirements within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will inform the state and local agencies and the NRC Region II Office of this incident.
The incorrect processing of the waste oil can as reported on 9/15/11 resulted in a failure to meet the performance requirement of 10CFR70.61 and as a result, met the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(2) (and 10CFR70.74). Notified R2DO (Guthrie) and NMSS EO (McCartin).
An extent of condition review has identified two additional cans that were improperly processed with a gross weight over the 9.58 kg gross weight limit specified in procedural requirements. March 2, 2011 9.66 kg July 13, 2009 9.65 kg At no time was an unsafe condition present. The decontamination oil processing area remains shutdown. Notified R2DO (Lesser) and NMSS (Benner).
|ENS 47154||15 August 2011 13:10:00||On 8/11/2011 at 1145 CDT the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump was declared inoperable due to oil sample results indicating high particulate (ISO Solid Contamination Code above the Action Limit IAW I-ENG-004) in the turbine lube oil. The action limit is 19/16 and the sample result was 23/21. The ISO Solid Contamination Code is a measure of particle count and size. The same sample was analyzed for metal particulate concentration and results were satisfactory. Efforts have been underway to determine the source of the contaminate and to restore the turbine lube oil to within specifications. On 8/14/2011 at 0945 CDT NRC Region IV granted a Notice of Enforcement Discretion NOED beginning at 1145 CDT on 8/14/2011 to expire at 1145 CDT on 8/15/2011. Cleaning efforts have been completed. Current sample results indicate acceptable levels. A Basic Engineering Disposition has been issued supporting the sample results and basis for operability. Technical Specification required shutdown per TS 3.7.5 condition C.1 and C.2 was initiated at 1055 CDT on 8/15/2011. The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was declared operable at 1203 CDT on 8/15/2011 and the power reduction was halted at 82% Rated Thermal Power (RTP). Power ascension to 100% RTP was commenced at 1209 CDT on 8/15/2011. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
|ENS 47143||11 August 2011 15:29:00||At 1138 CDT, while in the process of shutting down as required by Technical Specifications (Reference EN# 47142), with the reactor at approximately 15 percent power, a manual scram was inserted in order to complete the TS Required Action of being in Mode 3 within 12 hours. Upon inserting the manual scram, reactor water level dropped below 170 inches resulting in Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3 and 4 being received. This reactor water level response is considered normal following a reactor scram from power due to void collapse in the reactor vessel. Reactor water level is currently being controlled in the normal band. All PCIS group isolations went to completion and were subsequently reset. The PCIS isolations all functioned properly. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 47129||6 August 2011 03:53:00|
At 0152 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 2 received red alarms for containment monitoring cabinets 10A and 10B along with a rise in drywell floor drain leakage and drywell pressure. At 0205 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 2 entered technical specification action statement (TS 3.4.5 B) due to unidentified leakage rise of greater than 2 gpm within 24 hours. At 0217 EDT, the control room commenced power reduction to mitigate the rise in drywell leakage and drywell pressure. At 0322 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 declared an Unusual Event (EAL 2.1.1) due to unidentified drywell leakage greater than 10 gpm. Actual drywell floor drain leakage reached 11.3 gpm. The cause of the rise in unidentified leakage is unknown at this time. At 0345 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 has commenced a plant shutdown. The licensee has notified State and local authorities. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The licensee terminated Notice of Unusual Event at 1127 EDT because leakage rates, drywell level, drywell pressure, rad levels, and all other parameters on the licensee checklist were normal and stable. The licensee is continuing to power down in order to perform inspections in the drywell area. The licensee notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified: IRD MOC (Gott), R1RA (Dean), R1DO (Bellamy), NRR (Leeds), NRR EO (Cheok), DHS (Inzer) and FEMA (O'Connel) .
|ENS 45719||23 February 2010 16:58:00||On 2/22/10, we determined that there was pressure boundary leakage on Unit 2 from the leak off line associated with a pressurizer spray valve (2-RC-220). The source of leakage associated with a boron deposit discovered earlier on 2/18/10. The boron deposit formed based on a leak in a Class 1 manual valve packing leak-off line. The leak location was determined to be in the packing leak-off pipe fillet weld to the stem retaining structure of the valve in the packing gland area. The valve (2-RC-220) is a Class 1 pressure boundary. The packing leak-off line is considered an auxiliary connection in the stem retaining structure of the valve. At this time, we believe the most probable cause of the 2-RC-220 leak-off line socket weld leak was based on two factors, a small pore in the original socket weld metal and the location of a valve tag attachment wire. The leak location coincided with the location where a valve tag attachment wire laid across the weld. It is possible this wire, vibrating against the weld, opened up a subsurface pore in the weld metal which began to leak sometime after startup from the 2009 RFO (Refueling Outage) (March 2009). Since the failure may have occurred due to a material problem that resulted in abnormal degradation of a principal safety barrier (i.e., it is necessary to take corrective actions to restore the weld's integrity), this event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The valve was overhauled in the 2009 RFO and subsequently passed VT-2 inspection. The overhaul did not include any welding on the affected joint. Unit 2 is in Mode 5 to allow repairs to be made to this weld. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.|
|ENS 45716||23 February 2010 13:56:00||A gamma knife treatment prescribed to be administered to the left side of a patient was instead administered to the patient's right side. The scheduled 30 minute, 90 Gray procedure was terminated after 1.4 minutes when the administering physician detected the error. It is estimated that 4% of the prescribed dose was administered to the wrong area. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
|ENS 45553||9 December 2009 16:22:00||At 1231 emergency siren P-007 located in the Mishicot, WI area inadvertently actuated. The siren covers 0.9% of total EPZ population. Severe weather, snow, ice and wind is occurring at this time. At 1340 siren actuation was verified and Manitowoc County Sheriff was notified of the sounding siren. At 1350, Point Beach performed a siren test, reset the siren and it is no longer alarming. Repair team has been dispatched to the siren location to troubleshoot and determine the cause of the actuation. The population coverage for siren P-007 is 0.9% and the siren malfunction is not reportable due to loss of population coverage. However, based on actuation and notification of the Manitowoc County Sheriffs Department, the event is reportable. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.|