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 Start dateReporting criterionEvent description
05000391/LER-2017-00610 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

On December 11, 2017 at 0857 Eastern Standard Time (EST), the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped after Operators observed multiple dropped control rods. All control and shutdown bank rods inserted properly in response to the manual reactor trip. All safety systems including Auxiliary Feedwater actuated as designed. The plant was stabilized with decay heat removal through Auxiliary Feedwater and the Steam Dump System.

An intermittent electrical connection between a rod control power cabinet card and the power cabinet backplane power supply caused a rod control malfunction with control bank A group 2 control rods. The malfunction resulted in four control rods dropping into the reactor core. As a corrective action, all five control rod power cabinets had a 100 percent inspection of backplane connectors on the card cages. Backplane connectors were reformed and aligned as necessary to attain suitable electrical and mechanical connection. Additionally, all associated circuit cards for the power cabinets had their connectors re-formed with a precision tool.

This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as safety system actuations of the Reactor Protection System and Auxiliary Feed Water System.

05000391/LER-2017-00525 January 201810 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

On November 26, 2017. at 1225 Eastern Standard Time (EST), the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 experienced an unplanned Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) discharge to the Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) while de-pressurized. in Mode 5. with the Pressurizer vented to the Pressurizer Relief Tank.

ECCS injection via the Boron Injection flow path occurred during planned Safety Injection system Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) testing. The Boron Injection flow path should have been isolated and should not have resulted in any injection flow to the Unit 2 RCS. The condition was promptly corrected by operator actions based on observed plant conditions.

The cause of this event is that an Operator improperly used a Caution Order to determine the configuration of the breaker for the Boron Injection Tank outlet valve. Correct Component Verification was not utilized as required. and the current position of the breaker in the field was not validated to support testing.

Corrective actions for this event include revising procedures to ensure the breakers associated with the boron injection flow path will be tagged open during ESFAS testing and that lessons learned related to this event are communicated to operating crews. An evaluation on the use of Caution Orders for off normal equipment positions will be performed .

NRC FORM 330604-2O'

05000391/LER-2017-00425 September 201710 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

On July 25, 2017, at 0428 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 was in Mode 3.

commencing a Reactor Startup. While in the initial phase of withdrawing the first of four Control Banks, the two associated group demand position indicators deviated greater than 2 steps from each other. In accordance with Technical Requirement 3.1.7, Position Indication System, Shutdown, with one or more group demand position indicators inoperable, the reactor trip breakers are to be opened immediately. Operations personnel opened the reactor trip breakers immediately by initiating a manual trip of the Reactor Protection System. The Auxiliary Feedwater system was in service and controlling Steam Generator water levels at the time of the event and did not receive any valid actuation signals. No other system actuations occurred as a result of this reactor trip and all systems operated as designed.

The rod demand indication deviation was determined to be caused by a failed logic card, which was replaced.

05000391/LER-2017-00323 March 2017
22 May 2017
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

On March 23, 2017, at 0014 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 experienced an unplanned trip condition of both Turbine Driven Main Feed Pumps (TDMFPs) following a loss of Main Condenser Vacuum. The trip of both TDMFPs caused an automatic start of both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump as designed.

The plant was performing a normal startup, and had just synchronized the main generator to the grid. Subsequent to the event, the plant was transitioned to Mode 3 by inserting all control rods with a manual trip. All plant safety systems operated as expected.

The loss of condenser vacuum was the result of a significant breach of the Unit 2 main condenser - B zone. This failure is attributed to the main condenser neck support structural design being inadequate to maintain integrity within specification. Repairs to the condenser will be completed prior to Unit 2 returning to service.

05000391/LER-2017-00220 March 2017
12 May 2017
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

On March 20, 2017 at 0813 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 operations personnel manually tripped the plant from approximately 91 percent power based on lowering steam generator levels. Prior to the plant trip, the 2A Hotwell pump tripped at 0759 EDT and the 2C Condensate Booster Pump subsequently tripped at 0803 EDT. Operations personnel commenced to lower plant power after the 2A Hotwell pump trip in an attempt to maintain steam generator levels, but were unable to recover level and manually tripped the unit.

All control rods fully inserted and all automatically actuated safety related equipment operated as designed. At 0905 EDT, operations personnel exited the emergency operating instructions after the plant was stabilized.

This event resulted when scaffold crews inadvertently depressed the local trip button for the 2A Hotwell pump, which resulted in the secondary system transient. Bump guard covers were subsequently installed on local pushbuttons for selected pumps in the turbine building.

NRC I ORM TEE :36'01 APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/3112018 comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to NEOB-10202. (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

05000391/LER-2017-0019 March 2017
3 May 2017
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material

upper containment airlock inboard door was found not closed while the outboard airlock door was open. This created a containment bypass with leakage potentially greater than allowed by the Technical Specifications. The operator immediately identified that the pressure equalizing valve for the inner door was not fully closed when the outer door of the airlock was opened. The outer door was promptly shut to isolate the airlock. The inner door was then cycled which closed the equalizing valve. The total time that a containment bypass was present is estimated to be five minutes.

The equalizing valve did not seat properly due to a damaged part in the valve closing mechanism. The airlock remains functional, and an operations caution order was put in place related to use of this air lock. The airlock will be repaired prior to Unit 2 returning to Mode 4.

NRC I ORM 366 M6-2016; APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internal e-mail to used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

05000391/LER-2016-00830 August 2016
28 October 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

On August 30, 2016, at 2110 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 reactor tripped on turbine trip as a result of an electrical fault. All control rods fully inserted and no safety or relief valves lifted. The Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed.

The electrical fault was caused by an internal fault on the low voltage side of the 2B Main Bank Transformer (MBT) which resulted in a fire. The electrical fault was cleared by the 2B MBT sudden pressure and phase differential relays.

Automatic fire suppression operated as expected and a fire fighting team was established by the fire brigade with assistance from local fire departments. The fire was extinguished at 2230 EDT.

The failed 2B MBT was removed from the plant and the spare MBT was connected in its place. The unit was returned to power and replacement transformers are being procured by the Tennessee Valley Authority for long term reliability.

05000391/LER-2016-00723 August 201610 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

On August 23, 2016, at 1356 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), during power ascension testing, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of main feedwater. Concurrent with the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed. All control and shutdown rods fully inserted. All safety systems responded as designed.

The loss of main feedwater was due to a leak on a hydraulic fitting associated with the Main Feedwater Pump Turbine High Pressure Governor valve, resulting in the valve going partially closed with reactor power at 48 percent. With the governor valve partially closed, feedwater flow was reduced such that the unit needed to be manually tripped.

Subsequent investigation determined the leak to be caused by the installation of incompatible fittings associated with the governor valve that occurred during plant construction.

05000391/LER-2016-00613 August 201610 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

On August 13, 2016 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (WBN2) was being stabilized following a pre-planned reactor trip.

Both motor driven auxiliary feed water pumps and the turbine driven auxiliary feed water pump (TDAFW pump) were in operation maintaining steam generator (SG) water level between 6 - 50 percent in accordance with the Reactor Trip Response Procedure.

At 0333 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) the TDAFW pump was secured by procedure and SG water level lowered to the Lo-Lo Alarm setpoint (17 percent). With the Unit at 0 percent power, a trip time delay of 3 minutes is present for auxiliary feedwater actuation. At 0337 EDT, the TDAFW pump automatically started with SG water levels less than the Lo-Lo alarm setpoint (lowest level reached was 15 percent).

The cause of the event was a failure to brief the auto start feature of the TDAFW pump at Lo-Lo SG water level of 17 percent when briefing the control band for the SGs is between 6 to 50 percent.

05000391/LER-2016-00520 June 2016
19 August 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

On June 20, 2016, the 2B Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) tripped on a loss of vacuum in the 2B MFP turbine condenser, resulting in a loss of normal feed, and the subsequent trip of the main turbine. While operators were reducing power to within the capacity of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW), the reactor tripped at 1540 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on Steam Generator Water Level (SGWL) Lo Lo in Steam Generator No.4. SG water level lowered rapidly due to shrink from the relatively cold AFW following the trip.

All control and shutdown rods fully inserted. All safety systems responded as designed. The trip response was uncomplicated.

The trip was caused by a human performance error during the drain down of the 2A MFP turbine condenser which resulted in a loss of vacuum on the 2B MFP turbine.

05000391/LER-2016-0045 June 2016
4 August 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

On June 5, 2016 at 1227 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 was in MODE 1 at approximately 12.5 percent power when a safety injection (SI) actuation occurred, followed by an automatic reactor protection system (RPS) trip. No primary safety barriers (Reactor Coolant System, containment and fuel clad) were challenged and no primary or secondary safety or relief valves actuated during the event. The Unit 2 plant trip was considered a complicated trip due to SI actuation. Safety equipment operated as expected and SI was promptly terminated.

The reactor trip and SI were caused by a turbine governor valve failing open, causing a steam header pressure rate of decrease SI actuation signal.

05000391/LER-2016-00328 May 2016
27 July 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

The Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump auto-started upon a planned Reactor Trip at 0154 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on May 28, 2016. At 0157 EDT the Reactor Operator noted that TDAFW forward flow to Steam Generators 1 and 3 were approximately 800 gallons per minute, and placed the associated Level Control Valves in the closed position. At approximately 0203 EDT the Main Control Room received Alarm Window 60-A, TDAFW Pump Electrical Overspeed Trip. Operators walked down the TDAFW pump and determined that the turbine had tripped, by confirming that the Trip and Throttle Valve was no longer latched, and declared the TDAFWP inoperable. The equipment was repaired, the TDAFWP was re-tested successfully and returned to service. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.5 was exited on May 30, 2016.

The plant conditions at the time of the event were Unit 2 in Mode 3 at Normal Operating Temperature/Normal Operating Pressure following manual reactor trip from Mode 1. The reactor trip was unrelated to this event.

On June 29 2016, a past operability evaluation concluded that the TDAFWP had been inoperable from March 30 through May 30, 2016. This is reportable as a condition prohibited by TS.

05000391/LER-2016-00211 May 2016
11 July 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On April 14, 2016, during performance of Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.5.2, the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump (TDAFWP) failed to achieve required rated speed of 3950 rpm ± 25 rpm due to an equipment failure. The TDAFWP was declared inoperable, and Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.5, Condition B, was entered. The equipment was repaired, the TDAFWP was re-tested successfully and returned to service. TS LCO 3.7.5 was exited on May 4, 2016.

On May 11, 2016, a past operability evaluation concluded that the TDAFWP had been inoperable from March 30 through April 17, 2016, during periods of time when the TDAFWP was required for Mode 3 operations. This is reportable as a condition prohibited by TS.

During the same time period, the 2A-A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFWP) experienced an oil leak through the inboard bearing housing vent cap that resulted in the need to add approximately 4 ounces of oil on a daily basis. The MDAFWP was determined to be operable.

05000391/LER-2016-00114 April 2016
13 June 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

From March 18, 2016, when Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 first entered Mode 4 to April 14, 2016 with the plant in Mode 3, it was determined that a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS) existed. During this time both automatic and manual closure of the containment isolation valves and the sample isolation valves for the Steam Generator Blowdown (SGBD) sampling lines were disabled due to improperly installed electrical jumpers in the valve control circuits. The misplaced jumpers bypassed the Phase A containment isolation signals, the auto/manual start signals for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps, and the control valve seal-in circuits. Containment isolation on a Phase A signal is used to control potential release of radioactive material to the environ in the event of a Design Bases Accident. The AFW pump auto/manual start signals are used to isolate the SGBD sampling lines to preserve steam generator inventory. The seal-in circuits are used to allow the operator to manually position the valves in either the open or closed position from the main control room. This event occurred prior to initial reactor criticality. There was no loss of safety function.

The isolation valves for the SGBD sample lines were returned to service on April 14, 2016. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B) and (C).

05000390/LER-2017-0159 November 2017
8 January 2018
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On November 9, 2017, an issue was identified where Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) were not entered when non-TS Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) area coolers were removed from service for maintenance. The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) had been performing maintenance on ESF coolers serving Auxiliary Building areas without entering the TS LCO Action Statements associated with equipment present in those areas. Specific areas of concern identified were the general areas of the 713 foot and 737 foot elevations of the Auxiliary Building. These coolers were taken out of service for time periods longer than allowed for ESF equipment (typically 72 hours), which would represent a condition prohibited by the TS.

At this time, WBN has not confirmed that for those cases where a cooler was taken out of service without entering a TS LCO if an actual adverse impact on safety function would have occurred if an accident with a single failure had occurred during those time periods. Those details, and the cause and corrective actions related to a 2010 guidance change, will be provided in a supplement to this report.

05000390/LER-2017-01430 October 2017
20 December 2017
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident

On October 30. 2017. at 0942 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) operations personnel received a Main Control Room (MCR) alarm for low control room positive pressure. At 0943 EDT, a Control Room Envelope (CRE) door was found ajar and immediately closed. Technical Specification 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) was declared not met for both trains, and Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) Condition B was entered for Unit 1 (Mode 1) and Condition G was entered for Unit 2 (Mode 5). At 0945 EDT the alarm cleared, CREVS was declared operable and LCO 3.7.10, Conditions B and G were exited. The loss of the control room envelope is being reported as a loss of safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

The cause of this issue is a human performance error in that an individual leaving the control building complex failed to confirm closure of the MCR envelope boundary door. Corrective actions have been generated to develop and install an engineering feature to inform personnel closing the door that it is fully shut and latched.

05000390/LER-2017-0136 September 2017
24 January 2018
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical SpecificationsOn September 6, 2017, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) identified that the vacuum relief line airflows did not meet acceptance criteria for the Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) for Train A during the performance of 0- SI-30-7-A, ABGTS Pressure Test Troubleshooting of the low airflows identified an Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure (ABSCE) Unit 2 General Ventilation intake damper 2-FC0-30-108 with approximately one inch gaps in the blade seals with the damper in the closed position Preliminary investigation found that the damper linkage appeared to not be adjusted correctly to allow full closure of the damper blades following maintenance in May of 2017 The low vacuum relief line airflows resulted in the Train A ABGTS being inoperable, based on identified open ABSCE breaches, from July 7, 2017 to September 5, 2017 This time period is longer than that allowed by Technical Specification (TS) 3 7 12 for ABGTS, and is therefore a condition prohibited by TS The cause of this event was an incorrectly adjusted damper linkage after replacement of the damper actuator A training needs analysis will be performed to evaluate training solutions for damper linkage adjustments Damper preventative maintenance activities will be revised to address smooth operation and absence of mechanical binding
05000390/LER-2017-01223 October 201710 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On August 23. 2017. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) identified that procedures 1-E-1 and 2-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, contained steps to manually open 1-FCV-67-458 in the event of a Train A or B power failure.

Opening 1-FCV-67-458 would result in the crosstie of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) Headers 2A and 1B, which would lead to providing flow to equipment not operating due to the loss of a train of power. On October 6. 2017.

it was determined that for certain time periods, if a design basis accident had occurred on Unit 2 with a loss of offsite power concurrent with a train failure and with 1-FCV-67-458 opened, inadequate ERCW flow would have been available to remove decay heat after transfer to cold leg recirculation. This condition only affected operability of ERCW Train A. This is reportable as a condition prohibited by Technical Specification 3.7.8.

The issue associated with this incorrect procedural step to cross-tie the ERCW trains in 1-E-1 and 2-E-1 was addressed as part of actions to resolve an ERCW design and procedure issue documented in Licensee Event Report (LER) 390-2017-009. This report, while related, identifies an issue that was not addressed in the prior LER. The cause was determined to be the incorrect application of a cross tie requirement associated with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. Corrective action will be to include engineering in the review of procedures affected by complex design changes.

NRC FORM 355 ;:;4-217' APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. or by e-mail to NEOB-10202. (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget. Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number. the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

05000390/LER-2017-01123 August 2017
23 October 2017
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On August 23, 2017, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) personnel identified Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, was not entered for on-going work related to 1-FCV-31-330, Incore Instrument Room Air Handler Unit 1B Chilled Water System Isolation Valve. A clearance was placed on 1-FCV-31-330 by Operations Work Control for scheduled work on May 17, 2017 rendering the valve inoperable. Work was completed May 19, 2017, however, the clearance remained in place pending post maintenance testing after other related system work was complete. Due to a human performance error, the appropriate TS tracking program was not activated and no narrative log entry was made to signify entry into the TS as required by procedure. The in-place clearance satisfactorily met the required actions of TS 3.6.3 condition A.1. to isolate the affected containment penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve. However, without the required TS tracking program activated, personnel failed to comply with TS 3.6.3 condition A.2. to verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated every 31 days.

Failure to enter the TS tracking program in accordance with procedure was a human performance error. Corrective actions included coaching and department operating experience communication.

05000390/LER-2017-01017 August 2017
10 October 2017
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident

On August 17, 2017, at 1205 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) lost power to the 1B-B 6.9kV Shutdown Board. The loss of power to this safety related bus resulted in an automatic start of the Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP). Power to the 1B-B Shutdown Board (SDBD) was restored at 1505 EDT on August 17, 2017.

During the loss of power to the 1B-B SDBD, a reduction in containment and control rod drive mechanism cooling occurred. At 1233 EDT, lower containment average temperature exceeded Technical Specification (TS) limits, and TS 3.6.5 Condition A was entered for containment average air temperature not within limits. Lower containment average temperature was restored to within limits at 1525 EDT on August 17. 2017. This is reportable as a potential loss of safety function.

The cause of this event is mechanical vibration while closing a panel drawer resulting in actuation of protective relays that led to a loss of power.

Clearances will require the relays involved in this event to be isolated during drawer movement to prevent a similar occurrence.

05000390/LER-2017-00910 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)

On July 12, 2017, at 1238 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) determined that a preliminary analysis shows adequate Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) flow may not be available during dual unit limiting design basis conditions of one unit in Hot Shutdown on Residual Heat Removal (RHR) cooling when the other unit experiences a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Based on preliminary analysis, during a Unit 1 LOCA, Unit 1 receives adequate flow when following existing procedural guidance. However, Unit 2 may not receive adequate flow to meet cool-down requirements with design basis maximum temperatures. During a Unit 2 LOCA, however, current procedural guidance is not adequate to ensure the proper system alignment to establish correct ERCW Component Cooling Water (CCS) Heat Exchanger A and B flow rates for either unit's cool down requirements.

At the time of the event, Unit 2 had been shutdown for an extended period of time such that the flow delivered by ERCW was adequate to serve both Unit 1 in a LOCA and Unit 2 in Mode 4 or 5. Immediate corrective actions included procedure changes to ensure adequate ERCW flow for all possible plant situations in both units. The causes of this issue are a failure to address cross train elements of the ERCW system in the design analysis and a failure to address procedural impacts when the plant transitioned to dual unit operation. The procedure errors were corrected.

05000390/LER-2017-00814 August 201710 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

On June 15, 2017, at 1219 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.15 Condition B was entered for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 annulus pressure not within limits, resulting in Shield Building inoperability. At 1221 EDT, the WBN Unit 1 annulus pressure returned to normal, the Shield Building was declared operable, and LCO 3.6.15 Condition B was exited. Because the shield building is a non-redundant safety system, operation outside of TS allowable limits represents an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

The temporary loss of the Shield Building resulted from a loss of pressure control in the Auxiliary Building caused by a loss of Auxiliary Building General Ventilation due to a spurious cross zone fire alarm. The Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System was started to maintain Auxiliary Building pressure within limits and the non-safety related Annulus Auxiliary Building ventilation supply fans were replaced.

05000390/LER-2017-0079 June 2017
8 August 2017
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

On June 9, 2017. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) personnel determined that the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), as clarified by guidance in NUREG-1022, Revision 3. were being incorrectly applied for certain events associated with single train safety systems. When events occurred that resulted in these systems not meeting Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO). the short duration of these events relative to their required action completion time, coupled with prompt return to allowable values, were not considered a loss of safety function by Operations and Licensing personnel. As a result, multiple potential loss of safety function events were not reported as required. These events were related to Refueling Water Storage Tank (RVVST) level, Containment and Shield Building pressure, and Control Room Envelope integrity.

A review of these events indicate, when considering the actual system capability and the response of equipment and personnel. a loss of safety function capability impacting public health and safety did not occur for events associated with the RWST, Containment. Shield Building, or Control Room. Corrective actions include briefing personnel on the regulatory impact of these events, and the importance of the control room boundary.

.._ _ NRr, FORM Kri 2017:

05000390/LER-2017-0061 June 2017
31 July 2017
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On June 1, 2017, at 1550 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 operations personnel declared one of its two required offsite power sources to be inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, Condition A. One of the poles for this power source was found cracked and not able to meet its structural load requirements for wind or icing. The pole was replaced and the line returned to service on June 2, 2017.

This crack was determined to have been caused by an earlier line failure on May 27, 2017 when adjacent poles fell during a thunder storm, which also caused the plant to enter TS 3.8.1, Condition A. Based on evidence demonstrating that the pole with the crack had not met requirements from May 27, 2017 until replaced on June 2, 2017, a condition prohibited by Technical Specification 3.8.1 occurred because the line was not functional for a period longer than the allowed outage time.

The cause for failure to repair the pole with the crack following the May 27, 2017 event was that it was covered by vegetation, and was not discovered until June 1, 2017. Corrective actions to address this issue included investigation of the offsite power source support structures and replacement of degraded offsite power line poles to maintain high reliability of offsite power

05000390/LER-2017-00510 May 2017
10 July 2017
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On May 10, 2017, at 0907 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 operations personnel discovered the 1B-B Safety Injection pump discharge isolation valve (1-ISV-63-527) closed. Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, Condition A was immediately entered for one or more trains of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) inoperable. TS 3.5.2 Condition A was exited at 0913 EDT when 1-ISV-63-527 was opened.

Investigation determined that the 1 B-B SI pump discharge isolation valve had been closed prior to Unit 1 entering Mode 3 on April 26, 2017, representing a condition prohibited by TS. During this time period, the 1A-A SI pump was inoperable for 21 minutes, representing a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

The cause of the mispositioned valve was the result of an individual failing to follow procedure use and adherence requirements during the performance of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Blackout testing. The safety injection pump discharge valve was closed to support the test but was not reopened following the testing. Corrective actions for this event include personal accountability actions, revision of the EDG blackout procedures to ensure the SI pump discharge valves are reopened, and additional station focus on procedure use, particularly use of Not Applicable (N/A) in performing procedures.

05000390/LER-2017-00431 August 201710 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

On May 2, 2017, at 1945 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) and on May 4, 2017 at 1710 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Plant Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped due to a failure of the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Board 1C normal feeder breaker to close during the planned power transfer to unit power following plant startup. Concurrent with each reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed. All control and shutdown rods fully inserted. All safety systems responded as designed for both events.

For the first event. the cause was incorrectly attributed to a high resistance contact resulting in the normal feeder breaker failing to close. In the investigation following the second event, a relay associated with the RCP Board 1C control circuit was found incorrectly configured due to a human performance issue, which resulted in a standing trip signal on the RCP normal feeder breaker. To prevent recurrence, procedures will be revised to address material control of pretested components.

05000390/LER-2017-0034 January 2017
3 March 2017
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On January 4, 2017 at 1010 Eastern Standard Time (EST), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Operations personnel declared Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) strainer flush valve 2-FCV-67-9B inoperable due to having a through-wall leak.

The valve was replaced and the ERCW strainer was returned to service on January 5, 2017 at 0952 EST. This event is reportable because the valve had had a through-wall leak since January 31, 2016 and had not been declared inoperable. With a through-wall leak, a flaw evaluation is required to be performed to demonstrate the through-wall leak was stable. The failure to perform an adequate operability evaluation allowed the valve to remain in service for a period of time longer than allowed by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.8, Essential Raw Cooling Water, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Condition A. This represents a condition prohibited by the TS. Subsequent analysis of the valve demonstrated that it remained structurally sound with the leak, and would not have impacted the operability of the ERCW system.

The cause of the failure to perform an adequate operability evaluation has been determined to be human performance errors on the part of both operations and engineering personnel. Additional training of operations and engineering personnel is planned as corrective action to address the potential for recurrence of this issue.

05000390/LER-2017-00224 December 2016
22 February 2017
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical SpecificationsOn December 24, 2016, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) personnel identified that a clearance associated with a containment purge valve, 1-FCV-30-17, had been incorrectly hung. The clearance was intended to pull fuses to close and de-energize this valve in support of local leak rate testing. The incorrect fuses were removed, and the valve remained energized for about 24 hours while local leak rate testing was performed on the associated containment penetration. The clearance error was discovered when operations personnel attempted to replace the fuses for valve 1-FCV-30-17. The cause of the error was determined to be a human performance error. This has been determined to be a condition prohibited by Technical Specification 3.6.3, Limiting Condition for Operation, Condition A, because the penetration was inoperable for longer than the four hour required action time.
05000390/LER-2017-00110 November 2016
14 February 2017
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

On November 10, 2016, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant personnel identified a failure of the non-reverse clutch key on Emergency Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) motor B-A. While performing a lubrication work order, it was discovered that the clutch key was sheared. Subsequent investigation identified that other clutch key failures had occurred in the recent past. The non-reverse clutch prevents the ERCW pump from rotating in the reverse direction after pump trip, which could cause the motor to develop a higher than normal in-rush current if the motor was subsequently started, such as following an accident.

Based on the potential common mode failure of the non-reverse clutch, immediate corrective actions were put in place to ensure that the safety function of the ERCW pumps to start following an accident would not be impaired. The cause of the failure is under investigation.

05000390/LER-2016-0113 August 2016
9 December 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On August 3, 2016, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (WBN1) determined that a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS) had occurred.

During maintenance of the 1B-B centrifugal charging pump (CCP) room cooler, the bearing was found in a degraded condition requiring repair. This fan is required to support Operability of the 1B-B CCP. Based on the inability of the CCP to meet its calculated mission time of 10 days, the 1B-B CCP was considered to be inoperable from July 24, 2016 until restoration of the 1B-B CCP room cooler on August 5, 2016. This represents a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications due to the 1 B-B CCP being inoperable for greater than its allowed outage time. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

The cause of the bearing degradation and fan failure was over tensioning the fan belts due to a 2011 revision to a maintenance procedure which improperly removed the established method for belt tensioning. This method had been added to the procedure in 1995 as an action to prevent recurrence of a similar over tensioning event.

The 1B-B CCP room cooler had been rebuilt in December 2015 after a similar bearing failure had occurred as reported in LER 390/2016-006.

05000390/LER-2016-0108 June 2016
8 August 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

At 1526 Eastern Daylight Time on 6/8/2016, a determination was made involving the potential impact of a tornado on the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). The EDGs are required to be operable to provide power to ensure that acceptable fuel design limits, reactor coolant system pressure boundary limits, and containment integrity are not exceeded during abnormal transients. Further, the EDGs are designed with a crankcase pressure trip (setpoint of 1 inch water), which is bypassed following an emergency start. Engineering has determined that a tornado could potentially cause actuation of the crankcase pressure trip due to a low barometric condition. If an emergency start signal has NOT previously occurred, then during a tornado, actuation of the crankcase pressure trip would energize the shutdown relay causing an EDG lockout condition. The EDG lockout condition prevents subsequent EDG starts (normal or emergency) until operators manually reset the lockout condition locally at the EDG. This condition could potentially affect all four EDGs simultaneously.

A compensatory measure has been established, that upon notification of a Tornado Warning, the EDGs would be 'emergency started' and run during the time the Tornado Warning was in effect. This action bypasses the crankcase pressure trip function and allows the EDGs to perform their required safety function.

05000390/LER-2016-00921 November 2015
15 July 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On November 21, 2015, Watts Bar Nuclear Unit 1 (WBN1) operations personnel did not conduct a surveillance of the Train B Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) supply inboard containment isolation valve, which represented the late date for this surveillance. WBN1 personnel recognized the potential for this surveillance to go late on November 15, 2015, and therefore the provisions of Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 3.0.3 could not be applied. Failure to complete the surveillance required entering TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.3 and completing Required Action A.1, but the required action to isolate the affected penetration flowpath was not performed until January 30, 2016. This condition was not recognized as reportable until May 18, 2016.

This supplement clarifies the reportable event and reconciles event dates.

05000390/LER-2016-00817 May 2016
15 July 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

On May 17, 2016, at 1630 hours while restoring from a plant modification related to installation of new protective relays designed to detect open phase conditions on the 6.9kV shutdown boards, the feeder breakers for the 6.9kV Shutdown Board 1B-B tripped resulting in a loss of bus voltage. The feeder breakers tripped due to actuation of the loss of voltage relays in the shutdown board protective relay trip logic circuit resulting in separation of offsite power from the 6.9kV Shutdown Board 1B-B. The 1B-B emergency diesel generator did not auto start during this event because it was out of service due to planned maintenance.

In response to the loss of power on the 6.9kV Shutdown Board 1B-B, the operators immediately entered Abnormal Operating Instruction, 0-A01-43.02, Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown Boards, and manually started emergency diesel generators 1A-A, 2A-A, and 2B-B. All equipment operated properly. The emergency diesel generators were not required to be paralleled to their respective boards because offsite power was available.

Offsite power was restored to the 6.9kV Shutdown Board 1B-B at 1802 hours on May 17, 2016. Event Notification 51940 was issued May 17, 2016. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

05000390/LER-2016-0075 November 2015
20 June 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On April 21, 2016, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 concluded that a condition prohibited by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.8, Rod Position Indication, had occurred during the dropped rod event on November 05, 2015. The Surveillance Requirement for TS 3.1.8 states that each Analog Rod Position Indication, (ARPI), agrees within 12 steps of the group demand position for the full indicated range of rod travel.

Since the ARPI was indicating correctly for the dropped rod and was verified by diverse indications, it was considered operable. However, the Bases for TS 3.1.8 states that for the position indication to be operable, the Rod Position Indication System indicates within 12 steps of the step counter demand position as required by TS 3.1.5, Rod Group Alignment Limits. In the case of a dropped control rod, the Rod Position for the affected rod would not be within 12 steps of the demand counter. Since WBN Unit 1 at the time of the dropped rod was in a mode of applicability, the above conditions would have been met warranting entry into TS 3.1.8 Condition A. Because the actions of TS 3.1.8 were not taken within the required times, WBN Unit 1 was in a condition prohibited by TS.

TVA is reporting this issue pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

05000390/LER-2016-00613 May 2016
30 June 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On May 13, 2016, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (WBN1) determined that a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications had previously occurred. During the Fall 2015 WBN1 outage, maintenance performed on the 1B-B centrifugal charging pump (CCP) room cooling fan introduced a condition that resulted in a subsequent bearing failure of the room cooling fan on December 4, 2015. This condition would have prevented the 1B-B CCP pump from performing its specified function for its designed mission time. Based on the reduced reliability of the fan, the 1B-B CCP was considered to be inoperable from October 7, 2015 until the fan was repaired and returned to service on December 6, 2015. During this time period, there were several short time periods when the 1A-A CCP was inoperable.

An investigation into the cause of the failure was completed on April 21, 2016. The cause of the fan bearing failure was an undersized fan shaft, resulting in the 1B-B CCP fan having excess shaft to bearing clearance which caused the bearing inner ring to loosen from the eccentric locking collar. These excessive clearances allowed the fan bearing inner ring to slide on the shaft. The sliding rotation of the inner ring on the shaft resulted in excessive heat being generated within the bearing leading to catastrophic failure.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).

05000390/LER-2016-00522 October 2015
13 May 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident

On March 14, 2016, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 determined through engineering analysis that both trains of emergency gas treatment system (EGTS) were inoperable for 8 minutes, 10 seconds during preoperational testing of Unit 2 EGTS. The inoperability of A and B trains of Unit 1 EGTS took place on October 22, 2015, while Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and two trains of EGTS were required to be operable in accordance with technical specification (TS) limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.6.9, "Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)." At the time of the event, Unit 2 was in "no Mode," prior to initial fuel loading.

This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), "Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfilment of a Safety Function.

05000390/LER-2016-00422 March 2016
23 May 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

On March 22, 2016, at 1131 Eastern Daylight Time, the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (WBN1) reactor tripped due to the actuation of the Over Temperature Delta Temperature bistables. Concurrent with the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated. All control rods inserted upon the reactor trip and safety systems functioned as expected.

An investigation into the cause of the trip determined that a failure of a Valve Position Limit up/down counter circuit card in the Analog Electro-Hydraulic Turbine Control System resulted in the closure of the turbine high pressure governor valves, resulting in an automatic reactor trip and turbine trip on WBN1. The failed card was replaced and WBN Unit 1 was returned to service.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

05000390/LER-2016-00311 March 2016
10 May 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On March 11, 2016, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 concluded that a condition prohibited by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, had occurred during recent performances of TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.2.3. Due to inadequacies with gas quantification methodologies for Safety Injection (SI) and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system discharge piping, the ability to meet TS SR 3.5.2.3 could not be demonstrated, which is required in accordance with TVA's response to NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation In Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems." This condition existed from March 2012 to December 2015. In a subsequent analysis, WBN determined that the worst case gas accumulation in SI and RHR discharge piping would not have affected the ability of the SI and RHR systems from performing their safety functions. However, because the required actions of TS LCO 3.5.2 were not taken within the required times, WBN was in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

TVA is reporting this issue pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

05000390/LER-2016-0025 March 2016
4 May 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On March 5, 2016, at 1512 Eastern Standard Time (EST), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, Condition A for a containment isolation valve being inoperable.

During a containment walkdown, leakage was found on valve 1-FCV-61-122, Glycol Cooled Floor Return Header Isolation and the valve was declared inoperable. TS 3.6.3 Condition A requires that a penetration flow path with one containment isolation valve inoperable to be isolated by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve within 4 hours. The penetration associated with this containment isolation valve was not isolated until 2113 EST on March 5, 2016. The cause of this event was operations staff misunderstanding the applicability of the Note associated with TS 3.6.3, which allows administrative controls under certain conditions.

Because the action specified by TS 3.6.3 was not completed within four hours, this condition is reportable as an operation or condition prohibited by TS per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

05000390/LER-2016-00112 January 2016
9 March 2016
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On January 12, 2016, at 1645 Eastern Standard Time (EST), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Maintenance personnel were performing a 92 day Channel Operational Test for radiation monitor 1-RM-90-106A, Lower Containment Atmosphere Particulate Radiation Monitor, and found the mode switch in the "DIFF" position, which was not expected.

The surveillance was stopped and an investigation was conducted. It was determined that the design requires the mode switch to be in the "INT" position to be operable. The mode selector switch was placed in the "INT" position and the surveillance was completed. The radiation monitor was restored to OPERABLE status at 1743 EST on January 12, 2016.

Placing the mode selector switch in the "DIFF" position resulted in 1-RM-90-106A being INOPERABLE due to the loss of alarm function of the monitor. Investigation determined that the switch had been repositioned on December 8, 2015.

Because the containment particulate radiation monitor was inoperable for a period of time greater than permitted by Technical Specification 3.4.15, this condition is reportable as an operation or condition prohibited by Technical Specifications per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). During the time the monitor was inoperable, other means of leak detection (e.g., containment pocket sump level indication, reactor coolant system inventory balance) remained available.

05000390/LER-2015-00121 February 201510 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

reactor was manually tripped by control room operators due to a decreasing main condenser vacuum. Subsequent to the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated. Control and Shutdown rods fully inserted into the reactor core, and safety systems responded as designed. The unit was stabilized in Mode 3, with decay heat removal via Auxiliary Feedwater and the Steam Generator Atmospheric Dump Valves. The Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed and remained closed during the event.

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has determined that the decreasing condenser vacuum was due to a failure of an expansion joint boot seal in the "C" zone of the main condenser. This seal functions as the expansion joint between the condenser and low pressure turbines. The failure of the seal was due to a non-optimal vulcanization process and inadequate overlap in a joint splice, which significantly weakened the seal and allowed seal water to permeate the seal, further weakening the joint. The failed main condenser boot seal was replaced with a new boot seal on the "C" zone of the condenser. As a preventative measure, the boot seals on the "A" and "B" zones were also replaced.

05000390/LER-2014-00313 July 201410 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

On July 13, 2014 at 1937 (EDT), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant operators manually tripped the Unit 1 reactor due to automatic isolation of all low pressure feedwater heaters. Concurrent with the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed.

All Control and Shutdown rods fully inserted. All safety systems responded as designed and the unit was stabilized in Mode 3, with decay heat removal via Auxiliary Feedwater, steam dumps and the main condenser, with the station in a normal shutdown electrical alignment.

The need to manually trip the reactor was determined to be the result of two separate age related failures associated with the control scheme of the #7 Heater Drain Tank (HDT). The root cause of these failures was that replacement preventative maintenance (PM) tasks did not exist for these components. The components in question were replaced and corrective actions have been developed to generate replacement PMs for both components. In addition, replacement PMs will be developed for similar critical components of the Secondary Systems based on EPRI Guidance.

05000390/LER-2014-00211 February 201410 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

On February 11, 2014, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) engineering and operations personnel discovered that non- conservative operator manual action times were credited in Appendix R analyses. Preliminary Westinghouse transient analysis calculations of WBN Unit 1 fire protection features revealed that there was less time than previously credited to perform certain operator manual actions to prevent pressurizer overfill during certain Appendix R fire scenarios. The Westinghouse analysis assumes the time required to isolate the normal charging path, secure the second charging pump and isolate the emergency charging path is approximately 12.5 minutes. Watts Bar Unit 1 procedures are non- conservative in that they allow these actions to be completed in 18 minutes.

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has verified that potentially impacted Appendix R equipment remains functional; however, a compensatory fire watch has been established for the affected areas until plant modifications are completed.

This event was caused by an error in a fire protection program design calculation prior to commercial operation of Unit 1.

Modifications to address this issue will be completed during the Fall 2015 refueling outage.

05000390/LER-2014-00110 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

On January 24, 2014, 1525 Eastern Standard Time (EST) with Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Unit 1 at 100 percent rated thermal power, two Train A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Level Control Valves (LCV) failed open due to loss of air. The valves 1-LCV-3-156-A and 1-LCV-3-164-A failed open following removal of the backup nitrogen control system. Upon investigation two essential air isolation valves 0-ISV-32-371 and 0-ISV-32-373, which are normally open to supply essential air from the Auxiliary Compressed Air System (ACAS) to motor driven AFW LCVs, were found closed.

Valves 0-ISV-32-371 and 0-ISV-32-373 were immediately opened which restored essential air to 1-LCV-3-156-A and 1-LCV-3-164-A. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.5 was entered at 1525 on January 24, 2014 when Train A Motor Driven AFW was declared inoperable. Upon restoration of air to LCVs, TS LCO 3.7.5 was exited at 1612 on January, 24, 2014.

The cause of this event was that valves 0-ISV-32-371 and 0-ISV-32-373 were closed as part of work order activities and Operations personnel failed to restore the valves to their normal open position.

05000390/LER-2013-0023 May 201310 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident

On May 2, 2013 at 0845, B-train Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) was removed from service for planned maintenance and Operations declared Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.9 not met and entered Condition A for one EGTS train inoperable. On May 3, 2013 at 0111, the Main Control Room was notified that the A-A Auxiliary Air Compressor Air Dryer was not purging due to failure of the Auxiliary Control Air System (ACAS) A-A dryer central timing unit. Operations declared A-train ACAS and supported Technical Specification systems inoperable, including A-train EGTS.

WBN operations entered LCO 3.0.3 due to the inoperability of two trains of EGTS and began preparations to initiate an orderly shutdown within one hour. Operations initiated actions to restore B-train EGTS to standby in accordance with System Operating Instruction (S01)-65.02, Emergency Gas Treatment System. At 0155, B-train EGTS was declared operable and the actions of LCO 3.0.3 exited. No action was taken to reduce reactor power while in LCO 3.0.3.

The A-A Auxiliary Air Compressor Air Dryer central timing unit motor was replaced. The apparent cause of this event was that there were missed opportunities to identify the need for replacement preventive maintenance (PM) for the central timing unit. Change requests have been initiated for periodic replacement of the ACAS dryer central timing unit. Components in other systems which could be subject to the same failure mechanism will be reviewed and PM activities initiated as necessary.

05000390/LER-2013-0016 February 2013
  • On July 28, 2009, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) identified latent design input inconsistencies in hydrological computer modeling used for probable maximum flood (PMF) calculations.

The root causes of the condition were an organizational behavior which allowed the latent input inconsistencies to go undetected and management failure to provide oversight of the impact of river system changes on the calculated value of the PMF. The corrective actions to prevent recurrence are to procedurally require a Flood Protection Program, develop formal Flood Protection Program Management Implementing Procedure(s) and Design Standards/Guides, create a formal documented risk management process for all engineering products, formalize the elements of engineering technical rigor, and implement an upper tier integrated risk management process.

Upon discovery, TVA implemented both immediate and interim corrective actions to ensure the Fort Loudoun, Cherokee, Tellico and Watts Bar dams would not overtop during an assumed PMF event.

05000390/LER-2012-00516 October 201210 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

On October 16, 2012, at 2330 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN-1) licensed operators attempted a manual fast transfer of the 1B-B 6.9kV Shutdown Board (SDBD) from the normal feeder breaker to the alternate feeder breaker. The transfer was not successful, resulting in the automatic start of the four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). After the 1B-B 6.9kV SDBD de-energized and the loads were shed, the alternate feeder breaker closed and re-energized the 1B-B 6.9kV SDBD. The loads supplied by the 1B-B 6.9kV SDBD were subsequently reconnected, and required tests were successfully completed to ensure operability of the 1B-B 6.9kV SDBD.

At the time of the event, WBN-1 was in MODE 5 following a refueling outage. Operations personnel promptly entered the appropriate response procedure and re-established power to required loads. Required safety systems functioned as designed. This condition did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.

The cause of this event was that plant operators did not ensure the alternate feeder breaker hand-switch was held firmly in the "closed" position while initiating the fast board transfer.

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), a condition that resulted in automatic actuation of the EDGs.

05000390/LER-2012-00410 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
05000390/LER-2012-00310 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications0
05000390/LER-2011-00222 June 200910 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

While performing Surveillance Instruction 1-SI-67-1 on June 22, 2009, TVA discovered that both Primary Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) Supply Valve (2-FCV-67-66) and Backup ERCW Supply Valve (2-FCV-67-68) to the 2A-A Emergency Diesel Generator heat exchangers were open. Under normal operating conditions, 2-FCV-67-66 is open and 2-FCV-67-68 is closed. With both supply valves open, the system was not properly aligned, and ERCW supply headers 1A and 2B were cross-connected. This misalignment caused the ERCW system to be inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.8 and the system could not meet surveillance requirement (SR) 3.7.8.1, to verify valves are in the correct position. With both ERCW trains inoperable, the plant entered LCO 3.0.3. Valve 2-FCV-67-68 was closed immediately upon discovery, and the plant exited LCO 3.0.3. Evaluation of the system alignment indicates that there was no loss of safety function, but because of the incorrect alignment, the ERCW system was inoperable for over nine hours, and Watts Bar failed to be in mode 3 within seven hours as required by LCO 3.0.3.

This event is reported as a condition prohibited by TS under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) because the plant was in LCO 3.0.3 for a period longer than allowed by TS.