05000390/LER-2016-009, Regarding Failure to Complete Surveillance Requirements Causes Conditions Prohibited by the Technical Specifications
| ML16197A535 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/2016 |
| From: | Simmons P Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 16-009-00 | |
| Download: ML16197A535 (8) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) |
| 3902016009R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Iennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381 July 15, 2016 10 cFR 50.73 ATTN. Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Subject:
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 NRC Docket No.50-390 Licensee Event Report 390/2016-009-00, Failure to Comptete Surveillance Requirements Gauses Gonditions Prohibited by the Technical S pecifications Enclosed please find Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-390/2016-009-00 that has been prepared and submitted pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, (10 CFR) 50.73(aX2XiXB), conditions prohibited by Technical Specifications. Specifically, this LER reports conditions where compliance with Technical Specifications 3.6.3, Containment lsolation Valves, Required Actions were not met.
Should you have questions regarding this report, please contact Gordon Arent, Manager, Site Licensing at (423) 365-2004.
Paul Simmons Site Vice President Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Respectfully,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 July 18, 2016 cc (Enclosure):
NRC Regional Administrator - Region ll NRC Senior Resident lnspector - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLETTn REGULATORY GOMMISSION (1 1-2015) at*t'nu'?,
infifli LT.ENSEE EVEN, REP'RT (LER)
=o-r{F n *r.,
APPROVED BY OMb...O. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 1013112018
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 1. FACILIW NAME Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000390
- 3. PAGE OF 6
1
- 4. TITLE Failure to complete Surveillance Requirements Causes Conditions Prohibited by the Technical Specifications
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTHI DAY I YEAR YEAR I ti.i,'"TJSl.
REV NO.
MONTH !
DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME I
DOCKET NUMBER N/A I
11 11 I 2015 2016- 009 -00 07 18 2016 FACILITY NAME I
DOCKET NUMBER N/A I
- 9. OPERATING MODE II.THISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOFl0CFR$: (Checkallhatapply)
MODE 4 tr 20.2201(b) tr zo.22o3(aX3Xi) tr s0.73(aX2XiiXA) tr s0.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) tr 20.2201(d) n 2o.2zo3(aX3X..)
tr 50.73(ax2)(ii)(B) tr 50.73(a)(2)(viiiXB) tr 2o.2zo3(aX1) n 2o.22os(aX4) tr s0.73(ax2xiii) tr 50.73(aX2XixXA) tr 2o.2zos(aX2Xi) tr 50.36(cXlXiXA) n 50.73(a)(2XivXA) tr 50.73(a)(2Xx)
- 10. POWER LEVEL tr 20.2203(aX2Xii) tr 50.36(cxl XiiXA) tl s0.73(aX2)(vXA) tr rs.z1(aX4) tr 20.2203(aX2Xiii) tr s0.36(cX2) n s0.73(a)(2)(vXB) tr rc.r1(aXs) tr zo.22os(aX2Xiv) tr 50.46(a)(3xii) tr 50.73(aX2Xv)(c) tr rc.r7(a)(1) n 20.2203(a)(2Xv) tr 50.73(aX2XiXA) tr s0.73(aX2)(vxD) tr ft.rr(a)(2xi) tr 2o.22os(aX2Xvi)
X 50.73(aX2XiXB) tr 50.73(aX2Xvii) tr B.rz(ax2)(ii) tr 50.73(ax2)(i)(c) tr OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in
C. Dates and approximate times of occurrences
Date Event July 29,2015 Completed quarterly train A and B check valve testing of the ERCW supplv to UCCs September 22,2015 TS 3.6.3, Containment lsolation Valves, Required Actions were entered for the isolated train A ERCW supply line.
November 7, 2015 WBN1 commenced maintenance outaqe.
November 11,2015 WBN1 entered MODE 4 after a maintenance outage.
November 16, 2015 Quarterly train A and B check valve testing of the ERCW supplV to UCCs cannot be completed November 21,2015 Expiration of SR 3.6.3.4 (92-day) Frequency January 25,2016 Quarterly train A and B check valve testing of the ERCW supply to UCCs cannot be completed January 30, 2016 Plant operations personnel recognize that the last successful train B quarterly check valve surveillance testing was completed on July 29,2015 May 18, 2016 Determined that these plant conditions were reportable as conditions prohibited by TS.
On July 29,2015, WBN1 plant personnel satisfactorily completed the train A and train B check valve testing of the ERCW supply to UCCs in accordance with site surveillance procedures.
On September 22, 2015, WBN'I was in MODE 5 and shortly after commencement of 1R13 (reactor trip breakers were opened September 20,2015) plant outage workers observed water leaking from the 1A UCC. Further examination revealed that the ERCW supply line to the train A UCC had ruptured and was spilling water into an adjacent area. Accordingly, plant operators took action to isolate the ERCW supply line to the train a UCC. TS 3.6.3, Containment lsolation Valves, Required Actions were entered for the isolated train A ERCW supply line.
On November 11,2015, WBN1 entered MODE 4 from MODE 5, following a maintenance outage that commenced on November 7,2015. (Event Date)
On November 16, 2015, WBN1 plant personnel attempted, but could not satisfactorily complete, a portion of the train A quarterly check valve surveillance testing of the ERCW supply to UCCs because the train 1A supply had been isolated in response to the ruptured ERCW supply line.
Specifically, 1-CKV-67-580A could not be surveilled because it was between valves used to isolate the train A UCC ruptured ERCW supply line. Relatedly, train B check valve 1-CKV 580D could not be tested during the quarterly surveillance because the train A ERCW supply (which was isolated) is used to establish testing conditions.
On November 25, 2015, SR 3.6.3.4 Frequency expired.
On January 25,2016, performance of the train A and B quarterly check valve surveillance testing of the ERCW supply to UCCs was scheduled, but could not be completely satisfied due to the isolated train A supply line.
On, January 30, 2016, during document reviews, plant operations personnel recognized that the last successful completion of the train B quarterly check valve surveillance testing of the ERCW supply to UCCs had been completed on July 29,2015, which was beyond the quarterly periodicity, which expired on November 21,2015. ln response, plant operations personnel invoked TS SR 3.0.3, for a missed surveillance.
On May 18, 2016, it was determined that the plant conditions described above were reportable events as conditions prohibited by TS. (Discovery Date)
D. Manufacturer and model number (or other identification) of each component that failed during the event.
There were no components that failed during the event. The portions of the affected ERCW supply line to the 1A and 1B UCC are two inch stainless steel piping. The valves affected by this condition are stainless steeltwo inch check valves
E. Other systems or secondary functions affected
There were no other systems or secondary functions affected by this condition.
F. Method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error
The discovery of the condition prohibited by TS was identified by the NRC Senior Resident lnspector and confirmed by a WBN reportability evaluation.
G. The failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if known.
There were no components that failed during the event.
H. Operatoractions Other than the events described herein, there were no direct operator actions that influenced this event.
Automatically and manually initiated safety system responses
There were no automatically or manually initiated safety system responses as a result of this event.
lll.
Cause of the Event
A. The cause of each component or system failure or personnel error, if known.
There were no component or system failures that caused to this event.
B. The cause(s) and circumstances for each human performance related root cause WBN Operations personnel performed a Cognitive Adverse Trend review that analyzed these events as well as other recent LCO classification errors, and concluded:
"Operations Licensed personnel have not applied adequate rigor to ensure the accurate identification and timely implementation of Limiting Conditions of Operability (LCO)"
Specifically, 'Operations Licensed personnel have not consistently employed a process that validates LCO entries through the use of the licensing bases documents. Management oversight in the Main Control Room has not corrected issues with timely documentation of LCO implementation."
lV. Analysis of the Event Based on subsequent WBN causal evaluations, it has been concluded that only partial compliance with TS LCO 3.6.3, Containment lsolation Valves, Required Action A.2 could be confirmed.
Specifically, TS LCO 3.6.3 Required Action A.2, requires verification that the affected penetration flow path is isolated prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment, and it could not be confirmed that inboard train A ERCW supply isolation valve (1-FCV-67-295) occurred prior to Unit 1 MODE 4 entry on November 11,2015.
Additionally, operations personnel had initially invoked SR 3.0.3 when it was identified that the SR Frequency had expired for 1-Ct(/-67-580D. However, subsequent reviews revealed that this general TS provision did not apply and the surveillance should have been declared not met when the specified frequency expired on November 25,2015.
V.
Assessment of Safety Consequences
Safety limits and limiting safety system settings were not affected by this condition. There were no safety system responses associated with this condition. There were no component failures associated with this condition. There was no loss of safety function as a result of this condition.
VI. CorrectiveActions Corrective actions are being managed by Tennessee Valley Authority's corrective action program under Condition Reports (CRs) 1174000, 1172114, 1169297, 11U837, 1131257, and 1 131256.
A. lmmediateCorrectiveActions Compliance with TS 3.6.3 Required Action A.2 was achieved on January 30, 2016, when the required containment penetration isolation valves were confirmed to be closed.
B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence or to reduce probability of similar events occurring in the future.
The WBN Operations Superintendent will present a "case study" of the all events identified in the cognitive adverse trend evaluation to all licensed operators. The training will review TS issues with all licensed operators to ensure understanding.
Vll. Additional lnformation A. Previous similar events at the same plant A review of internal operating experience did not reveal any previously reported events or conditions that involved the same underlying concern or reason as this event, such as the same root cause, failure, or sequence of events. However, recent similar events at WBN1 have been identified and are being addressed through a Cognitive Adverse Trend review that analyzed these events.
B. Additionallnformation None.
C. Safety System Functional Failure Consideration (Reference NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance lndicator Guideline," for definitions and guidance)
The event did not result in a safety system functionalfailure.
D. Scrams with Complications Consideration (Reference NE! 99-02 for definitions and guidance)
There was not a unit SCRAM complicated or othenrvise associated with this event.
Vll!. Commitments None.