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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 540401 May 2019 21:03:00FarleyNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MISALIGNED CONTROL ROD At 1643 (CDT), with Unit 2 in Mode 2 during low power physics testing, the reactor was manually tripped per procedure due to a misaligned control rod. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the atmosphere using the atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 is not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 05/08/2019 AT 1212 EDT FROM MIKE CONNER TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

This Event Notification is being updated to clarify that the reactor was not critical when this event occurred. Therefore, the reporting requirement is changed from 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). The reactor was tripped during low power physics testing. The misaligned rod was encountered during rod group insertion and the affected bank had been inserted to the extent that the reactor was subcritical when the operators tripped the reactor. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Lopez)

ENS 5400216 April 2019 02:59:00FarleyNRC Region 2At 2355 CDT on 4/15/19, life-saving activities by offsite medical personnel for a Farley employee were terminated. The coroner declared the individual deceased at the plant site at 0130 CDT. The fatality is not believed to be work-related and the individual was inside of the Radiological Controlled Area. This is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will be notifying the Occupational Safety and Health Administration due to the on-site fatality. The licensee will perform a radiological survey of the individual prior to transportation offsite.
ENS 5382715 January 2019 12:25:00FarleyNRC Region 2At 0800 CST on January 15, 2019, a non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been placed on hold. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 533938 May 2018 10:38:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn May 8, 2018 at 0139 Central Daylight Time, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 declared containment inoperable due to total containment leak rate greater than technical specifications. The 1B containment cooler had seat leakage of approximately 30 gallons per minute from a service water drain valve. Though the containment cooler service water supply is not tested per the Appendix J program, a loss of the containment barrier is possible under accident conditions. The service water flow path to the 1B containment cooler has been isolated to exit the condition. The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.
ENS 533928 May 2018 01:39:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn May 7, 2018 at 1041 CDT, Unit 1 performed an RCS (reactor coolant system) leakrate procedure that calculated an unidentified RCS leakrate of 0.202 gpm. The leak source investigation concluded at 2150 that the packing for the charging flow control valve (FCV) was the source of the RCS leakage when it was bypassed, which isolated the leakage. A second RCS leakrate calculation was performed after the charging flow control valve was isolated which calculated an acceptable leakrate of 0.00 gpm. The packing leakage from the charging flow control valve represented leakage external to containment which would result in a greater that 5 Rem dose projection to control room personnel during accident conditions which does not satisfy the GDC19 criteria described in Technical Specification Bases 3.7.10. Therefore the control room emergency filtration system would not be able to fulfill its design function resulting in an unanalyzed condition. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) for a 'condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'. The packing leak from the charging flow control valve will remain isolated until repaired under work order SNC944374. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5329026 March 2018 18:19:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On March 25, 2018 at 1833 CDT, while at 100 percent power, Farley Unit 1 (FNP-1) conservatively declared a single Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) inoperable on the 1C Steam Generator line due to indication of Steam Generator pressure rise with a corresponding reduction in flow of that loop. FNP-1 began a reactor shutdown at 0400 CDT on March 26, 2018 to establish plant conditions to support testing the affected main steam line MSIVs while in the required action time of Technical Specification 3.7.2. At 1338 CDT on March 26, 2018, testing confirmed that the single MSIV was inoperable and that valve disassembly will be required. The duration of the valve repair would exceed the required action time of Technical Specification 3.7.2. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), as a plant shutdown required by technical specifications. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DOUGLAS HOBSON TO KEN MOTT AT 0202 EDT ON 5/16/18 * * *

This EN (event notification) is being updated to clarify the reporting criteria as 'Voluntary'. Farley Technical Specification 3.7.2 allows continuous operation in MODE 2 with an INOPERABLE MSIV as long as the other MSIV in the affected Main Steam Line is closed. The initiation of the shutdown was performed as a prudent action to repair and restore OPERABILITY of the affected MSIV and was not a requirement of the Farley Technical Specifications. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R2DO (Masters) was notified.

ENS 531599 January 2018 23:38:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On January 9, 2018, at 1759 CST, during review of NFPA 805 requirements and circuit analysis, it was determined that the NFPA 805 analysis and Fire Safe Shutdown Modeling did not consider all fire-induced failures. As such, a condition could possibly exist during a postulated fire where both safety related electrical trains could be impacted. This notification is to report a condition involving the fire safe shutdown analysis. The condition could result in an adverse impact on the ability of operators to respond to a postulated fire in these areas. Therefore, this notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Compensatory fire watches have been established in the affected areas. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM ANTONIO BENFORD TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1752 EST ON 2/28/18 * * *

Following additional refinements to the NFPA 805 Fire PRA Model, the circuits which initiated the initial report of an unanalyzed condition have now been evaluated and have proven that no significant degradation to plant safety existed. Therefore, EN 53159 is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Michel).

ENS 527852 June 2017 17:07:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This notification is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) due to both trains of Penetration Room Filtration (PRF) being inoperable due to an inoperable PRF Boundary. At 0920 (CDT) on 6/2/2017, a gap was discovered between an electrical penetration room ceiling and the containment wall where seismic gap material was noted to be missing. The gap was subsequently closed and PRF testing completed sat. The condition was exited at 1345 (CDT). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 7/25/17 AT 1725 EDT FROM MATT STANLEY TO DONG PARK * * *

On 6/2/17 at 1707 CDT Farley Nuclear Plant notified the NRC Operations Center of an entry into Technical Specification 3.7.12 Condition B for Unit 1 loss of two trains of Penetration Room Filtration (PRF). At 0920 (CDT) on 6/2/2017, a gap had been discovered between an electrical penetration and containment where seismic gap material was noted to be missing. The report was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) under Event Notification 52785. Upon further engineering review and satisfactory testing to support operability, Farley has determined that the configuration did not meet the criteria for a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, and is retracting the notification. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

ENS 524147 December 2016 17:24:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopDuring the evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and the potential impacts to Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment, it was concluded that the following SSCs (systems, structures, and components) were vulnerable to tornado generated missiles. The Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) intake and exhaust ventilation hoods, located on the roof of the SWIS, are not adequately protected from missiles generated by a tornado. Should a tornado-generated missile strike the SWIS intake and exhaust ventilation hoods, the hoods could crimp thus reducing air flow and challenging the performance of their heating and cooling safety functions. If the intake hoods were damaged or removed due to a missile strike, entry of rainwater could occur due to severe weather high wind velocity, and could affect safety related electrical equipment in the rooms directly below the hoods. These potential conditions could render Service Water trains inoperable on either or both units. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being addressed in accordance with EGM-15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 (enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). Required actions have been taken. Corrective actions will be documented in a follow up licensee event report. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. The licensee is evaluating the operability of the service water system. Should one train be declared inoperable, the licensee would be in a 72 hr. LCO action statement. If both trains are inoperable, then the licensee would enter T.S. 3.0.3.
ENS 5239527 November 2016 03:08:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0026 (CST) on November 27, 2016, Farley Unit 1 was manually tripped from 100% reactor power due to voltage swings suspected to be caused by the Auto Voltage Regulator. All control rods fully inserted and Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) auto-started as expected. All systems responded as expected. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). The cause of the main generator voltage oscillations is under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The trip was uncomplicated. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to condenser. The plant is at normal operating pressure and temperature with auxiliary feedwater supplying the steam generators. The electrical grid is stable and supplying plant loads. All safety equipment is available, if needed. Unit 2 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100% power.
ENS 5237417 November 2016 20:51:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1859 CST on November 17, 2016, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 initiated a shutdown from approximately 99 percent reactor power. The shutdown was initiated per Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3. This LCO entry was based on having no operable steam flow channels on the C loop for Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1. Unit 2 as not affected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 523568 November 2016 17:36:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1331 (CST) on November 8, 2016, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 manually tripped from 32% reactor power. The plant was ramping down to remove the main generator from service due to an unrelated issue. 1A SGFP did not respond to control Steam Generator (SG) level as expected when the miniflow was opened per procedure. SG levels lowered due to lower feed flow and the reactor was manually tripped in accordance with plant procedures. All control rods fully inserted and Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) auto started as expected. The Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed to minimize the cool-down. Decay heat is being removed through the Atmospheric Relief Valves. All other systems responded as expected. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). The failure of the 1A SGFP control is under investigation. Unit 2 was not affected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There is no primary to secondary leakage.
ENS 523401 November 2016 19:01:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1743 CDT on 11/1/16, readings were obtained that indicated ammonia above IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health) values in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building and an Alert was declared by the Emergency Director. The plant is stable with Unit 1 at 2% power. Unit 2 is at 100% power (and stable). The site is currently investigating to determine the source and ventilate the area." The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, EPA EOC, FEMA National Watch Center (email), FDA EOC (email), Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM BLAKE MITCHELL TO STEVEN VITTO ON 11/02/2016 AT 0443 EDT * * *

The following is the Emergency Preparedness 8-hour report for the Plant Farley ALERT declaration. An ALERT was declared at 1743 CDT on November 1, 2016, based on Emergency Action Level (EAL) HA3 (Release of toxic, asphyxiant, or flammable gases within vital areas which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or establish or maintain safe shutdown) due to an ammonia discharge into the Auxiliary Building. Farley Unit 1 was in Mode 2 at 2 percent power and Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power throughout the event. Actions completed during and leading up to termination from the event included walkdown of the area to locate the ammonia source, and isolating the ammonia source while atmospheric monitoring was performed in all affected and adjacent areas. Installation of additional ventilation fans was completed. This event has been entered into the Farley Corrective Action Program under Condition Report 10293519 (Ammonia levels in 100 Feet Radside). A review of the Alert classification has determined that the classification was timely and accurate. All required notifications were completed accurately and in a timely manner. The ERO (Emergency Response Organization) notification system functioned as expected and all emergency response facilities were activated in a timely manner. There were no missing or injured personnel during the event. There is no evidence of tampering or sabotage of plant equipment leading to this event. At 2202 CDT on 11/1/2016, the ammonia source was identified as Valve N1P20V913. At 2228 CDT, the ammonia source was isolated. Final assessment of the Auxiliary Building showed that the ammonia levels were less than 5 ppm. It was determined that a deficiency in the valve component was the cause of the ammonia leak. The Alert was terminated on 11/1/2016 at 2340 CDT. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Ernstes), IRD (Stapleton), NRR EO (Miller). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, EPA EOC, FEMA National Watch Center (email), FDA EOC (email), Nuclear SSA (email).

ENS 522741 October 2016 09:42:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0512 (CDT) on October 1, 2016, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 automatically tripped from 99 percent reactor power due to the inadvertent closure of a main steam isolation valve (MSIV). The closure of the MSIV caused a turbine trip resulting in an automatic reactor trip. Concurrent with the reactor trip, a safety injection (SI) occurred. The plant is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) autostarted as expected. The cause of MSIV closure and SI actuation is under investigation. Cooldown will continue to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) as planned for entry into a scheduled refueling outage. Restart is not planned until the completion of the refueling outage. Unit 2 was not affected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The MSIVs are open with the steam generators discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. SI was from high head injection which has been secured.
ENS 521575 August 2016 20:55:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1209 CDT on 8/5/16, during testing of Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Pre-action Sprinkler Systems, all zones on the Unit 2 Pyrotronics Fire Detection Panel went into an alarm state and were unable to be reset. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Assessment capability. The NRC Resident has been notified. The licensee has initiated all necessary compensatory and corrective actions.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BLAKE MITCHELL TO VINCE KLCO AT 1718 EDT ON 8/6/2016 * * *

At 1600 CDT on 8/6/16, the Unit 2 Pyrotronics Fire Detection Panel was declared functional following repair of master override reset test switch and supply fuse. The Pyrotronics Fire Detection Panel was successfully tested following maintenance. The emergency assessment capability for the site's Emergency Plan has been fully restored. The NRC Resident has been notified Notified the R2DO (Suggs).

ENS 5211621 July 2016 18:28:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopSouthern Nuclear Operating Company had a non-licensed supervisory contractor employee confirmed positive result for alcohol during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The contractor employee's unescorted access to the plant has been revoked. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 520611 July 2016 17:00:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 7/1/16, the Houston County Dispatch (911 Center) was conducting a monthly weather siren test. At approximately 1205 CDT, there was an inadvertent actuation of 41 emergency sirens in Houston County. The emergency sirens were deactivated at approximately 1208 CDT. Houston Country EMA issued a press release to notify the public of the inadvertent actuation. This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the inadvertent actuation and subsequent press release. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event as the offsite response capabilities remain functional. The site is operating normally with no emergency conditions present. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5191811 May 2016 10:56:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0653 (CDT) on 5/11/16, Farley Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped from 29 (percent) power. The initiating event was hi-hi Steam Generator level. Steam Generator levels began to rise following the start of a second condensate pump. The hi-hi steam generator level setpoint was reached causing the only running main feedwater pump to trip, a main feedwater isolation, and an automatic turbine trip. Auxiliary feedwater automatically started as expected. The reactor was manually tripped per procedure. All other systems responded properly for the event and there were no complications. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5114811 June 2015 13:15:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive test for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's plant access has been placed on administrative hold. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 510477 May 2015 09:45:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis notification is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) due to a Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 shutdown required by Technical Specifications. At 0509 CDT on 5/7/2015, 1B Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) tripped during transfer of 1B 4160V bus to 1B unit auxiliary transformer. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.4 Condition A was entered for loss of a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) loop. Unit 1 reactor was shut down per operating procedures and entered Mode 3 at 0740 CDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 510435 May 2015 13:05:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0422 CDT on 5/5/2015, with Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 in Mode 2, and the 1A Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP) in the tripped condition, the 1B SGFP was manually tripped during troubleshooting. The trip of the second SGFP initiated the auto start signal for the MDAFWPs (motor driven aux feedwater pumps) due to the auto start signal not being defeated. Both MDAFW pumps were in service supplying AFW to the steam generators (SG) when the actuation signal was received. The effects of the auto start signal were to fully open the AFW Flow Control Valves and isolate SG blowdown and SG blowdown sample valves. These actions occurred successfully and the auto start signal was reset. There was no adverse impact to the plant and decay heat continued to be removed through the condenser throughout the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5100824 April 2015 00:15:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis notification is being reported to NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification of an on-site fatality of a contract employee. In addition, the contracting company plans to notify the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of a fatality per 29 CFR 1904.39. At approximately 1717 CDT on 4/23/15, a 911 call was received in the Control Room regarding a contract employee who was found unresponsive and unattended in a temporary break room set up on the Turbine Deck during the Unit 1 refueling outage. Resuscitation by first responders and paramedics from a nearby town was unsuccessful. Resuscitation efforts were suspended at 1750. The Houston County Sheriff's Office was notified at approximately 1800 and they responded to the site at 1822. The county coroner was notified and arrived on site at 1850. (Farley Nuclear Plant) received notification at approximately 2035 that the contractor company intended to notify OSHA. A press release is not planned at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 1 remains in Mode 6 and Unit 2 remains in Mode 1 at 100% power.
ENS 5067713 December 2014 10:00:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0152 CST on December 13, 2014, both strings of the Unit 2 containment smoke detection system were declared non-functional due to a non-radioactive steam leak inside containment. The steam leak was causing spurious alarms to the smoke detection system. This condition prevents identification and assessment of a fire in containment. Required compensatory measures have been established. Since a fire in the containment building is an entry condition for the site's emergency plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The steam leak was caused by a faulty main steam flow detector. The licensee has shut down the reactor to effect repairs.
ENS 5061815 November 2014 08:14:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis notification is being made as required by 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to control room operators opening the Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2 reactor trip breakers via the main control board hand switch during reactor startup procedures. This is a valid actuation of the reactor protection system. The reactor was not critical at the time the reactor trip breakers were opened. While withdrawing control rods for reactor startup and low power physics testing with control bank C at approximately 50 steps, Digital Rod Position indication for one of the control rods (M12) changed to 90 steps. The control room operators stopped withdrawing rods and entered FNP-2-AOP-19 (Malfunction of the Rod Control System). The reactor trip breakers were opened at 0353 CST. All rods inserted as expected. All other systems functioned normally. The plant is stable at normal operating pressure and temperature. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5060412 November 2014 10:44:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0202 (CST) on November 12, 2014, it was determined that Unit 2 had no functional smoke detection capability in the containment. During post modification testing on the smoke detection system, it was discovered that both trains of detection were not functional. Required compensatory measures have been established. Since a fire in the containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered an unplanned loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). (Farley) Condition Report: 892818. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5053314 October 2014 07:37:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This notification is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to a Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2 manual reactor trip. The trip was initiated when the in service train of CCW cooling to the Reactor Coolant Pumps was lost due to a loss of the 2B Start Up Transformer (SUT). The control room team manually tripped the reactor then tripped all three reactor coolant pumps as required by station procedure. There was a line of severe thunderstorms with lightning passing through the plant site at the time of loss of the 2B Start Up Transformer. The 2B emergency diesel generator was out of service for maintenance therefore there was a loss of the 'B' train emergency power 4160V electrical bus ('B' train LOSP (Loss of Offsite Power)). 'A' train emergency power remained energized from offsite sources. The plant is stable at normal operating pressure and temperature. At 0433 (CDT), 2B Reactor Coolant Pump was re-started when support conditions were re-established. Heat sink is adequate using the 2A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. Unit 2 'B' train power was restored by starting the 2C emergency diesel generator at 0523 (CDT). This restored power to the Digital Rod Position Indication system, and control rod K-8 in control bank 'C' indicated full out, and all other control rods fully inserted. An emergency boration is in progress to compensate for the stuck rod. Additionally, the reactor trip resulted in a valid actuation of the Aux Feedwater system which is an eight hour non-emergency report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). During the transient, one primary PORV momentarily opened, then reseated. Decay heat is being directed to the atmospheric relief valves with no indicated primary to secondary leakage. There was no impact on Unit 1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 2125 EDT ON 10/15/2014 FROM BLAKE MITCHELL TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Digital rod position indication troubleshooting was conducted on 10/14/2014 and confirmed all control rods, including control rod K-8, fully inserted following the reactor trip. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Ayres), NRR EO (Davis) and IRD (Gott).

ENS 5003414 April 2014 14:48:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0600 CDT on 4/14/14, it was determined that the ability to obtain a post-accident hydrogen sample from Unit 1 containment was lost. With both trains of Post-Accident Hydrogen Analyzers (PAHA) out of service, it was discovered that there was reduced sample flow indicated on the backup methodology through a containment sample port (R67). Repair efforts are underway. A follow-up notification will be sent when assessment capability is restored. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DARRIN GARD TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1425 EDT ON 4/15/14 * * *

Assessment capability has been restored as of 1933 EDT on April 14, 2014 utilizing the containment particulate rad monitor sample port R-67. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Widmann).

ENS 4990112 March 2014 10:34:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 0841 (CDT) on March 12, 2014, the Unit 1 Pyro Panel (fire/smoke detection panel) was removed from service for required maintenance. The pyro panel was declared non-functional when it was removed from service. Compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in the Containment Building is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperature is being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service however this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. A courtesy follow up notification will be sent when the pyro panel is returned to service and functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DARRIN GARD TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1344 EDT ON 3/12/14 * * *

The repairs to the Unit 1 Pyro Panel have been completed and the panel was returned to service on 3/12/14 at 1010 CDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).

ENS 4986228 February 2014 11:02:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 0842 CST on February 28, 2014, the Unit 1 Pyro Panel (fire/smoke detection panel) was removed from service for required maintenance. The Pyro Panel was declared non-functional when it was removed from service. Compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the Unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in the Containment Building is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperature is being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service, however this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. A courtesy follow up notification will be sent when the pyro panel is returned to service and functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD LULLING TO CHARLES TEAL AT 2215 EST ON 2/28/14 * * *

At 1704 CST on 2/28/2014 the Unit 1 Pyro Panel was declared functional following the return of the fire indicating unit (FIU) to the original status. The Pyro Panel fire detection system was successfully tested following the maintenance. The emergency assessment capability for the site's Emergency Plan has been fully restored concerning a containment fire. The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (McCoy).

ENS 497893 February 2014 18:39:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

The facility Technical Support Center (TSC) was rendered non-functional due to a malfunction in the TSC HVAC system. A leak in the refrigerant tubing has resulted in a loss of refrigerant and affected the system's ability to provide proper climate control. Repairs are being planned and will commence today. The out of service time is greater than one hour which by the station's Technical Requirements Manual is an 8 hour non-emergency report. Compensatory measures per site procedure FNP-0-EIP-6.0 (TSC Setup and Activation) for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities are available. These measures include the conditional relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency if the Emergency Director deems the TSC to be uninhabitable. A follow up notification will be made when the TSC is declared functional. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0100 EST ON 02/04/14 FROM RICK LULLING TO S. SANDIN * * *

The following was received as a courtesy notification follow-up: At 2320 CST on 2/3/2014 the TSC HVAC was declared functional following post maintenance testing. Satisfactory pressure testing, system evacuation, and system re-charging were performed following the repair to two tubing leaks. Emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities have been fully restored to the Technical Support Center. The Emergency Director, and NRC Senior Resident Inspector have been informed. Notified R2DO (McCoy).

ENS 4974418 January 2014 14:48:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 10:20 (CST) on January 18, 2014, the Unit 2 Pyro Panel (fire/smoke detection panel) was declared non-functional due to an unknown equipment problem. Compensatory measures (e.g. continuous roving fire watches) have been established for all affected areas with the exception of the Unit 2 Containment Building. Containment fire watches have been established per the FSAR, which includes monitoring various temperatures, pressures, and other parameters for Containment, and systems associated with containment. However, this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. Since a fire in Containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability, and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RICK LULLING TO DANIEL MILLS AT 0700 EST ON 1/20/14 * * *

At 0404 CST on 1/20/14 the Unit 2 Pyro panel was declared functional following the replacement of the fire indicating unit (FIU) and the power supply, and successful post maintenance testing. The emergency assessment capability for the site's Emergency Plan has been fully restored concerning a Containment fire. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (King).

ENS 4973517 January 2014 12:45:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 0925 (CST) on January 17, 2014, the Unit 1 pyro panel (smoke detection panel) was removed from service for required maintenance. The pyro panel was declared non-functional when it was removed from service. Compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the Unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in Containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperatures are being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service, however, this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. The site NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DARRIN GARD TO CHARLES TEAL AT 2202 EST ON 1/17/14 * * *

The pyro panel was restored to service as of 1650 CST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (King).

ENS 4971511 January 2014 13:24:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn January 10, 2014, at 0919 CST, the plant voluntarily entered multiple required action statements in Technical Specifications 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System to conduct surveillance testing of the B-train Solid State Protection System (SSPS). During testing, abnormal indications were received. As a result of the abnormal indications, the SSPS has not been returned to operable status within the required completion time of 24 hours. At 1100 CST on January 11, 2014, Unit 2 commenced a plant shutdown required by technical specifications and will be in Mode 3 by 1519. Therefore, this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), plant shutdown required by technical specifications. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4963816 December 2013 21:37:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1627 CST on December 16, 2013 Farley Nuclear Plant determined that the following was an unanalyzed condition: As a result of recent industry operating experience (OE 305419, EN 49411, EN 49419) regarding the impact of un-fused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the Control Room, Farley performed a review of ammeter circuitry for similar issues. The review determined the described condition to be applicable to Farley resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The wiring design for the ammeters contains a shunt in the current flow from each DC battery and battery charger, but the ammeter wiring attached to the shunt does not contain fuses. It is postulated that a fire could cause one of the ammeter wires to short to ground. Concurrently, the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also short to ground. This would cause a ground loop through the un-fused ammeter cable. The potential exists that the cable could heat up, causing a secondary fire in the ammeter raceway. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to safely shutdown per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures have been implemented for affected areas of the plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4963716 December 2013 21:37:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1454 CST on December 16, 2013, the Unit 1 pyro panel (smoke detection panel) was declared non-functional due to an unexpected failure. Viable compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the Unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in Containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperatures are being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service, however, this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 2046 EST ON 12/17/13 FROM DARRIN GARD TO DANIEL MILLS * * *

The Unit 1 pyro panel has been returned to service as of 1554 CST on 12/17/13, which restores Unit 1 containment fire detection capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Freeman).

ENS 496199 December 2013 10:19:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 0906 CST on December 9, 2013, the Unit 1 pyro panel (smoke detection panel) was removed from service for planned repairs. The pyro panel is expected to be out of service for approximately 8 hours. Viable compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the Unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in Containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperatures are being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service, however this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining an effective assessment capability. A follow-up notification will be provided upon restoration of Containment Building smoke detection capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN ANDREWS TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1345 EST ON 12/9/13 * * *

The Unit 1 pyro panel (smoke detection panel) has been returned to service after planned repairs. The loss of emergency assessment capability reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) has been restored. The NRC Resident (Inspector) will be notified of the update. Notified R2DO (Masters).

ENS 494177 October 2013 20:36:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This is a report of a loss of emergency assessment capability as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). On October 7, 2013 at 1804 CDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 6 during a refueling outage, power was interrupted to all Unit 1 vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors as part of a pre-planned activity to connect the radiation monitors to an alternate temporary power supply to support deenergizing the normal power source for preventative maintenance. The connection to the alternate supply was completed and power was restored to the vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors at 1833 CDT. While the radiation monitors were without power, pre-planned compensatory measures were implemented where possible to monitor vent stack discharge and to minimize activities that posed a potential for release. At the completion of the preventive maintenance on the normal power supply, power to the vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitor will again be briefly interrupted to reconnect the normal power source to the monitors. The pre-planned compensatory measures will again be utilized during this power interruption. An update to this report will be provided following the restoration of normal power to the radiation monitors. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DARRIN GARD TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0419 EDT ON 10/13/13 * * *

On October 13, 2013 at 0217 CDT, with Unit 1 in defueled mode during a refueling outage, power was interrupted to all Unit 1 vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors as part of a pre-planned activity to transfer the radiation monitors back to their normal power supply. The connection to the normal supply was completed and power was restored to the vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors at 0245 CDT. Pre-planned compensatory measures were implemented where possible to monitor vent stack discharge and to minimize activities that posed a potential for release. Notified R2DO (Widmann) and the licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 492323 August 2013 06:50:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

(On August 3, 2013, at 0520 CDT), Farley Unit 1 declared an ALERT emergency based on (EAL) HA3, 'Release of Toxic, Asphyxiant, or Flammable Gas'. This was due to a tagout of the CO2 Fire Protection System, which resulted in an unexpected discharge of CO2 on the Unit 1 Radiation Side of the Auxiliary Building. The 100 foot elevation level on Unit 1 had an oxygen concentration below the required amount. CO2 has been isolated at the source tank in order to terminated the leak. No personnel have been affected. There is no radiation release in progress. ERDS has been activated. The licensee is assembling a team to enter the affected area and verify oxygen levels are within allowable limits in order to terminate the ALERT emergency. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State and local organizations. Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, DHS NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA and NuclearSSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JONATHAN MCCORY TO STEVE SANDIN AT 1215 EDT ON 08/03/13 * * *

Farley Unit 1 terminated from the ALERT at 1110 CDT on 8/3/13. Oxygen levels are acceptable in all areas of the plant. The CO2 tank has been isolated and is stable at 68%. Plant conditions are stable and improving and all necessary compensatory measures are in place. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable state and local authorities. Notified R2DO (King), NRR EO (Hiland), IRD (Kozal), and PAO (Couret), DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, DHS NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA and NuclearSSA via email.

ENS 4910612 June 2013 01:33:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a report of an automatic RPS actuation and automatic ESF actuation per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Additionally, this is to report intentions for a press release per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). At 2105 CDT on 6/11/13, Farley Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip from 100% power. The initiating event was the loss of the 1B Start up Transformer which resulted in de-energization of the B-Train ESF 4KV buses and the 1B and 1C Reactor Coolant Pump Buses. The 1B Emergency Diesel Generator auto started and tied to the B-Train 4KV Emergency buses. Both MDAFW (Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater) Pumps and the TDAFW (Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater) Pump auto-started and are supplying AFW flow to the steam generators. Decay heat removal is via the steam dumps to the main condenser. The cause of the loss of the 1B Start-up Transformer is unknown and is currently under investigation. All other systems functioned as expected in response to the loss of the 1B Start-up Transformer and reactor trip. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. A press release is planned. All control rods fully inserted. There is no impact on Unit 2. Currently the licensee does not plan to restart the 1B and 1C Reactor Coolant Pumps. Pressurizer spray has been isolated from the 1B loop per procedure. Main Condenser vacuum is adequate for decay heat removal.
ENS 491017 June 2013 20:21:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a report of an on-site fatality and planned press release per 10 CFR 52(b)(2)(xi). An off-duty Farley employee was supporting a non-work related activity on the plant site (within the Owner Controlled Area) and sustained a suspected weather related fatal injury. The individual was located outside of the protected area but on the plant property. The individual was transported to the plant nurses station and CPR initiated. CPR was terminated at 1550 (CDT) at the direction of ambulance personnel with the individual being unresponsive. The Houston County Sheriff was notified at approximately 1600 (CDT) and responded to the site with the county coroner. The NRC resident was notified on 6/7/2013 at 1650 (CDT). A press release is planned.
ENS 490915 June 2013 17:09:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a report of a loss of emergency assessment capability as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 1039 CDT on June 5, 2013, Farley Unit 2 experienced a communication failure of the Integrated Plant Computer (IPC). This represents a loss of Unit 2 automated SPDS and ERDS capability. This also rendered the Technical Support Center (TSC) non-functional for Unit 2 since the TSC relies on IPC data displays for event assessment. The Unit 2 IPC was returned to service at 1115 CDT, restoring all affected emergency response capability. Investigation to determine the cause of the failure is ongoing. With the exception of the Unit 2 IPC all systems functioned as required. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 4897828 April 2013 14:47:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a 60-day optional telephonic notification of an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump (TDAFWP). This report is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On 28 February 2013, at 1534 CST, during restoration of the Unit 1 TDAFWP from steam admission valve maintenance, steam was inadvertently admitted to the TDAFWP turbine, resulting in the TDAFWP delivering auxiliary feed water flow to the steam generators. On 28 February 2013, the Unit 1 TDAFWP was removed from service for replacement of the hand switch and air-supply solenoid to the TDAFWP steam admission valve. The tagout utilized for this maintenance closed the TDAFWP trip-throttle valve to ensure that steam remained isolated from the TDAFWP. During the replacement of the hand switch and air-supply solenoid, the normally closed steam admission valve failed to the open position. This went unnoticed by Operations personnel. When the TDAFWP trip throttle valve was reopened during post-maintenance restoration, the failed-open steam admission valve provided a steam path to the TDAFWP. The TDAFWP started and supplied approximately 60-70 gpm feed water flow to each steam generator for approximately one minute prior to being secured by the operators. No main turbine load reduction was required to maintain reactor power within limits. This was an invalid actuation of the TDAFWP due to no automatic actuation signals being present and no operator actions being taken with the intent of starting the TDAFWP. During a normal TDAFWP start, the steam admission valve is opened in concert with steam supply valves aligned in series with the steam admission valve. During this event, the steam supply valves remained closed (steam flow bypassed these valves through normally open warm-up valves). Therefore, this event was a partial actuation of the TDAFWP. The TDAFW Pump is a third, independent train of AFW. No other portions of the auxiliary Feed Water System actuated or received actuation signals during this event. The primary cause of this event was determined to be not complying with the tagging checklist when sequencing the tagout restoration steps. Corrective actions are scheduled to complete on 30 May 2013. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4896825 April 2013 20:51:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This is a report of a loss of emergency assessment capability as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). On April 25, 2013 at 1759 CDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 6 during a refueling outage, power was interrupted to all Unit 2 vent stack radiation monitors as part of a pre-planned activity to connect the radiation monitors to an alternate temporary power supply to support de-energizing the normal power source for preventative maintenance. The connection to the alternate supply was completed and power was restored to the vent stack radiation monitors at 1845 CDT. While the radiation monitors were without power, pre-planned compensatory measures were implemented to monitor vent stack discharge and to minimize activities that posed a potential for release. At the completion of the preventive maintenance on the normal power supply, power to the vent stack radiation monitors will again be briefly interrupted to reconnect the normal power source to the monitors. The pre-planned compensatory measures will again be utilized during this power interruption. An update to this report will be provided following the restoration of normal power to the radiation monitors. The NRC Resident inspector has been informed.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0400 EDT ON 4/29/13 FROM BRANNON PAYNE TO S. SANDIN * * *

On 28 April, 2013, power was again interrupted to the Unit 2 vent stack radiation monitors to restore the connection to their normal power supply. The radiation monitors were out of service from 2315 until 2340 CDT. Pre-planned compensatory measures were again implemented to monitor vent stack discharge and minimize potential for vent stack release. The reported time for the initial loss of vent stack radiation monitoring on April 25, 2013 was incorrect. The correct time was 1759 CDT. The NRC Resident has been notified. Notified R2DO (Sykes).

ENS 4893517 April 2013 01:16:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

Contract worker suffered a non-occupational medical emergency while working inside the Unit 2 Containment Building (105' elevation). The worker was working in a contaminated area when the event occurred. He was transported to Southeast Alabama Medical Center via ambulance. The worker is potentially contaminated. Health Physics provided escort in the ambulance. Farley Nuclear Plant (was) notified by Health Physics on 4/17/13 at 0028 (CDT) that (the) individual was surveyed and no contamination was found. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM JOSH CARROLL TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 4/18/13 AT 2243 EDT * * *

Farley Nuclear Plant is retracting this notification based on the following additional information not available at the time of the notification: Health Physics personnel have completed surveys that determined that the contract worker, ambulance, and hospital are free of contamination. The initial report was made based on the individual being potentially contaminated due to radioactive surveying being deferred to allow prompt medical attention. Based on the subsequent determination that the individual was not contaminated the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) are not met and this event report is being retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Vias).

ENS 4892616 April 2013 08:55:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This is an 8-hour report of a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0037 CDT on 4/16/13, during the performance of an 'A' train loss-of-offsite-power test per procedure FNP-2-STP-80.14, Farley Unit 2 experienced a complete loss of main control board annunciation. Emergency Power Board annunciators are unaffected. No emergency action level criteria have been exceeded as a result of the loss of annunciation, however, annunciators normally relied upon for emergency assessment are not functional. Troubleshooting to identify the cause of the loss of annunciation is in progress. No estimate for restoring annunciator power is currently available. Compensatory measures for critical parameter monitoring have been established and implemented. Unit 2 plant conditions remain stable in mode 5. Unit 1 is unaffected by this event. There has been no release of radioactivity to the environment. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DARRIN GARD TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1444 EDT ON 4/16/13 * * *

The Unit 2 main control room annunciators were restored at 0907 EDT on 4/16/13. The cause of the failure was determined to be a relay in the annunciator power supply circuit. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Vias).

ENS 487185 February 2013 17:36:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe facility Technical Support Center (TSC) was rendered non-functional due to a malfunction in the TSC HVAC system. A lugged connection on the air conditioning system control power relay became loose causing a loss of contact between the spade and the relay. Repairs have been completed and the air conditioning has been returned to service. However, the out of service time was greater than 30 minutes, which by the station's reporting procedures, is an 8 hour non-emergency report. The out of service time was from 0935 to 1342 CST. Compensatory measures per site procedure FNP-0-EIP-6.0 (TSC Setup and Activation) for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities were available. These measures included the conditional relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency if the Emergency Director deems the TSC to be uninhabitable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4867214 January 2013 17:52:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

The facility Technical Support Center (TSC) was rendered non-functional due to a malfunctioning TSC ventilation system. The TSC HVAC Air Handling Unit fan belt broke rendering the air conditioning non functional. Repairs have been completed and the unit has been returned to service however, the out of service time was greater than 30 minutes which by the station's reporting procedures is an 8 hour non-emergency report. The out of service time was from 1225 to 1630 (CST).

Compensatory measures per site procedure FNP-0-EIP-6.0 (TSC Setup and Activation) for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities were immediately put in place. These measures include the conditional relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency if the Emergency Director deems the TSC to be uninhabitable. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 4814026 July 2012 23:24:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 21:51 (CDT) (on 7/26/12), Farley has commenced shutdown of Unit 1 in accordance with T.S. 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating. 1B Diesel Generator was removed from service on 7/16 at 21:52 (CDT) for a planned 24 month outage. Due to emergent equipment issues with the diesel, the RAS (Required Action Statement) time of 10 days to return the diesel generator to service has not been met. Unit 1 shutdown to Mode 3 has commenced. The unit must be in Mode 3 by 03:52 (CDT) on 7/27/12, and Mode 5 by 09:52 (CDT) on 7/28/12. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4802614 June 2012 18:48:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopDuring a maintenance task to replace a main control board annunciator power supply an electrical short occurred while installing a jumper. This caused two circuit breakers to trip and a loss of all control room annunciators. The cause of the short was identified and corrected. The two circuit breakers were closed and the annunciator function was restored at 1358 CDT resulting in a total out of service time of 5 minutes. The unit was at a stable 100% power during the loss of annunciators. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4792415 May 2012 10:39:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe Farley Nuclear Plant Technical Support Center (TSC) has been rendered non-functional due to a pre-planned and scheduled maintenance period to perform PMs (Preventive Maintenance) on the TSC ventilation system. The TSC ventilation maintenance will be worked with high priority to include around the clock support. Pre-planned compensatory measures are in place in accordance with site procedures to include the conditional relocation of the TSC staff should the Emergency Director deem the TSC to be uninhabitable. This report is being generated per Technical Requirements Manual TRM section 13.13.1 condition B for the TSC emergency response facility being out of service for greater than 30 minutes. The projected return to service is on 5/15/12 at 16:30 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.