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Entered date | Site | Region | Reactor type | Event description | |
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ENS 57291 | 26 August 2024 16:54:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 8/26/2024 at 1200 CDT, Farley Nuclear Plant Medical Services identified a false negative quality assurance test. (The contracted laboratory) was provided an adulterated sample of hydrocodone and hydromorphone that was part of a blind performance test. The results from the (contracted laboratory) returned a false negative. This false negative test result will be investigated, and the results reported as required. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(c)(3). The NRC resident inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officer Report Guidance: The contracted laboratory was a U.S. Department of Health and Human Service (HHS) certified laboratory.
The following update was provided by the licensee via email: Following further review of the event, it has been determined that this issue is not reportable under 10CFR26.719(c)(3) as the unsatisfactory test was not for a validity screening test. This event is reportable for testing errors in accordance with 10CFR26.719(c)(1) and a 30 day report will be submitted. Notified R2DO (Suber) and FFD Group (email). |
ENS 56971 | 16 February 2024 05:34:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0048 CST on February 16, 2024, with Unit 2 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of 2A 125V DC distribution panel. The trip was complex due to the loss of components associated with A-train DC power. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 is not affected. An automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) occurred due to low-low steam generator levels. The AFW auto-start is an expected response with low-low steam generator levels from the reactor trip. AFW is still currently controlling steam generator levels. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56852 | 14 November 2023 14:36:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1041 CST on 11/14/23 with Farley Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 10 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to rising steam generator levels. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) was manually initiated in accordance with plant procedures and is feeding the steam generators. Heat removal is being provided via the atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 is not affected. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: All rods fully inserted. The licensee attempted to take manual control of the feedwater control valves to lower steam generator level but, due to reaching a steam generator level that requires a manual trip, the licensee manually tripped the reactor. |
ENS 56784 | 9 October 2023 21:52:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: A non-licensed employee supervisor failed a test specified by the fitness for duty testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56329 | 1 February 2023 13:40:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0956 CST with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The trip was not complex with all safety related systems responding normally post-trip. During the trip, the non safety related '1A' 4160V bus lost power resulting in the loss of one Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP-1A). Operations responded and stabilized the plant. The '1A' 4160V bus was re-energized at 1031 CST. Decay heat is being removed by steam dumps to the main condenser. Farley Unit 2 is not affected. An automatic actuation of (Auxiliary Feedwater) AFW also occurred, which is an expected response from the reactor trip. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56112 | 17 September 2022 13:06:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the Southern Nuclear Company via email: At 2257 EDT on 09/16/2022, it was determined that there was a programmatic vulnerability of the Fleet FFD program. Specifically, it was determined that some individuals were not placed into the follow-up pool for additional screening when required by the program. All identified personnel were in the random FFD pool, and were subject to the behavioral observation program. This is reportable in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(4) for all Units and 10CFR26.417(b)(1) for Vogtle Units 3&4. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. See EN#s 56113, 56114, and 56115. |
ENS 56028 | 3 August 2022 16:25:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1258 CDT on August 3, 2022, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to the supply breakers of the 1B startup transformer opening. The fast dead bus transfer for the reactor coolant pumps did not occur during the event. Currently the plant is in Mode 3 on natural circulation. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by steaming with atmospheric relief valves. Unit 2 is not affected. An automatic actuation of the 1B diesel occurred because of the power loss to the 1G 4160V bus. Additionally, the actuation of motor driven and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (AFW) also occurred. AFW auto-start is an expected response from this reactor trip. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the 1B diesel and the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 55490 | 24 September 2021 17:27:00 | Farley | NRC Region 1 | Based upon a 10 CFR 21.21(b) transfer notification from General Electric Hitachi (GEH), Southern Nuclear Operating Company's (SNC) Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) has determined there is evidence a Substantial Safety Hazard could have been created by the failure of the rivets installed on certain EC Trip Units if they were left uncorrected. These EC Trip Units are a subcomponent of all five (5) emergency diesel generator control panel supply breakers at FNP. This defect was identified and the components were repaired by GEH before being installed in the plant. These defective EC Trip Units never posed a challenge to the safe operation of FNP. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector at FNP has been notified. | |
ENS 55462 | 15 September 2021 11:30:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0658 CDT on 09/15/2021 a non work-related death occurred of a site employee. The individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area. This is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 55365 | 20 July 2021 13:06:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 54320 | 10 October 2019 02:17:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | EN Revision Imported Date : 3/19/2020 POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL TRANSPORTED TO AN OFFSITE MEDICAL FACILITY At 2340 CDT, on October 09, 2019, a site contractor was transported offsite for treatment at an offsite medical facility. Due to the nature of the medical emergency, the individual was not thoroughly surveyed prior to being transported offsite. This is an eight-hour notification, non-emergency for the transportation of a contaminated person offsite. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii). Following the individual being transported offsite, but prior to the individual arriving at the offsite medical facility, the individual was confirmed to not be contaminated. This occurred at approximately 2350 CDT, on October 09, 2019. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Farley Nuclear Plant is retracting this notification based on the information available at the time of the notification: Health Physics personnel had completed surveys that determined that the contract worker, ambulance, and responders were free of contamination prior to reaching the hospital. The initial report was made to alert the NRC based on the individual being potentially contaminated due to radioactive surveying being deferred to support prompt medical attention. Based on the subsequent determination that the individual was not contaminated the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) are not met and this event report is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller). | |
ENS 54287 | 21 September 2019 10:28:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | At 0800 (CDT), with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent (power), the reactor was manually tripped due to elevated vibration indication on the 2C reactor coolant pump exceeding annunciator response procedure trip criteria. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post trip. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) auto actuated as expected following the manual reactor trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed via the use of AFW and subsequent steaming of the steam generators to the main condenser. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b(2)(iv)(B). In addition, this event report is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR50.72(B)(3)(iv)(A) for a specified system actuation. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. Farley reported that there was no increase in containment unidentified leakage or fluctuations with RCP seal flow during this event. | |
ENS 54040 | 1 May 2019 21:03:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MISALIGNED CONTROL ROD At 1643 (CDT), with Unit 2 in Mode 2 during low power physics testing, the reactor was manually tripped per procedure due to a misaligned control rod. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the atmosphere using the atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 is not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
This Event Notification is being updated to clarify that the reactor was not critical when this event occurred. Therefore, the reporting requirement is changed from 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). The reactor was tripped during low power physics testing. The misaligned rod was encountered during rod group insertion and the affected bank had been inserted to the extent that the reactor was subcritical when the operators tripped the reactor. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Lopez) | |
ENS 54002 | 16 April 2019 02:59:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | At 2355 CDT on 4/15/19, life-saving activities by offsite medical personnel for a Farley employee were terminated. The coroner declared the individual deceased at the plant site at 0130 CDT. The fatality is not believed to be work-related and the individual was inside of the Radiological Controlled Area. This is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will be notifying the Occupational Safety and Health Administration due to the on-site fatality. The licensee will perform a radiological survey of the individual prior to transportation offsite. | |
ENS 53827 | 15 January 2019 12:25:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | At 0800 CST on January 15, 2019, a non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been placed on hold. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53393 | 8 May 2018 10:38:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On May 8, 2018 at 0139 Central Daylight Time, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 declared containment inoperable due to total containment leak rate greater than technical specifications. The 1B containment cooler had seat leakage of approximately 30 gallons per minute from a service water drain valve. Though the containment cooler service water supply is not tested per the Appendix J program, a loss of the containment barrier is possible under accident conditions. The service water flow path to the 1B containment cooler has been isolated to exit the condition. The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector. |
ENS 53392 | 8 May 2018 01:39:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On May 7, 2018 at 1041 CDT, Unit 1 performed an RCS (reactor coolant system) leakrate procedure that calculated an unidentified RCS leakrate of 0.202 gpm. The leak source investigation concluded at 2150 that the packing for the charging flow control valve (FCV) was the source of the RCS leakage when it was bypassed, which isolated the leakage. A second RCS leakrate calculation was performed after the charging flow control valve was isolated which calculated an acceptable leakrate of 0.00 gpm. The packing leakage from the charging flow control valve represented leakage external to containment which would result in a greater that 5 Rem dose projection to control room personnel during accident conditions which does not satisfy the GDC19 criteria described in Technical Specification Bases 3.7.10. Therefore the control room emergency filtration system would not be able to fulfill its design function resulting in an unanalyzed condition. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) for a 'condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'. The packing leak from the charging flow control valve will remain isolated until repaired under work order SNC944374. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 53290 | 26 March 2018 18:19:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On March 25, 2018 at 1833 CDT, while at 100 percent power, Farley Unit 1 (FNP-1) conservatively declared a single Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) inoperable on the 1C Steam Generator line due to indication of Steam Generator pressure rise with a corresponding reduction in flow of that loop. FNP-1 began a reactor shutdown at 0400 CDT on March 26, 2018 to establish plant conditions to support testing the affected main steam line MSIVs while in the required action time of Technical Specification 3.7.2. At 1338 CDT on March 26, 2018, testing confirmed that the single MSIV was inoperable and that valve disassembly will be required. The duration of the valve repair would exceed the required action time of Technical Specification 3.7.2. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), as a plant shutdown required by technical specifications. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
This EN (event notification) is being updated to clarify the reporting criteria as 'Voluntary'. Farley Technical Specification 3.7.2 allows continuous operation in MODE 2 with an INOPERABLE MSIV as long as the other MSIV in the affected Main Steam Line is closed. The initiation of the shutdown was performed as a prudent action to repair and restore OPERABILITY of the affected MSIV and was not a requirement of the Farley Technical Specifications. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R2DO (Masters) was notified. |
ENS 53159 | 9 January 2018 23:38:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On January 9, 2018, at 1759 CST, during review of NFPA 805 requirements and circuit analysis, it was determined that the NFPA 805 analysis and Fire Safe Shutdown Modeling did not consider all fire-induced failures. As such, a condition could possibly exist during a postulated fire where both safety related electrical trains could be impacted. This notification is to report a condition involving the fire safe shutdown analysis. The condition could result in an adverse impact on the ability of operators to respond to a postulated fire in these areas. Therefore, this notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Compensatory fire watches have been established in the affected areas. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Following additional refinements to the NFPA 805 Fire PRA Model, the circuits which initiated the initial report of an unanalyzed condition have now been evaluated and have proven that no significant degradation to plant safety existed. Therefore, EN 53159 is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Michel). |
ENS 52785 | 2 June 2017 17:07:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This notification is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) due to both trains of Penetration Room Filtration (PRF) being inoperable due to an inoperable PRF Boundary. At 0920 (CDT) on 6/2/2017, a gap was discovered between an electrical penetration room ceiling and the containment wall where seismic gap material was noted to be missing. The gap was subsequently closed and PRF testing completed sat. The condition was exited at 1345 (CDT). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On 6/2/17 at 1707 CDT Farley Nuclear Plant notified the NRC Operations Center of an entry into Technical Specification 3.7.12 Condition B for Unit 1 loss of two trains of Penetration Room Filtration (PRF). At 0920 (CDT) on 6/2/2017, a gap had been discovered between an electrical penetration and containment where seismic gap material was noted to be missing. The report was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) under Event Notification 52785. Upon further engineering review and satisfactory testing to support operability, Farley has determined that the configuration did not meet the criteria for a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, and is retracting the notification. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Blamey). |
ENS 52414 | 7 December 2016 17:24:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | During the evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and the potential impacts to Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment, it was concluded that the following SSCs (systems, structures, and components) were vulnerable to tornado generated missiles. The Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) intake and exhaust ventilation hoods, located on the roof of the SWIS, are not adequately protected from missiles generated by a tornado. Should a tornado-generated missile strike the SWIS intake and exhaust ventilation hoods, the hoods could crimp thus reducing air flow and challenging the performance of their heating and cooling safety functions. If the intake hoods were damaged or removed due to a missile strike, entry of rainwater could occur due to severe weather high wind velocity, and could affect safety related electrical equipment in the rooms directly below the hoods. These potential conditions could render Service Water trains inoperable on either or both units. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being addressed in accordance with EGM-15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 (enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). Required actions have been taken. Corrective actions will be documented in a follow up licensee event report. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. The licensee is evaluating the operability of the service water system. Should one train be declared inoperable, the licensee would be in a 72 hr. LCO action statement. If both trains are inoperable, then the licensee would enter T.S. 3.0.3. |
ENS 52395 | 27 November 2016 03:08:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0026 (CST) on November 27, 2016, Farley Unit 1 was manually tripped from 100% reactor power due to voltage swings suspected to be caused by the Auto Voltage Regulator. All control rods fully inserted and Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) auto-started as expected. All systems responded as expected. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). The cause of the main generator voltage oscillations is under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The trip was uncomplicated. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to condenser. The plant is at normal operating pressure and temperature with auxiliary feedwater supplying the steam generators. The electrical grid is stable and supplying plant loads. All safety equipment is available, if needed. Unit 2 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100% power. |
ENS 52374 | 17 November 2016 20:51:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1859 CST on November 17, 2016, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 initiated a shutdown from approximately 99 percent reactor power. The shutdown was initiated per Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3. This LCO entry was based on having no operable steam flow channels on the C loop for Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1. Unit 2 as not affected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52356 | 8 November 2016 17:36:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1331 (CST) on November 8, 2016, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 manually tripped from 32% reactor power. The plant was ramping down to remove the main generator from service due to an unrelated issue. 1A SGFP did not respond to control Steam Generator (SG) level as expected when the miniflow was opened per procedure. SG levels lowered due to lower feed flow and the reactor was manually tripped in accordance with plant procedures. All control rods fully inserted and Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) auto started as expected. The Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed to minimize the cool-down. Decay heat is being removed through the Atmospheric Relief Valves. All other systems responded as expected. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). The failure of the 1A SGFP control is under investigation. Unit 2 was not affected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There is no primary to secondary leakage. |
ENS 52340 | 1 November 2016 19:01:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1743 CDT on 11/1/16, readings were obtained that indicated ammonia above IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health) values in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building and an Alert was declared by the Emergency Director. The plant is stable with Unit 1 at 2% power. Unit 2 is at 100% power (and stable). The site is currently investigating to determine the source and ventilate the area." The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, EPA EOC, FEMA National Watch Center (email), FDA EOC (email), Nuclear SSA (email).
The following is the Emergency Preparedness 8-hour report for the Plant Farley ALERT declaration. An ALERT was declared at 1743 CDT on November 1, 2016, based on Emergency Action Level (EAL) HA3 (Release of toxic, asphyxiant, or flammable gases within vital areas which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or establish or maintain safe shutdown) due to an ammonia discharge into the Auxiliary Building. Farley Unit 1 was in Mode 2 at 2 percent power and Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power throughout the event. Actions completed during and leading up to termination from the event included walkdown of the area to locate the ammonia source, and isolating the ammonia source while atmospheric monitoring was performed in all affected and adjacent areas. Installation of additional ventilation fans was completed. This event has been entered into the Farley Corrective Action Program under Condition Report 10293519 (Ammonia levels in 100 Feet Radside). A review of the Alert classification has determined that the classification was timely and accurate. All required notifications were completed accurately and in a timely manner. The ERO (Emergency Response Organization) notification system functioned as expected and all emergency response facilities were activated in a timely manner. There were no missing or injured personnel during the event. There is no evidence of tampering or sabotage of plant equipment leading to this event. At 2202 CDT on 11/1/2016, the ammonia source was identified as Valve N1P20V913. At 2228 CDT, the ammonia source was isolated. Final assessment of the Auxiliary Building showed that the ammonia levels were less than 5 ppm. It was determined that a deficiency in the valve component was the cause of the ammonia leak. The Alert was terminated on 11/1/2016 at 2340 CDT. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Ernstes), IRD (Stapleton), NRR EO (Miller). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, EPA EOC, FEMA National Watch Center (email), FDA EOC (email), Nuclear SSA (email). |
ENS 52274 | 1 October 2016 09:42:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0512 (CDT) on October 1, 2016, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 automatically tripped from 99 percent reactor power due to the inadvertent closure of a main steam isolation valve (MSIV). The closure of the MSIV caused a turbine trip resulting in an automatic reactor trip. Concurrent with the reactor trip, a safety injection (SI) occurred. The plant is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) autostarted as expected. The cause of MSIV closure and SI actuation is under investigation. Cooldown will continue to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) as planned for entry into a scheduled refueling outage. Restart is not planned until the completion of the refueling outage. Unit 2 was not affected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The MSIVs are open with the steam generators discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. SI was from high head injection which has been secured. |
ENS 52157 | 5 August 2016 20:55:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1209 CDT on 8/5/16, during testing of Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Pre-action Sprinkler Systems, all zones on the Unit 2 Pyrotronics Fire Detection Panel went into an alarm state and were unable to be reset. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Assessment capability. The NRC Resident has been notified. The licensee has initiated all necessary compensatory and corrective actions.
At 1600 CDT on 8/6/16, the Unit 2 Pyrotronics Fire Detection Panel was declared functional following repair of master override reset test switch and supply fuse. The Pyrotronics Fire Detection Panel was successfully tested following maintenance. The emergency assessment capability for the site's Emergency Plan has been fully restored. The NRC Resident has been notified Notified the R2DO (Suggs). |
ENS 52116 | 21 July 2016 18:28:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | Southern Nuclear Operating Company had a non-licensed supervisory contractor employee confirmed positive result for alcohol during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The contractor employee's unescorted access to the plant has been revoked. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. |
ENS 52061 | 1 July 2016 17:00:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On 7/1/16, the Houston County Dispatch (911 Center) was conducting a monthly weather siren test. At approximately 1205 CDT, there was an inadvertent actuation of 41 emergency sirens in Houston County. The emergency sirens were deactivated at approximately 1208 CDT. Houston Country EMA issued a press release to notify the public of the inadvertent actuation. This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the inadvertent actuation and subsequent press release. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event as the offsite response capabilities remain functional. The site is operating normally with no emergency conditions present. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 51918 | 11 May 2016 10:56:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0653 (CDT) on 5/11/16, Farley Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped from 29 (percent) power. The initiating event was hi-hi Steam Generator level. Steam Generator levels began to rise following the start of a second condensate pump. The hi-hi steam generator level setpoint was reached causing the only running main feedwater pump to trip, a main feedwater isolation, and an automatic turbine trip. Auxiliary feedwater automatically started as expected. The reactor was manually tripped per procedure. All other systems responded properly for the event and there were no complications. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 51148 | 11 June 2015 13:15:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | A licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive test for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's plant access has been placed on administrative hold. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 51047 | 7 May 2015 09:45:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This notification is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) due to a Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 shutdown required by Technical Specifications. At 0509 CDT on 5/7/2015, 1B Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) tripped during transfer of 1B 4160V bus to 1B unit auxiliary transformer. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.4 Condition A was entered for loss of a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) loop. Unit 1 reactor was shut down per operating procedures and entered Mode 3 at 0740 CDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 51043 | 5 May 2015 13:05:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0422 CDT on 5/5/2015, with Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 in Mode 2, and the 1A Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP) in the tripped condition, the 1B SGFP was manually tripped during troubleshooting. The trip of the second SGFP initiated the auto start signal for the MDAFWPs (motor driven aux feedwater pumps) due to the auto start signal not being defeated. Both MDAFW pumps were in service supplying AFW to the steam generators (SG) when the actuation signal was received. The effects of the auto start signal were to fully open the AFW Flow Control Valves and isolate SG blowdown and SG blowdown sample valves. These actions occurred successfully and the auto start signal was reset. There was no adverse impact to the plant and decay heat continued to be removed through the condenser throughout the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 51008 | 24 April 2015 00:15:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This notification is being reported to NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification of an on-site fatality of a contract employee. In addition, the contracting company plans to notify the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of a fatality per 29 CFR 1904.39. At approximately 1717 CDT on 4/23/15, a 911 call was received in the Control Room regarding a contract employee who was found unresponsive and unattended in a temporary break room set up on the Turbine Deck during the Unit 1 refueling outage. Resuscitation by first responders and paramedics from a nearby town was unsuccessful. Resuscitation efforts were suspended at 1750. The Houston County Sheriff's Office was notified at approximately 1800 and they responded to the site at 1822. The county coroner was notified and arrived on site at 1850. (Farley Nuclear Plant) received notification at approximately 2035 that the contractor company intended to notify OSHA. A press release is not planned at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 1 remains in Mode 6 and Unit 2 remains in Mode 1 at 100% power. |
ENS 50677 | 13 December 2014 10:00:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0152 CST on December 13, 2014, both strings of the Unit 2 containment smoke detection system were declared non-functional due to a non-radioactive steam leak inside containment. The steam leak was causing spurious alarms to the smoke detection system. This condition prevents identification and assessment of a fire in containment. Required compensatory measures have been established. Since a fire in the containment building is an entry condition for the site's emergency plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The steam leak was caused by a faulty main steam flow detector. The licensee has shut down the reactor to effect repairs. |
ENS 50618 | 15 November 2014 08:14:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This notification is being made as required by 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to control room operators opening the Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2 reactor trip breakers via the main control board hand switch during reactor startup procedures. This is a valid actuation of the reactor protection system. The reactor was not critical at the time the reactor trip breakers were opened. While withdrawing control rods for reactor startup and low power physics testing with control bank C at approximately 50 steps, Digital Rod Position indication for one of the control rods (M12) changed to 90 steps. The control room operators stopped withdrawing rods and entered FNP-2-AOP-19 (Malfunction of the Rod Control System). The reactor trip breakers were opened at 0353 CST. All rods inserted as expected. All other systems functioned normally. The plant is stable at normal operating pressure and temperature. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 50604 | 12 November 2014 10:44:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0202 (CST) on November 12, 2014, it was determined that Unit 2 had no functional smoke detection capability in the containment. During post modification testing on the smoke detection system, it was discovered that both trains of detection were not functional. Required compensatory measures have been established. Since a fire in the containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered an unplanned loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). (Farley) Condition Report: 892818. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. |
ENS 50533 | 14 October 2014 07:37:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This notification is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to a Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2 manual reactor trip. The trip was initiated when the in service train of CCW cooling to the Reactor Coolant Pumps was lost due to a loss of the 2B Start Up Transformer (SUT). The control room team manually tripped the reactor then tripped all three reactor coolant pumps as required by station procedure. There was a line of severe thunderstorms with lightning passing through the plant site at the time of loss of the 2B Start Up Transformer. The 2B emergency diesel generator was out of service for maintenance therefore there was a loss of the 'B' train emergency power 4160V electrical bus ('B' train LOSP (Loss of Offsite Power)). 'A' train emergency power remained energized from offsite sources. The plant is stable at normal operating pressure and temperature. At 0433 (CDT), 2B Reactor Coolant Pump was re-started when support conditions were re-established. Heat sink is adequate using the 2A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. Unit 2 'B' train power was restored by starting the 2C emergency diesel generator at 0523 (CDT). This restored power to the Digital Rod Position Indication system, and control rod K-8 in control bank 'C' indicated full out, and all other control rods fully inserted. An emergency boration is in progress to compensate for the stuck rod. Additionally, the reactor trip resulted in a valid actuation of the Aux Feedwater system which is an eight hour non-emergency report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). During the transient, one primary PORV momentarily opened, then reseated. Decay heat is being directed to the atmospheric relief valves with no indicated primary to secondary leakage. There was no impact on Unit 1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Digital rod position indication troubleshooting was conducted on 10/14/2014 and confirmed all control rods, including control rod K-8, fully inserted following the reactor trip. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Ayres), NRR EO (Davis) and IRD (Gott). |
ENS 50034 | 14 April 2014 14:48:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0600 CDT on 4/14/14, it was determined that the ability to obtain a post-accident hydrogen sample from Unit 1 containment was lost. With both trains of Post-Accident Hydrogen Analyzers (PAHA) out of service, it was discovered that there was reduced sample flow indicated on the backup methodology through a containment sample port (R67). Repair efforts are underway. A follow-up notification will be sent when assessment capability is restored. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Assessment capability has been restored as of 1933 EDT on April 14, 2014 utilizing the containment particulate rad monitor sample port R-67. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Widmann). |
ENS 49901 | 12 March 2014 10:34:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0841 (CDT) on March 12, 2014, the Unit 1 Pyro Panel (fire/smoke detection panel) was removed from service for required maintenance. The pyro panel was declared non-functional when it was removed from service. Compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in the Containment Building is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperature is being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service however this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. A courtesy follow up notification will be sent when the pyro panel is returned to service and functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
The repairs to the Unit 1 Pyro Panel have been completed and the panel was returned to service on 3/12/14 at 1010 CDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue). |
ENS 49862 | 28 February 2014 11:02:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0842 CST on February 28, 2014, the Unit 1 Pyro Panel (fire/smoke detection panel) was removed from service for required maintenance. The Pyro Panel was declared non-functional when it was removed from service. Compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the Unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in the Containment Building is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperature is being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service, however this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. A courtesy follow up notification will be sent when the pyro panel is returned to service and functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
At 1704 CST on 2/28/2014 the Unit 1 Pyro Panel was declared functional following the return of the fire indicating unit (FIU) to the original status. The Pyro Panel fire detection system was successfully tested following the maintenance. The emergency assessment capability for the site's Emergency Plan has been fully restored concerning a containment fire. The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (McCoy). |
ENS 49789 | 3 February 2014 18:39:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The facility Technical Support Center (TSC) was rendered non-functional due to a malfunction in the TSC HVAC system. A leak in the refrigerant tubing has resulted in a loss of refrigerant and affected the system's ability to provide proper climate control. Repairs are being planned and will commence today. The out of service time is greater than one hour which by the station's Technical Requirements Manual is an 8 hour non-emergency report. Compensatory measures per site procedure FNP-0-EIP-6.0 (TSC Setup and Activation) for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities are available. These measures include the conditional relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency if the Emergency Director deems the TSC to be uninhabitable. A follow up notification will be made when the TSC is declared functional. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following was received as a courtesy notification follow-up: At 2320 CST on 2/3/2014 the TSC HVAC was declared functional following post maintenance testing. Satisfactory pressure testing, system evacuation, and system re-charging were performed following the repair to two tubing leaks. Emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities have been fully restored to the Technical Support Center. The Emergency Director, and NRC Senior Resident Inspector have been informed. Notified R2DO (McCoy). |
ENS 49744 | 18 January 2014 14:48:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 10:20 (CST) on January 18, 2014, the Unit 2 Pyro Panel (fire/smoke detection panel) was declared non-functional due to an unknown equipment problem. Compensatory measures (e.g. continuous roving fire watches) have been established for all affected areas with the exception of the Unit 2 Containment Building. Containment fire watches have been established per the FSAR, which includes monitoring various temperatures, pressures, and other parameters for Containment, and systems associated with containment. However, this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. Since a fire in Containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability, and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
At 0404 CST on 1/20/14 the Unit 2 Pyro panel was declared functional following the replacement of the fire indicating unit (FIU) and the power supply, and successful post maintenance testing. The emergency assessment capability for the site's Emergency Plan has been fully restored concerning a Containment fire. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (King). |
ENS 49735 | 17 January 2014 12:45:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0925 (CST) on January 17, 2014, the Unit 1 pyro panel (smoke detection panel) was removed from service for required maintenance. The pyro panel was declared non-functional when it was removed from service. Compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the Unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in Containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperatures are being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service, however, this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. The site NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The pyro panel was restored to service as of 1650 CST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (King). |
ENS 49715 | 11 January 2014 13:24:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On January 10, 2014, at 0919 CST, the plant voluntarily entered multiple required action statements in Technical Specifications 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System to conduct surveillance testing of the B-train Solid State Protection System (SSPS). During testing, abnormal indications were received. As a result of the abnormal indications, the SSPS has not been returned to operable status within the required completion time of 24 hours. At 1100 CST on January 11, 2014, Unit 2 commenced a plant shutdown required by technical specifications and will be in Mode 3 by 1519. Therefore, this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), plant shutdown required by technical specifications. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 49638 | 16 December 2013 21:37:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1627 CST on December 16, 2013 Farley Nuclear Plant determined that the following was an unanalyzed condition: As a result of recent industry operating experience (OE 305419, EN 49411, EN 49419) regarding the impact of un-fused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the Control Room, Farley performed a review of ammeter circuitry for similar issues. The review determined the described condition to be applicable to Farley resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The wiring design for the ammeters contains a shunt in the current flow from each DC battery and battery charger, but the ammeter wiring attached to the shunt does not contain fuses. It is postulated that a fire could cause one of the ammeter wires to short to ground. Concurrently, the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also short to ground. This would cause a ground loop through the un-fused ammeter cable. The potential exists that the cable could heat up, causing a secondary fire in the ammeter raceway. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to safely shutdown per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures have been implemented for affected areas of the plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 49637 | 16 December 2013 21:37:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1454 CST on December 16, 2013, the Unit 1 pyro panel (smoke detection panel) was declared non-functional due to an unexpected failure. Viable compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the Unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in Containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperatures are being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service, however, this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The Unit 1 pyro panel has been returned to service as of 1554 CST on 12/17/13, which restores Unit 1 containment fire detection capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Freeman). |
ENS 49619 | 9 December 2013 10:19:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0906 CST on December 9, 2013, the Unit 1 pyro panel (smoke detection panel) was removed from service for planned repairs. The pyro panel is expected to be out of service for approximately 8 hours. Viable compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the Unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in Containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperatures are being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service, however this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining an effective assessment capability. A follow-up notification will be provided upon restoration of Containment Building smoke detection capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The Unit 1 pyro panel (smoke detection panel) has been returned to service after planned repairs. The loss of emergency assessment capability reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) has been restored. The NRC Resident (Inspector) will be notified of the update. Notified R2DO (Masters). |
ENS 49417 | 7 October 2013 20:36:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This is a report of a loss of emergency assessment capability as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). On October 7, 2013 at 1804 CDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 6 during a refueling outage, power was interrupted to all Unit 1 vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors as part of a pre-planned activity to connect the radiation monitors to an alternate temporary power supply to support deenergizing the normal power source for preventative maintenance. The connection to the alternate supply was completed and power was restored to the vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors at 1833 CDT. While the radiation monitors were without power, pre-planned compensatory measures were implemented where possible to monitor vent stack discharge and to minimize activities that posed a potential for release. At the completion of the preventive maintenance on the normal power supply, power to the vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitor will again be briefly interrupted to reconnect the normal power source to the monitors. The pre-planned compensatory measures will again be utilized during this power interruption. An update to this report will be provided following the restoration of normal power to the radiation monitors. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
On October 13, 2013 at 0217 CDT, with Unit 1 in defueled mode during a refueling outage, power was interrupted to all Unit 1 vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors as part of a pre-planned activity to transfer the radiation monitors back to their normal power supply. The connection to the normal supply was completed and power was restored to the vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors at 0245 CDT. Pre-planned compensatory measures were implemented where possible to monitor vent stack discharge and to minimize activities that posed a potential for release. Notified R2DO (Widmann) and the licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 49232 | 3 August 2013 06:50:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | (On August 3, 2013, at 0520 CDT), Farley Unit 1 declared an ALERT emergency based on (EAL) HA3, 'Release of Toxic, Asphyxiant, or Flammable Gas'. This was due to a tagout of the CO2 Fire Protection System, which resulted in an unexpected discharge of CO2 on the Unit 1 Radiation Side of the Auxiliary Building. The 100 foot elevation level on Unit 1 had an oxygen concentration below the required amount. CO2 has been isolated at the source tank in order to terminated the leak. No personnel have been affected. There is no radiation release in progress. ERDS has been activated. The licensee is assembling a team to enter the affected area and verify oxygen levels are within allowable limits in order to terminate the ALERT emergency. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State and local organizations. Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, DHS NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA and NuclearSSA via email.
Farley Unit 1 terminated from the ALERT at 1110 CDT on 8/3/13. Oxygen levels are acceptable in all areas of the plant. The CO2 tank has been isolated and is stable at 68%. Plant conditions are stable and improving and all necessary compensatory measures are in place. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable state and local authorities. Notified R2DO (King), NRR EO (Hiland), IRD (Kozal), and PAO (Couret), DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, DHS NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA and NuclearSSA via email. |