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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5379318 December 2018 15:40:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4On December 18, 2018 at 1126 CST, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) reactor automatically tripped due to a loss of the A-1, non-vital 4160V bus. All control rods fully inserted. Loss of the A-1 bus resulted in de-energizing A-3 vital 4160V bus. Emergency Diesel Generator #1, K-4A, started automatically and is currently powering A-3 vital bus. Non-vital buses A-2, H-1, and H-2 and vital bus A-4 transferred power automatically to the Startup Transformer #1. Off-site power remains energized and available for ANO-1. The reason for loss of A-1 bus is unknown at this time. Currently, ANO-1 has stabilized in Mode 3, Hot Standby. Decay heat is being removed by the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The loss of the A-1, non-vital bus, is under investigation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state.
ENS 537775 December 2018 14:54:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to an invalid Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal. On October 9, 2018, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 was in refueling Mode 6, when a vital inverter failed while aligned from its alternate power source causing a loss of one of four vital instrument buses. The loss of the instrument bus resulted in one of the four engineered safety feature protection channels to enter a tripped state. Because one of the other four channels was already in a tripped state in support of a channel power supply replacement activity, two out of four protection channels were now in the tripped state resulting in a Safety Injection Actuation Signal, Containment Spray Actuation Signal, Containment Cooling Actuation Signal, Recirculation Actuation Signal, Emergency Feed Actuation Signal, and Containment Isolation Actuation Signal. In general, only one train of equipment is protected and assumed to be available during Mode 6 operations. Due to the defense-in-depth plant configuration in Mode 6, which is intended to avoid inadvertent start of emergency systems, the resulting actuations caused no adverse impact to Shutdown Cooling or Spent Fuel Pool cooling operations. At least one train of the following systems was aligned for automatic actuation: Service Water Emergency Diesel Generator Containment Penetration Room Exhaust Fan Other non-essential components which are shed or realigned upon safeguards actuation The few systems and components that were aligned for automatic operation responded as designed, including containment isolation valves and valves associated with the above systems (if aligned for automatic operation). The Service Water system was already in operation and, therefore, no Service Water pumps actuated. All systems and components which were capable of automatic operation performed as designed. The Emergency Diesel Generator started but did not synchronize to the bus. No safety injection occurred to the core. This actuation was caused by equipment failure and was not an actual signal resulting from parameter inputs. The affected actuation signals do not perform a safety function in Mode 6 and are not required to be available or operable. Therefore, this actuation is considered invalid. This event was entered into ANO's corrective action program for resolution. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(i) a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
ENS 5345916 June 2018 15:56:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4At 1121 CDT on June 16, 2018, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) performed a manual reactor trip due to a Turbine Bypass valve failing open on reactor startup. At the time, ANO-1 was in Mode 2 at approximately 2 percent power. The failed Turbine Bypass valve resulted in an overcooling event and the Overcooling Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) was entered. Main Steam Line Isolation (MSLI) automatic actuation occurred on 2 of the 4 channels of Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control during the overcooling event in the 'B' Steam Generator. The remaining channels of MSLI were manually actuated by the control room staff from the control room. Overcooling was terminated after the closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) and reactor coolant parameters were stabilized as directed by the Overcooling EOP. Additionally, Gland Sealing Steam was lost to the main turbine due to the closure of the 'B' Steam Generator MSIV and Loss of Condenser Vacuum Abnormal Operating Procedure was entered. This is a 4-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) notification due to a Reactor Protection System actuation (scram) and an 8-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) notification for safety system actuation." All control rods fully inserted into the core during the trip. Heat removal is via the Atmospheric Dump Control valves to atmosphere. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee also notified the State of Arkansas.
ENS 5345612 June 2018 22:11:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4On June 12, 2018, at 1500 CDT, a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure Boundary leak was identified during a Mode 3, hot shutdown walkdown on a High Pressure Injection Line (HPI) to Reactor Coolant Pump (P32C) drain line weld near MU-1066A HPI Line Drain Valve and MU-1066B HPI Line Drain Valve. The 3/4 inch drain line containing drain valves MU-1066A and MU-1066B on the 'C' HPI header (CCA-5 pipe class) has a through-wall defect on the pipe stub or welds between the sockolet and valve MU-1066A. The leak location is in the ASME Class I RCS Pressure Boundary. The hot shutdown walkdown was being performed as part of a planned outage to investigate excessive Reactor Building Sump inleakage. Total unidentified RCS leakage prior to the investigation was determined to be at 0.165 gpm. After the initial investigation of the leakage, the following Tech Specs (TS) were determined be applicable: TS 3.4.5 - RCS Loops Mode 3, TS 3.4.13 - RCS Leakage, TS 3.5.2 - ECCS. Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3 and in progress of an RCS cooldown to comply with Tech Spec requirements. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5271026 April 2017 14:49:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
CE
At 1004 CDT, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) reactor automatically tripped due to the partial loss of offsite power. At the time of the trip, the site was in a Tornado Warning and a Severe Thunderstorm Warning. The Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system auto-actuated due to the loss of main feedwater pumps and the loss of the Reactor Coolant pumps. Both Emergency Diesel Generators started as expected with only one loading as expected. All control rods fully inserted. Currently, ANO-1 has stabilized in Hot Standby via natural circulation. ANO-1 also lost Spent Fuel Pool cooling for approximately 69 minutes. The temperature of the spent fuel pool at the beginning of the event was approximately 102 (degrees) F. The spent fuel pool saw a heatup of 1 (degree) F during the loss of spent fuel pool cooling. The Spent Fuel Pool cooling has been restored. ANO-2 is currently in a refueling outage with all fuel in the spent fuel pool. ANO-2 completed a full core off load to the spent fuel pool and this was completed on April 12, 2017. Spent Fuel Pool cooling was lost for approximately 10 minutes. The Spent Fuel Pool temperature was 91 (degrees) F prior to the event. No heat up of the pool was identified during the event. Cooling has subsequently been restored. The #1 Emergency Diesel Generator auto-started as designed but did not supply the safety bus due to availability of offsite power. No radiological releases have occurred from either unit due to this event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5244117 December 2016 05:43:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP

At approximately 1400 CST on 12/16/16, during the performance of VEF-38A Lead Penetration Room Ventilation System (PRVS) Exhaust Fan Monthly Test, flow was found to be at 2000 SCFM with an operability limit of 1620 to 1980 SCFM. VEF-38A was declared inoperable. Unit 1 entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.11 Condition C for both trains of PRVS inoperable. With VEF-38A aligned as the lead fan and capable of auto-start, the operable standby fan (VEF-38B) would not have started. During the time that VEF-38A was inoperable and capable of auto-starting, the Unit 1 PRVS was in a condition that could have prevented the control of the release of radioactive material. At 1546 CST on 12/16/16, Unit 1 rendered VEF-38A incapable of auto starting by placing its hand switch in PULL-TO-LOCK. Unit 1 Entered LCO 3.7.11 condition A for one PRVS train inoperable and Exited LCO 3.7.11 Condition C. This is a notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for a condition that could have prevented the control of the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 2/7/17 AT 1528 EST FROM BUCHANON DICKSON TO DONG PARK * * *

EN 52441 was initiated on December 16, 2016, when the VEF-38A fan flow was found to be in excess of the procedurally defined operability limit during the monthly lead penetration room ventilation system test. The revision of the procedure in use at the time had inadvertently included acceptance criterion for fan air flow in the monthly supplements. The monthly tests demonstrate the flow paths for the two trains are functional and open, but they are not performed in the designed Engineered Safeguards (ES) configuration. The monthly tests do not secure the normal supply and exhaust ventilation within the penetration room boundaries; therefore, flow may be outside limits required during the ES configuration. The 18 month surveillance, which measures the flowrate of the system while in the ES configuration, was completed in April 2016. The surveillance verified the system's operability. The systems have not been modified or altered since this surveillance; therefore the measured flowrate remains the same. The procedure has been revised subsequent to this event to remove the flowrate as an 'acceptance criterion' for the monthly test. Because the VEF-38A flow did not result in fan inoperability, both fan trains remained operable; therefore, ANO-1 did not lose a safety function to control a radioactive release. Based on that, conclusion EN 52441 is being retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Warnick).

ENS 5227130 September 2016 04:01:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LPAt 2100 CDT on 09/29/16, while in Mode 6, both trains of Decay Heat (Residual Heat Removal) were declared inoperable due to a cracked weld on a 1" common pipe. The leak developed in a USAS B31.7, Class1 pipe at a weld upstream of pressure indication isolation valve DH-1037. The leak is not isolable from the common 8-inch Decay Heat piping and encompasses approximately 1/3 (one third) of the pipe circumference. At the time of discovery, the unit was in Lowered Inventory with both Loops of Decay Heat in service. Subsequently, one train of Decay Heat has been secured to reduce the likelihood of crack propagation. One Train of Decay Heat remains in service providing the function of removing Decay Heat and the other train is readily available. The leakage impacts redundant equipment required to fulfill a safety function. In the current condition, both trains are required to be operable to meet Technical Specification LCO 3.9.5, Decay Heat Removal (DHR) and Coolant Circulation-Low water Level. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) for any event or condition that results in a loss of Safety Function associated with the Decay Heat System (Residual Heat Removal System). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The leak is approximately 0.25 gallons per minute and pipe pressure is 140 psi. Compensatory measures are in place and include an individual posted to watch the pipe in case plugging is necessary. Repairs to the pipe will be completed once pipe is able to be drained.
ENS 5226728 September 2016 09:46:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CEOn September 16, 2016, at 0036 (CDT), during a 24-hour Technical Specification (TS) endurance run, the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) red train Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) became inoperable when its inboard generator bearing failed. ANO-2 TS 3.8.1.1, 'AC Sources', requires an inoperable EDG to be restored to service within 14 days or actions to place the unit in a shutdown condition initiated. It has been determined that repair options cannot be completed within the Allowed Outage Time (AOT) due to unforeseen circumstances which evolved during recovery efforts. At 0745 (CDT), ANO-2 initiated plant shutdown due to the inability to restore the red train EDG. ANO-2 will be shutdown and cooled down to Mode 5. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspectors.
ENS 5224215 September 2016 11:18:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LPDuring performance of an extent of condition evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornadoes, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, identified non-conforming conditions in the plant design such that specific TS equipment on Unit 1 is considered not (to) be adequately protected from tornado missiles. The reportable condition is postulated by tornado missiles entering vital switchgear rooms 99 and 100 and striking vital switchgears in the rooms. A tornado could generate multiple missiles capable of striking the Unit 1 vital switchgear and rendering both safety related AC electrical trains inoperable. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) safe shutdown capability, (B) residual heat removal capability, or (D) accident mitigation. This condition was identified as part of an on-going extent of condition review of potential tornado missile related site impacts. Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-313/2016-002-00 was recently submitted addressing previously identified tornado missile vulnerabilities at the Unit 1 plant. Enforcement discretion per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002 has been implemented and required actions taken. Corrective actions will be documented in a follow-on licensee event report. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5223411 September 2016 17:44:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LPDuring performance of an extent of condition evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornados, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, identified non-conforming conditions in the plant design such that specific TS equipment on Unit 1 is considered not be adequately protected from tornado missiles. The reportable condition is postulated by tornado missiles entering the Unit 1 Controlled Access area, elevation 386', Upper North Electrical Penetration Room (UNEPR) through penetrating a hollow metal door and then striking safety related cables. A tornado could generate multiple missiles capable of striking the Unit 1 UNEPR and rendering both safety related emergency feedwater trains inoperable. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and (D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (B) Remove residual heat, or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition was identified as part of an on-going extent of condition review of potential tornado missile related site impacts. Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-313/2016-002-00 was recently submitted addressing previously identified tornado missile vulnerabilities at the Unit 1 plant. Enforcement discretion per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002 has been implemented and required actions taken. Corrective actions will be documented in a follow-on licensee event report. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. A similar evaluation is on going for Unit 2.
ENS 5219524 August 2016 12:15:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LPDuring performance of an extent of condition evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornados, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, identified non-conforming conditions in the plant design such that specific TS equipment on Unit 1 is considered to not be adequately protected from tornado missiles. The reportable condition is postulated by tornado missiles entering the Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room through penetrating the hollow metal door or potentially from spalling of the block wall separating Room 96 and 97. A tornado could generate multiple missiles capable of striking the Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room and rendering both safety related electrical trains inoperable. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) Remove residual heat, or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition was identified as part of an on-going extent of condition review of potential tornado missile related site impacts. Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-313/2016-002-00 was recently submitted addressing previously identified tornado missile vulnerabilities at the Unit 1 plant. Enforcement discretion per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002 has been implemented and required actions taken. Corrective actions will be documented in a follow-on licensee event report. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5194923 May 2016 15:36:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
CE
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5189129 April 2016 10:48:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
CE
The licensee notified the Arkansas Department of Emergency Management, National Response Center, and Local Emergency Planning Committee regarding an onsite spill of 12 (percent) Sodium Hypochlorite (bleach solution). Approximately 2000 gallons of Sodium Hypochlorite solution leaked from a bulk tank within the protected area, outside the tank containment berm. Approximately 100 gallons were estimated to have entered the nearby storm drain. The estimate was based on preliminary chemistry samples. The quantity released exceeded the Reportable Quantity (RQ) for Sodium Hypochlorite (RQ of 100 pounds) and was therefore reported. There is no impact to the operation of the ANO units or personnel onsite or offsite. No harm to the environment is expected. No offsite emergency response is required. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies have been made. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5180819 March 2016 22:51:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
CE

Two (2) potentially degraded flood barriers at penetrations 0073-01-0034 and 0073-01-0063 were identified in the area between the Unit 1 Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building. The deficient barriers are a 'blockout section' of the floor designed to house multiple penetrations that transition from the Turbine Building to the Auxiliary Building. Attempts have been made to investigate the status of the flood barrier with no definitive results. Investigations and additional evaluations are continuing, however, it is currently unknown if the aggregate of these two flood barriers could potentially overwhelm and flood the Auxiliary Building which would challenge equipment necessary to remove residual heat and constitute an unanalyzed condition. Based on current conditions (i.e., no forecast flooding conditions), this condition does not present an immediate safety concern. This condition has been determined to be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). This condition is a non-emergency condition. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program. Compensatory measures have been prepared to allow placement of a seal over the identified deficient barriers. If required these seals can be installed well in advance of forecast flood conditions. Permanent repairs are currently being designed for installation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0044 EDT ON 3/22/2016 FROM KEITH LEDBETTER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

This is an 8 hour non-emergency supplemental notification to previously issued Event Notification number 51808. In EN 51808, two non-functional barriers were identified and reported, and during an extent of condition review, a third barrier has been identified that does not conform to expected flood barrier standards A potentially degraded flood barrier at 'blockout' penetration 0073-01-9018 was identified in the area between the Unit 1 Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building. The deficient barrier is a 'blockout section' of the floor designed to house multiple penetrations that transition from the Turbine Building to the Auxiliary Building. Attempts have been made to investigate the status of the flood barrier with no definitive results. Investigations and additional evaluations are continuing; however, it is currently unknown if this flood barrier could potentially be overwhelmed and flood the Auxiliary Building which would challenge equipment necessary to remove residual heat and constitute an unanalyzed condition. Based on current conditions (i.e., no forecast flooding conditions), this condition does not present an immediate safety concern. This condition has been determined to be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). This condition is a non-emergency condition. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program. Compensatory measures have been prepared to allow placement of a seal over the identified deficient barrier. If required this seal can be installed well in advance of forecast flood conditions. Permanent repairs are currently being designed for installation. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified earlier in the evening that this event would be updated. Notified the R4DO (Haire).

ENS 5178510 March 2016 09:44:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
CE
This notification is being made due to planned maintenance during the Semi-Annual Seismic System Functional Test. This test will result in a major loss of emergency assessment capability for emergency action levels (EAL) HA6 (Natural or destructive phenomena affecting VITAL AREAS), while the control room 0.1g acceleration alarm is non-functional. The emergency preparedness plan requires the 0.1g acceleration alarm indication to declare EAL HA6 during a seismic event > Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE). This condition requires an 8 hour nonemergency immediate reportability to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Major Loss of Assessment, Response, or Communication Capability. At approximately 0840 CST on March 10, 2016 the Semi-Annual Seismic System Functional Test commenced. While this test is in progress, seismic alarm capability is not available for EAL declaration purposes. ANO procedures provide compensatory measures of using offsite sources to obtain seismic data. It should be noted that seismic data will still remain capable of being recorded and only alarm capability is lost. The Semi-Annual Seismic System Functional Test is scheduled to be completed in less than 24 hours. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 517114 February 2016 18:50:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
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A non-licensed supervisor tested positive for a drugs during a random Fitness for Duty test. The individual's access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5160715 December 2015 10:24:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LPThis is a 4-hour Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) notification due to a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation. Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, was manually tripped from 43 percent power at 0544 CST. The reactor was manually tripped due to operator judgement during control issues with the Integrated Control System (ICS) during a planned downpower for Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system maintenance. CV-2672 B, low load control valve, failed to close. Subsequently, CV-2674 B, low load block valve, began to close and caused a loss of feed to E-24B Steam Generator. No additional equipment issues were noted. All control rods fully inserted. Emergency Feedwater (EFW) actuated and was utilized to maintain Steam Generator (SG) levels. This (EFW actuation) meets the 8 hour Non-Emergency Immediate Notification Criteria ((10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)). No Primary safety valves lifted. Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) did lift initially after the trip. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dump valves to the main condenser. Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Unit 2 was not affected by the transient on Unit 1. The licensee notified the State of Arkansas.
ENS 5154317 November 2015 12:11:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
CE

This notification is being made due to planned maintenance during the Semi-Annual Seismic System Functional Test. This test will result in a major loss of emergency assessment capability for emergency action level (EAL) HA6 (natural or destructive phenomena affecting VITAL AREAS), while the control room 0.1g acceleration alarm is non-functional. The emergency preparedness plan requires the 0.1g acceleration alarm indication to declare EAL HA6 during a seismic event greater than the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE). This condition requires an 8 hour non-emergency immediate reportability to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Major Loss of Assessment, Response, or Communication Capability. At approximately 1200 CST on November 17, 2015, the Semi-Annual Seismic System Functional Test will commence. While this test is in progress, seismic alarm capability is not available for EAL declaration purposes. ANO procedures provide compensatory measures of using offsite sources to obtain seismic data. It should be noted that seismic data will still remain capable of being recorded and only alarm capability is lost. The Semi-Annual Seismic System Functional Test will occur intermittently over the next four days. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM STEVE KIRSCHBERGER TO VINCE KLCO ON 11/18/15 AT 1940 EST * * *

The licensee returned the Seismic System to service at 1347 CST on 11/18/15. The licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Warnick).

ENS 5134024 August 2015 11:36:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
CE
This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50 72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that will result in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g. a significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System or offsite notification system.) The emergency preparedness plan requires seismic monitoring instruments to diagnose an earthquake for emergency actions levels (EAL) HU6 (Natural or destructive phenomena affecting protected area) and HA6 (Natural or destructive phenomena affecting vital areas). At 1020 CDT on August 24, 2015 the Semi-Annual Seismic System Functional Test commenced. While this test is in progress, seismic alarm capability is not available for EAL declaration purposes. ANO procedures provide compensatory measures of using offsite sources to obtain seismic data. It should be noted that seismic data will still remain capable of being recorded, only alarm capability is lost. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5118427 June 2015 06:40:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
CE

This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that will result in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g. significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System or offsite notification system.) The emergency preparedness plan requires seismic monitoring instruments to diagnose an earthquake for emergency action levels (EAL) HU6 (Natural or destructive phenomena affecting Protected Area) and HA6 (Natural and destructive phenomena affecting Vital Areas). At 2149 CST on June 26, 2015, (the) ACS-8003 seismic monitor was declared non-functional due to having a fault light indicated on the C529 seismic cabinet. (The) ACS-8001 seismic monitor had previously been declared non-functional due to the same condition. With these 2 monitors out of service the seismic alarm capability is not available. ANO procedures provide compensatory measures of using offsite sources to obtain seismic data. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 6/28/15 AT 1552 EDT FROM KENYON MCNEAILL TO DONG PARK * * *

On 6/28/15 at 1232 CDT, batteries have been replaced in ACS-8001 and ACS-8003 seismic monitors. Both monitors have been restored to a fully functional status. Seismic alarm capability is restored and Emergency Assessment Capability has been restored. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Campbell).

ENS 510291 May 2015 16:14:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
CE
This notification is conservatively being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that will result in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g. significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System or offsite notification system.) The emergency preparedness plan requires seismic monitoring instruments to diagnose an earthquake for emergency action levels (EAL) HU6 (Natural or destructive phenomena affecting PROTECTED AREA) and HA6 (Natural and destructive phenomena affecting VITAL AREAS). At approximately 1600 (CDT) on May 1, 2015, ANO plans to remove Motor Control Center B33 from service for maintenance. This will render the alarm functions for the seismic monitors nonfunctional. It is expected that this maintenance will take approximately 72 hours to complete. ANO procedures provide compensatory measures of using offsite sources to obtain seismic data. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5073915 January 2015 17:29:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CEThis notification is being made in accordance with NUREG-1022, Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 Section 3.2.12, News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency. On January 15, 2015 at 0720 CST, with Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) at 100% power, an on-site injury occurred on ANO-2. An individual fell while descending stairs and was injured. Pope County EMS transported the individual to a local medical facility. No contaminated individuals were transported off-site. No individuals were contaminated during the event. The individual was admitted to the local hospital. 29 CFR 1904.39(a) requires a report to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), US Department of Labor with twenty-four (24) hours after the in-patient hospitalization of one or more employees as a result of a work-related incident. At 1545 CST, ANO determined that this is a 24-hour OSHA reportable occurrence. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5064125 November 2014 17:07:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP

On Tuesday November 25, 2014, at 1211 CST, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) reviewed AREVA 10 CFR 50.46 Notification Letter FAB14-00632. This letter indicates that a deficiency was discovered in the uranium thermal conductivity models used in the ANO-1 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis of record. When the deficiency is corrected, the LOCA Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT) limits may be in excess of 2200 degrees Fahrenheit (F). 10 CFR 50.46 paragraph (b) defines the acceptance criteria for the LOCA analysis process. The ANO-1 licensing basis PCT is evaluated for compliance with the criterion 10 CFR 50.46(b)(1) and must not exceed a PCT of 2200 degrees F.

During AREVA's review of the issue, AREVA had provided compensatory measures in the form of reductions in LOCA linear heat rates as a contingency in case the errors were found to be substantiated, which were then translated into reduced axial imbalance limits so that ANO-1 would operate within 10 CFR 50.46 limits. As a precautionary measure pending the completed analysis, ANO-1 implemented the compensatory measures on October 20, 2014, and as a result, the errors reported have no impact on current plant operation or public health and safety. This event is being conservatively reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Based on 50.46(a)(3)(ii) criteria, ANO-1 will submit a written report within 30 days. ANO-1 has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.

ENS 505198 October 2014 15:39:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CEINPO-IER-L4-14-33 (Direct Current Circuits Challenge Appendix R Fire Analysis) was reviewed to determine applicability to ANO Unit 1 & 2. It was determined that 2P-21, Turbine Generator Emergency Seal Oil Pump, control cables are not fused and are routed through multiple fire zones containing safe shutdown equipment. A potential fire induced cable failure in any of these fire zones could result in a secondary fire or damage adjacent cables along the path of the unprotected cable. The concern is that under fire safe shutdown conditions, it is postulated that a fire in one zone can cause short circuits potentially resulting in secondary fires or cable failures in other fire zones where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. This condition is reportable as an 8-hour ENS report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected zones of the plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5045412 September 2014 20:42:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LPArkansas Nuclear One (ANO) identified the potential for stored fuel that does not meet the fuel specifications or loading conditions of the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System. Investigation into the cause of a Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) actuation on the morning of 9/12/2014 led to sampling of helium circulating through the Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC-24-060) as part of the Forced Helium Dehydration process in the final stages of cask loading. Sample results indicated the presence of Kr-85. Kr-85 is a fission product that indicates the potential for the fuel that does meet the selection criteria for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System. All fuel assemblies loaded into MPC-24-060 were checked to confirm their intact status (a cask Certificate of Conformance requirement) as part of the selection process. Each assembly's status as intact is based on in-mast sipping and/or ultrasonic testing performed subsequent to their final operating cycle. Results of these sipping and ultrasonic test campaigns are maintained in a comprehensive engineering report used to verify assembly status during cask fuel selection. Per the CoC for the Hi-STORM 100 Cask System, Appendix B, Section 1.0, the definition of 'INTACT FUEL ASSEMBLY' is a fuel assembly without known or suspected cladding defects greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks, and which can be handled by normal means. Given the presence of Kr-85 along with the fuels history, it cannot be confirmed that all fuel assemblies meet the definition of 'Intact' and would not meet the CoC Requirements for Fuel to be stored in the HI-STORM 100 SFSC System (Section 2.1.1). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5013824 May 2014 13:51:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CEOffsite notification has been made to the Arkansas Department of Health due to Pope county EMS rescue personnel entering a radiological / contaminated area. An individual was working in a radiological / contaminated area only accessible by ladder. The individual was unable to use a ladder to egress the area and requested assistance in exiting. Pope county EMS rescue with the on-site rescue team provided the necessary assistance which required the team to enter a radiological / contaminated area. The team, including the individual in question, has exited the radiological / contaminated area. They were evaluated by Radiation Protection and were not contaminated. The individual was transported to a local medical facility for further evaluation. The individual was assisted in exiting the 'A' steam generator cavity. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5006327 April 2014 23:57:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CEAt approximately 1932 (CDT) on 4/27/2014, the System Operations Center (SOC - Dispatcher) informed Unit 2 of a system wide grid emergency and ordered both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to come off line as soon as possible. At approximately 2012 (CDT), Unit 2 automatically tripped from 51% power due to an Auxiliary Trip on CPCs (Core Protection Calculator) due to Axial Shape Index (ASI) trip. All Control Element Assemblies inserted into the core. Both vital and non-vital 4160V and 6900V buses remain powered from Startup #3 Transformer. All Systems responded as designed. At 1932 (CDT), Unit 1 commenced a Rapid Plant Shutdown at a rate 5-7% per min with the intention to take the turbine offline and leave the reactor critical at 10-12% power on the Turbine Bypass Valves. When the Unit 2 reactor tripped, Unit 1 stopped the power reduction and stabilized the plant at approximately 19% Reactor Power and 125 Generated Megawatts. With SOC concurrence, Unit 1 stabilized power and was told to limit site output to <200 MWe. At 1932 CDT, Unit 1 began a down power from 100% power and Unit 2 began a down power from 95% power. On Unit 2, decay heat is being removed by the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3 with stable offsite power. The system wide grid emergency is believed to be caused by tornados in the region. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State.
ENS 499953 April 2014 17:08:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CEAt approximately 1301 (CDT) on 4/3/2014, Unit 2 tripped from 100% power for unknown reason(s). All Control Element Assemblies (CEA) inserted into the core. (Note that CEA 03 Plant Monitoring System indication still indicates fully withdrawn. However, CEA 03 in-limit light and control panel indication validate that CEA 03 is fully inserted.) 4160v bus 2A1 and 6900v bus 2H1 transferred to Startup Transformer #2. 4160v bus 2A2 appeared to de-energize and re-energize on Startup Transformer #3. 6900v bus 2H2 is de-energized. 2K4B emergency diesel generator started but did not tie onto the 2A4 4160v bus. Emergency Feedwater actuated on low steam generator level. Offsite power remains available and decay heat is being removed to the main condensers using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 was not affected. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the State.
ENS 498735 March 2014 11:20:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
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During walk downs to ensure the availability of flood protection barriers, a condition was identified which had the potential to adversely impact the ability to address external flooding conditions. Several individual pathways between both unit's Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building were identified that could bypass flood barriers. In the aggregate however, the current equipment could become overwhelmed and the flooding in the Auxiliary Building could then potentially challenge equipment necessary to remove residual heat. The identified pathways were for the most part unscheduled partially filled conduits. There were no isolation features on these pathways and no barriers to flooding were in place between the Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building thus the potential existed to bypass the existing flood barriers. Flooding of the Turbine Building conceivably could have resulted in the accumulation of water in sufficient quantities to fill the Turbine Building to the height of the external floodwaters which could enter the Auxiliary Building via one or more deficient flood barrier. These floodwaters would then potentially challenge equipment, located within the Auxiliary Building, which is required to remove residual heat. This condition has been determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This condition is a non-emergency condition. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program. Barriers are being installed in these pathways as they are identified or compensatory measures implemented. The walk downs were performed in response to Fukishima lessons learned. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 496189 December 2013 09:20:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CE

At approximately 0748 (CST) on 12/9/2013, an electrical fault occurred resulting in a fire and explosion on the ANO (Arkansas Nuclear One) Unit 2 Unit Auxiliary Transformer. This caused a unit trip and a loss of power to Startup 3 Transformer, which is one of the two offsite power feeds to ANO Unit 2. ANO Unit 2 is currently in a stable shutdown condition. With Startup 3 and Unit Aux Transformer unavailable, power was lost to the Reactor Coolant Pumps and Circulating Water Pumps. RCS (Reactor Coolant System) natural circulation is in progress removing core decay heat. Emergency Feedwater actuated due to low steam generator levels and is supplying both steam generators. The unit is steaming to the atmosphere. 2A-1 and 2A-3 are powered from SU (Startup) 2 Transformer. 2A-4 is powered from 2K-4B Emergency Diesel Generator. ANO Unit 1 is currently operating at 98% power. The auto transformer tripped off line with the fault in ANO Unit 2 Unit Auxiliary Transformer. This has caused Startup Transformer 1 to be inoperable. This places ANO Unit 1 in a 72 hour Technical Specification action statement (T.S 3.6.1 for Loss of the SU-1 Transformer). No significant injuries were reported as a result of this condition and offsite agencies have been notified. At 0800 on 12/9/2013 Unit 2 declared a Notification of Unusual Event based on EAL HU4 Fire or Explosion inside Protected Area not extinguished in 15 minutes. At 0917 on 12/9/2013, the fire on Unit 2 Unit Auxiliary Transformer is OUT. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC, and Nuclear SSA vial email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DAN BREEDLOVE TO VINCE KLCO AT 1336 EST ON 12/9/2013 * * *

At 1215 CST, ANO terminated from the Unusual Event as per HU4 stable plant conditions. ANO Unit 2 is stable and will be cooled down to Mode 5 via natural circulation and decay heat is being removed via emergency feedwater and downstream dump valves to atmosphere. There is no radiological release and no personnel injuries. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Arkansas Department of Emergency Management, Arkansas Department of Health, and other local authorities. Notified R4DO (Vasquez), NRR EO (King) and IRC MOC (Morris). Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC, and Nuclear SSA vial email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ALBERT MARTIN TO VINCE KLCO AT 1812 EST ON 12/9/2013 * * *

Outside agencies (National Response Center, Arkansas Department of Emergency Management, Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Coast Guard) were contacted due to a minor unknown amount of oil that entered the plant discharge to Lake Dardanelle. The oil was from the faulted Unit 2 Unit Auxiliary Transformer. The majority of oil was contained within the containment around the transformer or the oily water separator it drains to. Local inspection revealed only a small amount of what was released actually passed the containment booms that are continuously in place on the discharge canal. The oil boom was verified to be in good condition. The oil was verified to be mineral oil. The release was verified to be terminated. An additional oil boom was deployed. Reference (ANO) Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2013-03071. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Werner)

ENS 4895522 April 2013 23:23:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
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On 4-22-13, at 1623 (CDT), the ANO Unit 2 control room was notified of a loss of ventilation capability to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The main control boards associated with the variable speed drives on both air handling units at the EOF have failed. Therefore, there are no means to filter air for the EOF. If the EOF is staffed, the EOF will be required to relocate to the Alternate EOF in the event of a release that causes the EOF evacuation criteria to be exceeded, as directed by approved emergency response procedures. The on-site Operations Support Center, on-site Technical Support Center and off-site Alternate EOF remain fully functional to perform emergency assessment activities. Efforts are underway to expedite repairs. This notification is required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 4/24/13 AT 1003 EDT FROM STEVE COFFMAN TO DONG PARK * * *

At 1637 EDT on 4/23/13, the EOF ventilation has been restored and the EOF has full functionality. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Whitten).

ENS 4886931 March 2013 11:57:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
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At 0750 (CDT) on 3/31/2013, during movement of the Unit 1 Main Turbine Generator Stator (~500 tons), the Unit 1 turbine temporary lift device failed. This caused a loss of all off-site power on Unit 1. The ANO Unit 1 #1 and #2 EDG (Emergency Diesel Generator) have started and are supplying A-3 4160V switchgear and A-4 4160V switchgear. P-4A Service Water pump and P-4C Service Water pump has been verified running. Unit 1 has entered (procedures) 1202.007 - Degraded Power, 1203.028 - Loss of Decay Heat, and 1203.050 - Spent Fuel Emergencies. Unit 1 is in MODE 6. ANO-1 entered TS 3.8.2 A, 'One Required Offsite Circuit Inoperable'. All required actions are complete. The event caused a loss of decay heat removal on ANO Unit 1 which was restored in 3 minutes and 50 seconds. Unit 2 tripped and is in MODE 3. Emergency Feed Water was initiated on Unit 2 and Unit 2 was in (Technical Specification) 3.0.3 from 0817 (CDT) to 0848 (CDT) due to Emergency Feedwater. Unit 2 is being powered by off-site. Unit 2 Startup 3 (transformer) lock out at 0921 (CDT). (Bus) 2A1 is on Start up 2 (transformer) and (bus) 2A3 is on #2 EDG. 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) - 4-hr. notification due to the ES (Engineered Safeguard Feature) actuation on both Unit 1 and Unit 2. 10CFR50 72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) - 4-hr. notification due to RPS (Reactor Protection System) actuation on Unit 2. 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(xi) - 4-hr. notification due to Government Notification. 29CFR1904.39a - (OSHA) 8-hr. notification due to death on site. At 1033 (CDT) on 3/31/2013, Unit 2 entered a Notification of Unusual Event based on EAL HU4 due to damage in 2A1 switchgear. Notification of the NUE will be made lAW Emergency Plan requirements. Follow-up notifications will be made as appropriate. At this time, the full extent of structural damage on Unit 1 is not known. There was one known fatality and 4 known serious injuries to workers. The local coroner is on site for the fatality and the injured personnel have been transported offsite to local hospitals. Investigation into the cause of the failure and extent of damage is ongoing. On Unit 2, all rods inserted during the trip. The core is being cooled via natural circulation. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to atmosphere. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. The licensee has notified the State of Arkansas, local authorities, OSHA and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, DHS NICC, FEMA and Nuclear NSSA (via email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM DAVID THOMPSON TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1934 EDT ON 3/31/13 * * *

The licensee terminated the NOUE at 1821 CDT. The basis for termination was that the affected bus (2A2) is de-energized and no other equipment on Unit 2 was damaged. The licensee has notified the state and local authorities and will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Pick), NRR EO (Howe), IRD (Gott), DHS SWO, DHS NICC, FEMA and Nuclear SSA (via email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM STEVE COFFMAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1054 EDT ON 4/2/13 * * *

The licensee made the following edits to the third paragraph of their original report (edits in quotes): Unit 2 tripped and is in MODE 3. Emergency Feed Water initiated on Unit 2. Unit 2 was in (Technical Specification) 3.0.3 from 0817 (CDT) to 0848 (CDT) due to Emergency Feedwater "being procedurally overridden." Unit 2 "was initially" being powered by off-site. Unit 2 Startup 3 Lock out occurred at 0921. 2A1 is now on Startup 2, and "2A4" is on #2 EDG. Notified R4DO (Kellar) via email.

ENS 486442 January 2013 18:42:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CEAt 1308 hours (CST) on January 2, 2013, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 (ANO-2) experienced an inadvertent safety injection actuation signal (SIAS), containment cooling actuation signal (CCAS) and containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS) during matrix testing on 'C' channel plant protective system (PPS). All components actuated as designed for the stated actuation signals. After verification that the actuation signal was not valid the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps and low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pumps were secured and their hand switches placed in pull-to-lock as directed by the abnormal operating procedure for inadvertent SIAS at 1312 hours. The HPSI and LPSI pumps were the restored to normal standby condition and available for automatic operation at 1352 hours. The unit did down power to approximately 87% power when all three coolant charging pumps ran with suction aligned to the boric acid makeup tanks. The unit currently remains in mode 1. SIAS, CCAS, and CIAS have been reset. The cause of the inadvertent actuation signals is under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Unit 2 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 for approximately 40 minutes while the LPSI and HPSI pumps were in pull-to-lock.
ENS 481698 August 2012 13:15:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CEAt 0823 hours on August 8, 2012, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) experienced an automatic reactor trip. The reactor automatically tripped due to High Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Pressure that was caused by a Main Turbine trip due to high condenser back pressure from a degraded vacuum condition. The Reactor Protection System (RPS) performed as designed in response to the High Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Pressure condition resulting in automatic shutdown of the reactor from approximately 100 percent power. All Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) fully inserted on the trip. The Emergency Feedwater Actuation System (EFAS) actuated for the 'A' Steam Generator only due to level trending slightly below the setpoint. The plant has transitioned to supplying the steam generators using the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system. The unit is currently in Mode 3 and implementing the transient response process. The investigation into the cause of the trip is ongoing and the local NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. The unit is in a normal electrical lineup, and the decay heat is being removed by the main condenser via the turbine bypass valves. The State Department of Health was notified and ANO-2 will be issuing a press release.
ENS 4814127 July 2012 00:29:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
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At 2120 (CDT) (on 07/26/12), a loss of AC power to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) occurred effecting emergency response capability. The Technical Support Center (TSC) remained available. In the event of on emergency declaration requiring an EOF, the emergency Response Organization (ERO) would have been directed to report to the Backup EOF. Assessment capability via SPDS was not lost during this time period and communications equipment also remained available. Coincident with no local offsite power being available, the backup diesel generator was unable to supply AC power to the facility due to an overvoltage condition present on the transfer switch. No power was available from the time period of 2120 (CDT) to 2133 (CDT) when local offsite power was restored to the building. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(b)(3)(xiii) due to the unavailability of an emergency response facility. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4782411 April 2012 17:02:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
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As part of a planned NRC Emergency Plan Exercise on 04/11/2012, local radio and television stations were given access to drill exercise messages to facilitate public awareness of the drill. These messages were plainly marked as 'drill' activity. At 12:40 p.m. CST, an email was sent to Entergy Executive Management showing the contents of a web page that stated in part 'A site area emergency was declared Wednesday at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, today at 10:18 a.m. by Entergy Operations Inc. officials...' A Little Rock, Arkansas local television station had posted a story on their internet web page at 10:53 a.m., indicating a real event, not a drill activity. The television station News Director stated that once the error was identified, the story was removed from their web page within a matter of minutes. This unplanned media event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72.(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 4777727 March 2012 23:11:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CE

The following condition is being reported by Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed Condition.' Conservative engineering analysis has determined that the Spent Fuel Handling Machine (2H-3) is not qualified in a design basis earthquake event. Current seismic analysis is indicating a lack of margin for several structural parts of the machine. The Spent Fuel Handling Machine (2H-3) is currently parked and de-energized in a safe position and administratively prohibited from being moved over any irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool. Until further engineering evaluation or modifications can occur the Spent Fuel Handling Machine (2H-3) will remain in its current position and de-energized. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM STEVEN COFFMAN TO PETE SNYDER AT 1104 EDT ON 5/23/12 * * * 

The purpose of this notification is to retract the previous Event Notification Report #47777 made by Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 on 03/27/2012. The initial report indicated that the Spent Fuel Handling Machine (2H-3) may not have been qualified during a design basis earthquake event due to seismic analysis indicating a lack of margin for several structural parts of the machine. 2H3 was parked and de-energized in a safe position, and the condition was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed Condition.' Since the initial report, Engineering has completed a new seismic analysis which demonstrates that the discovered conditions of the Spent Fuel Handling Machine structural parts were adequate to preclude structural failure of the machine in the area of the Spent Fuel Pool. References to the calculations that formulate the basis for this conclusion are documented in the Licensee's corrective action program. Based on the new seismic analysis, the condition initially reported in EN #47777 did not result in 'an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety' and is therefore retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed on the seismic analysis results and informed of this retraction. Notified R4DO (Spitzberg).

ENS 471202 August 2011 21:27:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CE

The following condition is being reported by Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed Condition' and in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'A Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.' On 08/02/2011 at 1346 CDT, the ANO Unit 2 Control Room was notified by Engineering that a postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB) could potentially cause both the Red and Green Train Emergency Safeguard Features (ESF) Rooms to exceed their environmentally qualified temperature limits. This postulated condition would be possible due to normally open room purge dampers exposing ESF equipment in these rooms to a common area impacted by HELB conditions. The ESF Rooms contain the Red and Green Trains of High Pressure Safely Injection Pumps, Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps, Containment Spray Pumps, and Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers. Until further Engineering evaluation can be performed to validate this postulated scenario, ANO-2 has closed ESF room purge dampers to provide Red and Green ESF train separation during a potential HELB event. Refer to (ANO-2) Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2011-02772 for further information. The NRC Resident has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM STEVE COFFMAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1514 EDT ON 8/18/11 * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made by Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) on 08/02/2011 at 2127 (EDT) (EN# 47120). The initial report documented that a postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB) could potentially cause rooms containing both trains of Emergency Safeguard Features (ESF) equipment to exceed their environmentally qualified temperature limits. The ESF rooms contain the High Pressure Safely Injection Pumps, Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps, Containment Spray Pumps, and Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers. Specifically, normally open ESF room purge dampers exposing both trains of ESF equipment to a common area impacted by postulated HELB conditions were not modeled in the ANO-2 HELB analysis. This condition was reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed Condition' and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'A Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function'. Since the initial report, Engineering has revised the ANO-2 HELB model to include the effects of the open ESF room purge dampers. The resulting analysis shows that a HELB event will not cause the required ESF equipment to exceed analyzed temperature limits with the room purge dampers in the open configuration. Therefore, the condition did not result in 'a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function' and did not result in an 'unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'. Based on the revised HELB analysis, the previous report (EN#47120) describes a condition that does not meet the reporting requirements of 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) or 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and is therefore retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the retraction. Notified R4DO (Hay).

ENS 4657326 January 2011 17:08:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
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A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The subject individual has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspectors.
ENS 4655519 January 2011 22:50:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
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The licensee declared an unusual event based upon a potential security incident at the site. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4619723 August 2010 04:42:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CEThis is a 4 hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) notification due to a Technical Specification required shutdown. 2EDG-2 (Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator #2) is currently inoperable due to a planned outage which has exceeded the allowed 14 day time clock IAW (in accordance with) TS 3.8.1.1. This requires that Unit 2 be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours. Unit 2 is currently at 68% power and shutting down to comply with Technical Specifications. The licensee notified the Arkansas Department of Health and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4587226 April 2010 01:35:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LPThis is a 4 hour Non-Emergency 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) notification due to an Automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation (scram). At 2126 hours (CDT) on April 25, 2010, Unit 1 Reactor automatically tripped due to 2 of 4 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channels tripped. At the time of the trip, reactor power, as indicated by heat balance, was ~20%, while excore Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) indicated ~30%. The RPS high reactor power trip setpoint was 50% power. An NI calibration initiated an automatic withdrawal command to the control rod drive system. The rod withdrawal, resulted in one RPS channel tripping on high reactor power and another RPS channel tripping on high reactor coolant system pressure. All control rods fully inserted into the core and no safety systems, other than RPS, actuated. Emergency feedwater did not actuate and was not needed. No primary safety valves lifted. Seven secondary safety valves lifted and subsequently reseated. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3. The NRC resident has been notified. The licensee also informed the State of Arkansas and does not plan a press release. The Unit 1 reactor trip was uncomplicated. Current means of decay heat removal is normal feedwater to the Steam Generators with steam discharge to the Main Condenser through Main Steam Bypass. The Main Generator was online at the time of the trip and the plant is currently in a normal post trip electrical line up. There is no indication of primary-secondary tube leakage. All systems functioned as required.
ENS 4585418 April 2010 18:04:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LPThis is a 4-hour Non-Emergency, 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) notification due to an RPS actuation (scram). Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 was manually tripped from 11% power at 1357 hrs. CDT. The cause of the trip was operator judgment due to a small fire reported in the high pressure turbine enclosure at governor valve number 3 by a fire watch stationed at that location and an unrelated failure of P-32C Reactor Coolant Pump 3rd stage seal (upper seal) occurring earlier that afternoon. No additional equipment issues were noted. An extinguishing agent (CO2) was applied within approximately 30 seconds. All control rods fully inserted. No primary safeties lifted. No secondary safeties lifted. Emergency feedwater did not actuate and was not needed. No safety systems actuated. The plant will be cooled down to repair the P-32C Reactor Coolant Pump Seal. The NRC Resident has been notified. There was no effect on Unit 2. The grid is stable with Unit 1 in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to condenser using normal feed to the steam generators. The licensee will be notifying the Arkansas Department of Health.
ENS 4579727 March 2010 20:32:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP

Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 is currently shut down in Mode 6 for refueling outage 1R22. On March 27, 2010 at 1531 CDT a visual examination of Unit 1 pressurizer level tap 1-RC-1001 A/B indicated evidence of past leakage from the nozzle bore. The leakage is indicated by a small trail of what appears to be dry boron on the lower portion of the nozzle bore accompanied by rust stains on the stainless steel nozzle. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DAVID THOMPSON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1558 EDT ON 3/31/2010 * * *

Update per 10CFR50.72(c). During the visual examination of the bore of T1 pressurizer level tap nozzle RC-1001 after the inconel nozzle removal, it is evident that corrosion of the carbon steel base material is present. This nozzle location was identified as leaking during the bare metal visual examination. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (O'Keefe).

ENS 455498 December 2009 12:19:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CEArkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 experienced a high temperature on the 'A' Main Feedwater Pump thrust bearing which required the pump to be manually tripped . Steam Generator levels lowered as a result of the Main Feedwater Pump trip to the point that operators initiated a manual reactor trip. The Emergency Feedwater System automatically actuated on low Steam Generator level as a result of the Steam Generator level transient. The manual reactor trip requires 4-Hr non-emergency notification IAW 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The automatic actuation of Emergency Feedwater requires 8-Hr non-emergency notification IAW 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). All rods fully inserted. After the trip, decay heat was being removed using steam dumps to the condenser. Steam generator level was being maintained with the emergency feedwater pumps. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4537722 September 2009 15:11:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LPBased on the results of a past operability evaluation completed on 1329 (CDT), 9/22/2009, it appears that an unanalyzed condition existed intermittently for short periods of time in which a door that serves as a High Energy Line Break (HELB) barrier may have been unlatched. With the door not latched, an engineering evaluation concluded that a critical crack (HELB) in the Main Feedwater pipe traversing the south penetration room would force the door (DR-19) open, creating a harsh environment in the adjoining Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pump room. Because the EFW pump room is not evaluated for harsh conditions, it must be conservatively assumed that both pumps may fail to operate following this HELB event. Therefore, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. The licensee informed the Arkansas Department of Health. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4537622 September 2009 13:46:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
CE
The normal power supply to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was lost due to thunderstorms in the area. Support personnel were dispatched to assess the EOF. The facility has a diesel generator that should supply power to the facility. However, electricians discovered the generator degraded and non-functional. By 0511, 9/22/2009, electricians determined that they were unsuccessful at immediately restoring the generator. It is estimated that the EOF was degraded for approximately 5 1/2 hours. Following restoration of normal power, Computer Support personnel discovered that the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) at the EOF was not functioning. SPDS is a computer based system designed to monitor and display a concise set of parameters from which the safety status of the plant can be readily and reliably determined. The normal power supply was eventually returned (to service) by Entergy Arkansas Transmission and the EOF was restored at 0420 and SPDS terminals were subsequently restored at 0815, 9/22/2009. Due to the time that the EOF was degraded, this is considered a major loss of assessment, communications, and response capability. The licensee informed the Arkansas Department of Health. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4536720 September 2009 13:17:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CEThis report is being made due to an auto start of the Red Train Emergency Diesel Generator (2K-4A) which was the result of an unplanned loss of power to the Red Train 4160 Volt Electrical Bus (2A3) during surveillance testing. Concurrent with the loss of power, Shutdown Cooling Flow was temporarily lost. This condition occurred with the unit in Mode 5 during a refueling outage. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressurizer level was 85 percent and RCS temperature was 139 degrees Fahrenheit. During the momentary loss of power, 2A3 automatically shed its loads as designed. This caused the running Shutdown Cooling Pump (Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump 2P-60A) to secure which resulted in a loss of Shutdown Cooling Flow to the RCS for approximately three and a half minutes. Shutdown Cooling was restored using the applicable Abnormal Operating Procedure. RCS temperature rose approximately five degrees Fahrenheit. During the performance of planned surveillance testing, 2K-4A was unexpectedly auto started. An Offsite Power Transfer Test was being performed to test automatic transfer from Startup 3 Offsite Transformer to Startup 2 Offsite Transformer. The transfer was initiated by momentarily bypassing (jumpering) a relay. When the test was initiated, a slow transfer of the Red Train 4160 Volt Electrical Bus (2A1) occurred instead of the expected fast transfer. The slow transfer of 2A1 resulted in a momentary loss of power, for approximately two seconds, to the Red Train 4160 Volt Electrical Bus (2A3) which is supplied from 2A1. The under voltage condition on 2A3 caused 2K-4A to auto start, as designed. 2K-4A did not power 2A3, since 2A3 was powered from 2A1 after the slow transfer completed. The cause of the slow transfer versus a fast transfer is under investigation. The licensee notified the Arkansas Department of Health and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4533911 September 2009 11:32:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
CE
Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 is removing the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) from service for preventative maintenance and scheduled corrective maintenance. SPDS is a computer based system that is utilized by both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to provide critical information during an emergency. Unit 2 is currently in a refueling outage. Unit 1 is on line at 100% power. Compensatory measures are being taken to ensure that necessary backup monitoring is established on Unit 1. The maintenance window is scheduled to be open for 24 hours. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee made a courtesy notification to the Arkansas Department of Health.
ENS 4520314 July 2009 01:46:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
CE

At 2200 CDT on 7/13/09 it was discovered the Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone lines in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms and the Technical Support Center were not functioning. Additionally, the Health Physics Network is not functioning. This discovery occurred during extent of condition troubleshooting when it was determined that local cellular phone and land-line phone service was unavailable in some local areas. A successful land-line phone call to the NRC Operations Center was completed following this discovery, All State and local authorities required to be contacted in the event of an Emergency Class declaration were contacted via land-lines and made aware of the situation. Also at this time, the Dedicated Emergency Fax/Voice System (DEF/VS) is unable to fax to the Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) Little Rock Operations Center. Land-line voice communications to Little Rock have been verified. The Russellville ADH office is able to receive fax notifications from ANO and can ensure that all state and local agencies can be notified. The Russellville ADH office will remain manned until the situation is resolved. At approximately 2345 CDT, it was determined that the NRC Operations Center was unable to directly contact either Unit 1 or Unit 2 control room. The cause of the loss of communications is suspected to be a major fiber-optic line being cut In Morrilton, Arkansas. No estimate of time for repairs Is available at this time. The licensee has established that communication capability exists via either radio or phone with local emergency response and law enforcement organizations. The licensee can still contact the NRC via commercial circuits but cannot receive calls from the NRC. A dedicated cell phone line has been established by the licensee to facilitate communication from the NRC if necessary. State and local authorities have been informed of the problem. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified and has responded to the site.

  • * * UPDATE BY HUFFMAN AT 0500 EDT ON 7/14/09 * * *

The ENS lines and commercial phone service have been restored to ANO and verified operable. R4DO (Gaddy) notified.