ML20071M770

Control of Heavy Loads (C-10) Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plants Units 1 & 2, Technical Evaluation Rept

ML20071M770
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	05/31/1983
From:	Bomberger C FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To:	Clemenson F NRC
Shared Package
ML20071M772	List: ML20071M770
References
CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-07978, TAC-7978, TER-C5506-342, NUDOCS 8306030310
Download: ML20071M770 (28)

Text

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TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT .

CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS (C-10) -

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC CO, CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS UNITS 1 AND 2.

NRC DOCKET.NO. ..

50-317, 50-318 FRC PROJECTC5506 -

. . . . <.m-NRC TAC NC. 07978, 07,979 - FRCASSIGNMENT13 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81 130 FRCTASKS 342/343 Preparedby .

Franklin Research Center Author: C. Bomberger, N. Ahmed 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader: I. H. Sargent Preparedfor NuclearRegulatory Commisslon

• Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: F. Clemenson .

April 5,1983 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, appa.

ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.

')1M Copy Has Beerr Sent to PDR -

sh 00 Franklin Research Center A Division of The Franklin Institute ne Benjamin Frankkn Park.ey, PMe.. Pa 19103 (215) 448.Io03 0

TFJK5506-342 CONTENTS

. 1 Section

. Title. Page 1 INTRODUCTION. . .

. . . . . . . . . . 1 i

.- ca s-

'-** ~ ~, , , 1.1 P,u,rpose of Review. . . . .. . . . . . . . . s. . . . I 1.2 Generic Background . . . . ,. . . . . . . I 1.3 Plant-Specific Background . . . . . . . . . 2 2 EVALURTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 General Guidelines . . . .

. . . . . . . 4 2.2 Interia Protection Measures. ,

. . . . .- . . 18 -

3 CO)CLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.1 General Provisions for Isad Bandling . . . . . . 21 3.2 Interim Protection . . . . .

. . . . . . 22 4 REFERENCES . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . 23 -

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TER-C550 6-34 2 '

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FORENORD b This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Canter under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Office of

._ Nuclear Reactor' Regulation,- Division-of Operating Reactor'sP'for technical

^cesist'ance in su_pport of NRC operating reactor licensing actions. The h technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by ..

the NBC'.

/,,

Mr. C. Bomberger and Mr. I. 5. Sargent contributed to the technical preparation of this report through a subcontradi: with WESTEC Services, Inc. ,.

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y 1 TFJH:5506-342 g 1. INTRODt:CTION l.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEN This technical evaluation report documents an independent review of general load handling policy ar.d p:;ocedures at Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. 's (M&E) Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2. This evaluation was

,,, performed vith the f following objectives: . . . . - -

, , ,s ;t i , ,,a v . . .. .. .. ,

o to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of

.c NUREG-0612, " Control of Beavy Icada at Nuclear Power Plants" [1],

Section 5.1.1 i w ,,

\' o

.g to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of NUREG-0 612, Section 5.3.

J 1.2 GENERIC BA3 GROUND Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NBC) staff to sy.stematically evanhe staff licensing criteria' and,ttle  !* adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power ,

plants to e3sure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary .

. changes in these "reasures.

21s activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NBC staff on May 17, 1978 [2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy l

Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not

~

adequately cover the major causes of load handling accidents and should be upgraded. - -

In order to upgrade measures provided to control the handling of heavy loads,' the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a

'two p'a'rti objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first part of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines i

identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling nklin Research Center A Dnasien of The Frenien ansamme

i 1

TER-C550 6-342

. systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their -

probability of failure is uniformly small and appropeinte for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second part of the staff's objective, cchieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.2 through 5.'1.5, is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are

. . . .provided, in addi$ ion to those ,rhquired for,all, loa.d hand 14pg systems,' to

-ensure that theimtential fpr a toad drop is esttremelfsskil'(e.g., a single-failure-proof crane), or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling cecidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are ceceptably small. Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in ~

NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluati,on criteria.

A defense-in-depth approach was use'd to develop the staff guidelines to - ,-

cnsure that all load handling systems are designed and ' operated so that their probability of failure is appropriately small. The intent of the guidelines is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants perform the following: '

1. define safe, load travel paths, through procedures and operator

~ training, so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or. safe shutdown equipment '

l l

2.

provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable l operation of the handling system.

l 1

Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.

1.3 , PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND , , .  !

On December. 22,1980, the NBC issued a letter [3] to BG&E, the Licensee for galv.ert Cliffs 3sclear Power Plant, requesting that the Licensee review i l

provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at the Calvert Cliffs l plent, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent nklin Research Center A Dn=en of The Fremen buseme

TEM 506-342 determination of conformance to these guidelines. BG&E responded to this

• request on June 25, 1981 [4], January 4, 1982 [5], February 26,1982 [6], and March 1,1982' [7] .

Based on References 4 through 7, a draft Technical Evaluation ~ Report (TER) was prepared and informally transmitted to the Licensee. FOllowing a conference call>on June 6,1982,,a meeting was held on October 25, 1982,

. . . < .e.s .

}," ~}nvolv,ing the evaluators and regementatives of. the NBC, .pG&5, and Bechtel Carporation to discuss unresolved issues in the draft TER. In response to the draft TER and to this meeting, BGEE provided additional information in cubmittals dated August 2, 1982 [8] and January 25, 1983 [9]. References 4 through 9 have been incorporated into this final technical evaluation.

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nklin Research Center A Dres on of The FraMen innaeues

TER-C550 6-342

2. EVALUATION ,

This section presents a point-by-point evaluation of load handling provi-cions at the Calvert Cliffs plant with respect to NRC staff guidelines pr'ovided in NUREG-0612. Separate subsections are provided for both the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 and the interim measures of NUREG-0 612, Sectio.n 5.3. In each

. . _ . . case, the.guideli.ne or<-

i.nte.ria measure is

. -presented, Licensee-provided information is. summarized and evaluated, and a conclusion as to the ' xtent e of compliance, including recommended additional action.where appropriate, is presented. Rose conclusions are summarised in Table 2.1.

~~

2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES ~

/

The Nic has established seven general guidelines which must be followed in order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads. Rose guidelines consist of the following criteria from sectio.n 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612: -

o Guideline 1 - Safe Inad Paths '

o Guideline 2 - Icad Handling Procedures o Guideline 3 - Crane Operator Training o Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Devices" o Guideline 5 - Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed) o Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) o Guideline 7 - Crane Design.

These seven guidelines should be satisfied by all overhead hr.ndling

\

systems and programs in order to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the l~ ,

reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. The Licensee's verification of the extent to which these guidelines have been satisfied and

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an independent evaluation of this verification are contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

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' e$ culdeline 1 caldeline 2 outdeline 2 ouldeline 4 entdeline 5

Interte Interte Cepeelty sete load Crane oposetor special Littleeg entdeline 8 ouleekine 2 steesere 1 Messere s P. steevy teede 'ltonal pethe precedures Csene - Test . gechalcol n Tratatae Devices __Stines special 3' and lasseetten Crane Deelen preolticettone Attention

1. Polar Crane 18e/25 -- -

C -- - t C C -

C

?. neutron shield s C C -- -

!! C -- J --

C PAR Device and 2.75 C C - F = ** '-

Holst i - C Mein potet 4.5 'c C -- - -- --

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seal Ring i C

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C l peector vessel 90 . C C ==

j lleed ,P =* - == =

C avel List mig 9.1 , C C == F - == = =

• C RV stud 1.1 C C ==

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, e Ici memovat 3.0 C C -- --

7001 C -- -- --

C mefueling Pool 4 C. C - -

e 8talte C '

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Structure and - h* -

C Litt Alg y ,

Core support 132 .C C -

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• • • heavy tmada Stoon) rathe Procedures Treteine Devicae 8!!aes

$ and Inesection Crane Deelen Osecifications Attention ,

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2. Spent Fuel 150/15 - -- C .-- -

C C fg. caa crane .

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Irradiated 5 C C - P -- -- -- -- -

3 Specimen Cask .

N Spent ruel 10 C C - P -- -- -

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stand IL)

3. Turbine slag. 260/25 ** -- --

C -~ == C C. - --

Main Crane \ i Generator 175 C C - - C -- ~ --*  ; .- -

potor ur Turbine 55 C C - - C -~ ==1 -

potor 8 casing 88 C C = - C - --8 -- -

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motor S. Y

4. Turbine slog. 40/13 ,-- -- C == == C C. - --

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5. Intate structure 35/10 - -

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11. Machine shop 5 - - C - - C C - -

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TER-C550 6-34 2 2.1.1 Overhead Heavy Imad Bandling Systems

c. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has evaluated the load handling systems at Calvert Cliffs plant and concluded that the following systems should be subject to the

' general guidelines of NUREG-0612:

O *

~ ~_  ?* . . . . . .

. . s ..w. .

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o Spent fuel cask cr.ane- , ,,

, _ ~ , , , , , . , , ,

o Intake structure semi-gantry crane o Transfer machine ' jib crane. .

The following overhead handling systems have been excluded from NUREG-0612 because (1) lift points and safe shutdown equipment are cufficiently separated or (2) the largest load. lifted is not a heavy load.

1. Sufficient separations * * -

Chlorine house monorail Condensate domineralizer area monorail Condenser waterbox removal monorail vertical lifting rail Hot machine shop crane

• Decontamination room hoist '

Turbine building main crane

. Turbine building auxiliary crane Filter cask monorail Solid waste disposal trolley hoist Diesel generator room monorail Main steam room monorails containment equipment hatch hoist Containment equipment bay jib crane Component cooling room hoist Switch gear room monorail hoist

2. Capacity less than a heavy load:

Reactor head stud handling- jib crane

• Spent fuel pool jib crane. . ...

b. Evaluation and Conclusion "

The Licensee's evaluation of those overhead handling systems subject to compliance with the general guidelines is consistent with NUREG-0622 criteria. Suitable justification has been provided to exclude remaining A bij Franklin Research Center A Dansson of The Franen Inseam

TER-C550 6-342 de cranes on the basis of (1) physical separation between lif t points and safe -

chutdown equipment or (2) a hoist capacity less than that of a heavy load.

~.

2.1.2 .

Safe Load Paths (Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(111.

" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated

-~ fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool ,or to impact safe

- - ' shutdown equ'ipisent. the ~ path should 'follob,Eo thelgz0nt practical, '

ktructural~ floor members, S'eams, etc., such^ thaE if~the' load is dropped, the structure is more'likely to withstand the impact. Sese load patna should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.

Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

~

n. Sunnary of Licensee statements and Conclusions -

General arrangement drawings have been provided which identify load paths far heavy load movements. Drawings of these load paths are attached to the controlling procedures for review prior to and during load movement. Crane cperators and signalmen are made aware of the requirenents of load ' paths

, during operator training. Operators and signalmen are required to sign off -

the appropriate procedure prior to a lif t to indicate that paths have been rcviewed. If a deviation from a defined load path is necessary, current procedures call for an engineering review to be forwarded to the Plant operations and Safety Review Committee for review before the deviation can be allowed. Se Licensee states that use of equipment landmarks as indicated on l the load path drawings is preferable to marking load paths on the floor, and further notes that training of handling systems operators will be an important factor in ensuring adherence to safe load paths.

b. Evaluation '

, , The Licensee's submittal in response to Phase I suitably identified safe load paths for heavy loads at Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2. Although safe load paths are not marked at the Calvert Cliffs plant, the objective of providing a visual aid for operators is accomplished by using signalmen to guide the operators. However, the duties of these signalmen with regard to h Franklin Research Center A Ebne.en et The Frenen becams

TER-C550 6-342 safe load handling should be clearly defined (i.e., ensure that the load path ~

is clear prior to the start of the lift) in appropriate procedures.

Deviations from existing procedures are acceptably managed at the Calvert Cliffs plant. .

c. Conclusion and Recommendation

-**~~

Contingen up'oif the Licerisee ac'ceptably 'demoisitr3tkhat the duties of load handling signalumn are clearly defined, it is concluded that Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 comply with Guideline 1 of -NUREG-0612.

2.1.3 Icad Handling Procedures [ Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(211

" Procedures should be developed to. cover $oad handling operations for ,.-

heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to '

irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a. minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.

These procedures should includes identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of loads the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the , load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Procedures for individual loads have been identified (e.g., RV-7, 8 -

Reactor vessel head / shroud; RCS-1, 2 - Reactor coolant pump motor), and i Calvert Cliffs Instruction CCI-201A provides additional guidelines for crane operation and inspection reports. Procedures now in effect at both Units 1 and 2 comply with NUREG-0612 and referenced standards. For loads which are not covered by an applicable procedure, the Licensee has agreed to make a written procedure available before allowing the lifting of these loads.

b. Evaluation

., From the information provided, it is noted that lif ting procedures have bsen identified for the majority of heavy loads. These procedures, now in effect, satisfy the requirements of NUREG-0612. The review also indicates that several loads are not now covered by a written procedure, but the Licensee has agreed to prepare written procedures prior to lifting such loads.

A ,

ranklin Research Center ' .

A Dme.on of The Frennen ansamme

i TER-C550 6-342 l

c. Conclusion .

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 comply with Guideline 2 on the basis of the Licensee's verification that written load handling procedures either currently exist or will be prepared for all critical heavy loads subject to compliance with NUREG-0612.

. _ .2.1.4 Crane OSerator Trainino-[Cuideline' -

3h NUREG-0612 / Section 5.1.l(3)1

, . . .- .-- a

" Crane operators shouId be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and~ Gantry Cranes' (10]."

c. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions CCI-210A has been instituted to esI.ablish guidelines for crane operator. .'

training. 'Ihis procedure ensures the training of all crane operators in cccordance with ANSI B30.2-1976 in its entirety.

b.

Evaluation - -

Crane operator training and qualification programs at the Calvert Cliffs '

plant satisfy the criteria of this guideline on the basis of the Licensee's varification of compliance with ANSI B30.2-1976.

c. Conclusion Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 comply with this guideline.

2.1.5 Special Lif ting Devices [ Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(4)]

- "Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI i

N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lif ting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10",000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [121

._, This standard should apply to all special lif ting devices which carry .

heavy loads. in areas as defined above. For operating plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling 4 0000 Franklin Research Center A De of The Fransen buemme

TER-C550 6-342 device based on characteristics of the crane whi'ch will be used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the -

atress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device [NUREG-0612, Guideline 5.1.l(4)] ."

. a. Sunsnary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee 5 has stated that special lifting devices used at the,Calvert

~ ~ ~~

. .. Cliffs plant were' disigned and fabri'cated' p'rioi tti'th..e..(sIiTAnce of ANSI N14.6-1978, but were designed using accepted engineering practices and welding procedures according to design drawings. Special lif ting devices used at the Calvert Cliffs plant includes o reactor vessel head lift rig

~

o upper guide structure lift rig ,

o upper / lower superstand lif t rig' , ,~

o spent fuel cask yoke.

The spent fuel cask yoke and upper / lower stand lift rig are certified by the v:ndors to meet ANSI N14.6. Slings and spreader beams designated for a ,

specific device'were reviewed and verified to meet ANSI B30.9-1971 and ANSI N14.6-1978 design criteria.

!* The reactor vessel head lift rig and the upper guide structure lift rig i

i w:re evaluated to determine compliance with ANSI N14.6. In this evaluation,

dynamic load factors of 1.5 and 1.3, respectively, were used, and the results d1monstrated that the stress design factors of these lifting devices satisfy the ANSI requirements. Further, these lifting devices have been tested to 125% of the design load prior to initial use.

The Licensee states that a nondestructive examination (NDE) program has bzen implemented. This program requires periodic liquid penetrant examination l of the lif ting shackles in accordarice with ANSI N14.6-1978, Sec' tion 5.3.l(2) .

These shackles are the single load transmitting element between the crane hook end the lifting' devices and, as such, are considered to be the " weakest link" in Tea ~ch' of 'the lif ting devices. Further, requirements for both pre-use visual '

inspection for gross structural integrity and a detailed inspection following mishandling of any device are addressed in plant procedures. The Licensee 4

bd FrankJin Research Center A w ermraem m

TER-C550 6-342 concluded that the inspection program ensures continued reliability of these lifting devices without having to perform periodic load testing.

b. Evaluation Although it cannot be determined that the specific requirementis of ANSI N14.6-1978 for component design and fabrication have been satisfied for the

- - - reactor vessel hepd. lift ..rig.. and -

the upper

. - . guide structure lift rig, it is

. . , . a .. .

evident that these devices will-grovide a high-degree-of. load handling reliability. The Licensee has verified that all devices satisfy the recommended stress design margins of 3 on yield strength and 5 on ultimate otrength, inclusive of dynamic load considerations. Further, the initial load testing of the two devices to 125% of the design load sufficiently stressed

~

the devices to provide an adequate guarantee of the devices' structural

~

integrity.

The Licensee takes exception to periodic performance of load testing. It is noted that ANSI N14.6-1978 provides acceptable alternatives to periodic load tests if an initial acceptance load test has been satisfactor,ily performed; the owner may opt to perform an annual (or prior-to-use, depending on frequency of use) series of inspections in accordance with Section 5.3.l(2) of the ANSI

standard. In this regard, the Licensee has implemented performance of visual' inspections and limited NDE prior to each use of the lifting devices and is of the opinion that such an inspection program is adequate. The proposed continuing inspection program of visual examination for gross structur'al de'fects and periodic surface examination of a " weakest link" is questioned on two counts. .

o A surface examination of a single load transmitting element, such as the lifting shackle, in lieu of such examination for additional

~

connected members is reaso'na'ble" only if it is evaluated as the

" weakest lin'k" on the' basis of desigd margins or degradation (e.g. ,

wear) and not on the basis of location, as seems to be implied in the Licensee response.

o The proposed approach does not account for tension load bearing welds. Considering the cyclic nature of stresses in these special lifting devices, the periodic surface examination of load bearing welds required by ANSI N14.6-1978 in the absence of periodic overload nklin Research Center j A Dme.on at The Fm buenne

TER-C550 6-342 tests seems prudent. Ittile it can be agreed that the limited use made of these devices does not necessitate an annual 100% inspection of -

these welds, we cannot conclude that they may be ignored. A periodic inspection program which provides for the surface examination of these welds, possibly similar to that provided for in the Boiler and Pressure vessel Code for Class 2 supports, would be appropriate.

It is recommended that the Licensee review the requirements for dimensional and NDE testing of the upper / lower superstand lift rigs and the ,

"" spent fuel cask yke'and modify'their

- - ~~ - - -

inspection program aiccordingly.

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c. Conclusion and Recommendation ,

Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 substantially comply with Guideline 4. To fully comply, the Licensee should perform the following:

o verify that the selection of the weakest link is based upon design ,

margins or expected degradation, or implement a program of periodic ,-

inspections of all load bearing welds located on these special lifting devices.

2.1.6 Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed) [ Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(511

" Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, '511ngs'

[12]. However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. 'Ibe rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' that produces the maximum static and dynamic load. Ittcre this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions A program for material handling equipment saintenance, inspection, and

.. testing (CCI-219A) was instituted in early,19,80 for Calvert Clif fs Units 1 and 2 and is in compliance with ANSI B30.9-1971. The Licensee stated that all slings,were purchased from reliable vendors who sell products manufactured in accordance with industry standards, including OSHA 1910.184. This ensures that the requirement of a factor of safety of 5 for slings is met. Furth er ,

nklin Research Center '

A Dmo.on et The Frennhn buenne

TER-C550 6-342 cs inventory is replaced, manufacturer-certified factors of safety will be cbtained as a matter of policy and in accordance with plant procedures. At present, newly purcitased lif ting devices are attended by a certificate of compliance of the design load to specified requirements of ANSI B30.9-1971.

' The Licensee stated that the maximum impact for all load handling systems under the scope of NUREG-0612 is less than or equal to 10%, thereby minimizing the effect of dynamic loading on the design factor of safety. A formal

.. . s .:w...

(( inspection progr,em and the training of riggers,has been impipmented.

r

b. Evaluation Since slings used at the Calvert Cliffs plant are procured to ANSI B30.9-19 71 standards, and since a formal sling inspection program has been implemented, sling usage at the Calvert-cliffs plant meets the, intent of ,

Section 5.1.1(5) of NUREG-0612. On the basis of information provided by the '

Licensee, hoist speeds are relatively slow and dynamic loads are therefore a

reasonably small percentage of the overall static load and may be disregarded.

c. Conclusion ' ' '

Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 comply with Guideline 5 based on the Licensee's verification.

2.1.7 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) [ Guideline 6, NUREG-0 612, i

Section 5.1.1(6)1

"'Ihe crane should be inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes, ' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use when it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, er where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspectionan'd t'est frequency (e.g. , th'e polar crane

- inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations and is generally not accessible during power operation. " ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be

. _, performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, tests, and maintenance should be performed prior to their us e) ."

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TER-C5506-342

c. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee is committed to implement ANSI B30.2-lS76 and has completed this review and comparison of existing inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures with this standard. CCI-219A, which outlines the necessary inspection, testing, and maintenance requirement intervals, has been octablished. Although some overhead handling systems have been identified as

._ -e result of the NtIREG-0612 -review which will require development of specific

" ^ ins ~pection, testing, an'd maintenince procedures, ~theiA' systems are now included within the scope of CCI-219A which requires such procedures.

b. Evaluation The Calvert Cliffs plant satisfies the requirements of this guideline on .,

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the basis that existing procedures have been reviewed for compliance with ANSI .

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B30.2-1976. In addition, the Licensee has made a commitment to comply with l

those handling systems which have been included as required by this review of NUREG-0 612. -

c. Conclusion -

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant complies with Guideline 6.

2.1.8 Crane Design [ Guideline 7, NUREG-0 612, Section 5.1.l(7)1 1

"The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes, ' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes' [13). An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70

{

may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the  !

specification is r.atisfied." '

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a. ~ Su5nnary of Licens~ee Statements and Conclds~ ions ~

. . 1 The Calvert Cliffs overhead cranes were purchased using the Electric l Overhead Crane Institute's Specification Number 61 (EOCI-61), design codes of l 1

the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) and the American Welding i l

Society '(AWS), and American Society for Testing and Materials (ASIM) specifications. As a minimum, structural design is in accordance with EOCI-61 l i

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l  !!Ebd Franklin Research Center l 4 % or w rr.na n m

TER-C550 6-342 cxcept where governed by more restrictive requirements. Structural members not covered by EOCI-61 were designed and fabricated with standard AISC codes and spe=ifications. 1he Licensee also notes that CMAA-70 is a revision of EOCI-61 and that the most significant difference between the two standards relates to an increase in impact factor. The Licensee has completed detailed structural, electrical, and mechanical analyses of the overhead cranes. No significant deviations were revealed by this review that would necessitate

. _ _ - . . .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . s .w..

, _further action jio ensure adhereage to NUREG-06L2. .., . ,

b. Evaluation The designs of the reactor building polar crane, turbine building main and auxiliary cranes, spent fuel crane, and intake structure crane at the Calvert Cliffs plant meet the intent of-Section 5.1.l(7) of NUREG-0612 on the .-

basis of the point-by-point review of CIRA-70 and ANSI B30.2 provided by the Licensee. As indicated by the Licensee, the cranes substantially comply with i

CMAA-70 criteria. Several areas of the design, however, were noted not to be -

in verbatim compliance. For each of those areas, the Licensee has provided reasonable justification to conclude that theseldifferences will not affect

. the cranes' ability to safely handle heavy loads.

c. Conclusions and Recommendations 1

The Calvert Cliffs plant load handling systems subject to NUREG-0612 comply with Guideline 7.

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1 l 2.2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES '

The NaC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented at operating nuclear power plants to "pcovide reasonable assurance that no

~

heavy loads will be h'andled ove'r'the spent ' fuel pool and that measures exist 1

to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the core or spent fuel pool. Four of the six interim measures of the report consist of Guideline 1, Safe Ioad Paths; Guideline 2, Inad Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes g -la-k Franklin Research Center

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4 TER-CS50 6-342 l

(Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) . The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria:

1. Heavy load technical specifications

2. Special review for heavy loads handled over the core. .

Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection reasures are contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

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. . . . .. a . .

. . . . .. . . . . s 2.2.1 Technical Specifications [ Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-4612, Seetion 5.3 (1)1 -

" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,

' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Building,' for PWR's and Standard Tednical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' crane Travel,' for BWR's, to prohibit.. [~

handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementa-tion of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 [of NUREG-4 612] . "

a. Evaluation ,

A review of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant technical specifications .

~

indicat.es that specification 3.9.7 prohibits movement of loads greater than .

1600 lb (the weight of a fuel rod and combined element assembly) over irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool.

b. Conclusion l

l The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant complies with Interim Protection

Mrasure 1.

2.2.2 Administrative Controls [Intierim Protection Measures 2, '3, 4, and 5,

' - ~ ~

' NUREG-0 612, Se'ctions 5.3 (2)-5.3 (5)1 - -

" Procedural'or administrative measures [ including safe load paths, load l

- handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection] ... -

can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 [of NUREG-0 612] ."

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i 4 0000 Franklin Research Center A Dawon of The Fram insomme

TER-C550 6-342

c. Evaluation The specific requirements for load handling administrative controls are contained in NUREG-0 612, Section 5.1.1, Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6. She Licensee's compliance with these guidelines has been evaluated in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7, respectively, of this report.

, _ . ,b . Conclusions and Recommendatiims , ,

.. .. .. . - . .. . . . .. s Conclusions and recommendations concerning the Licensee's compliance with these administrative controls are contained'in sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7 of this report.

2.2.3 Special Review for Heavy Loads Handled Over the Core IInteria Protection Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Seetion 5r3 (6)] , /

. ..special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include the following for these loads: (1) review of procedures for inst'allation of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load tg assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions age clear and conciser (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, -

. slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operation, and content of procedures."

n. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that a special review of load handling over the core has been completed.

• " ' '~

b. ' Evaluation and Conclusion ' '

Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 comply with Interim Protection Measure 6.

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. TER-C5506-342

3. CDICLUSION This summary is provided to consolidate the results of the evaluation contained in Section 2 concerning individual NBC staff guidelines into an cverall evaluation of heavy load handling at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power

' Plant Units 1 and 2. Overall conclusions and recommended Licensee actions, where appropriate, are provided with respect to both general provisions for

[ $ load landling (

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l 612, Secf.ilin 5'.l.5) and ejanpiet; ion'_ohe .. staff recommendations for interim protection (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) .

3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR I4RD HANDLING The NBC staff has established seven guidelines concerning pecvisions for handling heavy loads in the area of the-reactor vessel, near stored spent ,

fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. 'Ibe intent of these guidelines is twofold. A plant conforming to these guidelines will have developed and implemented, through procedures and operator training, safe load travel paths such that, to the maximum extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or.near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. A plant c nform'ing to these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator

• training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system. As detailed in Section 2, it has been found that load handling operations at the Calvert Cliffs plant are conducted in a highly reliable manner consistent with the staff's objectives as expressed in these guidelines.

In only one area was a need for further action by the Licensee indicated.

o BG&E should implement a program of periodic nondestructive examination of load bearing welds in'special lifting devices.

4

• 00hd Franklin Research Center A Omason af The Freen ansanne

. . TER-C550 6-342 3.2 INTERIM PRCrfECTION The NEC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) that certain masures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 is complete. Specified reasures include the implementation of a technical specificatiion to prohibit

,_ _ the handling of heavy loads over' fuel in the storage poo).g..pompliance 'with .

Guidelines 1, 27 3, and' 6 o,f NUREG-0612, Sectida-5.1.Ir r review of load handling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure. An evaluation of the information provided indicWtes that the Licensee substantially complies with the staff's measures for interim ,,

/

protection. -

1 NO Franklin Research Center A w orrh. rem m

TER-C5506-342 t

4. REFEEEN::ES

1. NIC

" Control' of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" July 1980 NUREG-0612 -

2. V. Stello, Jr. (NBC)

Letter to all Licensees  ;

Subject:

' Bequest for-Additional Infornation on Control of Heavy Icads

. Near Spent-Fuel - - - - --- -

17-May-78 r

3. D. G. Eisenhut (NBC)

Letter to all operating reactora Subject Control of Heavy Ioads 22-Dec-80

4. A. E. Lundvall (BG&E) , ','

Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NIC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Ioads 25-Jun-81

5. A'. E. Lundvall (BGEE)

Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NIC) ~

Subject:

Control of Heavy Isads 4-Jan-8 2 .

6. R.' F. Ash (BG&E) -

Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NIC)

Subjects Control of Heavy Ioada 26-Feb-82

7. A. E. Lundvall (BGEE)

Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NIC)

Subject Control of Heavy Icads 1-Mar-82

8. R. F. Ash (BGEE)

Letter to D. G. Eisenhut, (NIC). . , ,,

Subject:

Control of Heavy Icads

, 2-Aug-82 , , , ,

9. R. F. Ash (BG&E) .

~ Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NIC)

Subject Control of Heavy Inads 25-Ja n-83 4 .

UbdU Franklin Research Center -

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1 TER-C5506-342

10. American National Standards Institute

" Overhead and Gantry Cranes" -

ANSI B30.2-1976

11. American~ National Standards Institute

" Standard for Lif ting Devices for Shipping containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" ~

ANSI N14.6-1978

12. American National Standards-Institute

. _ . . " Slings * * ~ ~ ~ - -

-- ' ~~s +

ANSI B30.9-1971 ,

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13. Crane Manufacturers Association of America

" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" Pittsburgh, PA CMAA-70 1

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b Franklin Research Center i A % s Th. r a % . _

_._.. . _ _ . _ _...______ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ , _ . _ . . . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ . . . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ __ ._.