ML11355A130
| ML11355A130 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/2011 |
| From: | US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | NRC/RGN-II |
| References | |
| Download: ML11355A130 (55) | |
Text
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
After Action Report (AAR) 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) REP Exercise After Action Report McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) Exercise IFINALI August 9, 2011 Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program PublishedNovember 21, 2011 SFEMA
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) REP Exercise After Action Report McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) Exercise
[FINAL]
August 9, 2011 Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program PublishedNovember 21, 2011
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) I After Action Report (AAR) 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) REP Exercise This page is intentionally blank I
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Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise Administrative Handling Instructions
- 1. This After Action Report (AAR) for the 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Full Plume Phase Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Exercise is considered a public document.
- 2. Points of
Contact:
Federal: Duke Energy:
Mr. Kevin Keyes Mr. Kevin Murray North Section Chief Emergency Preparedness Manager FEMA Region IV McGuire Nuclear Station 3003 Chamblee-Tucker 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 Huntersville, North Carolina 28078 770/220-5378 980/875-4672 kevin.keyes@dhs.gov kevin.murray@duke-energy.com State of North Carolina:
Mr. Stephen Payne Ms. Carolyn Freitag NCEM NCEM REP Program Manager State Exercise Officer 4713 Mail Service Center 4713 Mail Service Center Raleigh, North Carolina 27699 Raleigh, North Carolina 27699 919/715-0170 919/715-9213 spayne@ncem.org cfreitag@ncem.org Cabarrus County: Catawba County:
Mr. Bobby Smith Mr. Bryan Blanton Director Director Emergency Management Emergency Services 65 Church Street SE/PO Box 707 100-A South West Blvd/PO Box 389 Concord, NC 28026-0707 Newton, North Carolina 28658 704/920-2143 828/465-8230 rssmith@cabarruscounty.us bblanton @catawbacountync.gov Charlotte-Mecklenburg County: Gaston County:
Mr. L. Wayne Broome Mr. Tommy Almond Director Coordinator Emergency Management Emergency Management 228 East Ninth Street 615 North Highland Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28202-2530 Gastonia, North Carolina 28053-1578 Handling Instructions 2011 MNS REP Exercise I
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise U i
704/336-7616 704/862-6240 lbroome @ci.charlotte.nc.us tommy. almond @co. gaston. nc.us Iredell County: Lincoln County:
Mr. David Martin Ms. Martha Lide Director Asst County Manager and Director Emergency Management 201 East Water Street/PO Box 788 Emergency Management 115 West Main Street I Statesville, North Carolina 28687 704/878-3037 Lincolnton, North Carolina 28092 704/736-8660 I dmartin @co.iredell.nc.us mlide@lincolncounty.org I
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I Handling Instructions 2011 MNS REP Exercise 2
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Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise Table of Contents Page Administrative Handling Instructions .............................................................................................. 1 Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................. 3 Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 6 Section 1: Exercise Overview .................................................................................................... 9 1.1 Exercise Details ........................................................................................................ 9 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership ....................................................................... 10 1.3 Participating Organizations ..................................................................................... 10 Section 2: Exercise Design Summary ...................................................................................... 13 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design ................................................................................. 13 2.2 FEMA Exercise Objectives ..................................................................................... 15 2.3 FEM A Exercise Capabilities ................................................................................... 16 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities .......................................................................................... 19 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results ............................................................................. 19 3.2 Evaluation Summaries ............................................................................................. 19 3.2.1 State Of North Carolina ............................................................................... 19 3.2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center .......................................... 19 3.2.1.2 W estern Branch Office ............................................................ 21 3.2.1.3 Dose Assessment ...................................................................... 21 3.2.1.4 Field M onitoring Team M anagement ........................................ 22 3.2.1.5 Field M onitoring Team Operations .......................................... 23 3.2.1.6 M obile Laboratory .................................................................... 23 3.2.1.7 W aterway Warning Lake Norman ............................................. 24 3.2.1.8 National Weather Service Greenville-Spartanburg Airport ..... 24 3.2.2 Joint Operations .......................................................................................... 25 3.2.2.1 Emergency Operations Facility ................................................. 25 3.2.2.2 Joint Information Center ........................................................... 26 3.2.3 Risk Jurisdictions ........................................................................................ 26 Table of Contents 2011 MNS REP Exercise 3
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise 3.2.3.1 Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, North Carolina ..................... 26 3.2.3.1.1 Emergency Operations Center ................................. 26 3.2.3.1.2 Traffic Control Points .............................................. 27 3.2.3.1.3 Backup Route Alerting ........................................... 28 3.2.3.1.4 Protective Actions for Schools ................................ 28 3.2.3.1.5 EW and Vehicle Monitoring and Decon .................. 29 3.2.3.1.6 Reception and Congregate Care Center ................... 29 3.2.3.1.7 M edical Services Drill .............................................. 30 3.2.3.2 Catawba County, North Carolina ............................................ 30 3.2.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center ................................. 30 3.2.3.2.2 Traffic Control Points .............................................. 31 3.2.3.2.3 Backup Route Alerting ............................................ 32 3.2.3.2.4 EW and Vehicle Monitoring and Decon .................. 32 3.2.3.2.5 Reception and Congregate Care Center ................... 33 3.2.3.3 Gaston County, North Carolina ............................................... 34 3.2.3.3.1 Emergency Operations Center ................................. 34 3.2.3.3.2 Traffic Control Points ............................................... 35 3.2.3.3.3 Backup Route Alerting ............................................ 35 3.2.3.3.4 Protective Actions for Schools ................................ 36 3.2.3.3.5 EW and Vehicle Monitoring and Decon .................. 37 3.2.3.3.6 Reception and Congregate Care Center ................... 37 3.2.3.4 Iredell County, North Carolina ................................................. 38 3.2.3.4.1 Emergency Operations Center ................................. 38 3.2.3.4.2 Traffic Control Points ............................................... 39 3.2.3.4.3 3.2.3.4.4 Backup Route Alerting ............................................
Protective Actions for Schools ................................
39 40 I
3.2.3.4.5 EW and Vehicle Monitoring and Decon .................. 40 3.2.3.4.6 Reception and Congregate Care Center ................... 41 I
Table of Contents 2011 MNS REP Exercise 4
Homeland- Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise 3.2.3.5 Lincoln County, North Carolina ............................................... 42 3.2.3.5.1 Emergency Operations Center ................................. 42 3.2.3.5.2 Traffic Control Points ............................................... 43 3.2.3.5.3 Backup Route Alerting ............................................ 43 3.2.3.5.4 Protective Actions for Schools ................................. 44 3.2.3.5.5 EW and Vehicle Monitoring and Decon ................... 44 3.2.3.5.6 Reception and Congregate Care Center .................... 45 3.2.4 Host Jurisdictions ........................................................................................ 46 3.2.4.1 Cabarrus County, North Carolina ............................................. 46 3.2.4.1.1 Emergency Operations Center ................................. 46 3.2.4.1.2 Traffic Control Points ............................................... 46 3.2.4.1.3 Reception and Congregate Care Center .................... 46 Section 4 : C onclusion ................................................................................................................... 48 List of Appendices Appendix A: Scenario Summary ............................................................................................ 53 Appendix B: Table 2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation ........................................................ 56 Appendix C: Exercise Timeline ............................................................................................... 57 Appendix D: Exercise Evaluators and Assignments ............................................................... 58 Appendix E : Acronym s ................................................................................................................ 68 Appendix F: Exercise Locations ............................................................................................... 71
- 1. Exercise Locations Out of Sequence Week, July 25-29, 2011: ......................... 71
- 2. Exercise Locations, Exercise Week, August 8-11, 2011: ................................. 73 Appendix G: Exercise Planning Team Leadership ................................................................. 75 Appendix H: 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station Extent of Play Agreement .............................. 77 Appendix I: Medical Services Drill, Charlotte-Mecklenburg County ........................................ 103 Table of Contents 2011 MNS REP Exercise 5
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise Executive Summary On August 9, 2011, the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region IV, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program staff evaluated a plume exposure pathway exercise in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the I McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS). The evaluation of out of sequence activities during the week of July 25-29, 2011 is included in this report. The activities included: traffic control points; protective actions for schools; reception and congregate care centers; emergency worker and vehicle monitoring and decontamination; and waterway warning. A Medical Services Drill I
(MSD) was conducted on August 10, 2011.
The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The previous Federally evaluated exercise was conducted on August 18, 2009. The I
qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted in December 1980.
Officials and representatives from the State of North Carolina; the risk counties of Catawba, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Gaston, Iredell and Lincoln Counties; the host county of Cabarrus County; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Region II; and Duke Energy as well as I numerous volunteers participated in this exercise. FEMA Region IV also played in the exercise by providing Technological Hazards Liaison personnel to the State of North Carolina state emergency operations center (SEOC), which contributed to the exercise realism. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise.
I FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made the exercise a success.
State and local organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. FEMA did not identify any Deficiencies, but did identify three Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) during this exercise, one of which was self-corrected during the exercise. A listing of the exercise objectives, followed by a summary of the exercise issues follows. Detailed ARCA information is contained in Section 4.
The strength of the working relationships between the various State and local first responder agencies in their mission planning and execution abilities throughout all phases of the exercise was obvious, and confirmed the success of the McGuire Task Force organizational structure.
The McGuire Task Force, co-chaired by representatives from both North Carolina Emergency Management and Duke Energy, has proven to be an excellent example of public and private agency cooperation.
I Executive Summary 2011 MNS REP Exercise 6
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise The objectives for the 2011 MNS REP Exercise were as follows:
- Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide emergency operations center (EOC) management including direction and control through the State and counties EOC Multi-Agency Coordination Center System (MACCS).
" Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for State and county emergency workers and the general public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.
" Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for State and county emergency workers and the general public through exercise demonstration.
- Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System using the North Carolina Alert and Notification System through exercise play.
" Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the Joint Information Center (JIC) for joint (public and private sector) emergency information communications.
" Objective 6: Demonstrate the ability to conduct independent dose assessment, management of field teams, and mobile or fixed laboratory analysis in response to a radiological release.
These objectives encompass the REP Exercise Evaluation Criteria as negotiated in the Extent of Play Agreement in Appendix H.
Executive Summary 2011 MNS REP Exercise 7
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
I AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise I Summary of Exercise Issues:
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-I-I-I-I Charlotte Fire Department (CFD) personnel did not I know their duties or responsibilities concerning monitoring personnel or I vehicles, and the flow path was inadequate and could lead to contaminated evacuees I Charlotte- wandering uncontrolled Mecklenburg County ARCA 6.a.1 37-11-6.a. 1-A-01 around the reception and congregate care areas.
I Sirens indicating activation of North North Carolina's Alert and Notification System following I
Carolina, development of a protective State Emergency action decision related to a General Emergency were not I
Operations sounded due to a failure of Center North ARCA 5.a. 1 37-11-5.a. l-A-02 established procedures. I Carolina The High Purity Germanium Department of Health and (HPGe) Gamma Spectrometer in the Radiation Protection I
Human Section (RPS) Mobile Services, Division of Laboratory was not operational. The device could I
Health not correctly identify the Service Regulation, isotopes in the Counting Standard used to calibrate the I
Radiation Protection Section ARCA 4.c. 1 08-10-4.c. l-A-03 system and, therefore, could not be used to count sample media during the exercise.
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Executive Summary 2011. MNS REP Exercise 8
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise Section 1: Exercise Overview 1.1 Exercise Details Exercise Name 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP)
Program Evaluated Exercise Type of Exercise Full-Scale Exercise Exercise Off Scenario/Out of Sequence Dates July 25-29, 2011 and August 10, 2011 Exercise Date August 9, 2011 Locations See Appendix F for a complete listing of locations of supported exercise activities.
Sponsors North Carolina Emergency Management Duke Energy 116 West Jones Street McGuire Nuclear Station 4713 Mail Service Center 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Raleigh, North Carolina 27699 Huntersville, North Carolina 28078 Program Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) REP Program Mission
Response
Capabilities U
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management U Emergency Public Information and Warning U Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place U Emergency Public Safety and Security Response U
Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination U Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment U
Mass Care U
Public Health Laboratory Testing Section 1: Exercise Overview 2011 MNS REP Exercise 9
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
I AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise I Scenario Type REP, Full Plume Phase Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) I 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership See Appendix G for a listing of the members of the exercise planning team leadership. I 1.3 Participating Organizations The following agencies, organizations and units of government participated in the 2011 MNS REP Exercise. I DHS, FEMA Region IV I
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
National Weather Service (NWS), Greenville-Spartanburg Airport (GSP) I Office of the Governor
" Public Information
- Office of Citizen's Affairs I
Department of Crime Control and Public Safety (CCPS)
" Division of Emergency Management
" North Carolina State Highway Patrol (NCSHP)
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" National Guard
" Public Affairs Office I Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
- Wildlife Resources Commission, Division of Enforcement Department of Health and Human Services I
" Division of Public Health, Office of Public Health
" Division of Facility Services
" Division of Health Service Regulation, Radiation Protection Section (RPS)
I Charlotte-Mecklenburg County
" Charlotte Fire Department I
" Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department
" Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools I
" Department of Social Services
" Charlotte-Mecklenburg Emergency Management Office (CMEMO)
- Emergency Medical Services/MEDIC I
" Fire Marshal
" Health Department
" Huntersville Police Department I
" Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sheriff's Office
" University of North Carolina at Charlotte (UNC Charlotte) Police Department I Section 1: Exercise Overview 2011 MNS REP Exercise I
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Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise Catawba County
- Catawba County Emergency Services
" Catawba County Schools
" Catawba county Fire/Rescue Manager
- Catawba County Sheriff's Office
- Catawba County Department of Social Services
- Catawba County Health Department
- Bandys Crossroads Volunteer Fire Department
- Sherills Ford-Terrell Fire Department Gaston County
- Gaston County Emergency Management
" Gaston County Department of Social Services
" Gaston County Emergency Medical Service
" Gaston County Fire Marshal
- Gaston County Schools
- Gaston County Police Department
- Gaston County Sheriff's Office
- Gaston County Health Department
" Gaston Emergency Medical Services (GEMS), Specialized Tactics and Rescue Team (STAR)
" Gastonia Fire Department, Special Operations Division, Hazardous Materials Branch Iredell County
- Iredell County Emergency Management
" Iredell County Department of Social Services
" Iredell County Emergency Medical Service
" Iredell County Fire Marshal
" Iredell County Sheriff's Office
" Iredell County Health Department
- Iredell County Schools
- Iredell County Radiological Monitoring and Decontamination Teams
- Iredell County 911 Center
- Iredell County Solid Waste
" Iredell County Animal Control
- Mooresville Fire Department HAZMAT Team
" Shepherd Volunteer Fire Department Lincoln County
" Lincoln County Emergency Management
- Lincoln County Department of Social Services
- Lincoln County Emergency Medical Service
" Lincoln County Fire Marshal
- Lincoln County Sheriff's Office
" Lincoln County Health Department
" Lincoln County Schools Section 1: Exercise Overview 2011 MNS REP Exercise 11
Homeland Security Exercise'and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise
" North 321 Fire Department
" Lincolnton Fire Department Ir
" Lincolnton Police Department Cabarrus County
" Cabarrus County Department of Social Services
" Cabarrus County Emergency Management
- Cabarrus County Emergency Medical Service
" Cabarrus County Health Alliance/Health Department
" Cabarrus County Schools
" Cabarrus County Sheriff's Office I
" Kannapolis Fire Department
. Kannapolis Police Department I Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES)/Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES) I American Red Cross (ARC)
Duke Energy Carolina's Medical Center- University (CMC-U) I University of North Carolina at Charlotte (UNC Charlotte)
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Section 1: Exercise Overview 2011 MNS REP Exercise 12
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design DHS/FEMA administers the REP Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) parts 350, 351 and 352. 44 CFR 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for licensee, State, tribal and local governments impacted by the EPZs established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of State, Tribal and local government Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures by DHS/FEMA. One of the REP Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises State, Tribal and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant.
The results of this exercise together with review of the RERPs and procedures and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP- 1 through the Annual Letter of Certification and staff assistance visit enables FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of the final After Action Report (AAR) to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that State, Tribal and local plans and preparedness are (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.
On March 18, 1981 the State of North Carolina formally submitted the RERP for the McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) to FEMA Region IV. Formal approval of the RERP was granted by FEMA on June 4, 1981 in accordance with 44 CFR 350.
A REP exercise was evaluated on August 9, 2011, and included evaluations of the following out of sequence activities held from July 25 through July 29, 2009, to include a Medical Services Drill (MSD) on August 10, 2011:
- State of North Carolina, North Carolina Emergency Management (NCEM); North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission, Law Enforcement; Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD, the lead agency for Incident Command); Catawba County Sheriff's Office; Lincoln County Sheriff's Office; and Iredell County Sheriff's Office: waterway warning and clearance of Lake Norman on July 27, 2011.
" State of North Carolina, NCEM Western Branch Office (WBO) and North Carolina State Highway Patrol (NCSHP): Traffic control points at MNS McGuire Office Complex (MOC) on July 27, 2011.
Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2011 MNS REP Exercise 13
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise
" Charlotte-Mecklenburg County: Traffic control points at MNS MOC on July 27, 2011; protective actions for schools at Charlotte-Mecklenburg Emergency Management Office and the J.M. Alexander Middle School, Blythe Elementary School, and Croft Community School on July 26, 2011; emergency worker and vehicle monitoring and decontamination at Charlotte Fire Department Station #27 on July 28, 2011; reception and congregate care at University of North Carolina-Charlotte (UNC Charlotte) on July 29, 2011; and a MSD at Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Emergency Medical Services (EMS)/MEDIC Headquarters Training Facility (accident site) and Carolinas Medical Center- University (hospital) on August 10, 2011.
" Catawba County: Traffic control points at MNS MOC on July 27, 2011; emergency worker and vehicle monitoring and decontamination at Sherrils Ford-Terrell Fire and Rescue Station on July 28, 2011; and reception and congregate care at Bandys High School on July 26, 2011.
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" Gaston County: Protective actions for schools at Gaston County Springfield I Elementary School for Springfield Elementary School, Stanley Middle School, Kiser Elementary School, North Gaston High School (host evacuation school),
and Gaston County Schools administration on July 26, 2011; emergency worker l and vehicle monitoring and decontamination at East Gaston High School on July 26, 2011; and reception and congregate care at Ashbrook High School on July 25, 2011.
" Iredell County: Traffic control points at MNS MOC on July 27, 2011; protective actions for schools at Iredell County emergency operations center (EOC) for Coddle Creek Elementary School on July 26; emergency worker and vehicle monitoring and decontamination at Northbound 1-77 Rest Area, Mile Marker 39 on July 28; and reception and congregate care at South Iredell High School on July 28, 2011.
" Lincoln County: Traffic control points at MNS MOC on July 27, 2011; protective l actions for schools at Lincoln County EOC for Catawba Springs Elementary School on July 26; emergency worker and vehicle monitoring and decontamination at North 321 Fire Station on July 25, 2011; and reception and congregate care at Lincolnton High School on July 26, 2011.
" Cabarrus County: Traffic control points at MNS MOC on July 27, 2011; and reception and congregate care at Northwest Cabarrus Middle School on July 26, 2011.
I Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2011 MNS REP Exercise 14
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AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise 2.2 FEMA Exercise Objectives Capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items that were derived from the Target Capabilities List (TCL). The capabilities listed below form the foundation for the organization of all FEMA Region IV REP Program objectives and observations in this exercise.
" Emergency Operations Center Management: Is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. EOC management includes EOC activation, notification, staffing, and deactivation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, State, and Federal EOCs; coordination public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and recovery activities.
" Emergency Public Information and Warning: Is the capability that includes public information, alert/warning and notification. It involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, coordinating officials, and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions.
" Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place: Is the capability to prepare for, ensure communication of, and immediately execute the safe and effective sheltering-in-place of an at-risk population (and companion animals), and/or the organized and managed evacuation of the at-risk population (and companion animals) to areas of safe refuge in response to a potentially or actually dangerous environment. In addition, this capability involves the safe reentry of the population where feasible.
" Emergency Public Safety and Security Response: Is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations and properties, and sustaining operations from response through recovery. Public Safety and Security Response requires coordination among officials from law enforcement (LE), fire and EMS.
" Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination: Is the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials release, either accidental or as part of a terrorist attack. It includes testing and identifying all likely hazardous substances onsite; ensuring that responders have protective clothing and equipment; conducting rescue operations to remove affected victims from the hazardous environment; conducting geographical survey searches of Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2011 MNS REP Exercise 15
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise suspected sources or contamination spreads and establishing isolation perimeters; mitigating the effects of hazardous materials, decontaminating on-site victims, responders, and equipment; coordinating off-site decontamination with relevant agencies, and notifying environmental, health, and law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction for the incident to begin implementation of their standard evidence collection and investigation procedures.
" Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment: Is the capability to appropriately dispatch emergency medical services (EMS) resources; to provide feasible, suitable, and medically acceptable pre-hospital triage and treatment of patients; to provide transport as well as medical care en-route to an appropriate receiving facility; and to track patients to a treatment facility.
" Mass Care: Is the capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding centers, basic first aid, bulk distribution of needed items, and related services to persons affected by a large-scale incident, including special needs populations. Special needs populations include individuals with physical or mental disabilities who require medical attention or personal care beyond basic first aid. Other special-needs I
populations include non-English speaking populations that may need to have information presented in other languages. The mass care capability also provides for pet care/handling through local government and appropriate animal-related I
organizations. Mass care is usually performed by nongovernmental organizations (NGO), such as the American Red Cross (ARC), or by local government- I sponsored volunteer efforts, such as Citizen Corps. Special-needs populations are generally the responsibility of local government, with medical needs addressed by the medical community and/or its alternate care facilities. State and Federal i entities also play a role in public and environmental health by ensuring safe conditions, safe food, potable water, sanitation, clean air, etc.
" Public Health Laboratory Testing: The Public Health Laboratory Testing capability is the ongoing surveillance, rapid detection, confirmatory testing, data reporting, investigative support, and laboratory networking to address potential exposure, or known exposure, to all-hazards which include chemical, radiochemical, and biological agents in all matrices including clinical specimens, food and environmental samples, (e.g., water, air, soil). All-hazard threats include those deliberately released with criminal intent, as well as those that may be present as a result of unintentional or natural occurrences.
2.3 FEMA Exercise Capabilities Additionally, each capability is linked to several corresponding activities and tasks to i provide additional detail. Based upon the identified exercise objectives, the following capabilities and associated activities are:
- Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide EOC management including Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2011 MNS REP Exercise 16
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise direction and control through the Counties and State EOC MACCS.
Capability: EOC Management - Activate EOC/MACC/IOF; Direct EOC/MACC/IOF Tactical Operations; and Provide EOC/MACC/IOF Connectivity Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for State and County emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.
" Capability: EOC Management - Gather and Provide Information; Identify and Address Issues; and Support and Coordinate Response
" Capability: Emergency Public Information and Warning -
Manage Emergency Public Information and Warnings; Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Notification Plans and Issue Emergency Warnings
" Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for State and Counties' emergency workers and public through exercise demonstration.
" Capability: EOC Management - Direct EOC Tactical Operations; Gather and Provide Information; and Identify and Address Issues
" Capability: Emergency Public Safety and Security Response -
Activate Public Safety and Security Response; Control Traffic, Crowd, and Scene; and Command and Control Public Safety and Security Response Operations
" Capability: Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place - Direct Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection Operations; Activate Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection; Implement Evacuation Orders for General Population; Collect and Evacuate Population Requiring Assistance
" Capability: Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination
- Direct Hazardous Material Response and Decontamination Tactical Operations; Activate Hazardous Material Response and Decontamination; Assess Hazard and Evaluate Risk; and Conduct Decontamination and Clean-up /Recovery Operations
" Capability: Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, Related Services) -
Establish Shelter Operations and Shelter General Population.
" Capability: Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment - Direct Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Operations; Activate Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment; Transport; and Provide Treatment Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2011 MNS REP Exercise 17
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System utilizing the Public Notification System (PNS)/Emergency Alert System (EAS) through exercise play.
Capability: Emergency Public Information and Warning -
Manage Emergency Public Information and Warnings; Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Notification Plans; and Issue Public Information, Alerts/Warnings, and Notifications.
" Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the JIC for joint (public and private sectors) emergency information communications.
I Capability: Emergency Public Information and Warning -
Establish JIC; Conduct JIC Operations; Issue Public Information, Alerts/Warnings, and Notifications; Conduct Media Relations; and Provide Public Rumor Control.
" Objective 6: Demonstrate the ability to conduct independent dose assessment, management of field teams, and mobile or fixed laboratory analysis in response to a radiological release.
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" Capability: Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination
- Direct Hazardous Material Response and Decontamination Tactical I
Operations; Activate Hazardous Material Response and Decontamination; Assess Hazard and Evaluate Risk; and Conduct Decontamination and Clean-up /Recovery Operations
" Capability: Public Health Laboratory Testing - Obtain and Direct Laboratory Testing, Surveillance, rapid detection, confirmatory testing, data reporting, investigative support, and laboratory networking to address potential exposure, or known exposure to in all matrices including clinical specimens, food and environmental samples, (e.g., water, air, soil).
I Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2011 MNS REP Exercise 18
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the August 9, 2011 plume exercise and Off Scenario/Out of Sequence (OOS) interviews and demonstrations of July 25-29, 2011 and Medical Service Drill (MSD) on August 10, 2011. The exercise tested the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments within the 10-mile EPZ around MNS.
Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on their demonstration of Capabilities and their equivalent REP criteria as delineated in the Interim REP Program Manual dated August 2002. Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent of play agreement used are in Appendix H of this report.
Table 2, at Appendix B, presents the status of all exercise criteria that were performed during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:
" M: Met (No Deficiency or Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) assessed and no unresolved ARCA from prior exercises)
" D: Deficiency assessed
" A: ARCA(s) assessed or an unresolved ARCA(s) from a prior exercise
" N: Not Demonstrated 3.2 Evaluation Summaries 3.2.1 State Of North Carolina 3.2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
The North Carolina State Emergency Response Team (SERT) effectively demonstrated the state's emergency response actions to a radiological incident involving MNS. The SERT Leader effectively directed his staff throughout the exercise. The SERT members were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and successfully coordinated necessary actions with the risk counties of Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Catawba, Gaston, Iredell, and Lincoln, the host county of Cabarrus, the MNS emergency operations facility (EOF), the NCEM WBO Regional Coordination Center (RCC), and various other agencies throughout the exercise. Periodic status briefings and conference calls fully involved the various agencies and professionally addressed the concerns and recommendations of the county emergency management directors while achieving concurrence on key decisions.
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 19
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise All personnel were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and successfully performed their assigned actions.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1, L.e. 1, 2.a. 1, 2.b.2 Emergency Public Information and Warning The North Carolina SERT demonstrated this capability within the state emergency operations center (SEOC) through activities related to the prompt notification system and the subsequent development and release of emergency information by public information personnel supporting the Joint Information Center (JIC).
The process by which the public would be advised of emergency instructions and information in the event of an incident at MNS comprises the State's Alert and Notification procedure. Annexes C and E, North Carolina Radiological Emergency Response Plan provide detailed guidance on the coordination involved in public I notification. Upon the notification that the utility had declared Site Area Emergency and subsequently General Alert, the Lead Risk County and SERT staff followed these established procedures and activated the Alert and Notification system. However, following the protective action decision (PAD) at 1240 to activate the siren system at I
1245 the SERT failed to conduct a countdown so that not all sirens were activated. This was identified by the WBO staff and new times were developed and implemented to i correctly sound all sirens (see Section 4). Upon receipt of emergency classification level (ECL) changes by the utility, SERT staff authenticated the transmissions before initiating actions which were guided by their use of checklists keyed to the escalating ECLs. They closely followed the outlined steps of coordination and decision making and generally I
within 30 minutes of receipt of a change of plant status had coordinated an appropriate response. They effectively coordinated with and transmitted information to the l supporting National Weather Service (NWS) duty forecaster providing a secondary notification that ensured redundancy and 100% coverage of the population within the 10-mile EPZ.
The second aspect, preparation and dissemination of emergency information, was successfully demonstrated using a procedural change which located the news writers in the SEOC rather than in the JIC. All news releases were released to the media from the SEOC rather than from the JIC. This was done in order to place the news writers closer to the approving official (the SERT Leader). Changes to news releases were accomplished more efficiently when they were not sent back and forth from the JIC.
However all news releases still were approved by all county representatives in the JIC, which did still require sending the messages back and forth. All information released to the media was consistent with protective action decisions and emergency notification forms. All releases were current and accurate.
One rumor was identified during the exercise. The JIC informed the SERT Public I
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 20
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise Information Officer (PIO) that calls had been received inquiring if the incident at MNS was related to terrorist activity. The staff member in charge of rumor control quickly conferred with the SERT Leader and the Duke Energy Liaison. They determined there was no indication of terrorist activity, and that information was promptly relayed to the JIC.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 5.a. 1, 5.b. 1 3.2.1.2 Western Branch Office Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
The NCEM WBO demonstrated the capability to effectively activate and manage the RCC by activating sufficient staff to manage their role in the exercise, establishing and maintaining communication with the affected counties, the SEOC and the EOF. The WBO staff ensured that county needs and requests were met and ensured that the State, counties and Duke Energy coordinated their actions and kept one another informed.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 1.a. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1, L.e. 1 3.2.1.3 Dose Assessment Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary The North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Division of Health Service Regulation, Radiation Protection Section (RPS) dose assessment staff routinely monitored and evaluated plant, radiological, meteorological, and field monitoring data in order to quantify the simulated radiological plume and provide protective action recommendations (PARs) to the SERT Leader. Dose projections were performed using an Excel spreadsheet designed to emulate the Duke Energy RADDOSE program dose projections. Dose projections were coordinated with Duke Energy and were based on plant conditions and radiological data. Results were evaluated in collaboration with the utility dose assessors in the EOF. The RPS Director provided excellent direction and control of the dose assessment staff, worked effectively with Public Health on potassium iodide (KI) decisions, and the Duke Energy Liaison to evaluate and assess plant and off-site radiological conditions in order to provide input into PADs made by the SERT Leader for the safety and health of emergency workers and the public.
The RADDOSE program used by Duke Energy does not consistently provide results within the required factor of 10 as compared to the RASCAL program. According to the Dose Assessment Leader, the utility has worked with RPS on this issue, and the resolution was to develop an Excel spreadsheet to emulate RADDOSE calculations. The spreadsheet used RADDOSE algorithms and X/Q values, so that an "apples to apples" comparison can be made with the utility dose projections. Further, the RPS staff used a Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 21
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise "repeat back" process to ensure accuracy of data entry for making dose projections.
At 1329, air sample results were available from an RPS Field Monitoring Team (FMT), I and the RPS Director had the Dose Assessment staff back-calculate to determine the source term and verify the relative accuracy of previous dose projections. The RPS dose assessment staff was unfamiliar with this process and unsuccessfully attempted to use RASCAL to complete the request.
Dose assessment staff demonstrated professional conduct, competence and dedication in the performance of their responsibilities.
For this capability the following REP criteria were met: l.a. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 2.a. 1, 2.b. 1, 2.b.2 3.2.1.4 Field Monitoring Team Management Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary In response to activation, the RPS Field Team Management staff demonstrated their ability to mobilize the FMTs to arrive at the incident scene and initiate response i operations to assist in management of the incident. Field Team Management was supported by the Field Team Coordinator (FTC), the RPS SERT Coordinator, the SERT Radio Communicator and two RPS Assistants. The FTC appropriately managed resources to evaluate the hazards present and the level of risk to RPS field responders.
I Equipment and supplies were sufficient to support management of FMT activities.
Communications systems consisting of radios, cellular telephones, and satellite telephones were tested and verified operational before FMT deployment. Radio communication failures with FMTs occurred; however, backup communication methods were used to effectively communicate with FMTs.
I The FTC gave FMTs, the Mobile Laboratory and Sample courier a radiological briefing i via radio prior to FMT deployment. The FMTs were assigned to perform radiological surveys by traversing downwind locations within the plume emergency planning zone.
The assigned radiation monitoring locations allowed the teams to locate both the plume edges and obtain maximum readings at the plume centerline. Field radiation I
measurements were immediately communicated to the RPS Director and dose assessment personnel for use in calculation dose projections and making protective action decisions.
The Field Team Management staff participated in the decision for FMT members to take KI. FMT personnel were promptly advised when to take KI. FMT personnel exposure and KI ingestion was recorded and tracked by the FTC. The FTC was knowledgeable regarding the use of KI and in radiation exposure control methods, including the process for obtaining radiation exposure extensions, if needed.
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 22
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise For this capability the following REP criteria were met: l.a. 1, 1.d. 1, L.e. 1, 2.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 4.a.2 3.2.1.5 Field Monitoring Team Operations Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:
Two RPS FMTs, designated as Red and Blue, were pre-positioned at the Rudisill National Guard Armory in Charlotte, North Carolina. Equipment, supplies and dosimetry were sufficient to support radiological monitoring operations. Communications systems, consisting of radios, cellular telephones and satellite telephones were tested and verified operational before deployment. Survey equipment was operationally and source checked before deployment into the field.
The FTC gave the FMT personnel a radiological briefing via radio. The FMTs performed radiological surveys by traversing downwind locations as instructed by the FTC. Airborne radioactivity was sampled using air samplers with particulate filters and sample cartridges. Personnel exposure was recorded, tracked and transmitted to the FTC.
Field team members were knowledgeable of their exposure limits and the use of KI.
Field team members demonstrated the ability to obtain measurements and samples in order to properly track and assess the plume.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 4.a. 1, 4.a.3 3.2.1.6 Mobile Laboratory Public Health Laboratory Testing Capability Summary:
The RPS Mobile Laboratory was located at the Rudisill Army National Guard Armory in Charlotte, North Carolina. This location is about 17 miles south of MNS and is outside the plume phase EPZ. Personnel were pre-positioned at 0800 per the Extent of Play (EOP). Mobile Laboratory personnel consisted of personnel assigned to the Sample Courier, Sample Control and the Mobile Laboratory functions. Effective communications were maintained with the SEOC by 800 Mega Hertz radios. The Sample Courier successfully demonstrated the delivery of samples to the Sample Control Station located inside the National Guard building. Sample Control personnel successfully demonstrated the receipt and processing of air sample cartridges, air sample filter paper and soil. Procedures were followed to control the spread of contamination and screen samples so that only those with a contact dose rate of less than 1 mR/hr were sent to the Mobile Laboratory. The Sample Control Team demonstrated excellent attention to detail, peer checking and compliance with procedures.
The Mobile Laboratory was equipped with a low background Proportional Counter to perform alpha or beta-gamma counting of air sample cartridges, filter papers and wipes; Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 23
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise and a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) Detector and a 4096 Multi-Channel analyzer to perform gamma spectrometry for different solid and liquid geometries. Minimum Detection Activity levels were sufficient to allow for protective action decision making based on radioactivity in food samples, soil, grass, and air samples.
During the exercise the HPGe Gamma Spectrometer in the Mobile Laboratory could not correctly identify the isotopes in the Counting Standard used to calibrate the system and, therefore, could not be used to count sample media during the exercise. The Mobile Laboratory personnel could not get the system to work properly and called their in-house expert for help, but did not get a response. Hence, the isotopic analyses of high priority air samples, soil and food samples could not be provided locally at the forward Mobile Laboratory location. As a result, during the plume phase, air samples would have to be transported to the State Laboratory in Raleigh. During the post plume phase, there may be Federal capabilities available for post-plume sample analyses, but these samples may i also require transport to the State Laboratory in Raleigh if Federal resources are not in place at the time of need. This delay in analyzing and reporting sample results to State decision-makers could impact the timeliness of protective action decisions. I For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: l.a. 1, 1.d. 1, L.e. 1, 3.a. I For this capability the following REP criteria were not MET: 4.c. 1 (see Section 4) 3.2.1.7 Waterway Warning Lake Norman i Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
The demonstration for Alert, Notification and Evacuation of Lake Norman was performed by representatives of the North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission (NCWRC), Division of Enforcement; Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department l (CMPD), Lakes Enforcement Section; Catawba County Sheriff's Office; Iredell County Sheriff's Office; and the Lincoln County Sheriff's Office. Part of Lake Norman is in the EPZ in the listed counties. The CMPD Lake Sections Supervisor served as the Incident Commander (IC), and successfully oversaw clearance operations. CMPD also provided a command and control boat as well as patrol boats. The NCRWC officers provided Operations Section support at the Incident Command Post (ICP) and patrol boats.
Sheriff's Deputies from the three supporting counties provided patrol boats. All personnel were well versed in their mission requirements and fully demonstrated the ability to warn the public on Lake Norman. The level of professionalism and mutual support displayed by the officers involved was commendable.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 1.a. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1, L.e. 1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 5.a.3 I
3.2.1.8 National Weather Service Greenville-Spartanburg Airport i I
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 24
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
The US Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), NWS Greenville-Spartanburg Airport in Greer, South Carolina successfully demonstrated the ability to receive and disseminate emergency information to the public and the media. The public notification system for counties surrounding MNS consists of Emergency Alert System (EAS) and NWS tone-alert radio broadcasts. The following equipment was on hand and operational; a dedicated Duke Energy Hotline, Brother Intellifax 2820 (primary), and a Sharp Mx 2300n Fax Machine (secondary). The facility is equipped with a backup generator and an additional backup generator for the radar.
Each NOAA radio has its own individual backup power. The emergency notification information is entered into the computer system to activate the Emergency Alert System (EAS). The emergency information is disseminated to the public and media in the affected counties via local television and radio stations as well as NWS radio.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 5.a. 1 3.2.2 Joint Operations 3.2.2.1 Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
In accordance with established procedures, following the declaration of ECL Alert the utility operator activated the facility's Emergency Response Organization. At this time the Emergency Coordinator responsibilities were transferred from the Control Room to the Technical Support Center (QSC), and actions were initiated to staff the Duke Energy Emergency operations Facility (EOF). There were adequate supplies and equipment available to support all responsloperations.
Direction and control of emergncy management operations were the responsibility of the utility operator, who fulfilled th~se duties in a professional and effective manner. The State and local government officials dispatched to the EOF served in an all-important liaison capacity between the utility operator and their respective emergency operations centers (EOCs). The government officials, in conjunction with the utility's Emergency Director, effectively communicated, coordinated and functioned as a cohesive response and recovery unit.
The utility operator's assessment as well as the State's independent assessments of the offsite health and safety considerations supported the PARs, which were based solely on plant conditions, and the subsequent PADs. All PADs were based on sound technical analyses, which included environmental field measurements, computerized dose assessment models, a thorough understanding of the simulated emergency at hand, and interactions with the utility operator's senior staff.
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 25
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 2.b. 1 3.2.2.2 Joint Information Center Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
The agencies of the JIC successfully demonstrated this capability by developing, coordinating and disseminating emergency public information with a sence of urgency and without undue delay. The JIC serves as the central point of contact for the distribution and release of information to the media and public during an emergency at MNS. The JIC is maintained by Duke Energy and offers ample space for the PIOs and
- staff from the utility, State, county, and Federal agencies to perform their duties. The JIC was well equipped and had redundant communications systems. During the media briefings the spokespersons accurately answered all questions and were able to fully discuss what actions have been taken by their organizations in response to the emergency.
I Established protocols were followed when preparing, coordinating and disseminating news releases. The ability to provide timely emergency information and instructions for the public and the media was successfully demonstrated. A critical aspect of keeping the I
public informed is ensuring the correct information is available and erroneous information is corrected and rumors squelched. The JIC manager and PIO representatives I preformed their roles in accordance with their published procedures and plans.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1,1.d. 1, L.e. 1, 5.b.1 i 3.2.3 Risk Jurisdictions 3.2.3.1 Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, North Carolina 3.2.3.1.1 Emergency Operations Center I Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Emergency Management Office (CMEMO) staff and county agencies successfully demonstrated the capability to provide agency coordination for incident management by activating and operating an EOC. This included: EOC activation, notification, staffing, management, direction, control and coordination of response activities. It also included coordination of efforts among neighboring governments and the State. They also demonstrated the ability for coordination of public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response activities.
EOC personnel were pre-positioned per the EOP, but the Emergency Management Director (EMD) explained the normal callout system and the ability to insure the EOC could be activated in a timely manner. The County General Manager and a Charlotte Assistant City Manager participated on the Decision Team during the exercise.
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 26
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise The EOC had sufficient equipment and communications for conducting operations and communicating with other State and local governments and agencies, including two dedicated telephone systems.
The EMD effectively demonstrated the ability to provide direction and control of all support agencies and to make proper PADs depending upon the conditions. PADs were identified for ingesting KI; evacuating EPZ sub-zones within the county, and sheltering in place other sub-zones. The EMD also demonstrated the ability to protect special needs populations and protect the health and safety of the citizens of Charlotte-Mecklenburg County.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1, i.e. 1, 2.a. 1, 2.b.2, 2.c. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.c. 1, 3.c.2, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2 Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
Charlotte-Mecklenburg County emergency management staff personnel demonstrated the capability to develop, coordinate, and disseminate accurate alerts and emergency information to the media and the public and activate warning systems to notify those most at-risk in the event of an emergency. The EMD successfully activated the siren system at ECL SAE and an EAS message was transmitted for release to the public. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg PIOs developed and issued a press release to clarify what actions the general public should take. When an ECL GE was declared the sirens were activated and PADs were issued on an EAS message and in press releases.
The Fire Marshal and Charlotte Fire Department (CFD) personnel were knowledgeable of the process to perform backup route alerting.
The PIOs maintained contact with the PIOs at the JIC. They insured that any Charlotte-Mecklenburg generated press releases were reviewed by the EMD and the County Decision Team. Two public inquiry personnel from the County 3-1-1 Center staffed the Public Inquiry function in the EOC. The staff consistently obtained accurate information or referred the callers to the appropriate information sources. There were no trends or rumors identified during the exercise.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 5.a. 1, 5.a.3, 5.b. 1 3.2.3.1.2 Traffic Control Points Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:
Charlotte-Mecklenburg County successfully demonstrated this capability during interviews with law enforcement officers from the CMPD, Huntersville Police Department (HPD) and a trooper from the North Carolina State Highway Patrol Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 27
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise (NCSHP). Each officer was equipped with personal protective radiological items and understood the operation and purpose of assigned dosimetry. They had received recent training on dosimetry and KI and were able to perform their assigned emergency tasks in a limited radiological threat environment.
The main role of the officers was to establish and maintain traffic control points (TCPs) l to facilitate the smooth traffic flow of evacuees during an incident at MNS. Their explanation of departmental procedures to alert and brief sufficient personnel to staff designated TCPs, their understanding of individual requirements at assigned TCPs, and a common sense approach to overcoming obstacles and impediments to traffic flow showed that CMPD, HPD, and NCSHP officers are well prepared to implement protective action measures commensurate with this capability.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2 3.2.3.1.3 Backup Route Alerting Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
CFD personnel were knowledgeable in the ability to disseminate accurate alerts and emergency information to the public and activate warning systems to notify those most at-risk in the event of an emergency. The Fire Department personnel were prepared to dispatch personnel to conduct backup route alerting if necessary. They knew dosimetry I
and KI requirements and what personnel to dispatch depending upon which siren failed to activate.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 3.a. 1, 5.a.3 3.2.3.1.4 Protective Actions for Schools Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place Capability Summary:
The ability to safeguard students and staff in the event of an incident involving MNS was successfully demonstrated, through an interview with the principals and designated representatives of J.M. Alexander Middle School, Blythe Elementary School, Croft Community School, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) Transportation Supervisor, the CMS Deputy Safety Coordinator, CMEMO, and NCEM WBO staff. The principals were well conversant with their respective emergency plans and all key personnel were familiar with each other and had well-coordinated plans and procedures.
CMS has sufficient buses to relocate all students in a timely manner and the host site is prepared to accept the relocating students and assist in their supervision and eventual release to parents/guardians. Staff and faculty have specific functions and those are addressed during regularly scheduled school drills and evacuation/relocation exercises.
All interviewed staff were knowledgeable and demonstrated a very professional and Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 28
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise caring demeanor.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 3.c.2 3.2.3.1.5 Emergency Worker and Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:
CFD personnel successfully demonstrated the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials release, decontaminate on-site responders and equipment; and coordinating off-site decontamination with relevant agencies.
The CFD Team Radiological Officer gave a good safety and radiological briefing to the entire monitoring and decontamination team. He also reminded each worker of their dosimetry requirements, exposure limits, KI requirements and time requirements for reading and reporting their direct reading dosimeter (DRD) results.
The vehicle monitoring and decontamination teams exhibited good team work, communications and good monitoring and decontamination practices. The use of team leaders at all stations was a good practice.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. 1, 6.b. 1 3.2.3.1.6 Reception and Congregate Care Center Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:
CFD personnel staffed the initial monitoring station and the decontamination area at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte (UNC- Charlotte) site. CFD personnel were issued DRDs and a simulated permanent record dosimeter (PRD), but did not know there were two ranges of DRDs and they were to wear one of each range. CFD personnel assembled a portal monitor and four survey instruments, but did not appear familiar with how any of the instruments worked and how to set up and correctly perform operational checks. The process for monitoring vehicles or marking them as contaminated was vague and personnel discussed several options ranging from surveying the vehicles immediately to marking the vehicles and surveying them later. Personnel at the decontamination area were unsure of how to monitor evacuees and how to use their equipment. Overall the CFD personnel were unsure of their equipment for monitoring and the decontamination process. It was not obvious that evacuees could be monitored and decontaminated successfully at this facility.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1 For this capability the following REP criteria were not MET: 6.a. 1 (see Section 4)
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 29
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation. Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding and Related Services) Capability Summary:
Charlotte-Mecklenburg County successfully demonstrated the ability to care and shelter the general population evacuated from the MNS EPZ. The Greater Carolinas Chapter of U
the American Red Cross (ARC), supported by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Health Department and the Department of Social Services (DSS). The Health Department assists with the distribution and ingestion of KI, and DSS assists with special needs evacuees. The UNC Charlotte Police Department provided tremendous law enforcement support to the facility, to include fully activating and staffing the UNC- Charlotte EOC.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 6.c. 1 3.2.3.1.7 Medical Services Drill Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Capability Summary:
Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Emergency Medical Services (EMS)/MEDIC staff successfully demonstrated their activities under the Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Capability during a Medical Services Drill (MSD). After receiving a call for assistance MEDIC Dispatch deployed appropriate emergency medical service resources, provided appropriate contamination control for the victim and the MEDIC Team, and notified the I
Carolinas Medical Center- University (CMC-U) on the status of the contaminated injured patient, and then transported the patient to the hospital.
CMC-U demonstrated their expertise under the Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Operations Capability by receiving a contaminated injured patient and properly performing I necessary decontamination and contamination control actions. The contaminated patient received emergency medical care, was decontaminated successfully and transferred for medical care.
For this capability the following criteria were MET: 6.d. 1 3.2.3.2 Catawba County, North Carolina 3.2.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center I Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
The Catawba County EMD and EOC staff successfully demonstrated the ability to protect the safety of its citizens in the event of an incident at MNS. The Catawba County EMD successfully demonstrated excellent direction, control and coordination of response activities at the EOC by conducting very informative, thorough and structured briefings at regular intervals. This experience reflected on Catawba County EOC staff which enabled them to perform their duties and responsibilities in a very professional and cohesive manner. The EMD coordinated all PADs with the SERT and risk counties.
I Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 30
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise Alert, notification and mobilization of the EOC staff was prompt and the EOC was activated in a timely manner. Staff personnel were knowledgeable, professional and performed their duties proactively and in accordance with established plans and procedures.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1, i.e. 1, 2.a. 1, 2.b.2, 2.c. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.c. 1, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2 Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
The PIO prepared numerous news releases after consultation with the EMD and information was received from the JIC to ensure accurate information would be provided that was consistent with the current situation. The PIO consistently provided documentation to the EMD for review and approval prior to release to the JIC. The PIO also fielded telephone inquiries to answer public concerns. The PIO expeditiously prepared the Catawba County State of Emergency proclamation. The PIO communicated via e-mail and fax to coordinate the release of all media related information. A total of seven news releases were produced and approved by the EMD. The PIO accomplished her duties competently and proactively by looking ahead and comprehending the over-arching components affecting public information and warning. Catawba County EOC coordinated information regarding protective actions, siren activations, and two EAS messages.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 5.a. 1, 5.a.3, 5.b. 1 3.2.3.2.2 Traffic Control Points Activate Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:
This capability was successfully demonstrated in two separate parts- implementation by out of sequence interview and management by the law enforcement representative in the county EOC. Catawba County Sheriff's Office deputies can be activated, mobilized and deployed to assigned TCPs in a timely manner. Command and control of the TCPs as well as resource coordination and impediment removal is completed from the EOC and relayed to personnel through supervisors or dispatch. TCPs are established at the direction of the county EOC or at ECL SAE. Assigned deputies were knowledgeable in directing evacuees out of affected areas to the reception centers. The deputies were also competent in the use of issued exposure control equipment. The assigned deputies also provide and maintain an effective law enforcement presence in maintaining perimeter control of the evacuated areas.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, .d. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 31
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation, Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise 3.2.3.2.3 Backup Route Alerting Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary: I An interview was conducted with the Fire Rescue representative in the EOC relating to1 backup route alerting procedures. Catawba County's primary method of alerting the public is through activation of a siren system. Backup route alerting is used when siren failure(s) are identified. The Fire Rescue representatives were knowledgeable and professional and dedicated approach while talking through their emergency procedures. The County Fire Rescue Coordinator described the actions he would take after being informed that a siren had failed. He identified the siren coverage area, which fire stations would be utilized, what routes they would cover and how many units would be necessary to complete the route within 45 minutes. He explained the routes and the scripted message that would be announced over the public address systems. He stated the county had sufficient resources m had been identified to cover all routes in the event all sirens failed to sound. Fire Rescue representatives were well trained in personal protective measures as well as in activities to safeguard the public. m For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 3.a. 1, 5.a.3 3.2.3.2.4 Emergency Worker and Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination.
Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:
The capability to assess and manage the,'consequences of a hazardous materials release was successfully demonstrated by Catawba County. The county emergency worker and vehicle decontamination station was established in the parking lot of Sherrills Ford-Terrell Fire Station 2. This site offers adequate space with clearly defined perimeters for entry and access control. Members of the Sherrills Ford-Terrell Fire Department, Catawba l County Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT), Catawba County EMS and Catawba Emergency Services demonstrated the ability to activate, mobilize and conduct activities in support of a radiological release at MNS.
Sufficient equipment, dosimetry and supplies to support the monitoring and decontamination operations were available during this demonstration. A portable personnel monitoring system was erected and used for personnel survey and monitoring.
A Sherrills Ford-Terrell Fire Department pumper truck provided water for vehicle decontamination with runoff water being diverted to county drainage system. The monitoring team conducted operational checks on the survey meters and demonstrated the proper use of the instruments. All workers were knowledgeable in exposure control and were well trained in their roles and positions in support of these operations.
The personnel operating the station successfully demonstrated the monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and equipment. These operations were performed in accordance with the procedures outlined in the county's plans, procedures Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 32
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise and guidance.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, i.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. 1, 6.b. 1 3.2.3.2.5 Reception and Congregate Care Center Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:
Catawba County successfully demonstrated the ability to assess radiological hazards through radiological monitoring and establishing contamination action levels. The county managed radiological exposure by providing radiological safety briefings, implementing radiation exposure limits and issuing personal dosimetry to all emergency workers. Spread of radiological contamination was minimized by activating the Bandys High School reception and congregate care center, which monitored and decontaminated evacuees and their vehicles as required. The IC gave an extremely informative safety and radiological briefing to the entire monitoring and decontamination team. He also reminded each worker as they were issued their dosimetry of their exposure limits, KI requirements, time requirements for reading and reporting their DRD results. All agencies involved in the monitoring and decontamination team exhibited outstanding team work, effective communication skills, a strong understanding of exposure control, and demonstrated thorough monitoring and decontamination techniques.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. 1 Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding and Related Services) Capability Summary:
Catawba County was prepared to provide evacuees immediate shelter, security, food, water, sleeping space, sanitation facilities and medical care. Preparation to open the shelter for evacuees from the 10 mile EPZ within the county would be initiated at the ECL SAE, and the shelter would be established at ECL GE. The Catawba Valley Chapter of the ARC was responsible for the coordination of all government and non-government agencies involved with sheltering. Bandys High School is an ARC-certified shelter with a capacity for 500 evacuees.
The high school campus has adequate space, sufficient resources and utilities to support the assigned mission. Cross contamination of the shelter was prevented by use of the signed shelter passes distributed by the monitoring and decontamination staff. Only evacuees with signed passes who had processed through the monitoring station and reception desk were allowed inside the shelter facility. KI is not maintained at the shelter nor will ARC staff distribute KI to the general public at the shelter. In accordance with county plans, KI is stored with the County Health Department and would be moved to the shelter and distributed by the Health Department when ordered to do so. For this demonstration, county health officials were not present to discuss KI distribution to the general public.
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 33
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 6.c. 1 3.2.3.3 Gaston County, North Carolina 3.2.3.3.1 Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
Gaston County Emergency Management successfully demonstrated this capability. The EOC was alerted, mobilized and activated in a timely manner. Processes and organizational structure were well defined. The Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC) served as the EOC manager, and exhibited expert direction and control of the EOC throughout the exercise. Direction and control and timely decisions were aided by the participation of elected officials in the decision making process, and by an internal Incident Management software program that made real time tracking and resource management more functional. Operational activities were chronicled, tracked and recorded with internal communications systems. Numerous briefings and status updates i were conducted that kept the staff abreast of changing conditions. The briefings allowed staff input and aided in coordination within the EOC, and with external agencies, other jurisdictions and the SEOC. Implementation of coordinated PADs in response to PARs was timely and decisive as a result of constant and deliberate guidance from the EOC I
manager. Emergency responders were interviewed and were knowledgeable of assigned equipment and procedures related to radiation safety. The EOC was adequately equipped with maps, video display, reproduction equipment, computers and electronic tracking I
systems. Sufficient reference materials were available at each work station, including position binders for each staff position in the EOC. The binders detailed the scope of the I EOC operations and the duties and responsibilities of the specific positions with brevity and clarity. All support activities were readily identifiable by placards on the desks and colored identifying vests which designated their support function. Staff personnel were n keenly familiar with operational procedures and demonstrated a high level of competence in the ability to protect the health and safety of the public and emergency workers in the event of an incident at MNS. They professionally performed their responsibilities in accordance with established plans.
I For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1,1 .c. 1, 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 2.a. 1, i 2.b.2, 2.c. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. l, 3.c. 1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2 Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary: I Emergency public information and warning was successfully demonstrated with the coordination and implementation of the EAS messages and release of information to the media. Upon receiving notification of ECL Alert, under guidance from the EMD the Gaston County PIO generated a news release that provided a statement of the emergency situation and activation of the county EOC. Gaston County produced and distributed one news release regarding the EOC activation before the activation of the JIC. Upon Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 34 2011 MNS REP Exercise I
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise activation of the JIC, all other joint messages regarding incident events around MNS, including PARs, PADs and implementation instructions were coordinated with lateral jurisdictions and the State over the Decision Line and through conference calls. They were supplemented by alternative methods available in the event established methods were overwhelmed. News releases were generated by the PIO and vetted through Gaston County representatives at the JIC for release or input. Public notification and warning was appropriately completed with a sense of urgency. An integral component of the EAS system included pre-scripted messages synchronized to provide a uniform message to be distributed to the public and included coordination of siren activation and distribution of coordinated messages through the NWS. Rumor control was handled by the PIO prior to activation of the JIC, and addressed one inquiry. Deputies of the Gaston County Sheriff's Office were interviewed regarding backup route alerting procedures in the event a siren failure had occurred. They were knowledgeable of their responsibilities, equipment and procedures. Staff members were familiar with the procedures for coordination and implementation of the county emergency plans.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 5.a. 1, 5.a.3, 5.b. 1 3.2.3.3.2 Traffic Control Points Activate Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:
Officers of the Gaston County Police Department were thoroughly knowledgeable in the establishment and location of traffic control points. The officers were proficient in the demonstration and use of personal dosimetry and recording any measured readings.
Patrol vehicles are equipped with sufficient safety equipment to aid in traffic direction and have multiple means of radio and computer aided dispatch technology to receive and transmit essential information. There are procedures in place to complete removal of impediments to traffic. Procedures conveyed were consistent with county plans and procedures.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: l.a. 1, 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2 3.2.3.3.3 Backup Route Alerting Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:
Deputies of the Gaston County Sheriff's Office were interviewed about procedures for accomplishing backup route alerting in the county. They were knowledgeable in exposure limits, reading and recording requirements for personal dosimetry, the use of KI, and procedures to be followed in conducting route alerting. Equipment would be received at the designated staging area with a briefing of the assigned area. Through technology available from the county geospatial information system (GIS) relating to siren coverage areas, designated routes could be formulated to show areas not covered by Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 35
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise overlaps from adjoining siren areas and transmitted to the computer aided dispatch consoles in the patrol cars. This allowed an efficient use of resources in covering non alerted areas, which in turn decreased the amount of time or officers to contact the residents in those areas. In the event of a GIS technology failure or non availability, the designated siren area can be referenced with a standard street route map. There is a pre-scripted message to be read while traveling through the designated area. By utilizing GIS technology and personal knowledge of the area, sufficient manpower would be available to cover any designated area within 45 minutes of a siren failure.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 3.a. 1, 5.a.3 3.2.3.3.4 Protective Actions for Schools Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place Capability Summary:
Gaston County successfully demonstrated its ability to meet this capability during an interview with representatives of Gaston County Office of Emergency Management i (OEM), Gaston County Schools, Gaston County Health, and the principals of three of the six schools within the Gaston County sub-zones of the MNS EPZ, and the host school supporting these three. OEM has developed detailed guidance on the actions required by the school system and individual schools to initiate protective actions to safeguard I
students, staff and faculty in the event of an incident at MNS. The school system and in-turn the individual schools have developed procedures to ensure timely and effective implementation of protective actions.
I Although two of the principals were newly assigned, all were well conversant with the plans and the responsibilities at each school inherent in implementing emergency procedures. Teachers receive in-service training to maintain currency on their responsibilities and each classroom has emergency binders with checklists that aid the teacher in implementing plans. Coordination with parents is a function of the schools and I
begins with an initial letter at the beginning of the year and supplemented by materials provided by Duke Power. In the event a protective action is directed, parents would be informed by the individual schools through the Connect-Ed system.
I During the discussion it was evident that there is a close working relationship between I OEM and the school system, and thatdecisions involving individual schools are made with consideration of their input. The principal of the host school has prepared a reception plan to facilitate the arrival of three relocating school population, assistance to this body, and developed a release plan to minimize traffic congestion.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 3.c.2 I I
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 36
Homeland SecurityExercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise 3.2.3.3.5 Emergency Worker and Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:
Gaston County very effectively demonstrated the ability to perform emergency worker and vehicle monitoring and decontamination operations during a demonstration at the East Gaston High School. Supporting agencies were the Gastonia Fire Department, Special Operations Division, HAZMAT Branch; the Gaston Emergency Medical Services (GEMS) Specialized Tactics and Rescue Team (STAR); and Gaston County Emergency Management. Upon notification from the Gaston County EOC the agencies would mobilize to the school and begin set-up of operations. The agencies complemented each other with their operations and supplies, smoothly performing as one integrated team.
Incident command was quickly established, equipment and supplies were issued and the site was quickly set up for operations. All emergency workers (EW) present were briefed on safe operations, to include exposure to radiological contamination. Team members performed a thorough survey and decontamination of the contaminated emergency workers and vehicles while maintaining proper documentation.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, i.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. 1, 6.b. 1 3.2.3.3.6 Reception and Congregate Care Center Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:
The City of Gastonia Fire Department (HAZMAT), Gaston County EMS personnel and Gaston County Emergency Management personnel successfully demonstrated the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials release, decontaminating victims and coordinating off-site decontamination with relevant agencies.
The reception center at Ashbrook High School had ample space to provide monitoring, decontamination and registration of evacuees. The parking area was sufficient to handle vehicles. Personnel were knowledgeable of exposure limits and contamination limits.
Signs and directions were sufficient to direct evacuees where they needed to go for monitoring. Emergency workers were knowledgeable of their exposure limits, call back values and turn back limits. Decontamination monitoring was sufficient to monitor the expected evacuee population of 3320 within a 12-hour period.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 1.a. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. 1 Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding and Related Services) Capability Summary:
The Gaston County Chapter of the ARC, assisted primarily by the Gaston County DSS, demonstrated the ability of county staff and ARC volunteers to meet the congregate care needs of evacuees during a nuclear incident at MNS. The county employees and ARC Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 37
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise 3 volunteers worked together as a team and demonstrated shared responsibilities in meeting the needs of evacuees. It was evident that the ARC as lead and all supporting county agencies (Schools, Sheriff, Police, EMS, Health, Mental Health and Animal Control) had coordinated on establishing and managing a safe shelter that could expand to meet the needs of evacuating citizens. Personnel participating in the demonstration were well-versed in their roles. The facility demonstrated its use of in-house interpreters and connectivity with off-site resources to meet the potential multi-lingual needs of evacuees.
Consideration to meet the medical and health needs of evacuees was demonstrated along with the availability of representatives conversant with other services that could assist evacuees. Law enforcement was available to provide security in a variety of manners -
traffic control, ingress and egress, and management of any possible sex offenders in the shelter. Lastly, in response to evacuee concerns over care for pets, County Animal 3
Control is prepared to assist in the establishment of a pet control facility adjacent to the shelter. The demonstration at Ashbrook High School met the requirements established for this capability For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 6.c. 1 3.2.3.4 Iredell County, North Carolina 3.2.3.4.1 Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
Iredell County Emergency Management and EOC personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to provide multi-agency coordination for an incident at MNS. The EOC was a well-equipped facility capable of supporting emergency operations. Overall direction I
and control of the county response was provided by the EMC. PADs were discussed among the county leaders present including the EMC, County Manager (CM), Deputy County Manager and the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners. The Chairman had I
decision-making authority and the CM acted in the Chairman's place when he was not present. PADs were coordinated with the State and other counties. The EMC had the full support and trust of the county senior leadership, and thus could make timely I
decisions, such as during one conference when the EMC concurred with a PAD which was different than the PAD he and the CM had decided on prior to the call. However, the CM was notified immediately after the call and agreed with the EMCs decision.
Following the EMC's decision to activate the EOC, he provided a status briefing to EOC staff, and he continued to conduct briefings regularly throughout the exercise. The I
combination of the status briefing and verbal communications among EOC staff ensured all staff members were fully aware of the county's overall response. The staff also had full access to the NC State Preparedness and Resource Tracking Application (SPARTA) system, the state-wide version of the WebEOC system. The EMC frequently instructed staff to review their plans and procedures and to anticipate actions to be taken should conditions at MNS worsen. This resulted in an EOC staff readily implementing decisions Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 38
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise made by the leadership.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1, i.e. 1, 2.a. 1, 2.b.2, 2.c. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.c. 1, 3.c.2, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2 Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
Iredell County EOC and Warning Point (WP) personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to provide the media and the public with emergency information and warnings.
Two PIO personnel in the EOC prepared a total of five news releases at the direction of the EMC. Following approval by the EMC, the releases were disseminated to the media.
The PIO staff in the EOC stayed in close contact with the PIO staff in the JIC once it was activated. The PIO staff was prepared to field inquiries from the public, and the EMC reminded all EOC personnel to forward all public and media inquiries to PIO phone.
Siren activation was accomplished by the WP in a timely manner following protective action decisions in coordination with the State and other risk counties. In accordance with the EOP, a silent test of the siren system was performed for the first siren activation and there were no failures. Subsequent activations were simulated. Backup route alerting personnel were staged and standing by for instructions in case of a siren failure.
EAS messages were issued by Charlotte-Mecklenburg County.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 5.a. 1, 5.a.3, 5.b. 1 3.2.3.4.2 Traffic Control Points Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:
The establishment of TCPs in Iredell County was demonstrated during an interview with representatives of the Iredell County Sheriff's Office and the North Carolina State Highway Patrol. The discussions provided ample evidence that the agencies were well prepared to assemble sufficient law enforcement personnel to staff the 20 TCPs in a timely manner. Procedures are in place to ensure personnel are able to provide assistance to evacuees and facilitate the evacuation process by maintaining a smooth traffic flow.
The law enforcement officers were well trained on personal radiological protective measures and described how they would respond to impediments to traffic flow.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2 3.2.3.4.3 Backup Route Alerting Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
Iredell County EOC personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to provide backup Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 39
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise route alerting in the event of a siren failure. Sufficient fire and law enforcement resources were deployed to the staging area, and personnel were familiar with backup route alerting plans and procedures. No siren failures occurred during the exercise.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 3.a. 1, 5.a.3 3.2.3.4.4 Protective Actions for Schools Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place Capability Summary:
The Iredell-Statesville School District Safety Officer, the Coddle Creek Elementary School Assistant Principal, and a school bus driver displayed the capability to prepare for, ensure communication of, and immediately execute the safe and effective sheltering-in-place and/or the organized and managed evacuation of the students and staff to areas of safe refuge in response to a potential or actual dangerous environment. The notification systems were capable of notifying parents and staff of any protective action decisions in a timely manner and notify parents where to pick up their children. All staff, including bus drivers received annual training on actions to take in case of an incident at MNS. None of the bus drivers or staff are considered emergency workers and do not use any dosimetry. I The school district personnel demonstrated an excellent knowledge of plans for; sheltering in place or relocating students, student accountability, KI ingestion requirements, and in general procedures to insure the safety and welfare of the students.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 3.c.2 3.2.3.4.5 Emergency Worker and Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:
Emergency worker and vehicle monitoring and decontamination in Iredell County was performed by a multi-agency task force designated as Radiological Teams #1. All team members were cross-trained and worked very well together. Two similar teams were available to staff 24-hour operations. Teams would be mobilized to the site (Northbound 1-77 Rest Area at Mile Marker 39) from the county EOC using the Black Port Connect call down system. The system will notify groups of people with a single message and will notify them on up to three devices or numbers. Mooresville Fire Department HAZMAT Team and Iredell County Emergency Management each brought a trailer containing supplies for the operations. The multiple agency personnel, as well as the supplies provided from the various agencies, complemented one another to provide for a well-run and equipped operation. A decontamination.tent was set up to provide for decontamination of emergency workers, and could accommodate four individuals at time.
Team members displayed excellent organization of responsibilities and thorough monitoring techniques.
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 40
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 1.a. 1, i.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. 1, 6.b. 1 3.2.3.4.6 Reception and Congregate Care Center Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:
Statesville Fire Department and HAZMAT, Iredell County Fire Services (Fire Marshal's Office, County Solid Waste Department. and County Emergency Medical Services personnel, successfully demonstrated the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials release, decontaminating victims, and coordinating off-site decontamination with relevant agencies.
The site layout and physical boundaries of South Iredell High School provided an excellent location for the establishment of a reception and congregate care center. The area was clearly marked and offered ample space for the reception and monitoring of vehicles. The team processed two vehicles during this exercise and established that they were fully capable of effectively meeting the requirements for monitoring evacuee vehicles and maintaining their personal safety, to include those measures associated with radiation.
Personnel at the initial monitoring point and the secondary monitoring point demonstrated good monitoring techniques and were knowledgeable of their equipment and contamination limits. Emergency workers were knowledgeable of their exposure limits, call back values and turn back limits. Decontamination areas for males and females were sufficient to handle evacuees and the personnel were very knowledgeable of decontamination methods and alternative means to decontaminate personnel. There was more than sufficient personnel and equipment to monitor the expected evacuee population of 1928, within a 12-hour period.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. 1 Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding and Related Services) Capability Summary:
The Greater Carolinas Chapter of the ARC is designated as the Iredell County lead for the establishment and management of shelters in the event of an incident at MNS which threatens the public. The ARC volunteers have received ARC training on shelter operations and demonstrated the ability to register evacuees desiring shelter, assessing their needs, and providing temporary housing and feeding. Volunteers were prepared to provide limited medical and mental health support on site and provide assistance in evacuee registration in the ARC "Safe and Well" website. Among the county agencies supporting the ARC shelter, the Department of Health is prepared to relocate a sizeable quantity of KI tablets to the shelter to meet local and transient evacuee needs. Animal Services and Control is prepared to establish an adjacent shelter for companion animals (pets) to include animal registration, housing and feeding with assistance in care provided Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 41
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise by owners. The ARC shelter demonstration at the South Iredell High School successfully met the requirements of this capability.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 6.c. 1 3.2.3.5 Lincoln County, North Carolina 3.2.3.5.1 Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
Lincoln County successfully demonstrated effective direction and control at the EOC.
Key personnel and participants were in position and motivated to perform their emergency functions. The EOC was fully staffed before the start of the exercise in accordance with the EOP.
I The Lincoln County EOC's physical location was small and cramped. However, the use of the space was well defined and its usability was planned well. Equipment was ample, operational, and in good condition. Maps and displays were functional and served their purpose. I The Lincoln County EOC's primary form of communication with the Warning Point was a landline. The alternate form of communications was a UHF/VHF radio. The primary form of communications with MNS, the SEOC, WBO RCC and other counties was the I
Selective Signaling System (SSS) and Decision Line. Each form of communication was utilized with success throughout the exercise.
The EMD was in charge of the emergency response at the Lincoln County EOC. She conducted EOC staff briefings at least hourly if not more. EOC staff briefings were also conducted with each ECL change. The staff was kept up to date throughout the entire I
exercise. PADs were well coordinated and made swiftly without any delay. All members of the EOC staff constantly reviewed their respective plans and procedures, and maintained open lines of communication within the EOC.
I For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 2.a. 1, 2.b.2, 2.c. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.c. 1, 3.c.2, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2 I
Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary: I This capability was successfully demonstrated during the exercise. The primary system to alert and warn the residents of Lincoln County is the siren system which Duke Energy has installed within the 10-mile EPZ. Backup route alerting will alert and warn county residents if a siren fails. The EMD will task the WP (Lincoln County Communications Center, which is not co-located with the EOC) to activate the siren system, and after the activation of the siren system a communication staff member would call the EOC to Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 42
Homeland SecurityExercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise report completion of the task and any failures of the siren system. If there is a siren failure the EMD would task the Fire Marshal at the EOC with the coordination of backup route alerting.
Additional activations will provide the affected populations with follow-up emergency instructions. Sirens may be sounded for other area emergencies associated with the on-going event prior of release an appropriate EAS messages. EAS would provide informational or instructional messages via radio and TV on an area-wide basis throughout the land and water portion of the 10-mile EPZ within a reasonable amount of time. NWS tone-alert radios would provide an automatic alarm signal concurrent with siren activation, and broadcast emergency instructions to the public.
EAS messages generated at the JIC are faxed or emailed to the EOC, where the Lincoln County PIO had them approved by the EMD. After approval by the EMD and/or County Manager, the approval was relayed to the county PIO in the JIC for release. News releases generated by the county PIO were approved for release the same way, and then were emailed or faxed to the local news media.
Press releases contained accurate and approved information consistent with precautionary and protective action decisions discussed in the EOC. They also contained specific directions or addresses for reception centers, evacuation routes, pet friendly shelters and telephone numbers for more information. All releases were faxed and emailed to the appropriate news media for immediate release.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 5.a. 1, 5.a.3, 5.b. 1 3.2.3.5.2 Traffic Control Points Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:
Through interview, the Lincoln County Sheriff's Office, Lincolnton Police Department and North Carolina State Highway Patrol demonstrated appropriate equipment and communications to support the implementation of Lincoln County TCPs. Officers were knowledgeable about the ingestion of KI, use of dosimetry, and exposure control limits.
The officers understood the method for receiving and implementing traffic control point assignments and resolving possible impediments to evacuation.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 1.a. 1, 1.d. 1, L.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2 3.2.3.5.3 Backup Route Alerting Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
Backup route alerting was successfully demonstrated during an interview of the Fire Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 43
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise Marshal at the Lincoln County EOC. The primary system to alert and warn the residents of Lincoln County is the siren system Duke Energy installed within the 10-mile EPZ.
The siren system is activated by the Lincoln County Communications Staff (county WP).
In the event of a siren failure the Fire Marshal would identify the siren that had failed, then notify and task the appropriate Fire Department. The primary planning document for conduction backup route alerting was the Zone Warning Responsibility, which specifies the sub-zone routes, siren numbers and the fire stations responsible for running the routes. All of the fire department personnel that would perform backup route alerting receive annual training and have knowledge of the exposure control limits and the procedures to report their readings. Dosimetry was at the fire stations.
To supplement the capability of backup route alerting the Lincoln County Sheriff Office deputies could also be used, and mutual aid agreements could be enacted if necessary.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 3.a. 1, 5.a.3 3.2.3.5.4 Protective Actions for Schools Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place Capability Summary:
Lincoln County successfully demonstrated its ability to meet this capability during interviews with the Lincoln County Superintendent of Schools, the Lincoln County Schools Transportation Director and the Principal of the Catawba Springs Elementary School. The three key officials in ensuring the health and safety of the students and staff I
of the Catawba Springs Elementary School were very familiar with the actions required for notification and evacuation. There was an obvious close working relationship between the Lincoln County Schools and Lincoln County Emergency Management. Both I
the Superintendent of Schools and the Transportation Director routinely participate in emergency exercises, and man staff positions at the emergency operations center (EOC).
The Catawba Springs Elementary School Principal described in detail how, at the beginning of the academic year, each teacher received a handbook with detailed instructions, parents received a copy of the Duke Energy School Safety Brochure, and a consent form to sign and return for school staff to administer KI, which each teacher had on hand for students. All personnel interviewed were knowledgeable and competent.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 3.c.2 3.2.3.5.5 Emergency Worker and Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary: i The North 321 Fire Station proved to be an excellent facility to conduct emergency worker and vehicle monitoring and decontamination. The layout of the facility was conducive to minimizing cross contamination. Adequate amounts of equipment and Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 44I
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise supplies were on hand, and were well-organized in labeled bins for easy access. The emergency workers were familiar with their dosimetry kits, administrative values and the recording of dose values. Emergency workers and their vehicles were successfully monitored and decontaminated prior to exiting the facility.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, I.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. 1, 6.b. 1 3.2.3.5.6 Reception and Congregate Care Center Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:
Lincoln County successfully demonstrated the ability to monitor, decontaminate (if necessary), and shelter evacuees from the EPZ. The personnel staffing the Lincolnton High School reception activity successfully assessed radiological hazards through radiological monitoring and establishing contamination action levels. The county managed radiological exposure by providing radiological safety briefings, implementing radiation exposure limits and issuing personal dosimetry to all emergency workers.
There was sufficient space and facilities to handle the anticipated number of evacuees and vehicles. Appropriate quantities of personal dosimetry and special equipment for survey and decontamination operations were available. Personnel demonstrated the ability to manage contamination control, displayed good communication, and teamwork.
All personnel were well trained and demonstrated a high degree of knowledge on monitoring and decontamination of evacuees.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: l.a. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. 1 Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding and Related Services) Capability Summary:
Lincoln County successfully demonstrated this capability during a demonstration at the Lincolnton High School reception and congregate care site. Shelter activities were conducted under the overall supervision of the Lincoln county DSS, with the Lincoln County Chapter of the ARC providing management of the shelter. The DSS staff and ARC volunteers demonstrated competency in the reception and processing of evacuees who had been monitored and/or decontaminated following a simulated nuclear incident at MNS.
The facility was well laid out and could reasonably accommodate the 200 or so evacuees for which the shelter was certified to house by ARC survey. The DSS Facility Manager, ARC and county emergency management personnel pointed out that if there was a major influx of evacuees surpassing the ARC survey number that shelter operations could expand to other areas of the school complex. The shelter staff demonstrated the ability to provide basic health, mental health, and special needs support for evacuees; enable them to enter their contact data in the nation-wide ARC website; and provided information in a bi-lingual manner. As a pet friendly shelter, concerns of pet owners would be eased through the efforts of Lincoln County Animal Control.
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 45
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 6.c. 1 3.2.4 Host Jurisdictions 3.2.4.1 Cabarrus County, North Carolina U 3.2.4.1.1 Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
Cabarrus County EOC staff and volunteers were professional and fully engaged throughout the exercise. Plans and procedures include redundancies to ensure the safety and protection of the public. The use of Reverse 911 enabled the EMC to notify staff in a timely manner. The EMC held frequent briefings and further enhanced coordination I
efforts through Incident Action Plan development between agencies. Decisions were made with a sense of urgency and coordinated with county and city officials' I appropriately. EOC staff demonstrated knowledge and capabilities necessary to receive evacuees should an incident occur at MNS.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. l, .c. l, .d.1, L.e. 1, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2 3.2.4.1.2 Traffic Control Points Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary: I Cabarrus County representatives discussed effective measures for activating and mobilizing personnel at TCPs. All law enforcement officers would report to a rally point to receive assignments and dosimetry kits. Since the rally point was located at the county reception and congregate care center, the officers had a clear understanding of how evacuees should be directed and the resources available to them at the shelter. The equipment and communications maintained by the TCP officers was sufficient to perform operations. The officers interviewed were familiar with the use of dosimetry, knew the administrative reporting values and turn back limits. The officers interviewed were knowledgeable of their duties involving traffic flow, evacuee information and EPZ entry restrictions.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2 3.2.4.1.3 Reception and Congregate Care Center Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise The Cabarrus County Fire Department HAZMAT, County EMS and Emergency Services personnel successfully demonstrated the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a radiological incident, successfully decontaminating victims and coordinating off-site decontamination with relevant agencies.
The reception area at Northwest Cabarrus Middle School had ample space to provide monitoring, decontamination and registration of evacuees. The parking area was sufficient to handle vehicles. Personnel were knowledgeable of exposure limits and contamination limits. Signs and directions were sufficient to direct evacuees where they needed to go for monitoring. Emergency workers were knowledgeable of their exposure limits, call back values and turn back limits. Decontamination monitoring was more than sufficient to monitor the expected evacuee population within a 12-hour period.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: L.a. 1, i.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 6.a. 1 Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding and Related Services) Capability Summary:
Cabarrus County successfully demonstrated this capability during at the Northwest Cabarrus Middle School site. Shelter activities were conducted under the overall supervision of the Cabarrus County Chapter of the ARC, supported by the Cabarrus County DSS, Cabarrus County Sheriff's Office, EMS and Cabarrus County Health Alliance. The staff and volunteers demonstrated excellent competence in the reception and processing of evacuees who had evacuated the area surrounding MNS following a simulated nuclear incident.
The facility was well laid out and could reasonably accommodate the 120 evacuees in the main gymnasium, plus another building available next door. The shelter staff demonstrated the ability to provide basic health, mental health, and special needs support for evacuees; enable them to enter their contact data in the nation-wide ARC website; and provided bi-lingual information.
For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 6.c. 1 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 MNS REP Exercise 47
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise Section 4: Conclusion I Officials and representatives from the State of North Carolina; the risk counties of Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Catawba, Gaston, Iredell and Lincoln Counties; the host county of Cabarrus County; and Duke Energy as well as numerous volunteers participated in the exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise.
FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts*6f the many individuals who participated and made the exercise a success.
I FEMA wishes to acknowledge the exceptional efforts of the many individuals who planned, prepared for and participated in this exercise. Protecting the public health and safety is the full- l time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others.
Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. I State and local emergency response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them.
During this exercise, FEMA identified the following ARCAs:
- 1. (37-11-6.a.1-A-01) Charlotte-Mecklenburg County:
Condition: Charlotte Fire Department (CFD) personnel did not know their duties or responsibilities concerning monitoring personnel or vehicles, and the flow path was I
inadequate and could lead to contaminated evacuees wandering uncontrolled around the reception and congregate care areas. The CFD personnel were unsure of:
- a. Proper wear or use of or use of direct reading dosimeters (DRD). CFD personnel had both 0-200 mR and 0-20R direct reading dosimeters (DRDs) available for monitoring.
CFD standard operating procedure (SOP) required them to wear one of each type.
Instead some CFD personnel wore 0-200 mR DRDs and some wore 0-20R DRDs.
- b. How to assemble the portal monitor.
- c. How to source check the portal monitor or the Ludlum Model 2241 survey instruments.
- d. Where evacuee vehicles would park their vehicles, the route evacuees would take to arrive at the monitoring station, or if the vehicles should be monitored and decontaminated.
- e. The route to the decontamination area was poorly marked and personnel at the decontamination area were not notified when contaminated personnel could be arriving (one female was unaccounted for as soon as she left the monitoring station and finally walked into the male shower room about 45 minutes after she left the monitoring station.
- f. The female shower area was a storage area and a new female shower area was available but was not used.
Section 4: Conclusion 2011 MNS REP Exercise 48
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise
- g. Personnel at the final monitoring station were not knowledgeable of how to use their survey instruments (monitored too fast and too far away from the person, did not know what the instrument results meant, did not know what background readings were or why they were important).
- h. No evacuee was monitored by a survey instrument after alarming the portal monitor.
If they alarmed the portal monitor they were assumed to have contamination over their entire body and had to completely disrobe and take a shower even if only their shoes were contaminated.
- i. After showering all personnel dressed themselves in a Tyvek suit and booties prior to being monitored (Tyvek suits would prohibit the detection of any remaining contamination).
Possible Cause: Personnel had not received sufficient training and operational time with the equipment.
Reference:
- a. North Carolina Radiological Emergency Response Plan Part 2, Section 4 -
Mecklenburg County, January 2008 VII. PLANS, EXERCISES, DRILLS AND TRAINING. SECTION B. RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING.
- b. Fixed Facility Radiological Emergency Response Plan (Incorporated from NC REP Plan Part 2 Section 4), Annex K-2, Charlotte - Mecklenburg Integrated Response Plan for All Hazards, Updated January 22, 2010, Attachment 2.11 Personal Monitoring Station and Shelter at UNCC
- c. NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1; K.5.b, O.4.c,d
- d. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County RCCC, TCL Capability: Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) Response and Decontamination, Activity 2: Decontamination and Clean-Up/Recovery Operations Effect: Contaminated evacuees could be released without being properly decontaminated, or evacuees who were not contaminated could be made to undergo unnecessary decontamination procedures, or contaminated evacuees could wander throughout the area spreading contamination. The monitoring and decontamination personnel did not demonstrate the ability to protect the safety and health of the general public.
Recommendations:
- a. All personnel involved should receive additional classroom training and on the job training to insure they have the ability to effectively perform their tasks.
- b. Have the same personnel re-perform these tasks under evaluation.
Criterion Not Met: 6.a. 1 Section 4: Conclusion 2011 MNS REP Exercise 49
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise
- 2. (37-11-5.a.l-A-02) SEOC:
Condition: Sirens indicating activation of North Carolina's Alert and Notification 1 System following development of a protective action decision related to a General Emergency were not sounded due to a failure of established procedures.
Possible Cause: Annex E, North Carolina Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) states that any circumstance requiring, siren activation will be coordinated by the Lead County, and they may elect to use a siren countdown to accomplish this. In instances where the SERT is in direction and control the Annex calls for the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) to request the Lead County to conduct a countdown.
The Extent of Play (EOP) for the exercise stated that "Charlotte-Mecklenburg as the Lead County will coordinate and conduct the countdown for silent and simulated siren activations." The actual activation of sirens is accomplished by the individual counties.
At 1240 risk counties and the SERT concurred on sounding sirens at 1245 relative to the protective action decision for evacuation and sheltering. The SERT was subsequently I contacted by Gaston County and informed that they had not sounded their sirens because they had not received a siren activation countdown as called for in the EOP. Other risk counties activated their sirens at the designated time without a countdown occurring i because of their concurrence in the Alert and Notification time sequence. The Western Branch Office, the State's Regional Coordination Center (RCC), also noted that this error had occurred and brought it to the attention of the SERT.
Although the Annex and EOP were clear on who was responsible for the coordination of siren activation, the SERT failed to request Mecklenburg County to conduct a I countdown. This was further exacerbated by historical precedent in which the SERT had conducted the countdown when in direction and control. It appeared as if the participant's actions relative to siren activation were either guided by adhering to individual county initiation of their systems at the appointed time, or a concern that a I
violation would be assessed due to failure to await the countdown called for in the EOP.
References:
- b. Annex E (Alert and Notification) to NC RERP
- c. Paragraph 5, Annex C: Extent of Play (EOP), McGuire Nuclear Station Evaluator Handbook Effect: This failure in the Alert and Notification process could have unduly delayed citizens from initiating a timely evacuation from affected areas or taking steps to safeguard themselves through in-place sheltering. These delays could have further resulted in citizens becoming contaminated from a radiation release.
Recommendation: None. NCEM personnel self-identified and successfully re-I Section 4: Conclusion 50 2011 MNS REP Exercise I
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise demonstrated the successful activation of North Carolina's Alert and Notification system.
Corrective Action Demonstrated: Upon coordination with the North Carolina Emergency Management Western Branch Office RCC and risk counties, the SERT coordinated new times for the activation of the Alert and Notification for the second protective action to re-demonstrate this action. The procedures in Annex E were modified, with the SERT accepting responsibility to coordinate the siren activation and siren countdown. The SERT Plans Officer coordinated and conducted a countdown for the simulated siren activation at 1310. All risk counties acknowledged simulating siren activation. This effectively cleared the issue.
In subsequent coordination with NC Emergency Management staff it was agreed that the State's procedures would be revised with a strong possibility that the SERT would assume responsibility for coordination and countdown for siren activations when in direction and control.
Criterion Met: 5.a. 1.
- 3. (37-11-4.c. l-A-03) RPS Mobile Laboratory:
Condition: The High Purity Germanium (HPGe) Gamma Spectrometer in the Radiation Protection Section (RPS) Mobile Laboratory was not operational. The device could not correctly identify the isotopes in the Counting Standard used to calibrate the system and, therefore, could not be used to count sample media during the exercise.
Possible Cause: The HPGe detector and some of the electronics had just been replaced.
The detector was calibrated in July 2011 after it had been replaced. Possible causes include: improper installation that caused erratic operation; sensitive electronics in the newly installed system could have been damaged while the Mobile Laboratory was in transit from Raleigh to Charlotte and/or the electronic amplification had changed and it needed to be manually adjusted.
References:
- a. State of North Carolina, Radiation Protection Section, SOG XXVII, Procedure to Analyze Spectra on the HPGe Detector on Radiation Protection's Mobile Laboratory.
- b. NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1; C.3, J.11.
Effect: The isotopic analyses of high priority air samples, soil and food samples could not be provided locally at the forward Mobile Laboratory location. As a result, during the plume phase, air samples would have to be transported to the State Laboratory in Raleigh. During the post plume phase, there may be Federal capabilities available for post-plume sample analyses, but these samples may also require transport to the State Laboratory in Raleigh if Federal resources are not in place at the time of need. This delay in analyzing and reporting sample results to State decision-makers could impact the Section 4: Conclusion 2011 MNS REP Exercise 51
Homeland Security Exercise and EvaluatiOn Program (HSEEP) 1 AAR 2011 McGuire Nuclear Station REP Exercise I timeliness of protective action decisions.
I Recommendations:
- a. Have the unit checked by a Vendor Technician or other knowledgeable person and I conduct a fault analysis. This will ensure that timely corrective action is taken to keep the sensitive HPGE system operational.
- b. Consider mounting the HPGe system on a shock absorbing foundation in the Mobile I Laboratory to minimize damage during transit (if that was the problem).
Criterion Not Met: 4.c.1. I Schedule of Corrective Actions: FEMA will work with the State to determine the schedule of corrective actions for the remaining two ARCAs to be demonstrated during the 2011 Harris I Nuclear Plant REP Evaluated Exercise scheduled for November 29, 2011 or during the Catawba Nuclear Station REP Evaluated Exercise scheduled for April 24, 2012.