05000333/FIN-2017003-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Vent Line Socket Weld Failure |
| Description | On January 14, 2017, during the initial drywell walkdown following shutdown for a refueling outage, Entergy personnel identified a through-wall leak on the vent line off of the bonnet of the motor operated gate valve on the suction side of the A reactor water recirculation pump. A three- to four-foot steam plume was observed. Entergy determined this constituted a violation of TS 3.4.4, RCS Operational Leakage, that requires RCS leakage to be limited to no pressure boundary leakage. Based on the unidentified leakage rate of 0.06 gallons per minute measured during plant operation and visual inspection of the leak area, the leak likely existed while the plant was online. The condition was reported in Event Notification 52490 as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) because it represented a degradation of a principal safety barrier. The inspectors reviewed LER 05000333/2017-001, CR-JAF-2017-00245, and the associated apparent cause evaluation. Entergy determined that this leak was caused by the existing pipe support allowing for excessive lateral movement which led to higher stresses in the socket weld connection. Additionally, the recirculation pumps were operated at a reduced flow condition for an extended period during the previous cycle, which likely resulted in an increased number of vibration cycles. The inspectors also reviewed the leakage data over the previ ous cycle and Entergys operational decision making IR and determined that the existence of RCS pressure boundary leakage was not within Entergys ability to foresee and correct and therefore was not a performance deficiency. The inspectors screened the significance of the condition using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, and determined that the condition represented very low safety significance (Green) because it would not have resulted in exceeding the RCS leak rate for a small loss of coolant accident and would not have likely affected other systems used to mitigate a loss of cooling accident. Enforcement. TS 3.4.4 requires, in part, that RCS operational leakage shall be limited to no pressure boundary leakage. If pressure boundary leakage exists, the TS 3.4.4 limiting condition for operation action statement requires the unit be in at least hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Contrary to the above, for a period that began on an unknown date that was likely more than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> before January 14, 2017, and ending on January 14, 2017, RCS pressure boundary leakage existed, and the licensee did not place FitzPatrick in at least hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. This issue is considered within the traditional enforcement process because there was no performance deficiency associated with the violation of NRC requirements. IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Section 03.22 states, in part, that traditional enforcement is used to disposition violations receiving enforcement discretion or violations without a performance deficiency. The NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 2.2.1 states, in part, that, whenever possible, the NRC uses risk information in assessing the safety significance of violations. Accordingly, after considering that the condition represented very low safety significance, the inspectors concluded that the violation would be best characterized as Severity Level IV under the traditional enforcement process. However, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion (EA-17-121) in accordance with Section 3.10 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, which states that the NRC may exercise discretion for violations of NRC requirements by reactor licensees for which there are no associated performance deficiencies. In reaching this decision, the 19 NRC determined that the issue was not with in the licensees ability to foresee and correct, the licensees actions did not contribute to the degraded condition, and the actions taken were reasonable to identify and address the condition. Furthermore, because the licensees actions did not contribute to this violation, it will not be considered in the assessment process or the NRCs Action Matrix. This LER is closed. |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000333/2017003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2017 (2017Q3) |
| Type: | Violation: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Kolaczyk B Sienel R Barkley E Burket R Rolph G Stock A Burritt |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |
Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2017003 | |||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2017Q3
| |||||||||||||||||||||