05000313/FIN-2009003-05
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | Unit 1 Technical Specification, Section 5.4.1.a, Procedures, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 3.d, requires, in part, that procedures for startup, operation, and shutdown of safety-related systems should provide instructions, as appropriate for the high pressure injection system. Contrary to the above requirement, the licensee failed to provide adequate procedures which resulted in an improper electrical equipment alignment of the Unit 1 high pressure injection pumps. Specifically, after declaring high pressure injection pump P-36C inoperable, high pressure injection pump P-36C was in a configuration where high pressure injection pump P-36C would auto-start rather than high pressure injection pump P-36B, the operable pump following a loss of coolant accident concurrent with a loss of offsite power. This was licensee identified because the inadequate pump electrical lineup was noted by the next operating shift crew and declared high pressure injection pump P-36C inoperable until the auto-start feature was defeated by racking out the associated breaker. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance because: (1) the finding was not a qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of functionality of the high pressure injection system; (2) it did not lead to an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; (3) it did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; (4) it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-significant per 10 CFR 50.65, for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and (5) it did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This issue was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2009-0881 which included an apparent cause evaluation. |
Site: | Arkansas Nuclear |
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Report | IR 05000313/2009003 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | G Guerra P Elkmann C Graves A Sanchez J Josey J Clark J Mateychick R Kellar J Rotten |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2009003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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