05000266/FIN-2015001-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | The licensee identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, due to the licensees failure to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. Specifically, the licensee unacceptably preconditioned the D107 battery charger by lifting and reseating the wire harness connector to the current limiter card prior to conducting required surveillance testing on the battery charger. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, states, in part, that a test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Contrary to this, from November 15, 2008 through on August 14, 2014, the licensee failed assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. Specifically, procedure RMP 93596A, D105 Station Battery, D107 Battery Charger Maintenance and Surveillances, Revisions 08, which the licensee used to perform its 18-month TS surveillance, improperly sequenced the step to lift and reseat the current sensing and limiting card edge connector prior to performing the surveillance test. The current limiting function for the charger is necessary to prevent the charger input current from exceeding the supply breaker current setting and tripping the battery charger when its needed for accident mitigation. The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as AR 01993719. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors answered Yes to question number 3 and concluded a detailed risk evaluation was necessary. To evaluate this finding, the Senior Reactor Analysts assumed that the exposure time was one-year which is the maximum allowed by the SDP. The Point Beach Standardized Plant Analysis Risk model version 8.22 and Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations version 8.1.2 software was used to obtain a delta core damage frequency (CDF Internal) for internal events of 6.22E7/yr. The dominant core damage sequences involve a loss-of-offsite-power initiating event with a loss of reactor coolant pump seal cooling, a failure of rapid secondary depressurization, failure of the reactor coolant pump seals, failure of RCS cooldown (primary and secondary), and failure of high pressure recirculation. Since the total estimated change in core damage frequency was greater than 1.0E-7/yr, an evaluation was performed for external event delta risk contributions. The evaluation found that external event risk contribution was 3.09E7/yr, giving a total CDF of CDF Total = 6.22E7/yr + 3.09E7/yr = 9.31E7/yr. Large Early Release Frequency - Sequences important to Large Early Release Frequency include steam generator tube rupture events and inter-system loss-of-coolant-accident events. These were not the dominant core damage sequences for this finding. Based on the Detailed Risk Evaluation, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2015001 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2015 (2015Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Boettcher D Oliver J Cameron K Barclay V Myers |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2015001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2015Q1
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
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