05000261/FIN-2016001-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Adequately Establish and Implement Procedure During Tornado Watch/Warning |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of technical specification (TS) 5.4.1.a for the licensees failure to adequately establish and implement procedure OMM-021, Operation During Adverse Weather Conditions. Specifically, the licensee failed to include requirements to tie down or remove loose material in the area of Unit 1 adjacent to the switchyard. Additionally, the licensee failed to implement the procedural requirements to tie down or remove material in the vicinity of the turbine building ground level and secure doors to the chemical treatment room and as required by procedure OMM-021. As corrective action, the licensee secured or removed the material in the vicinity of the turbine building and issued a procedure change request to change procedure OMM-021 to include an action to secure or remove potential missile hazards in the vicinity of the switchyard in the Unit 1 area. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 2005141. The licensees failure to include requirements to tie down or remove loose material in the area of Unit 1 adjacent to the switchyard in procedure OMM-021, and failure to implement the procedural requirements to tie down or remove material in the vicinity of the turbine building ground level and secure doors to the chemical treatment room as required by procedure OMM-021 during a tornado watch/warning was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the failure to secure or remove potential missile hazards in the areas adjacent to the switchyard increased the likelihood of a unit trip and/or loss of offsite power event. The inspectors evaluated the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 1, Section B and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available. The performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect of Work Management in the area of Human Performance because the organization did not implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities associated with a tornado watch/warning such that nuclear safety was the overriding priority. |
| Site: | Robinson  |
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| Report | IR 05000261/2016001 Section 1R01 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Nielsen C Scott D Bacon G Hopper J Parent K Ellis W Loo |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix A Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Robinson - IR 05000261/2016001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Robinson) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (Robinson)
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