05000247/FIN-2017010-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Diesel Fuel Oil Temperature Protection |
| Description | The NRC identified a finding for the failure to assure that diesel powered Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) equipment would be reliable to mitigate postulated beyond-design basis external events during very low temperature conditions. Specifically, at temperatures below 21F, portable FLEX equipment, such as emergency diesels, steam generator and reactor makeup pumps, and transfer pumps, were susceptible to conditions in which they would not have been capable of starting and operating due to fuel crystalizing or gelling. (CR-IP2-2017-04902/IP3-2017-05574)The failure to ensure that the portable diesel equipment could function within the required temperature range was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The significance of the finding was evaluated using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix O, Significance Determination Process for Mitigating Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051), dated October 7, 2016, and Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, dated April 12, 2012. The event of concern was determined to be a seismic event greater than 0.3g resulting in a loss of offsite power during extreme cold weather events. A bounding evaluation was performed in accordance with Step 4.1.1 of Appendix M. Indian Point declared full compliance with the order on August 12, 2016. The preliminary review of available weather conditions for the site, from the time of full compliance, shows that the temperature was below the cloud point of the fuel for over 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />. The Indian Point Unit 3 External Initiator Risk Informed Notebook was utilized to estimate the risk and was determined to adequately model the risk of both units. Utilizing Table 5.3.2, sequences that included emergency power, auxiliary feedwater, and high pressure makeup were evaluated. Assuming a 200 hour0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> exposure and the unavailability of all diesel driven FLEX equipment the risk was determined to less than 1E-7/yr. Therefore, the finding was determined to have a very low risk significance. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Avoiding Complacency of the Human Performance area because the licensee failed to ensure that all susceptible elements of the mitigation strategies were designed, maintained, or operated in such a manner that they could reliably function over then entire temperature spectrum for beyond-design basis external events. [H.12] |
| Site: | Indian Point  |
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| Report | IR 05000247/2017010 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2017 (2017Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 2515/191 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Cahill B Fuller A Rosebrook A Siwy |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000247/2017010 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2017Q4
Self-Identified List (Indian Point)
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