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| Entered date | Site | Region | Reactor type | Event description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 57115 | 9 May 2024 11:48:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0800 EDT on May 9, 2024, it was identified during leak rate testing that through-wall flaws existed on reactor plant river water piping inside the containment building. This determination resulted in a containment bypass condition such that a gaseous release could have occurred at a location not analyzed for a release in the loss of coolant accident dose consequence analysis. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents. Evaluation of the condition of the piping is ongoing to support repair prior to startup. With the plant currently in cold shutdown, the containment, as specified in Technical Specification 3.6.1, is not required to be operable. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 57075 | 13 April 2024 03:55:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0035 EDT on April 13, 2024, with Unit 1 at 97 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to 1 of 3 reactor coolant pump (RCP) low flow reactor trip (signal) associated with a loss of the A and B 4160 volt normal buses. Auxiliary feedwater and the 1-1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) automatically started on valid actuation signals. The 1-1 EDG sequenced on to supply all required loads per plant design. All control rods fully inserted and the trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operators have responded and stabilized the unit in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser via the condenser steam dump system with steam generators being supplied by the main feedwater system. Unit 2 is not affected by the event. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the valid actuations of auxiliary feedwater and the 1-1 EDG, this event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC senior resident inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Power for the A-E Bus is on the 1-1 EDG. The D-F Bus is on offsite power. One electrical train of offsite power is down. |
| ENS 56569 | 11 June 2023 09:02:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0130 EDT on June 11, 2023, it was discovered that the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 auxiliary building door A-35-5A, credited for tornado missile protection of the primary component cooling water system, was open and unlatched. Upon discovery, the door was shut and latched. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56527 | 19 May 2023 12:33:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0852 (EDT) on May 19, 2023, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 at zero percent power, an actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) occurred. The reason for the AFW auto-start was a failed start attempt of the 'B' main feedwater pump. The 'A' and 'B' motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the 'Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps' signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56519 | 16 May 2023 08:09:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone: A licensed operator failed a test specified by the FFD testing program. The individual's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56485 | 22 April 2023 21:35:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1942 EDT on April 22, 2023, during the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 refueling outage, while performing examinations of the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that one penetration could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME Code Section XI. The reactor vessel vent line penetration will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indication was not through-wall as there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified |
| ENS 56435 | 28 March 2023 08:59:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56350 | 12 February 2023 14:41:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone call and email: At 0800 on February 12, 2023, it was discovered that both trains of control room emergency ventilation system were simultaneously inoperable due to a safety injection relief valve discharging to a Unit 1 sump. This leakage in conjunction with design basis loss of coolant accident may result in radiological dose exceeding limits to the exclusion area boundary and to the control room, which is common to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an 'Unanalyzed Condition and a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.' There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Retraction of EN56350, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Inoperable: Based on subsequent evaluation, it was determined that the control room emergency ventilation system remained operable due to the maximum measured leak rate being within the bounds of the analysis. The maximum measured leak rate of 32,594 cc/hr from the safety injection system did not challenge the calculated maximum engineered safety features leak rate of 45,600 cc/hr and remained within the current dose analysis limits. As such, this was not an unanalyzed condition and did not prevent the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Bickett). |
| ENS 55953 | 21 June 2022 16:52:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 1547 EDT on June 21, 2022, it was determined that Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 experienced a reportable chemical leak. Approximately 261 gallons of a Sodium Hypochlorite/Sodium Bromine mixture reached the ground and approximately 130.5 gallons (of the 261 gallons) progressed to the Ohio River (via storm drain). The source of the leakage has been isolated and absorbent material has been placed to contain the leakage. Following confirmation of this leakage, notifications were made to the following offsite agencies starting at 1615 EDT: National Response Center (Incident Report # 1339391) Pennsylvania Department Of Environmental Protection Beaver County Emergency Management This condition is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55943 | 15 June 2022 09:47:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0724 EDT on 6/15/2022, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to lowering Steam Generator levels due to a secondary plant perturbation in the Heater Drain System. All control rods fully inserted into the core and the Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed in response to the full power reactor trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves. Unit 2 is not affected and remains at 100 percent power and stable. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55602 | 23 November 2021 09:10:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid specific system actuation. At 0907 (EDT) on September 30, 2021, with Unit 1 in Mode 1, at 100 percent power, an actuation of the 1-1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) occurred during loss of voltage relay functional testing. The 1-1 EDG auto-start was due to human error during performance of the test procedure when the bus 1AE undervoltage signal was improperly defeated and a simulated undervoltage signal was applied. No actual undervoltage condition was present during this event. The 1-1 EDG automatically started as designed when the bus undervoltage signal was received. This was a complete actuation of an EDG to start and come to rated speed, and all affected systems functioned as expected in response to the actuation. Following the actuation, the relays were restored and the 1-1 EDG was shut down in accordance with plant procedures. This event is considered an invalid system actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters and was not a manual initiation. Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this telephone notification is provided within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55586 | 17 November 2021 16:24:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1313 hours on November 17, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of the 21B Main Feedwater Pump (due to low suction pressure). The Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed in response to the full power reactor trip. Additionally, the Main Steam Isolation Valves were manually closed to prevent excessive reactor coolant system cooldown. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the atmosphere using the Atmospheric Dump Valves. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power in Mode 1. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency Specific System Actuation per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident has been notified. |
| ENS 55572 | 12 November 2021 13:52:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1007 EST on November 12, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at approximately 17 percent power following a refueling outage, the reactor was manually tripped due to increasing steam generator water levels due to an oscillating Main Feedwater Pump Recirculation Valve. Additionally, the Main Steam Isolation Valves were manually closed to prevent excessive reactor coolant system cooldown. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the atmosphere using the Atmospheric Dump Valves. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power in Mode 1. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification, per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55540 | 22 October 2021 02:15:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0104 EDT on October 22, 2021, during the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 refueling outage, while performing examinations of the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that two penetrations could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME Code Section XI. Penetrations 28 and 40 will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indications were not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-6 to find potential flaws/indications before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55507 | 5 October 2021 10:07:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0632 EDT on October 5, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at approximately 90 percent power for an end of cycle coastdown, the reactor automatically tripped due to an unexpected unblocking of the low power trip logic. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. The Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed in response to the reactor trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power in Mode 1. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is being reported as an eight hour, non-emergency Specific System Actuation per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55413 | 18 August 2021 01:07:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0024 EDT on 8/18/21, an unusual event was declared (EAL HU 4.1) due to receipt of multiple fire alarms and halon discharge in the cable tunnel. At 0036, the fire brigade verified no signs of fire. Unit 1 remained at 100 percent power and stable. The area is currently being ventilated. Unit 2 was not affected by this event. The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. R1 Public Affairs (Screnci) was notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
At 0401 EDT, Beaver Valley terminated their notification of unusual event. The basis for termination was that there was no indication of fire. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified State and local authorities. Notified R1DO (Jackson), IRD MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Felts), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email). |
| ENS 54749 | 18 June 2020 20:37:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | On June 18, 2020, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 determined that leakage from an outside out-of-service liquid waste pipe that is within a radiologically controlled area contains several isotopes. Analysis indicates greater than 2,000 picoCuries per liter of tritium, and isotopes of Mn-54, Co-58, Co-60, and Cs-137 are above the lower limit of detection. At 1725 EDT, in accordance with site procedures and NEI 07-07, 'Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative,' notification to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was planned. At 1930 EDT notification to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was completed. The leak is currently contained. The leakage did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a planned notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 54680 | 24 April 2020 07:00:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | At 0130 (EDT) on April 24, 2020, during the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 refueling outage, while performing examinations of the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that one penetration could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME Code Section XI. Penetration 37 will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indication was not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-4 to find potential flaws/indications before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 54369 | 4 November 2019 09:06:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | At 0535 (EST) on November 4, 2019, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 15 (percent) power, the reactor was manually tripped due to the lifting of an 'A' Main Steamline Safety Valve following a Condenser Steam Dump transient. The trip response was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip, and all control rods fully inserted into the core. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the Main Condenser by using the Condenser Steam Dump Valves. Offsite power is available and is currently supplying Normal and Emergency busses. The plant is currently stable in mode 3. Unit 2 is unaffected by this event and remains at 100 (percent) power in mode 1. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 54366 | 2 November 2019 23:03:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | At 1515 on November 2, 2019, the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) was declared inoperable due to a Low Head Safety Injection relief valve discharging to the Safeguards Sump during routine surveillance testing. The leakage from the Low Head Safety Injection system in conjunction with a postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA) Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) with transfer to Safety Injection Recirculation may result in dose exceeding the Dose Analysis of the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) and the Control Room, which is common to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. This condition may not be bounded by existing design and licensing documents; however, it poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The Low Head Safety Injection relief valve has been isolated to prevent further leakage, and makeup to the RWST completed. At 1602 on November 2, 2019 the RWST was declared Operable. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), (C), (D) as an Unanalyzed Condition and a condition that could have prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function." The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |