05000293/FIN-2015003-03
From kanterella
Revision as of 08:57, 25 September 2017 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by Mark Hawes)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Operability Assessment of the Shutdown Transformer |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when Entergy failed to adequately assess the operability of the shutdown transformer as required by EN-OP-104, Operability Evaluation Process. Specifically, Entergy failed to evaluate changes to the 23 kilovolt (kV) line supplying the shutdown transformer that resulted in the shutdown transformer incorrectly being called operable. This issue has been entered into the corrective action program under CR 2015- 7787. Entergy is conducting a causal analysis and operators have been given interim guidance to declare the shutdown transformer inoperable under similar conditions. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, a modification was made to the site, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) that was unrecognized by Entergy during the operability determination process and resulted in the incorrect operability determination for the shutdown transformer. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of safety function, and did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Avoid Complacency, in that individuals did not recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent problems, or inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Specifically, personnel did not fully evaluate the change to the 23 kV line, and instead relied on a previous incorrect operability determination to justify declaring the shutdown transformer operable. |
| Site: | Pilgrim |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000293/2015003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2015 (2015Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Dionne B Scrabeck E Carfang K Mangan R Mckinley J Dunn J Pfingstein |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
| ' | |
Finding - Pilgrim - IR 05000293/2015003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Pilgrim) @ 2015Q3
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||