05000316/FIN-2016003-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Wetting of Safety-Related Battery Charger |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance with an associated NCV of TS 5.4, Procedures, was self-revealed on June 21, 2016, when safety-related N-Train Battery Charger 2BCB was found soaked with water from a roof leak above. The licensee failed to follow administrative procedures for control of temporary catch basins. TS 5.4 states, in part, that the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978, be established, implemented, and maintained. Regulatory Guide 1.33 states, in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. Contrary to this requirement, the licensee installed and subsequently removed a drip-catch above battery charger 2BCB that was being used to protect the charger from a water leak in the area pending roof repairs. On June 3, 2016, the Performance Assurance department noted the catch had been installed outside of any formal process. In response, the licensee removed the catch but did not put anything in its place to protect the charger. On June 21, 2016, a severe rainstorm occurred, resulting in the wetting of the charger. The other charger was in-service at the time, so there was no impact to the affected N-Train distribution system. In response, the licensee added another protective device, dried out, inspected, and tested the charger. It was restored to operable status on June 23. The issue was more than minor because it adversely affected the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, whose objective is to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding screened as Green, or very low safety significance, because there was no loss of system operability. The finding had an associated cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance area, specifically, H.7., Documentation. Had the licensee kept their leak detection log up-to-date with the addition of the catch over the charger initially, it would have prompted the licensee to ensure the repairs to the roof were complete before removing the barrier. Further, it would not have been identified as an issue by Performance Assurance. |
| Site: | Cook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000316/2016003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2016 (2016Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Bozga J Ellegood K Riemer T Go T Taylor |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Cook - IR 05000316/2016003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cook) @ 2016Q3
Self-Identified List (Cook)
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