ML12156A411

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Intervenors' Motion to Amend and Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking)
ML12156A411
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 06/04/2012
From: Kamps K, Lodge T J
Beyond Nuclear, - No Known Affiliation, Citizens Environmental Alliance of Southwestern Ontario, Don't Waste Michigan, Green Party of Ohio
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
RAS 22550, 50-346-LR, ASLBP 11-907-01-LR-BD01
Download: ML12156A411 (16)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA NUCLEAR REG ULATORY COMMISSION Before the At om ic Saf ety and Licensin g Board I n the Matter of First Energy Nuclear Ope rating Company (Da vis-Be sse Nucle ar Powe r Station, Unit 1)) Docke t No. 50-346-L R)J une 4, 2012

) *****INTERV ENORS' MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT PROPOSED CONTENTION NO. 5 (SHIE LD BUILDING CRACKI NG)Now come Be y ond Nuclea r, Citiz ens Environment Allianc e of Southwester n Ontario (CEA), Don' t Waste Michiga n, and the Gr een Par ty of Ohio (c ollectively , "I nterve nors"), by and throug h counsel, a nd move the B oard to a llow them to supplement and amend the ir proposed Contention No. 5, which addre sses the shield building c rac king phe nomena a t the Davis-B esse Nuclea r Power Station ("

Davis-B esse"). /s/ Terry J. L odg e Terr y J. L odg e (O hio Ba r #0029271) 316 N. Michig an St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627 Phone/fax (419) 255-7552 tjlodge50@

y ahoo.com Counsel for I nterve nors MEMORAN DUM A. Background On J anuar y 10, 2012, I nterve nors moved for admission of a new Contention No. 5, which states: I nterve ners c ontend that Fir stEnerg y's re cently-discover ed, extensive cra cking of unknown orig in in the Davis-B esse shield building

/seconda ry rea ctor ra diologica l containment structur e is an a g ing-rela ted fe ature of the plant, the c ondition of which pre cludes saf e oper ation of the a tomic rea ctor be y ond 2017 for a ny period of time, let alone the proposed 20-y ear license pe riod.The NRC Staff ha s proposed a lternative w ording which would tra nsform the c ontention into a contention of omission. FENOC a nd the Staff timely responde d to the orig inal contention motion. On Fe bruar y 27, 2012, First Ene rg y Nuclea r Ope rating Company ("F ENOC") furnished the NRC with its "Root Cause Ana ly sis Report" ("

Root Cause Analy sis" or "RCA"), ML 120600056. Then, on Apr il 5, 2012, FENOC deta iled its "ag ing ma nag ement plan" to addre ss shield building cr acking in a "Reply to Requests for Additional I nformation" (ML 12097A216) , purportedly to provide mana g ement over time of the shield building' s historic cra cking phenom-ena. F or conve nience' sake , I nterve nors will refe r to this April 5 item as "RAI AMP."I nterve nors ar e supplementing their cr acking contention for the purpose of exposi ng discrepa ncies be tween F ENOC's F ebrua ry 27, 2012 "Root Cause Ana ly sis Report" ("

Root Cause Analy sis" or "RCA"), and the RAI AMP. They rese rve the rig ht to provide furthe r supplementation of their motion in support of proposed Contention 5 upon fur ther re view of the Revised Root Cause Analy sis and Perfor mance I nterna tional's analy sis. They further rese rve the rig ht to supplement their contention filing with evidence from a F OI A re sponse anticipate d from the NRC Staff which wa s propounded to the a g ency on or about January 26, 2012.

B. Issu es of Fac t And Incons istencies Bet ween Root Cause Analysis And RAI AM P 1. FENOC's Credibilit y Is I ncreasingly Suspe ct The RAI AMP has alre ady been r ender ed suspec t. I n May , FEN OC place d in the rec ord "Revision 1 of Shield Building Root Cause Evaluation" (ML 12142A053) a nd Perfor mance I mprovement I nterna tional's "Root Cause Assessment, Da vis-Be sse Shield Building L aminar Cracking" re port (ML 12138A037). Ea ch conta ins troubling new information sug g estive of lifelong structura l and cr acking idiosy ncra sies at Davis-B esse, a nd they prove tha t the Ag ing Manag ement Plan must be scrutinized for whe ther it g enuinely addre sses the complex troubles with the shield building. A g rowing body of fa cts undermines c onfidenc e in manag ement arr ang ements for the shield building, while public c oncer ns about the phy sical integ rity of the building as a containment structur e snowba ll. The NRC staff itself ha s rec ently demonstrated w hy the RAI AMP should be held suspect. On Ma y 25, 2012, the Union of Conce rned Scie ntists complained to the NRC R eg ion I I I direc tor (letter attache d) that the e x tensive re visions that were r equire d to be made to the Fe bruar y RCA (resulting in the May 2012 Revised RCA) wer e made only beca use F ENOC's incomplete and e rrone ous information in the Fe bruar y RCA was ca ug ht and cor rec ted by the NRC staff during inspection ac tiviti es. Da vid L ochbaum, a nuclea r eng ineer , noted in the complaint that "Ha d the information bee n deeme d by the NRC to either be c omplete and a ccur ate or be inc omplete/inac-cura te but immaterial during its inspections, the re-submittals of the root cause assessment and r oot cause evalua tion would not have bee n nece ssary. The re-submittals under the se circ umstan-ce s constitute prima facie evidenc e that F ENOC violated §50.9."

But ther e is a lar g er que stion. Even though N RC - for some re ason - f orce d FEN OC to revise its F ebrua ry 2012 RCA to ex plain why it had not weathe r-se aled its shield building, FEN OC still has not explained why. At pag e 5 of its May 16th revision (ML 12142A053), the NRC St aff score d FEN OC: "The root ca use re port did not document or initiate a c orre ctive ac tive to determine w hy the shield building de sign did not include a require ment for a protec tive seala nt as wa s included in other sa fety rela ted buildings."

FEN OC's appa rent re sponse, also at Revised RCA p. 5, is this: "I nformation re g arding why the shield building de sign did not include a require ment for a n exterior protec tive seala nt was a dded in sec tion 3.3.5 -- Desig n [page 33], and Attachment 6 --

Shield Building Milestones

[page s 86 & 88]." But a t Revised RCA p. 33, FENOC still doesn't r eally explain why. I t merely states: No exterior protec tive seala nt other than the w ater proofing membrane below-g rade was spec ified as a barr ier a g ainst moisture migra ting into the shield building structure from the e nvironment. A B echte l project mee ting he ld on September 5, 1969 to revie w and e stimate protective c oating s for DB NPS [Davis-B esse Nuc lear Power Station]

deter mined that there would be no painting require d on the inside or outside conc rete walls of the shield building. Neither the Fie ld Service Contra ct for f ield painting (F SC-21), the specif ication for f ield painting (A-24), or the spec ification for the shield building (C-38) descr ibe applica tion of an exterior protec tive seala nt on the shield building. An e x terior pr otective se alant on the shield building was not identified in industry standards f or protec tive coating s for re actor containment fa cilities or the nuclea r industry such as AN SI N5.9-1967, AN SI 101.2-1972, or AN SI N101.4-1972. The ref ore, the desig n codes a t the time of construc tion did not require the a pplication of a pr otective coating on the exterior of the shield building

.And at Revised RCA p. 86, FE NOC repor ts that on November 11, 1970, "

The B echte l Power Corporation re vised the site ar chitectur al eleva tion drawing (A-20 thr oug h A-23) to spe cify a water proof f inish applied to the reinfor ced c oncre te exterior surfa ces of various buildings, excluding the shield building

." Then, on pa g e 88, F ENOC re ports that on Aug ust 15, 1976, "The Tole do Edison Company examined the shield building dome pa rape t are a and f ound a small are a of the latex coating at appr ox imately 315 deg ree s mid-way up the dome that wa s peeling and chipping from being applied too hea vily." B ut at p. 29 of the Revised RCA, F ENOC re ports that the dome para pet coa ting wa s laid on 1/4 inch thick. FENO C further r eporte d that the too-thick coa ting was re moved, and a thinner re place ment applied.

1 So the dome para pet was se aled, but inexplicably , not the exterior wall of the shield building. To I nterve nors' knowle dg e, F ENOC has ne ver a cknowledg ed that the shield building dome par apet ha d been w eathe r sea led until the May 16 Revised RCA.

At Revised RCA p. 88, FENO C asserts that on September 07, 1976, "The Be chtel Power Corporation re quested the f ield painting c ontrac tor to proce ed with the applica tion of a water proof f inish to t he re inforce d concr ete e x terior surf ace s of var ious structures, e x cluding the shield building." So the ext erior w all of the shield building -

perha ps the most important structure on the entire Davis-B esse site - w as neve r we ather-sea led, when othe r saf ety-sig nificant concr ete building s were order ed to be pa inted by Be chtel.This doesn't square with the only public explanation given by FEN OC. On Fe bruar y 28, 2012, J ennife r Young , a F ENOC spokesper son, told the Toledo Bla de new spaper that "she ha d no historical information about how the structure desig n decision wa s made but re marke d that two other saf ety-sensitive conc rete buildings at the pla nt complex were pa inted for a esthetic rea sons. Unlike the shield building, whic h was built continuously , the other building s' concr ete was poure d at diffe rent times and thus looked blotchy , she said."

2 What emerg es is the picture of a nuc lear power plant corpor ation which has to be alter-nately coddled a nd pressure d for f acts a nd explanations. I nterve nors, in their initial moti on for Contention 5 to be admitted, trace d the history of misleads and r eluctanc e on F ENOC's par t to be"On e s m al l a re a of la te x co at ing at app rox imatel y 315 de grees m id-way up t he s hie ld bui ldi ng 1 dome was f ound pee li ng and c hip pin g from bein g appli ed t oo h eavil y (~1/4 i nch). T hat coa ti ng was ide nti fi ed f or re m oval wi th the ar ea re app li ed u si ng a th inn er la yer of th e s ame lat ex." htt p://www.t ole dobl ade.com/lo cal/20 12/02/28/Davis-Bess e-cr acks-bla m ed-on-bli zz ar d.ht m l 2 candid with the public. I t is specious for F ENOC to try to justi fy this blunder using a "blotchy", aesthe tic, rationale. So who's to blame for the most safety-sig nificant struc ture in this nuclear power plant complex not being moisture-se aled 40 y ear s ag o? Why , no one. And who' s expected to believe

, in light of a wholly-incomplete, toke nistic investigation (de tailed below) that there is no reason to be suspicious that the true e x tent of the c rac king a nd deter ioration of the shield building rema ins unknown? Why , ever y one.The c onclusion that "the B liz zard of '78 did it" is viewe d with skepticism because the eng ineer ing liter ature is disputed over how for cef ul the delivery of pre cipitation must be for it to penetr ate c oncre te. I n an ar ticle, "Qua ntification of Water Pene tration I nto Concrete T hroug h Cracks by Neutron Radiog raphy ," The 3rd ACF International Conf erenc e-ACF/VCA 2008, 925, M. Kane matsu, Ph.D., I. Maruy ama, Ph.D., T. Nog uchi, Ph.D., H. I ikura, Ph.D. and N. Tuchiy a, rese arc h eng ineer s, found that:

[W]ater pene trates throug h the cr ack immediate ly afte r pouring and its migra tion speed a nd distribution depends on the moisture condition in the concr ete. With another detailed a naly sis, it i s understood that the wa ter ha s rea ched a round 50mm depth in the horizontal crac k, but 20-30mm depth in the vertica l cra ck immediately afte r pouring water. Fr om these re sult it is detecte d that water rea ches to the 25-30mm depth in few minutes after it is ex posed to wate r and in 30 minutes it rea ches to the 80mm.

This m eans water wil l be supplied to th e rebar with few m inu tes' scattere d showers.

3 (Emphasis supplied). The re is no conside ration nor discussion which a ddresse s the possibili ty that much less than the dr ama of the B liz zard might ha ve produc ed the da mag e.2. FENOC Proposes To Plan T o Have A Plan FEN OC ventures (RCA at 7) that the B liz zard of '78 is the c ulprit for all of the shie ld htt p://www.de gas.nua c.na goy a-u.ac.j p/i ppe i/pap er_e/2008 11_ACF_K ane m at su.p df 3 building cr acking: The c onclusion of this investigation is that the ca use of the c oncre te laminar cra cking was the de sign spe cifica tion for construc tion of the shield building that did not specify application of a n exterior seala nt from moisture. The a ction to preve nt rec urre nce of the shield building c oncre te laminar c rac king is to apply an exterior prote ctive sea lant as a ba rrier ag ainst moisture migra ting into the conc rete. There fore , with an ef fec tive exterior protec tive seala nt the shield building conc rete laminar c rac king w ill not repeat under the require d combinations of extreme environme ntal conditions such as the shield building experienc ed during the seve re blizz ard of 1978. RCA at 7. But this application of e x terior se alant come s 40 y ear s overdue. Even c omponents which we re se aled a nd/or protec ted with barr iers, such a s the shield building conc rete located below g rade , have f ailed and suf fer ed wa ter-bor ne deg rada tion, some of it due to leaks of bor ated water inside the shield building. Also, initial coating atop the dome pa rape t roof fa iled, beca use it was done ba dly. FEN OC's Fe bruar y 2012 RCA further g ives the lie to the RAI Ag ing Ma nag ement Plan inasmuch as F ENOC pronou nces its own investigation to be incom plete: The shield building dome lacks fa ctors found in the a rchitec tural flute shoulder s like the discontinuity stress conc entra tion factor a nd high de nsity reinfor cing steel nece ssary for c rac k initiation and propag ation. There fore , only the re mainder of the acc essible, above-g rade , exterior wall of the shield building shou ld be examin ed simil ar to those are as pre viously examined.

[Id. at 54.]********************The re mainder of the ac cessible shield building exterior walls shou ld be exami ned usin g Im pulse Response testin g with confirm atory core bore s to clearly define the exte nt of conditi on.Id. at 57 (e mphasis supplied).

The RCA conc ludes that "the tig hter spac ing of the outer f ace of structura l reinfor cing steel such a s in the top 20 feet of the shield building a nd adjac ent to opening s or blockouts ca n

fac ilitate propag ation of laminar c rac king a s evident at the ma in steam line pene tration block-outs." RCA at 41. Rebar w as installed too densely in are as opene d for maintena nce ove r the plant's history and a spa cing sensitivity study established that a hig her de nsity of re bar c ould propag ate laminar cra cking bey ond the ar chitectur al flute re g ion with a g iven stress condition.

RCA 96. Rebar wa s also installed too densely at the main stea m line penetra tion blackouts. This was done as an e arthqua ke prote ction for the shie ld building structure , beca use the c oncre te was more vulner able ther e due to the " discontinuiti es." But ironica lly , it facilitated c rac k propag ation. Notwithstanding the se construc tion defec ts, FENOC insists, utterly , that the B liz zard of 1978 was the only possible cause of propulsion of moisture unusually deeply into the opening s and cr evice s of the shield building f rom the southwest direc tion, and owing to that directionality

, that the rusting and swe lling of too-sha llow or too-conc entra ted re bar a nd conseque nt concr ete bursts that have c aused c rac king a re la id at the blame of the wea ther. And F ENOC also admits in the RCA that examination of the entire structur e has not take n place - and f or that, in the RAI AMP, FENOC plans only to have a plan: FEN OC is developing a compr ehensive eng ineer ing pla n to re-e stablish the desig n and licensing basis confor mance of the Shield Building. The plan is sche duled to be completed a nd issued by Dec ember 1, 2012.

The plan wi ll in clude a detailed structural analysis of th e Shield Bu ildin g and consider applicable effe cts.RAI AMP at 11/29 of .pdf. (Empha sis suppli ed). Where one mig ht expect immediate, priority curr ent re g ulation activities to be complete, the y are rele g ated to be de alt with in the future in the RAI AMP. And so the RAI AMP is deficient. A plan to ha ve a pla n is not a prese nt, articulate d plan for the manag ement of the ag ing shie ld building. Not only is there no dire ction to conduct a thoroug h investiga tion of the entire shie ld building, the RAI AMP forese es sca nt planned testing to be done dur ing inf reque nt inspections over the c oming de cade s, as, for e x ample, a me re handful of c ore bor es.3. Eve n The Unduly-Narrow Root Cause Inve stigati on W as Incomple te The c redibility of having a plan-to-have-a-plan is further undermined by the limited scope of the investig ation of the c rac king w hich has take n place to date. The re w as no examination of cra cks during the 2011-2012 investig ation if they wer e less than 1/16" in width. RC A at 26. Earlier cra cks identified in the Ma intenance Rule Structure Eva luations from J une 1999 and November 2005 wer e less than 1/16 inch, he nce those cra cks we re de emed a cce ptable. Id. at 26. The RAI AMP states that the widest cr ack w as .013". RAI AMP at 2 (of 8). T he widest shield building exterior surf ace concr ete c rac k identified in the RCA, by contra st, was measur ed at 0.025 inches. RCA at 26. The ma nag ement plan, pr omulga ted to encour ag e vig ilance a nd responsivene ss about future c rac ks, does not acc urate ly ref lect the known e x tent of cr acking in the shield building e x terior. Only 15 of the 16 flute shoulde rs wer e ana ly zed for dama g e. " I mpulse Response testing and cor es [sic] bores take n using ma n-lifts from the g round and sc aff old from building r oofs acr oss 15 of the 16 ar chitectur al flute shoulder s confirme d that a similar conc rete cra ck phenomenon in the a rchitec tural flute shoulder s exi sts in other reg ions around the pe rimeter of the shield building..." But " Shoulder 14 was not ac cessible f rom the g round due to interf ere nce with a start-up tra nsformer." RCA at 18. The absurd theme that runs throug hout FENO C's manag ement dec isions over the y ear s is constantly that convenie nce outwe ighs sa fety conce rns.That indiffe renc e to safe ty is evident in the cra cking problems with the shield building, fr om a failure to inspect in a ser ious fashion until the swollen and bursting reba r made it impos sible to ignor e.

4. Other Damage To Shield Buildi ng Exterior Goe s Unconsidere d In RCA Since May 1996, surfa ce visua l inspections of the shield building e x terior ha ve identified concr ete spa lling above the orig inal construction opening. Id. I n an Aug ust 2011 reply to NRC Requests for A dditional I nformation (RAI

), (ML 11242A166), a t 9/54 of .pdf, FE NOC indicated that spalling w as noted on the e x terior shield building surfa ce in 1999 a nd 2005 in three a rea s, with the pits in t he conc rete as much a s 2" de ep. The se obser vations preda te the 2012 root c ause understanding that the entire Shield Building e x terior ha d never been se aled a g ainst moisture intrusion. The FEN OC assuranc e in Aug ust 2011 that "the method of r epair is based on the actua l siz e, depth a nd amount of re bar e x posed in the ar ea to be repa ired," g iven the potential for 4 more e x posure of and dama g e to exposed reba r nea r the e x terior shield building surfa ce tha n anticipated, a ppear s not to have bee n clar ified in subsequent doc uments, including the RCA. That exposed rebar could lead to more and wor se cr acking in the shield building, both surfa ce a nd subsurfac e I n FEN OC's May 16, 2012 revision (ML 12142A053) of the Fe bruar y 2012 Root Cause Analy sis appear s this st atement (at 29): On Aug ust 15, 1976 the Toledo Edison Company construction super intendent documented a n examination of the shield building dome par apet that f ound a cr acke d and broken a rchitec tural flute shoulder corne r at a pproxi mately 292 deg ree azimuth. There wer e also other hairline shrinka g e cr acks in the dome para pet at both cor ners of eac h arc hitectura l flute shoulder, a t mid-width of eac h flute, and ve rtical a round the pe riphery of the pa rape t that should not affec t the structura l integr ity of the shield building dome para pet. . . .

Wit hout refe renc e to this event, the Fe bruar y 2012 RCA consultant concluded (p. 56)5 Resp ons e t o RAI , id. At 7 (o f 1 6).4 T he 1 976 dome cra cking is not m ent ion ed i n t he F ebr uar y RCA.5-1 0-that "[t]he shield building dome lacks fa ctors found in the a rchitec tural flute shoulder s like the discontinuity stress conc entra tion factor a nd high de nsity reinfor cing steel nec essar y for c rac k initiation and propag ation," and tha t it is there fore unnece ssary to examine it for cra cking. Even without reinforc ing ste el, the dome ha s a history of cr acking.5. Exposure O f Shield Building Interior T o Eleme nts Goes Unconside red In RCA Whil e foc us of the RCA has bee n solely on exterior cra cking , the status of the interior of the shield building may be proble matic, also. Construction of the shield building c ommenced on April 26, 1971 with above-g rade concr ete pour s. RAI AMP at 80. Thus for 2 y ear s and 4 months, the shield buildi ng was e x posed to the outer a tmosphere, mea ning the SB interior w as in contac t with unimpeded, repe ated moisture (rains, snow, slee t, wind-driven pr ecipitation of a ll forms), with no we ather seala nt on the inside wall of shield building. O n Aug 22, 1973, the concr ete pour for c onstruction of SB dome bottom slab beg an. On Aug ust 6, 1975, concre te pours for c losing the SB construction opening beg an; they wer e complete d on Dec ember 1, 1975.

RAI AMP at 81-82. The c onstruction opening in the shield building wa s open for 4 y ear s, 8 months, allowing e ven more exposure of the SB inter ior wall to the ele ments. When in 2002-2003 the rea ctor he ad wa s replac ed, ther e wa s nece ssarily an opening in the shield building wa ll for a pe riod of five wee ks, with additional consequent e x posure of the shield building interior to the e lements. RCA at 82. Another br eac h of conta inment that left the shield building open to the e lements was the most re cent ve ssel head sw ap out, which r an fr om October throug h Dec ember 2011. Thus there was a nother month or more of exposure of inter ior of the shield building to the e lements. But the r oot cause investiga tion narrowly scrutinizes the shield building exterior we ather fac tors aff ecting the exterior only from 1978 for war d. FEN OC-1 1-attempts to persuade the NRC and the public at lar g e that one ic onoclastic we ather event, the Blizz ard of 1978, so permea ted the complete d, protec ted and e nclosed shield building w ith moisture that it set off dec ades of unarr ested de teriora tion, y et both the inside and outside of the building we re r epea tedly subjected to incle ment wea ther for over se ven (7) y ear s befor e the Blizz ard.Moreove r, Da vis-Be sse has other water problems inside the shield building. I n RAI response s dated May 24, 2011 (ML 11151A90), the N RC st aff had noted a "history of g round water infiltration into the annular spac e betwe en the c oncre te shield building a nd steel conta in-ment." Dur ing a 2011 AMP audit, NRC st aff also revie wed doc umentation that:

[I]ndi cate d the pre sence of standing water in the annulus sand pocke t reg ion. The standing water appea rs to be a r ecur ring issue of g round wa ter lea kag e and a rea s of corr osion were observe d on the containment ve ssel. I n addition, during the audit the staff revie wed photog raphs that indica te pee ling of clea r coa t on the containment vesse l annulus are a, and de g rada tion of the moisture barr ier, c oncre te g rout, and sea lant in the annulus are a that we re installed in 2002-2003.

Id. at 47/280 of .pdf.

6. Lack of QA Control 40 Y ears Ago Should Spur, Not Deter, Complete Inv estigation FEN OC states in the Fe bruar y RCA that:

The fa ilure modes for the laminar c rac king of the shield building c oncre te wall wer e primar ily desig n rela ted from a bout 40 y ear s ag o under a quality assura nce pr og ram outside the control of F ENOC. Ther efor e, the c ondition does not curre ntly exis t in other applicable prog rams /proc esses, e quipment / sy stems, org anizations, environments, and individuals.

RCA at 54. Precisely beca use F ENOC purporte dly did not have QA a ssuranc e contr ol over the shield building's c onstruction 40 y ear s ag o, it is i ncumbent upon Applica nt to completely investiga te and identify all cra cking which mig ht be pre sent in the structure , and to authorita-tively rule out conne ctions betwee n interior and e x terior c oncre te surfic ial damag e or de fec ts,-1 2-both in the concr ete a bove, and be low, the surfa ce. T he RCA emphasizes that the shield building has under g one "long-term e x posure to moisture" (p. 24) which ha s "mig rat[ed] through c oncre te"(pp. 46,47, 56). What is missi ng is an ana ly sis which considers a nd if war rante d, ref utes, any connec tion between the cra cking , and spalling or the plac ement of too-de nse re bar or the potential for moisture-cause d damag e to the interior of the shield building fr om moist ure w hich even now may be wicking into interior concr ete. The potential for c oncre te damag e ema nating outward f rom inside the shield building ha s not been a ddresse d at all by FEN OC.C. Standards Regarding Ad m issib ility of Sup plem ental Inf orm ation A new c ontention may be filed a fter the deadline f ound in the notice of he aring with leave of the pre siding off icer upon a showing that: (i) The infor mation upon which the ame nded or ne w contention is based wa s not previously available

(ii) The infor mation upon which the ame nded or new contention is based is mater ially differ ent than informa tion previously available
and (iii)

The a mended or new c ontention has bee n submitt ed in a timely fashion base d on the ava ilability of the subseque nt information. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)

(2).I nterve nors re spectfully submit t hat their supplementa l fac ts are timely submitt ed under the Commiss ion's standard in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)(i)-(iii). The supplemente d/amended Contention 5 meets the NRC's three-part standa rd for a timely contention. The infor mation on which the c ontention is based was not pre viously available

the RCA was rele ased on F ebrua ry 27, 2012, and the RAI AMP on April 5, 2012. The RCA was then e x tensively revised a nd re-rele ased on Ma y 16, 2012. Revision 1 RC A (ML 12142A053). The information on which the contention is based is mater ially differ ent than informa tion previously available , see 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)-1 3-(2)(ii), beca use it relate s to findings a nd commitments that did not exis t when I nterve nors moved for a dmission of Cont ention 5 in J anuar y 2012. This amendment/supplementation of Conten-tion 5 is t imely beca use it is filed within six ty (60) da y s of the RAI AMP relea se on April 5, 2012, and 60 day s is the period orde red by the ASL B in whic h I nterve nors must act.

Shaw Areva MOX Se rvice s, Inc. (Mix ed Oxide Fuel F abric ation Fa cility), L BP-08-10, 57 NRC 460, 493 (2008). I nterve nors have responde d to trigg ering events in a ma nner w hich is timely acc ording to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)

(2)(iii).D. Conclusion The history of cr isis manag ement at Da vis-Be sse - or c erta inly , the public per ceptions of the same -

is shameful. F irstEnerg y is not transpare nt in its investiga tions and repe atedly has been f ound not to be forthrig ht with the public. That lack of candor has eve n beg un to trouble the NRC staff, a s new re ports, RAI response s, and ana ly ses continue to ema nate f rom FEN OC over the cra cking problems. Ther e ar e many inconsistencies a nd varia nces be tween F ENOC and the NRC staff, but just as disturbingly , betwee n FEN OC and its own consultants. Contention 5 should be admitted for tria l.WHEREFORE , I nterve nors re spectfully ask that the fa ctual basis for their propose d Contention 5 be amende d/supplemented with the informa tion provided in support of this Motion; and that Contention 5 be admitted for hear ing./s/ Terry J. L odg e Terr y J. L odg e (O hio Ba r #0029271) 316 N. Michig an St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627 Phone/fax (419) 255-7552 tjlodge50@

y ahoo.com Counsel for I nterve nors-1 4-UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA NUCLEAR REG ULATORY COMMISSION Before the At om ic Saf ety and Licensin g Board I n the Matter of First Energy Nuclear Ope rating Company (Da vis-Be sse Nucle ar Powe r Station, Unit 1)

.) Docke t No. 50-346-L R)J une 4, 2012

) *****CERTIFIC ATE OF SERVICE OF

'INTERVENORS' MOTION TO AMEND A ND SUP P LEMENT PROP OSE D CONTENTION NO. 5 (SHIEL D BUILDING C RACK ING)'We here by cer tify that a copy of the "I NTERVENORS' MOTI ON TO A MEND AND SUPP L EMENT PROPOSED CONTENTI ON NO. 5 (SHI EL D B UI L DI NG CRACKI NG)' was sent by us to the following pe rsons via ele ctronic de posit filing with the Commiss ion's EI E sy stem on the 4th day of June, 2012:

Administrative J udg e Wil liam J. Fr oehlich, Chair Atomic Safety and L icensing Boa rd Panel U.S. Nuclea r Reg ulatory Commi ssion Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: wjf1@nrc.g ov Administrative J udg e Dr. Willi am E. Ka stenberg Atomic Safety and L icensing Boa rd Panel U.S. Nuclea r Reg ulatory Commi ssion Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: wek1@nr c.g ov Administrative J udg e Nicholas G. Tr ikouros Atomic Safety and L icensing Boa rd Panel U.S. Nuclea r Reg ulatory Commi ssion Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: ng t@nrc.g ov Offic e of the Secre tary U.S. Nuclea r Reg ulatory Commi ssion Rulemaking s and Adjudica tions S taff Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: hear ingdoc ket@nrc.g ov Offic e of the Gene ral Counsel U.S. Nuclea r Reg ulatory Commi ssion Mail Stop O-15D21 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Catherine K anata s cathe rine.ka natas@nr c.g ov Br ian G. Ha rris E-mail: Br ian.Har ris@nrc.g ov L loy d B. Subin lloy d.subin@nrc.g ov Offic e of Commission Appellate Adjudication U.S. Nuclea r Reg ulatory Commi ssion Mail Stop:

O-16C1 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: ocaa mail@nrc.g ov Michae l Keeg an-1 5-Don't Waste Michig an 811 Har rison Street Monroe, MI 48161 E-mail: mkeeg anj@comc ast.net Stephen J. Bur dick Morg an, L ewis & Boc kius L L P 1111 Pennsy lvania Ave nue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20004 Phone: 202-739-5059 Fa x: 202-739-3001 E-mail: sburdick@morg anlewis.c om Timothy Matthews, Esq.

Morg an, L ewis & Boc kius L L P 1111 Pennsy lvania Ave nue, N.W.Washington, DC 20004 Phone: (202) 739-5830 Fa x: (202) 739-3001 E-mail: tmatthews@morg anlewis.c om Respectf ully submitt ed,/s/ Terry J. L odg e Terr y J. L odg e (O hio Ba r #0029271) 316 N. Michig an St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627 Phone/fax (419) 255-7552 tjlodge50@

y ahoo.com Counsel for I nterve nors/s/ Kevin Kamps Kevin Ka mps Radioactive Waste Watchdog Be y ond Nuclea r 6930 Carroll Ave nue, Suite 400 Takoma Par k, MD 20912 Tel. 301.270.2209 ext. 1 Email: kevin@bey ondnuclea r.org Website: www.bey ondnuclea r.org Pro se on behalf of I nterve nors-1 6-

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