ML17208A766

Environ Qualification of Electrical Equipment in Harsh Environ Which Is Required for Accident Mitigation/ Monitoring.

ML17208A766
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	06/01/1980
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17208A765	List: ML17208A763 ML17208A766 ML17208A767
References
IEB-79-01B, IEB-79-1B, NUDOCS 8007020321
Download: ML17208A766 (25)

Text

FLORIDAPOWER6cLIGHTCOMPANYRESPONSETOI6KBULLETIN79-013PHASEI(ACTIONITEMS1-3)FORSTLUCIEUNITNO.1ENVIRONMENTAL UALIFICATION OFEIZCTRICAL EUIPMENTINAHARSHEWiIRONMENT WHICHISREUIREDFORACCIDEFZMITIGATION/MONITORING JlPiK1,1980.4go-96ggy7QgP3l7eD<~~Uvl4LVV~lIISnovosogg-I'.

TABLEOFCONTENTSSECTIONTITLEPAGE1.01.11.

21.3INTRODUCTION

ContentsofReportMethodology SystemsAnalysisApproachl-l1-11-11-22.02.12.22.3POST-ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT Post-LOCA Environmental Conditions MainSteam.LineBreakEnvironmental Conditions EighEnergyLineBreakOutsideContainment Environmental Conditions 2-12-12-23.0MASTERLIST3-14.0COMPONENT EVALUATION SHEETS4-1 INTRODUCTION ContentsofReportThisreportissubmitted inresponsetoIEBulletin79-01BasPhaseIofatwophaseeffort,wherePhaseIrespondstoActionItems1,2and3.PhaseIIrespondstoActionItems4and5ofthesubjectBul-letinandwillbesubmitted twomonthfromthedateofthisreport.-FloridaPower&LightCompany(FP&L}responded toIEBulletin79-01(vialetterL-79-181datedJuly2,1979)asregardsequipment insidecontainment.

This,reporttherefore follows'he formatofthepre-viousreportbuthasbeenexpandedtorespondtotheincreased scopeofIEBulletin79-01B,i.e.,toaddressequipment locatedoutsidecontainment.

Inaddition, inordertofacilitate completion oftheNRCevaluation oftheStLucieUnit1submittals, a"systemsanalysis" approachhasbeenusedasdiscussed inSeccdon1.3infra.Thisreportconsistsofthreemajordivisions:

amainreportcontain-ingdescriptive ande~lanatory information; aMasterListwhichde-lineates, bymajorsystem,theequipment whichseesaharshenviron-mentandisrequiredtomitigate/monitor theaccident, andtheCom-ponent.Evaluation Sheetswhichpresent-detailedenvironmental.

parameters foreachcomponent exposedtotheh'arshenvironment.

Hethodolo Equipment qualification byits.verynatureinvolves.

consideration ofthe"designbasisaccident,"

(DBA}scenariowhereinthepostulated..

accidentresultsintheworst-case environmental conditions (e.g.,pressure, temperature, humidity) towhichtheequipment isexposedandunderwhichit.mustfunction.

Therefore forequipment insidecontainment theDBA'saredefinedastheLOCAandtheMbLBwhichgivetheworstenvironmental conditions withrespecttocontainment pres-sure.and/ortemperature; theworstcaseswereidentified pertheFSARianalyses andarediscussed inSections2.1and2.2below.Highenergylinebreaks(HELB)outsidecontainment aredefinedanddis-cussedinFSARAppendices 3Cand3D.Whereasequipment.

insidecon-tainmentseestheenvironment oftheaccidentitisrequiredtomitigateortomonitor,theequipment

required, foranHELBoutsidecontainment inmostcasesisnot.exposedtotheharshenvironment ofthepipebreakunderconsideration.

Therefore theresponsetoIEBulletin79-01Binvolved1)adefinition oftheaccident2)adeter-minationofequipment requiredtomitigatetheaccident, 3)adeter-minationofequipment requiredtomonitorrecoveryfromtheaccident, 4)definition oftheresultant environmental conditions andplantarea(s)involvedand5)locationoftheequipment identified insteos(2),(3)and(4).Sourcesutilizedfortheabovedeterminations includedtheFSAR,Technical Specifications, Emergency Operating Procedures, PipingInstrumentation

Drawings, Electrical Equipment Lists,ValveLists, 00 1.2(Continued)

CableandConduit,Lists,thepreviousresponseto79-01,andonsitesurveys.1.3SstemsAnalsisAnroachTable1-1isalistofthesystemsreviewedtodetermine whetheranycomponents withinthosesystemswereexposedtotheaccidentenvironment andwererequiredforaccidentmitigation (AM)orpost-accidentmonitoring (PAM).Thisapproachensuredthatallcomponents exposedtotheaccidentenvironment wereconsidered forevaluation, evenifsuchequipment hadnotbeenpreviously identified assafety-related, orClasslE,ordefinedasanengineered safetyfeature.Conversely, thisap-proachalsoidentified systems.which,althoughrequiredforAMorPAM,arelocatedinaplantarearemotefromtheaccidentenvironment, andwhicharenotsubjecttoaharshenvironment.

Usingthesystemsanalysisapproach, systemswereidentified asserv-inganAMorPAMfunction.

Thesesystemsweretheninvestigated todetermine what,ifany,.components wereexposedtotheaccidenten-vironment; thisinvestigation wasdoneona"loop"basis;thatistheelectrical loopfromtheaccidentareaboundaries totheaffectedde-vicewastracedandeachcomponent evaluated.

Forexample,iftheSafetyInjection SystemisactuatedforaDBA-LOCAbyapressuretransmitter, inside.containment, theentireelectrical loopisevalu-ated,fromthecontainment electrical penetration assemblyviacables,splices,switchesetctothetransmitter, for-qualification totheDBA-LOCAenvironment insidecontainment.

OntheotherhandaCom-ponentCoolingWaterSystempressuredifferential transmitter whichisusedtomonitorCCWflowtothecontainment fancoolers,butwhichislocatedintheRABinanareaunaffected bytheDBA-LOCAconditions (eg,unaffected byshinefrompipingrecirculating radio-activesumpfluid)need.notbeevaluated further.Similarly, equip-mentinsidetheControlRoom,Electrical Equipment Rooms,and-otherplantareasunaffected bytheaccidentunderconsideration, whichseesanambientenvironment

'isnotevaluated further.NotethatFP&Lisevaluating.,

asaseparateitemunderPhaseIIoftheresponsetoIEBulletin79-01B,theeffects.ofradiation onequipment againsttheguidelines providedinEnclosure 4oftheBulletin.

Duringthecourseofthisreview,usingthesourcesdescribed inSubsection 1.2itwas-determined thatsomeequipment, forexamplethereactorcoolantpumps,didnotserveasanaccidentmitigator ormonitor,butinsteadwereusedin"bestestimate" accidentscenarios foroperatorconvenience.

Whereitwasdetermined thattheoperation ofsuchequipment wasnotreliedupontomitigatetheenvironmental 1-2 1.3(Continued) effectsoftheaccident, orwheresuchequipment wasnottheprimarymeanstoachievesafeshutdown, furtherevaluation wasnotperformed.

TheEmergency Operating Procedures generally arebasedona"bestestimate" orrealistic accidentscenarioandthuscalloutmoreequip-mentforoperatorusethanisassumedavailable inthetraditional DBAscenario.

Since.theDBAresults9.n'worst-case accidentenvironment, itgovernedthechoiceofAMandPAMequipment.

1-3

TABLE1-1ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS STLUCIEUNIT1SYSTEMSANALYSEDENGIiNEERED SAFETYFEATURESACTUATION SYSTEMSAFETYINJECTION SYSTEMCONTAINMENT COOLINGSYSTEMZODINE'EMOVAL.

SYSTEMCONTAINMENT SPRAYSYSTEMHYDROGEN, CONTROLSYSTEMRADIATION MONXTORING SYSTEMECCSAREAVENTILATION SYSTEMCONTAIiiENT PURGESYSTEMCONTAINMENT VACUUMRELIEFSYSTEMSHIELDBUXLDINGVENTILATION SYSTEMCONTROLROOMAIRCONDITIONING SYSTEMAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMBATTERYROOMVENTILATION SYSTEMELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ROOMVENTILATION SYSTEMEMERGENCY DIESELGENERATOR SYSTEMSHUTDOWNCOOLINGSYSTEMCOMPONENT COOLINGWATERSYSTEMCHEMICALVOLUMECONTROLSYSTEMCOOLINGWATERSYSTEMMAINSTEAMSYSTEMMAINFEEDWATER SYSTEMWASTE.iiNAGEKNT SYSTEMSAMPLINGSYSTEMELECTRICAL EQUZPKBFZ iiISCELLANEOUS PENETRATIONS REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMINSTR~iTAIRSYSTEM1-4 2.0POST-ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT 2.1Post-LOCA Environmental Conditions Theplantenvironmental serviceconditions withinthecontainment areclassified inthefollowing environmental designcategories described inFSARSection3.11.1:I-A,Longtermcontainment environment following LOCAorsteamlinebreakaccident(uptooneyear).I-BShorttermcontainment environment following LOCAorsteamlinebreakaccident(upto15minutes,orforcertainECCScomponents, uptoinitiation ofrecir-culation).

Theenvironmental conditions oftemperature,

pressure, humidity, andradiation foreachofthesetwocategories arepresented inTable3.11-1oftheFSARandarerepeatedinTables2-1and2-2herein.TheseTablesaxepresented asAttachment ItotheCompon-entEvaluation SheetsinSection4.0.ThecategoryI-AandI-Benvironmental conditions completely enve-lopetheworstcaselossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)considered intheFSAR.ThisworstcaseLOCAisadoubleendedslotruptureatthesuctionofthereactorcoolantpumpinthecoldleg(9.82ft2breakarea)..Thisresultsinthehighest'eak containment pressureQ8.4psig)and'oincident temperature (259oF).Thepostulated accidentpressureandtemperature timehistorycurvesarepresented inFigures6.2-1Aand6.2-1CoftheFSARandareincludedinFigures2-1and2-2ofthisSectionrespectively.

Thecontainment radiation environment isbasedonaLOCAfissionproductreleasesourceconsisting of50percentofthecorehalogeninventory, 100percent,ofcoreinventory and1percentcoresolidfissionproduct.inventory.

Inadditiontothetemperature,

pressure, humidity, andradiation environments described intheabovecategories, theelectxical equipment withinthecontainment-willbee~osedtoachemicalenvironment.

ThepHofthecontainment sprayismaintained be-tweenabout8.5and10.5duringbothinjection and.recirculation by'headdition.

ofsodiumhydroxide.

Thischemicalsprayenviron-mentwillexistforonlyalimitedperiodfollowing whichtheequipment inquestionwillbegintodry.

2.2MainSteamLineBreakEnvironmental Conditions TheworstcaseMSLBaccidentoccursat105%powerwitha5.355ftbreakarea.Thepostulated.

accidentpressureandtemperature timehistorycurvesarepresented inFigures6.2-14and6.2-12oftheFSARandareincludedinFigure2-3and2-4ofthissectionre-spectively.

ThesameFiguresaregivenasAttachment IItotheComponent Evaluation SheetsinSection4.0.Thecontainment atmospheric temperature onlyexceedsthatofcate-goriesI-AandI-B(seeTables2-1and2-2)fortheworstcasemainsteamlinebreak(MSLB)accident, forapproximately 40seconds.Thistemperature (290oF)hasnotbeenusedasabasisfozenvironmental qualification.

ofelectrical equipment:

duetothe.extremely shorttimeofthe.transient asdiscussed in'heFSARatSubsection 6.2.13.2..3Hih.EnezLineBreakOutsideContainment

-Environmental Conditions Alineisconsidered ahighenergylineiftheservicetemperature isgreaterthan200Forifthedesignpressureisgreaterthan275psig;pipingwhichispressurized only.duringtesting(eg,miniflowlines)isnotconsidered highenergy.In,generala.high'nergy line,break(HELB)outsidecontainment doesnotresult'njeopardizing thecapability tomaintaintheplantina.safecondition, nordoesanHELBoutsidecontainment seriously impairthecapability toreachsafeshutdown.

Forexample,abreakinan.auxiliary steamline,or'nasteamgenerator blowdownline,isimmediately self-isolating andplantoperation.

isunhindered; thus"accident mitigation" consistsoflineisolation onlyand"post-accident monitoring" islimitedtoensuringthatthelinere-main'sisolateduntil.repairsareeffected.

Itshouldbenotedalsothatthesystemsanalysis" approachis,appropriately so,afunc-tionalreviewsuchthat..the questionofwhetherthereshouldbeIEequipment onnon-safety classlinesismoat;thereviewwascon-ductedtoensurethataaAM..orPAMfunctionexistsand=thattheequip-merztrequiredforthatfunctionis,qualified fortheappropriate environment.

FSARAppendices 3Cand3Dpresent,a discussion ofhighenergylinebreaks(HELB)outsidecontainment.

Thefollowing HELB(and.corresponding designconditions) wereconsidered thereinand,werethebasisforthereviewinthisreportofHELBoutsidecontainment:

a)Mainsteamlines(885psig,520F)b)Mainfeedwater lines(1050psig,440F)c)ShutdownCoolingSystem(450psig,300F)d)Steamgenerator blowdownlines(900psig;532oF)e)Auxiliary steamlines(40psig,350oF)f)Chemical6VolumeControlSystem-letdown(2200psig,450F)andcharging(2300psig,120F)2-2 2.3(Continued}

TheshutdowncoolingsystemisexemptedfromHELBbasedontheshortoperational pex'iodcriterion ofMEB3-1andinanycaseisenveloped byaCVCSHELBasdiscussed below.ZnadditiontotheaboveHELBsoutsidecontainment, theAuMliaryFeedwater (AFW)System(985psig,120oF)wasreviewedforadverseenvironmental effectsonAM/PAMequipment, duringtheplantopera-tionalmodesofstaxtupandshutdown..

Asregards"accident mitiga-tion"and"post-accident monitoring" inthesemodes,.again.effective isolation ofthebrokenline.istheparamount concern;following anAFWbreakthe"plantwouldbeplacedintheshutdownmodeifinstart-up,orcontinued toshutdownutilizing theredundant AFWpump(s)ifthebxcakoccurs:attheonsetofshutdowncooling.Thesixsystemsidentified abovewerereviewed.

forapostulated high-energylinebreakoutsidecontainment'.

The.postulated accidentenvironment waslocatedonplantgeneralarrangement drawingsandAM/PAMequipment wasx'eviewed todetermine itsinclusion ontheMasterList(refexence Subsections 1.2and1.3).Perthediscussions inFSARAppendices 3Cand3D-theresultant accidentenvironments aregivenbelow:a)mainsteamUncs(thesteamtrestleareabeingtheareaofconcern):

up.to320oFforabout95.seconds(ie,MSZSoccursat485psig);14.7psia.sincethisisanoutdoorarea;.100%relativehumidity(RH)fromtheescapingsteam,onlyif'hebreakisorientedtowardAM/PAMequipment.

b)mainfeedwatex':

lines.(steamtrestlearea):since.thetemperature isabout.80oFlowerthisHELBisenveloped bytheenvironmentel oondtMone ofieem.(eg~eure;320oF/95seconds;:

14.7'psia;100%RK.c)steamgenerator blowdownlines(piping;penetration'rea ofRABbeingthearea.ofconcern):

thisHELB.is,enveloped byaCVCS1'etdownlineHELBinthesameRABarea,item(e),.below,sincetheletdownlineisassumed.toreleasecool-antatabout600F;upto175F,lessthan1psig;upto100%RH.d)a~liary,steamlines(theonlysafety-related concernistheline12-AS-1runningoutdoors12feetfromthecontrolroomnorthoutsideairintake):upto350F;14.7psiasinceanoutdoorarea;upto100%RHiftheHELBisdirectedtowardAM/PAMequipment.

NotethattheCRambienttempera-turerisesonlyabout12Faboveambientconservatively assuming750cfmintakeof500FsteampertheFSAR.2-3 2.3(Continued) e)CVCS-letdownUne(pipingpenetration area):upto175F;lessthan1psig(blowdown isterminated inabout6seconds);

upto100%RH.CVCS-chargingline(onlythatportionfromthepumpdis-chargeishighenergy):120F;14.7psia;upto100%RH.Notethatthechargingpumpsareofthereciprocating typethusnopressurebuildupispostulated.

f}auxiliary feedwater system(lowersteamtrestleareabeingthearea,ofconcern).:

upto120F;14.7psiasinceanout-doorarea;upto100%RHonlyifAFVbreakis,directedto-wardAM/PAMinstruments.

NotethatlossofoneofthethreetrainsofAFWdoesnotimpairsafeshutdowncapability andthattheAFWSystemismanuallyoperatedandcloselymonitored.

Asindicated inSection1.0,theharshenvironment resulting fromeachofthethreeclassesofbreaksgivenabove(LOCA,MS',HELE)waslocated.duringthereviewofsystems/equipment requiredtomiti-gatethatparticular accidenttodetermine whether;suchequipment wasexposedtotheharshenvironment.

Thexeviewassumedthatnosinglefailures:

occurredandthat.offsitepowerwasavailable inordertomaximizethekindsandquantities ofcomponents sub)ecttoxeviewforenvironmental qualification.

Resultsarepresented inSections3.0(MastexList)and4.0(Component Evaluation-Sheets)ofthisreport.2-4 TABLE2-1ENVIROiiHENTAL REQUIREMENTS STLUCIEUNIT1LICENSING COiEI'BAHTS CateoI-A(Lon-term)Time0-2hr2-24hr1-31day31day-1yrTemperature

('F)270240150130Pressuresi)4427HumidityV.)100100100100Radiation (R/hr)2x106lx1063x10310NOTES:(1)Integrated.

AccidentDose(R):40yearsofNorma1Operation (R):TotalIntegrated Dose(R)2.8x1073.5x102.8x107(2}ForHainSteamBreakQua1ification seeSection2.22-5 TABLE2-2ENVIROKKNTAL REQUI~TSSTLUCIEUNIT1LICENSING CO~INITNENTS CateoI-A(Short-term)

Time(Mn.)Temperature

('zPressureHumidity~X)Radiation

~(R15270441007.6x105NOTE:Integrated AccidentDose(R):40yearsofNormalOperation (R):TotalIntegrated Dose(R)7.6K1053.5x1051.1.x1062-6 SS202$20II'x8lS'10101102IOTTUIEISEC110IIOSRev.32-9/6/I4FLOR<UAPOwERaLIGnrCHARYST.LUCIEPLANTUNITICONtAINMENT P/ESSUREVS.Tla:EFOR9.$2FTSLOT8REAKFIGURF.4.2.1A~

200150100101102TIME(SEC110S10410SFLORIOAPOWER4LIGMTCOMPANTST.LUCIEPLANTUNITICOMTAINMEtlT ATMOSPHERE ANOSUMPWATERTEMPERATURES VS.TIMEfOR9.82P'12SLOTBREAKFIGURE4.2.1C CA0LJ~IA5CECOCAOoOKCLIC9CT.I-C310TtHE(SEC) 1CRev.32-9/6/74FLORIDAPOWERELIQITCOSCPA5IT ST.LUCIEPLAHTUHIT1COHTAINIIEHT PRESSUREVS.TIIIEFORASOS'OWER(149$VWTIl5XSREAKAREA{$.355FTTISTEAIILIHERREAKFIGURE6.2-l4 oMMf'hTHHEN'TITISPHERE no14IllAIIAJClIASo+NI-CZISJ0-oI-LIQUIDoo10TtHE(SEC)

Rev.32-9/6/74FLORIDAPOWERLLIGHTCOSIPAHTST.LUCIEPLAHTUNIT1COHTAIHMEHT ATMOSPHERE ANOLIOUIO~TEMPERATURES VS.TISIEFORA105%,POWERI2494MARTISSXBREAKAREAIS.SSSFT21STEAMLIHE RREAKFIGURE6.2-12 3.0iQsSTERLISTPerActionItem1oflEBulletin79-01Bequipment andcomponents wereidentified, usingtheSystemsAnalysismethodology described inSection1.0,asrequiredtomitigate(AM)ortomonitor(PAM)thecourseofanaccident.

Basedontheharshenvironment result-ingfromeachaccident, asdescribed inSection2.0,equipment re-'quiredforAM/PAMandexposedtotheharshenvironment wasenteredontheMasterListofsystems/equipment whichisappendedhereto.TheMasterListfollowsthegeneralformatofEnclosure 2ofIEBulletin79-01B.AM/PAMequipment insidecontainment requiredfor'DBA-LOCA, oraDBA~LBinsidecontainment, isincludedontheMasterList.InadditionAM/PAMequipment insidecontainment requiredforanHELBoutsidecontainment isincludedontheMasterListandisreviewedontheComponent Evaluation Sheets(Section4.0)againstthenormal40-yearcontainment environment (eg,integrated radiation exposure; upto120F;upto100XRH).AM/PAMequipment outsidecontainment, requiredforanHELBoutsidecontainment, isenteredontheMasterListifsuchequipment isalsoexposedtotheharshenvironment oftheaccidentwhichitmitigates and/ormonitors.

AM/PAMequipment outsidecontainment whichseesanambientenvironment isnotin-cludedon.theMasterListpertheguidancecontained inIEBulletin79-01BandtheSupplement Information thereto.Forthepurposesofthisreportandinaccordance withtheStLucieUnit1FSAR,ambientenvironment isdefinedasupto104F(120Finsidecontainment),

atmospheric

pressure, andrelativehumidities rangingupto100percent.1'uringthe.reviewandevaluation oftheMasterListtheEngineered SafetyFeaturesActuation System(Table1-1)wasidentified withinthecontextofspecificcomponents withinthemajorsystemwhichwereactuatedbytheESFAS.ForexampleaReactorCoolantSystemsolenoid~alveactuatedbyaCISisincludedintheRCSlistandnotenumerated separately underacontainment isolation "system"sincesuchasystemdoesnotestperse.Similarly theIodineRemoval,System,components arelistedundertheContainment SpraySystem.RefertothefirstpageoftheMasterListforidentifi-cationoftheSystemnumbering andthefunctiona3; components, ie,mechanical, instrumentation, ventilation orelectrical.

Notethatcross-referencing totheComponent Evaluation Sheets(Section4.0)isprovidedbySystem/function coding.3-1

4.0 COMPONENT

EVALUATION SHEETSPerActionItems2and3ofIEBulletin79-01Beachcomponent iden-tifiedinthe'Master List(Section3.0)wasevaluated foritsre-quiredenvironmental qualification.

TheComponent Evaluation Sheets(CES)appendedheretofollowthesameformatandcontentasEnclosure 3toIEBulletin79-01Bandassucheachsheetisself-explanatory.

Znordertofacilitate theNRCreviewandtoeschewobfuscation oftheStLucieUnit1submittals thusfar,however,theCESinforma-tioniselucidated below.Environment Parameters a)Operating Timetingeneralthecomponent operating timerequirements aregiven.intheFSARas"long-term" or"shortterm'";also.refertoSection2.1ofthisreport.PerFSARSections3.11,6.2and7.5,thelong-term gen-erallyreferstoaperiodoftimeup.tooneyearpost-accident, asthetimerequiredfor.post-accident monitoring instrumentation tofunction..

"Short-term" isdelineated intheCES(andAttachment ItotheCES)as15minutes,withtheunderstanding thatamajorityofinstruments actuatedbyESFASarerequiredtofunctionforonlythefirstfewsecondsfollowing anaccidentandarethennotrelieduponfurther.Forelle,apressuretransmitter willsend.ahigh-containment-pressure (5psig)signal.for'ISonor.bef'oreabout".Os8seconds(refertoPigure2-1~sura)andthencehaveserveditsfunction.

Engineering judgement isusedinsomecasestoinferre-quiredoperating timeandthisissonotedontheCESbyafootnote.

b)Temperature:

givenastheultimatetemperature peakreachedinthespecified operating timeorasafunctionoftimeperAttachments IandII.Engineering judgement isusedinsomeinstances toinferresultant operating temperature andissonotedontheCES.AlsoseeSection2.2.c)Pressure:

similartotemperature, is,givenasthepeakex-pectedorasAttachment Z.orZItotheCES.Engineering judgement isnotedifused.d)RelativeHumidity:

100percentisgenerally given.astheultimateexpectedeventhoughthisvaluemaynotbeattainedduringthecourseofsomeaccidents, notablyHELBin'anoutdoorareaseparated manyfeetfromAM/PANequipment.

Notethatupto.100percentRHisdefinedasanambientcondition becauseofthe'semi-tropical environment ofStLucieUnit1.4-1 4.0(Continued) e)Chemicalspray:StLucieUnitl,utilizes asodiumhydrox-ideadditivetothecontainment spraysystemasaniodineremovalagent;theIodineRemovalSystemisdiscussed inFSARSubsection 6.2.6.ThepHofthecontainment sprayatthespraynozzleismaintained between10.0-10.5andtheequilibrium pHofthesumpisgreaterthanorequalto8.5.Thusarangeofchemistry pHof8.5-10.5isindicated intheCES..A'angeofppmboronisalsoindi-catedwhichdepends.ontheamountofboricacidpresentintheRCSandinjectedfromtheRefueling WaterStorageTank.f)Radiation:

For.aDBA-LOCAtheradiation exposureisgivenbyAttachment I,whichisbasedonaLOCAreleaseasdes-cribedinSection2.1above.AM/PAMequipment insidecon-tainmentisthusenveloped.

bytheLOCAsourceterm.Forequipment outsidecontainment thedose.ratemapscontained inFSARSection12.1wereusedinconjunction withengineer-inganalysis/judgement toinferequ)pment radiation ezposure.

ZntheECCSareavaluesofupto10radswereusedperFSARSubsection 6.3.3.3..

NotethatFP&Lwilladdressthesubjectofpost-LOCA radiation.

effectsupon.submittal ofthePhaseZIreporttwomonthshence.g}Aging:FP&Lwilladdressagingbasesand.criteria.

atthePhaseIIreportsubmittal.

Although"aging"wasnotarequirement for'lass1Eelectrical equipment.

duringtheoperating; licensereviewperiodforStLucieUnit1,thisparameter isidentified asan"openitem"intheCESforthemajorityoftheequipment reviewed.

h}Submergence:

Per1EBulletin79-01BandtheSupplement Information, thereto,submergence isacriterion forAM/PAMequipment insidecontainment only.Environment' ecification isgivenastheFSARrequirement'or allparameters; ifinferredfromFSARdata(eg,operating time.require-ments)thisfactissonotedontheCES.Environment uglification istestreportdataasindicated intheDocumentation Reference column;ifengineering judgement/analysis astoFSARequivalency isinprocessthisfactisnotedontheCES.Whereenvironmental qualification specifics werenotavailable alettertothevendorhasbeenissuedandnotedontheCES.FP&Lisattempting toobtainresponses totheseletterswithinthenext60days.Information derivedfromtheElectricPowerResearchInstitute (EPRZ)compendium ofqualification datafrom27powerplantsissoidentified.

4-2

~~l~4.0(Continued)

Documentation.

Reference

-Specification isthePSARSectionorSub-sectionwhereintheenvironmental parameters aresetforth.Ifsuchparameters areinferredbyengineering judgement thisisnotedontheCES.Documentation Reference

-uglification delineates thetestresultparameters; ifengineering judgement wasusedthisissonoted,andifanalysesasto-equivalency areongoingthisfactappearsasafootnoteontheCES.Information derivedfromtheEPRIdataisidentified assuchand.effortsarepresently underwaytoobtaintheactualtestreport(s).

ualification Methodisindicated asthevendor'ssimultaneous orsequential testand/orengineering analysis; ifongoingengineering analysesarebeingperformed byFP&Lorourarchitect-engineer orNSSSvendorthisissonotedontheCES.Outstandin Itemsareindicated inthiscolumnwhereadditional in-formation (eg,vendor.testreports,EPRI-listed testreports)ispresently beingpursued,whereengineering analysesareunderway,whereadditional information isbeingdeveloped and/orwhereapara-meterwillbeaddressed.

duringthePhaseIIreport.NotethatFP&Lwilladdressallopenitemsidentified.

assuchinthisreport,.inthePhaseIIreporttobesubmitted withintwomonth.DuringthisintervaLadditional clarification.

onitemssuchasopera-tingtime,radiation environment etcwillbedeveloped.

and.presented inthePhaseIIreport,andthestatusofexpediting vendorrepliestotheCESopenitemswillbegiven.A"none"intheOutstandin Itemscolumnindicates that:either1').thequalification testdatameettheenvironmental parameter requiredbytheStLucieUnit1PSARor2)the=parameter isnotconstrued asa"harsh"environment; or3)theparameter isnotapplicable.

Thusa,"none"indicates nofurtheractionisrequired.

4-3 c~I4J11