05000334/FIN-2013003-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V Instructions, Procedures and Drawings requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures or drawings. Contrary to the above, on February 6, 2013 and March 6, 2013, FENOC failed accomplish the requirements of procedure NOBP-OP-1009, Prompt Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment Preparation Guide, which requires, in part, if at any time it is discovered that the operability of an SSC is impacted, notify the control room. Specifically, FENOC failed to notify the control room that the service water pipe minimum wall thickness for the prompt operability determination (POD) CR-2012- 17604 had been exceeded. CR-2012-17604 required a minimum wall thickness of 0.046 inches and the February and March non-destructive testing identified minimum wall thickness of 0.044 and 0.042 inches respectively, with no update to the POD to verify that adequate structural integrity of the pipe existed. FENOC entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 2013-05358 and verified that adequate wall thickness remained. The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of safety function, did not represent actual loss of a safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and did screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. |
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
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| Report | IR 05000334/2013003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Kern D Spindler E Carfang G Hunegs J Kulp N Floyd P Kaufman T Moslak T Ziev |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Beaver Valley - IR 05000334/2013003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Beaver Valley) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Beaver Valley)
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