05000321/FIN-2010004-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | A licensee-identified violation was discovered on December 15, 2009 for Unit 1 and Unit 2 of TS 3.7.5 which states, three control room air conditioning subsystems shall be operable during Modes 1, 2 and 3, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during core alterations, and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs). Contrary to this requirement, since January 6, 2006 it was identified that valve 1P41-F123A would not close. This valve is in the plant service water (PSW) cooling line for the non safety-related air conditioner for the Shift Managers office. PSW is also used to cool the safetyrelated main control room air conditioners. This valve is one of two valves that are designed to isolate in the event of a pipe rupture to ensure adequate PSW flow is maintained to the main control room air conditioners. Since this valve would not isolate, this portion of the line would no longer be considered single failure proof. This should have resulted in a declaration of an inoperable air conditioning subsystem and Units 1 and 2 entering the appropriate action statements required by TS 3.7.5. Immediate corrective action was taken by the licensee to isolate the upstream manual valve (1Z41-F881) and restore the operability of the main control room air conditioning subsystem. The significance of this finding was screened using the Phase 1 of the SDP in accordance with NRC IMC 0609 Attachment 4, Table 4a. Because the finding was impacted by seismic considerations, a Phase 3 analysis was conducted by the Regional Senior Reactor Analyst. The analysis determined the significance of the finding to be Green, primarily due to the very low likelihood of a seismic event strong enough to damage the non-seismic piping. Additional margin was provided by the availability of a manual isolation valve (1Z41- F881) which could be used to mitigate a pipe break within the affected area. This condition was documented in the licensees corrective action program as CR 2009111828 and LER 05000321,366/2009-006 |
Site: | Hatch ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000321/2010004 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | S Shaeffer G Johnson M Cain E Morris P Niebaum K Schaaf D Hardage |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Hatch - IR 05000321/2010004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hatch) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Hatch)
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