ML26021A192
| ML26021A192 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/2026 |
| From: | Ami Agrawal NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBB |
| To: | Gerfen P Pacific Gas & Electric Co |
| References | |
| IR 2025004 | |
| Download: ML26021A192 (0) | |
Text
January 28, 2026 Paula A. Gerfen, Senior Vice President, Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer Pacific Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 56, Mail Code 104/6 Avila Beach, CA 93424
SUBJECT:
DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2025004 AND 05000323/2025004
Dear Paula A. Gerfen:
On December 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. On January 15, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Adam Peck, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2.
P. Gerfen 2
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Ami N. Agrawal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch B Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000275 and 05000323 License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl: Distribution via GovDelivery Signed by Agrawal, Ami on 01/28/26
Non-Sensitive
Sensitive
Publicly Available
Non-Publicly Available OFFICE SRI:DORS/PBB RI:DORS/PBB SPE:DORS/PBB BC:DORS/PBB NAME MHayes NGarcia MBloodgood AAgrawal SIGNATURE
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
DATE 01/26/26 01/26/26 01/27/26 01/28/26
Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Inspection Report Docket Numbers:
05000275 and 05000323 License Numbers:
DPR-80 and DPR-82 Report Numbers:
05000275/2025004 and 05000323/2025004 Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-004-0011 Licensee:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company Facility:
Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location:
Avila Beach, CA Inspection Dates:
October 1, 2025, to December 31, 2025 Inspectors:
J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector E. Garcia, Resident Inspector M. Hayes, Senior Resident Inspector E. Lantz, Senior Resident Inspector Approved By:
Ami N. Agrawal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch B Division of Operating Reactor Safety
2
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations Failure to Correctly Plan Work to Avoid Unnecessary Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperability Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000323/2025004-01 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71111.24 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a associated with the licensees failure to follow the work planning guidance contained in Procedure AD7.DC8, Work Planning, Revision 61.
Specifically, the licensee failed to isolate an electrical circuit which resulted in unexpectedly declaring diesel generator 2-3 inoperable during maintenance.
Additional Tracking Items None.
3 PLANT STATUS Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period, except for shutting down the unit to repair a feedwater heater tube leak from December 16 through 19, 2025.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On October 5, 2025, the unit was shut down to enter refueling outage 25. On November 4, 2025, the unit began a controlled power ascension to rated power after completing refueling outage 25. The unit reached full power on November 7, 2025. The unit remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk-significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY 71111.04 - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)
Unit 2 spent fuel pool gravity makeup from refueling water storage tank during core offload on October 14, 2025 (2)
Unit 1 component cooling water pump 1-3 on December 11, 2025 Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 2 high head safety injection system on October 30, 2025.
4 71111.05 - Fire Protection Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)
Unit 2 containment 117-foot elevation on October 16, 2025 (2)
Unit 2 containment 91-foot elevation on October 16, 2025 (3)
Unit 2 containment 140-foot elevation on October 31, 2025 71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
(1)
Units 1 and 2 component cooling water testing on November 17, 2025 71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR)
Due to the government shutdown, this inspection was completed remotely via in office document review from December 5 to 12, 2025. The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing documents associated with the following activities in Unit 2 during refueling outage 2R25.
PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified that the following nondestructive examination and welding activities were performed appropriately:
(1)
Ultrasonic Examination pressurizer, weld girth 1 charging, WIB-858K, socket weld component cooling water, 25-VI, 25-IV, lug welds and baseplate reactor coolant, WIB-435, Line 16-14 SPL, pipe to elbow Dye Penetrant Examination charging, WIB-858K, socket weld Visual 1 Examination reactor coolant, reactor coolant pump seal house bolts, 12 component cooling water, 25-VI, 25-IV, lug welds
5 PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.02)
No ASME Code inspection of vessel upper head penetration was required this outage.
PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified the licensee is managing the boric acid corrosion control program through a review of the following evaluations:
(1) 51262879, chemical and volume control, CVCS-2-195 body-to-bonnet 51271825, safety injection, SI pump 2-1 discharge flange 51272594, chemical and volume control, welded joint above CVCS-2-8514 51276814, spent fuel, SFS-2-75 Bonnet Bolts 51262410, chemical and volume control, CVCS-2-273 pipe cap 51277473, safety injection, accumulator 2-3 outlet weld PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities (Section 03.04)
No ASME Code inspection of the steam generator tubes was required this outage.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)
(1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 shutdown activities during the start of refueling outage 2R25 on October 4, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors observed and evaluated a crew of licensed operators during simulator training on November 19, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)
Emergency diesel generator governors on October 29, 2025 (2)
Unit 2 chemical and volume control system check valves on December 1, 2025
6 71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)
Unit 2 Yellow shutdown outage risk during lowered inventory with a single source of offsite power available on October 8, 2025 (2)
Unit 1 feedwater heater 1-5C emergent tube leak repair on December 17, 2025 71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)
Unit 2 blown fuse during component cooling water pump 2-1 recirculation valve relay replacement causing emergency diesel generator 2-3 inoperability on November 13, 2025 71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors evaluated Unit 2 refueling outage 2R25 activities from October 5, 2025, to November 5, 2025.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
(1)
Unit 2 source range detector replacements on October 6, 2025 (2)
Unit 2 component cooling water pump 2-1 recirculation valve relay replacement on November 12, 2025 (3)
Unit 1 auxiliary building 480 V switchgear supply fan S-44 maintenance on November 17, 2025 (4)
Unit 2 battery charger 221 two-year periodic maintenance on November 18, 2025 (5)
Unit 1 safety injection pump 1-1 following 8-year coupling maintenance on December 3, 2025 Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)
Unit 2 emergency diesel generator outage testing on October 5, 2025 (2)
Unit 2 auxiliary saltwater pump 2-2 testing on December 8, 2025
7 Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)
Unit 2 containment isolation valve testing on October 16, 2025 (2)
Unit 1 containment isolation valve testing on December 16, 2025 OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE 71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)
(1)
Unit 1 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
(2)
Unit 2 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
(1)
Unit 1 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
(2)
Unit 2 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025) 71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)
Emergency diesel generator 2-2 jacket water pump replacement frequency overdue on November 7, 2025 (2)
Unit 1 feedwater heater 1-5C high level causing a shutdown for repairs on December 15, 2025 71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in water intrusion during heavy rains that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
INSPECTION RESULTS Failure to Correctly Plan Work to Avoid Unnecessary Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperability Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000323/2025004-01 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71111.24 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a associated with the licensees failure to follow the work
8 planning guidance contained in Procedure AD7.DC8, Work Planning, Revision 61.
Specifically, the licensee failed to isolate an electrical circuit which resulted in unexpectedly declaring diesel generator 2-3 inoperable during maintenance.
==
Description:==
On September 29, 2025, Unit 2 experienced a spurious opening of component cooling water pump 2-1 recirculation valve FCV-606. FCV-606 provides pump protection to component cooling water (CCW) pump 2-1 during low flow conditions. At the time of the valve opening CCW pump 2-1 was operating normally. Operations personnel were dispatched to attempt to close FCV-606 from its local control handswitch. Personnel were able to get FCV-606 closed while holding the control switch in the closed position, but the valve would reopen sometime after releasing the handswitch. The valve remained open until October 24, 2025, when the valve was shut by operations. After investigation, plant personnel made the decision to calibrate relay 37HF12.
On November 11, 2025, maintenance personnel removed and attempted to calibrate relay 37HF12. During the calibration personnel had trouble getting the relay into tolerance and a decision was made to reinstall the removed relay and attempt to recalibrate the relay the next day. During reinstallation plant personnel inadvertently contacted an incorrect termination point and blew two fuses, UY-01 and UA, in the circuit. The termination points were partially taped for electrical isolation, but this was not sufficient to isolate the circuit during inadvertent contact between two wires. When the fuses blew operations lost white potential light indication for all components associated with electrical bus F. Operations still had open/close light indication for bus F and did not receive any undervoltage component starts on bus F. Operations performed an operability assessment and determined overall safety function was not affected because they believed undervoltage bus protection was still maintained. During the operability assessment operators referred to a similar failure in a prior notification on bus G.
On November 12, 2025, the residents reviewed the notification associated with the blown fuse, SAPN 51311497, and the previous occurrence of blown fuses in a similar circuit on safety bus G. This notification, SAPN 50543217, initially stated diesel generator operation was not impacted with this condition, but in a later task stated the diesel generator would not auto sequence emergency loads onto the bus during a loss of power from the normal source.
This was due to the failure keeping a load shed signal in on all motor loads associated with bus G. The inspectors presented the results of SAPN 50543217 to operations and engineering management for evaluation. After investigation operations declared diesel generator 2-3 inoperable.
Corrective Actions: Maintenance replaced the blown fuses and replaced relay 37HF12 and returned FCV-606 to service.
Corrective Action References: Notifications 51311497, 51311564, and 50543217 Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to isolate electrical circuits while performing relay calibration to prevent unintended equipment actuations was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to isolate the circuit electrically caused an
9 unanticipated inoperability of emergency diesel generator 2-3 when maintenance workers landed a wire associated with maintenance on relay 37HF12.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not affect the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, did not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) function of a single train technical specification system for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, did not represent a loss of the PRA function of one train of a multi-train technical specification system for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, did not represent a loss of the PRA function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, did not represent a loss of a PRA system or function as defined in the plant risk information book (PRIB) or the licensees PRA for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and did not represent a loss of the PRA function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 3 days.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.
Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately update the clearance package to electrically isolate the system prior to performing maintenance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, written procedures shall be maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 9, states, in part, maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances.
AD7.DC8, Work Planning, Revision 61, step 8.8.1.a, states in part, when performing maintenance on electrical equipment, the equipment shall be isolated to prevent any unintended equipment actuations.
Contrary to the above, on November 11, 2025, the licensee failed to properly perform maintenance on safety-related electrical equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to isolate the circuit associated with relay 37HF12, while performing relay calibrations, to prevent the unintended fuse clearing of fuses UY-01 and UA when landing electrical wires which resulted in the inoperability of diesel generator 2-3.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
10 EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On December 22, 2025, the inspectors presented the Unit 2 inservice inspection results to Blair Jones, Vice President Business and Technical Services, and other members of the licensee staff.
On January 15, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Adam Peck, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
11 DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Inspection Procedure Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Date 106714-2 Component Cooling Water 73 106718-10 Units 1 & 2 Inside Auxiliary Building 203 107707-2 Reactor Coolant System 55 107708-2 Chemical Volume and Control System 127 107708-5 Chemical Volume and Control System 135 107709-2 Safety Injection 63 Drawings 107709-3 Safety Injection 67 AD8.DC55 SFP Gravity Makeup Valve Reference List 50 OP AP-22 Spent Fuel Pool Abnormalities 37 71111.04 Procedures OP B-3A:II Safety Injection System Alignment Verification for Plant Startup 24 111805-42 Containment Building Elev. 117' 3
111906-29 Containment Building Elev. 91' 7
111906-30 Containment Building Elev. 117' 7
71111.05 Drawings 111906-31 Containment Building Elev. 140' 6
Corrective Action Documents Notifications 51109260, 51144943, 51201059, 51225507 MA1.ID20 Testing/Inspections for Aux Saltwater System NRC Generic Letter 89-13 Compliance 9
PEP M-234 CCW Heat Exchanger Performance Test 20, 21, 22 71111.07A Procedures STP M-26A FCV-601, ASW Unit 1 and 2 Cross-Tie Dividing Valve, Flow Test 13 50601807 Quick HIT Self-Assessment for Reactor Coolant System Materials Degradation Management Program (RCS MDMP) and Steam Generator Management Program (SGMP) 11/06/2013 51057867 ASMP SAQH Weld Program QHSA 07/20/2021 Miscellaneous 51067384 DCPP Inservice Inspection Program 2020 Formal Self-Assessment 06/25/ 2020 AD4.ID2 Plant Leakage Evaluation 15 ER1.ID2 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program 9
71111.08P Procedures ISI X 2 Visual Inspection of Reactor Upper Internals and Fuel Assembly Guide Pins 2A
12 Inspection Procedure Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Date ISI X-101 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Pressure Test (Portions of ASME Class 1 and 2 Requiring Operator Assistance) 9 MA3 Special Processes 3A NDE VT 2-1 Visual Examination During Section XI System Pressure Test 7
STP R-8C Containment Walkdown for Evidence of Boric Acid Leakage 13A WDI-STD-088 Underwater Remote Visual Examination of Reactor Vessel Internals 20 WDI-STD-1 013 (PDI-ISI-254-SE-NB)
Remote In Service Inspection of Reactor Vessel Nozzle to Safe End, Nozzle to Pipe and Safe End to Pipe Welds Using the Nozzle Scanner 3
WDI-STD-146 ET Examination of Reactor Vessel Pipe Welds Inside Surface 16 71111.11Q Procedures OP L-4 Unit 2, Normal Operation at Power 92 Corrective Action Documents Notifications 51307931, 51308323 MP M-21.8 Diesel Engine Governor Actuator Maintenance 29 71111.12 Procedures STP M-21-SCH Diesel Engine Inspections - General Procedure 15 Corrective Action Documents Notifications 51156419, 51315323 Miscellaneous 2R25 Outage Safety Plan 0
AD8.DC51 Outage Safety Management Control of Off-Site Power Supplies to Vital Buses 22 AR PK10-16 FDWTR HTRS LEVEL HI 21 OP C-7:IV Condensate System - Feedwater Heaters Remove from Service 11 71111.13 Procedures OP O-36 Protected Equipment Postings 33A 71111.15 Corrective Action Documents Notifications 50543217, 51311497 Miscellaneous 2R25 Outage Safety Plan 0
OP L-0 Mode Transition Checklists 92 OP L-1 Unit 2, Plant Heatup from Hot Shutdown to Hot Standby 97 OP L-2 Hot Standby to Startup Mode 48 71111.20 Procedures OP L-3 Secondary Plant Startup 64
13 Inspection Procedure Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Date OP L-5 Plant Cooldown from Minimum Load to Cold Shutdown 100 OP L-6 Cold Shutdown/Refueling 44 Corrective Action Documents Notifications 51287579, 51287740, 51287754, 51311497, 51311564 MP I-2.32-1 Source/Intermediate Range Detector Replacement 6
STP I-37-N31.A Source Range N31 Channel Operational Test 5
STP I-37-N31.B Source Range N31 Channel Calibration 15 STP I-37-N32.A Source Range N32 Channel Operational Test 5
STP I-37-N32.B Source Range N32 Channel Calibration 16 STP I-4B4 Determination of Source Range Detector Characteristic Curves 23 STP M-13F 4kV Bus F Non-SI Auto-Transfer Test 72 STP M-13G 4kV Bus G Non-SI Auto-Transfer Test 64A STP M-13H 4kV Bus H Non-SI Auto-Transfer Test 55 STP M-15 Integrated Test of Engineered Safeguards and Diesel Generators 81 STP M-8D Combined Type B and C Leakage Evaluation 9
Procedures STP V-600 Valve and Penetration Leakage Summary 29 71111.24 Work Orders WO 60174540, 60174543, 60177645, 64158439, 64198967, 64246354, 64258830, 64258831, 64262446, 64306434 Corrective Action Documents Notifications 51133450, 51300035, 51315323 MP M-21.5 Diesel Engine Water Pump Replacement 7
STP M-21-ENG.4 Diesel Engine Generator Inspection (Every Fourth Refueling Outage) 14 71152A Procedures STP M-21-ENG.8 Diesel Engine Generator Inspection (Every Eighth Refueling Outage) 5A Corrective Action Documents Notifications 50573202 71152S Work Orders WO 60059552