05000260/LER-2009-008, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Inoperable Longer than Allowed by the Plants Technical Specifications

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Inoperable Longer than Allowed by the Plants Technical Specifications

ML093360186
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry  (DPR-052)
Issue date:	11/24/2009
From:	West R Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 09-008-00
Download: ML093360186 (7)

LER-2009-008, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Inoperable Longer than Allowed by the Plants Technical Specifications

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
2602009008R00 - NRC Website

text

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 November 24, 2009 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Facility Operating Licenses No. DPR-52 NRC Docket No. 50-260

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 50-260/2009-008 The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) provides details of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System being inoperable longer than allowed by the plant's Technical Specifications.

The Tennessee Valley Authority is submitting this report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact F. R. Godwin, Site Licensing and Industry Affairs Manager, at (256) 729-2636.

Respectfully,

.G. West Vice President cc: See page 2

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 November 24, 2009 Enclosure cc (w/ Enclosure):

NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 08/31/2010 (9-2007)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. PAGE Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2 05000260 1 of 5

4. TITLE: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Inoperable Longer Than Allowed By the Plant's Technical Specifications

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBERMONTH AY YEAR N/A N/A FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 09 30 2009 2009 008 00 11 24 2009 N/A N/A

9. OPERATING MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

El 20.2201(b)

[I 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

El 20.2201(d)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

El 20.2203(a)(1)

El 20.2203(a)(4)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

[I 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(x)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

[E 50.36(c)(2)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

[: 73.71(a)(4)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

El 73.71(a)(5) 000 El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

El OTHER E] 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

ED 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) spFiyormAbstrant belo6 a6 or NRC

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Steve Austin, Licensing Engineer 256-729-2070MANU-REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SY MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX X

BN 65 W290 Y

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION

[]

YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

Z NO DATE N/A N/A N/A ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On September 30, 2009, at approximately 0830 hours0.00961 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15815e-4 months <br /> Central Daylight Time, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)

Site Engineering personnel concluded that during a September 29, 2009, manual reactor scram, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system pump failed to inject into the reactor vessel in response to decreasing water level. At the time the conclusion was made, Unit 2 was in Mode 3 with reactor pressure less than 150 psig; thus, the RCIC system was not required to be operable in accordance with the Applicability of Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.3, RCIC System. Consequently, no entry into the associated TS actions was required.

Previously, on September 12, 2009, BFN personnel noted that plant data indicated that since August 27, 2009, the output from the Woodward Electric Governor-Magnetic Pickup (EG-M) control box was lower than expected.

On September 29, 2009, the Unit 2 RCIC system failed to properly start and inject into the reactor vessel when the Reactor Vessel Low Low, Level 2 (-45 inches) setpoint was reached following a manual reactor scram.

Because the RCIC system failed to inject when needed and the governor output had been lower than expected for an extended period of time, TVA has concluded that the RCIC system had been inoperable longer than the TS 3.5.3, Required Action A.2 Completion Time of 14 days. The root cause of this event was a failure to enter a condition adverse to quality into the corrective action program. When the HPCI system was inoperable, it remained available for injection into the reactor pressure vessel except for a total of five minutes. During the time periods that the HPCI system was unavailable, the remaining emergency core cooling systems were available to perform the HPCI system function. Therefore, TVA concludes that there was no significant reduction in the protection of the public by this event.

NRC FORM 366 (9-2007)

(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

E.

Scram With Complications Consideration:

This event was not a complicated scram according to NEI 99-02.

VIII. COMMITMENTS

None.