ML23156A393

PR-073 - 49FR23867 - Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments

ML23156A393
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/08/1984
From:	Chilk S NRC/SECY
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PR-073, 49FR23867
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ADAMS Template: SECY-067 06/08/1984 PR-073 - 49FR23867 - MODIFICATION OF PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS PR-073 49FR23867 RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

DOCKET FILE INVENTORY Document Docket No.

Date 01 06/05/84 02 07/05/84 03 07 /11/84 04 07/16/84

. 05 08/06/84 06 08/15/84 07 08/27/84 08 09/06/84 09 09/07/84 10 09/10/84 11 09/10/84 12 09/10/84 13 09/10/84 14 09/10/84 15 09/10/84 16 09/10/84 17 09/10/84

. 18 09/10/84 19 09/10/84 Docket No. PR-73

( 49 FR 23867)

In the Matter of MODIFICATION OF PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS VOLUME 1 Date of Title or Document Oescrietion of Document 06/05/84 Federal Register Notice - Proposed rule (published 06/08/84) 07/02/84 Corrments TSMT (Mayer) (1) 06/25/84 Co1T111ents University of Illinois at Chicago (Ruekberg) (2) 07 /10/84 Corrments John Parkyn (3) 08/01/84 Comments Long Island Lighting Company (Leonard) (4) 08/13/84 Comnents Transnuclear, Inc. (Mangusi)

(4A) 08/22/84 Corrments Missouri Department of Natural Resources (Kucera) (5) 07/20/84 Comments Iowa State Department of Health (Eure) (6) 09/06/84 Comments Department of Energy (Garrison)

(7) 09/10/84 Note to Receipients regarding Co11111ent No. 4A 08/31/84 Comments Minnesota Environment Quality Board (Kalitowski) (8) 09/05/84 Comments Chessie System Railroads (Blank) (9) 09/07/84 Co11111ents Carolina Power & Light Company (Zimmerman) (10) 09/10/84 Comments LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae

( Trosten) ( 11) 09/06/84 Co11111ents Duke Power Company (Tucker)

(12) 09/07/84 Comments Washington Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council (Lewis) (13) 09/07/84 Comments Electric Power Research Institute (Stahlkopf) (14) 09/07/84 Colllllents Baltimore Gas & Electric (Bennett) (15) 09/10/84 Corrments Wisconsin Electric Power Company (Fay) (16) j

PR-73 (49 FR 23867)

. 20 09/11/84 09/05/84 Comments Lindsay Audin (17) 21 09/11/84 09/06/84 Comments Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (Etchison) (18) 22 09/11/84 09/10/84 Comments Atomic Industrial Foru, Inc.

(Wiggin) (19) 23 09/12/84 09/10/84 Comments Ecology/Alert (Nemethy) (20) 24 09/13/84 09/10/84 Comments Houston Lighting & Power

{Wisenburg) (21) 25 09/13/84 09/11/84 Comments Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (Eisenberg) (22) 26 09/13/84 undated Comments Sierra Club Radioactive Waste 27 09/13/84 09/10/84 Campaign (Resnikoff) (23)

Comments General Electric (Flowers) (24) 28 09/14/84 09/10/84 Comments Virginia State Office of Energency and Energy Services

( S 1 ayton) ( 25 )

29 09/17/84 09/10/84 Comments State of Rhode Island and 30 09/20/84 09/14/84 Providence Plantations (V11d) (26)

Comments Middle South Services, Inc.

(Killar) (27) 31 09/21/84 09/13/84 Comments Washington Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council (Lewis) (28) 32 09/27/84 09/25/84 Cormnents State of Wisconsin Radioactive 33 Waste Review Board (Strohl) (29) 10/15/84 10/12/84 Comments City of New York Commissioner of Health (Sencer) (30) 34 10/18/84 09/27/84 Cormnents Governor of State of Utah (Matheson) (31) 35 10/18/84 10/16/84 Ltr NRC Chairman Palladino to Governor of Utah (Honorable Matheson) acknowledging comment No. 31 36 01/25/85 01/15/85 Comments Michigan Department of Public Health (Jager) (32)

Mr. Samuel Chilk STATE OF MICHIGAN JAMES J. BLANCHARD, Governor DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEAL TH 3500 N. LOGAN P.O. BOX 30035, LANSING, MICHIGAN 48909 GLORIA R. SMITH, Ph.D., M.P.H., F.A.A.N., Director January 15, 1985 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

Dear Mr. Ch4lk:

During the December 5, 1984, Region III State Liaison Affairs meeting, NRC representatives indicated that state comments on the proposed modification to Rule 10 CFR 73, published in the 6/8/84 Federal Register, Vol. 49, No. 112, would continue to be considered, despite the September 10, 1984, closing date.

We appreciate the extended oppor-tunity to comment on the prepared rulemaking.

Michigan has several concerns regarding the proposed rule relaxations.

These concerns are amplified by two factors; 1), the regulations are being relaxed just prior to a time period in which there will be a significant increase in the number of spent fuel shipments due to the opening of the first high-level radioactive waste repository and/or a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facility; and 2), the recent Inconsistency Rulings by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) indicate federal resistance to state imposition of safeguards.

For example, the DOT has ruled that Michigan cannot impose stricter communications and escort requirements for spent fuel shipments passing through the state. The State of Michigan requests that the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) carefully consider the following comments:

1.

The recent studies used as justification for the proposed rules relaxation have only considered radiological health impacts as viable public impacts.

Any sabotage attempt, regardless of its success, will cause severe consequences.

The public will fear the contamination of air, water, and food and will be unwilling to live in the area of the sabotage attempt.

A local exodus is likely.

One only has to look to examples such as Times Beach or Three Mile Island to realize that impacts to public well-being caused by adverse public reaction may far outweigh the radiological health impacts the studies have predicted.

IL'- NUdEA~ lt(CO\\.i.161tt' <;OMMISSdi DOCmlNG & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Date _jm /?.S-~ - -

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Mr. Samuel Chilk January 15, 1985 Page 2

2.

The recent studies assert that there will be no early fatalities caused by a sabotage attempt using high explosives. It is difficult to understand why a high explosive sabotage attempt would not kill somebody, particularly if the attempt is located at a truck stop or some other non-isolated location.

3.

Apparently the recent studies did not include a scenario in which a shipment is hijacked, mechanically opened, or partially opened and strategically placed so that an explosive would cause maximum contamination.

Such a scenario should be considered and impacts evaluated prior to making a decision to relax security requirements.

4.

Only radiological health impacts from inhalation of contaminated respirable particulates generated by a sabotage attempt were considered.

The health impacts from water and food supplies contaminated by a sabotage attempt should also be considered.

5.

The Commission apparently believes the cost of existing security cannot be justified. The cleanup after even a partially successful sabotage attempt could entail soil removal, equipment disposal, water resource cleanup, and potentially the purchase of private residences in a sabotage area and would therefore.be very costly.

If the currently applicable security regulations prevent only one sabotage attempt and ensuing cleanup, the cost of the security will have been justifiable. Secondly, the Department of Energy will be taking title to spent fuel shipments going to repositories and MRS facilities, and therefore the federal government will be bearin9 security costs as well as any cleanup costs.

6.

The recent studies referenced discounted the scenario of detonating high explosives in close proximity to a spent fuel shipment due to safety considerations to the person detonating the explosives.

This assumption has been shown to be invalid by the r~cent, very effective, suicide truck bombings.

The impact from this type of sabotage attempt must be evaluated.

7.

The recent studies did not consider that the spent fuel shipment casks may be re-designed (transport/disposal) into lighter casks that can hold larger amounts of spent fuel than the existing casks that were evaluated.

The test results would not be applicable to any casks except those that were tested in the studies.

8.

Eliminating prior route approval and advance local law enforcement agency coordination will severely hinder the states' efforts to fill the gaps left by the security relaxations (elimination of armed guards and communications center). Other states' experience has shown that the existing prenotification procedures are not always as timely as the regulations require and are therefore not adequate for security planning purposes.

Mr. Samuel Chilk January 15, 1985 Page 3 The State of Michigan opposes the proposed security relaxations for the reasons given.

We hope the Commission carefully considers our comments.

We thank you for the opportunity to comment and look forward to your response.

LEJ/CMh cc:

Charles Cribley, MSP William Rucinski, MSP James Pitz, MDOT Very truly yours, L- ~~~

Lee E. Jager, P.E., Chief Bureau of Environmental and Occupational Health

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The Honorable Scott M. Matheson Governor of Utah Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Dear Governor Matheson:

Thank you for your letter of September 27, 1984 concerning the proposed changes in the requirements for safeguarding spent nuclear fuel.

We apprec i ate having the benefit of your views.

We have received extensive comments in response

• to this proposed rulemaking, some favoring the proposed changes and others expressing concerns.

A copy of these comments was provided to a member of your staff on October 3, 1984.

Over the next few months we wi l l be reassessing the costs and benefits of the proposed changes in light of these comments.

The issues identifi ed in your letter will be fully evaluated and considered in the course of this reass essment.

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Nunzio J. Palladino

ScOTT M. MATHESON GOVERNOR STATE OF UTAH OF"F"ICE OF" T~E GOVERNOR

$ALT LAKE CITY 84114 September 27, 1984 The Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission 1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20555

Dear Chairman Palladino:

KETE~

USNRC

.84 OCT 18 A9 :J The state of Utah has examined the Nuclear Regulatory Corrnnission's (NRC) proposed changes in safeguarding requirements for shipments of spent nuclear fuel and urges tne COrrmission to retain the existing safeguarding standards for the following reasons.

The Corrmission proposes to eliminate armed escorts for shipments of spent fuel cooled 150 days or more on the basis of conclusions drawn from recent studies involving models of present generation transportation casks.

In light of the fact that l arger, less expensive casks are being considered for the transportation of these fuels, changing physical protection requirements at this tirne seems premature.

The state would also like to point out that there will be a monumental increase in the number of shipments of this type once a repository is open for waste acceptance. The ramifications of this increase, in regard to the security of these shiµnents, are uncertain and warrant a conservative approach to safeguarding.

Finally, the cost to the industry to provide this physical protection, as reported in the federal register on June 8, 1984, is a nominal

$27,000 per. year. This amount is well spent providing a deterrent to sabotage attacks or attenpts by terrorists to obtain isotopes contained within these shipments.

AS such, existing safeguarding measures may afford protection* to transportation persoMel and members of the general public f rom non-radiological, as well as, radiological dangers.

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The Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino September 27, 1984 Page The comnission is also considering elimination of route surveys and advance coordination with local law enforcement agencies. Because of new Department of Transportation (DOT) routing requirements (49 CFR 177.825) the NRC suggests that their advance coordinaton efforts as required by 10 CFR 73 are redundant.

The state of Utah, however, finds that NRC regulations and ror's regulations do not duplicate nooe specific requirements and therefore urges that route surveys and advance coordina~ion requirements be retained.

Governor SMM:jh

oOGKET NUMBER PR-'ii3 P.J<<}~OSEO BULE THE CITY OF NEW YORK ~9 /=£.. ~~?6 ~~

COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH

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David J. Sencer, M.D., M.P.H.

125 WORTH STREET NEW YORK, N. Y. 10013 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission United States Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D. C.

20555 DOCKETf.fl USNRC

• a4 OCT 15 Pl :13 19 nQf.Fi:. ::. OF SECRI: A1 October 12, oOOCKETING & SERVI!

BRANCH Commission Attention :

Docketing and Service Branch Re:

Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 73

Dear Secretary Chilk :

I wish to submit the following comments on subject proposed change.

In general, the regulations appear to represent an abrogation of governmental responsibilities and turning over to private industry the protection of the public.

Specifically, I point to the following issues :

1)

NRC would no longer require an armed guard and would substitute the truck driver or train engineer for the guard.

2)

NRC would no longer approve routes for spent reactor fuel shipments and leave them to industry.

3)

NRC would no longer require coordination with local enforcement agencies of the communities through which shipments would be made and would substitute a letter to the governor (not even registered) post-marked seven (7) days prior to the shipment.

I trust these comments will be t aken into consideration.

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See Distribution Sincerely, 1 Dav'::? 1

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Distribut ion:

Hon. Joseph McGough Hon. Richard Mendes Hon. Martha Holstein Hon. Brendan Sexton Ms. Judith Chesser Hon. Jean Cropper Leonard Solon, M.D.

Mr. Marvin Bogner Wilfredo Lopez, Esq.

STATE OF WISCONSIN RADIOACTIVE WASTE REVIEW BOARD

• a4 SEP 27 P 4 :28 September 25, 1984 Mr. Samuel Chilk, Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

921 Tenney Building 110 E Main Street Madison, WI 53702 (608) 266-0597 (608) 267-7615 The Technical Advi sory Council of the Wisconsin Radioactive Waste Review Board has reviewed the proposed rule modification to 10 CFR Part 73, which relaxes previousl y adopted interim safeguard measures for spent fuel shipments.

The Review Board is submitting the attached comments to be entered into the record and considered by the staff in the Commission.

Joseph Strohl, Chairman Wisconsin Radi oact ive Waste Review Board Attach.

Sp:.i r.*,

Mr. Samuel Chilk - September 24, 1984

2.

The revisions of 10 CFR Part 73 [modification of protection requirements for spent fuel shipments] cannot be supported by the documentation which is made by the NRC.

The deletion of route surveys and advance coordination with local law enforcement agencies is counter to the concept of local government concern and responsibility. Without route surveys for all spent fuel shipments it would be difficult the assess the local entities emergency preparedness and response capabilities. The elimination of armed escorts with other deletions pertain to spent fuel cooled for 150 days or more.

These deletions are based on three studies: "Final Report on Shipping Cast Sabotage Source Investigation (NRC)",

"Assessment of the Safety of Spent Fuel Transportation in Urban Environs (DCJE) 11 and 11Pier Review (US Army)".

The modifications are listed in the Federal Register of June 8, 1984.

According to these studies the.. Average Radiological Consequence" of postulated terrorist attack in a heavily populated area "would be no early tatalities and less than l (0.4) latent cancer fatalities and the calculated peak radiological consequence "is no early fatalities and less than 3 (2.9) latent cancer fatalities". These figures do not reflect the findings of earlier studies (SAND 77-1927, NUREG-0194, NUREG-0170) which state that a worst case effect of an attack might result in up to 60 early fatalities, 1600 on orbibities and 1300 latent cancers (SAND 82-2365).

The Comnission's consequence analysis considers only health effects resulting from a respirable release. A worst case analysis must also consider potential human health consequences from the contamination of surface water, in the event that a cask is imnersed in water following a successful penetration, and from contamination of the imnediate blast area. The three studies indicate that unirradiated fuel was used or simulated.

Even with computer modeling such tests without irradiated fuel over 150 days old are questionable. These tests also indicate that one HED (High Explosive Device) on a cask will have health ettects estimates that only include exposure due to the release of airborne, respirable particles less than 10 microns in diameter.

The health effects model (DOE) "uses calculated airborne and ground radionuclide concentrations to estimate the public:s exposure to (1) external radiation trom airborne radionuclides in the clouds and radionuclides deposited from the cloud onto the ground and (2) internal radiation from radionuclides inhaled directly from the passing cloud, inhaled resuspended radionuclides and injested contaminated food and milk".

This study is a complete analysis for the aerosols.

However the aerosols represent only a small fraction of the total material released.

DOE conducted HED tests on release fractions for one-quarter and full scale models.

The fraction of fuel released as aerosol for one-quarter scale was 5.1 x 10-5 and for full scale it was 1.4 x 10-5. Total fraction of fuel released for one-quarter scale was 3.6 x 10-3 and for full scale it was 1.3 x 10-2.

Percent of release that was aerosoled for one-quarter scale was 1.4% and for full scale was.1%.

In the test the other 99% of the fuel that is released from the cask covers the chamber walls and floors where the test are conducted.

The test does not reflect a real situation.

In a real situation, we need to know how tar would it go, how much of it can we realistically expect to clean up, and what are the occupational and public exposures that would result?

Mr. Samuel Chilk - September 24, 1984

3.

Unlike a typical transportation accident, an explosive attack would result in a loss of shielding and therefore direct external exposures should also be considered in the estimation of health effects, particularly among first responders and clean-up personnel.

An act of sabotage is designed to produce worst effects therefore worst case scenarios and risk estimates must include an inversion layer and more than one jet.

DOE does not indicate if these scenarios were considered.

Use of scenarios which increase the health effect estimates by factors of 2 or 10 does not counter balance the decrease in fuel release projections, from initial hypothized values of 14,000 g to a val ue of 34 g based on real experimental evidence. Scientific evidence should not deal with speculation but with facts.

The Commission should consider health effects of inhalation of particles up to l&

microns in diameter.

While particles smaller than 7 microns are most likely to be deposited in the bronchial and lungs particles up to 15 microns may be inhaled and deposited in the oral and nasal cavities. The Commission should also base its peak conseQuence calculations on population exposure assumptions 11more severe than those postulated in NUREG/CR-0743---(e.g., localized areas, such as stadiums, with extremely high population densities) 11 Assumptions regarding location, topography (e.g., elevation) and meteorological conditions should also be made.

The Commission's conseQuence analysis also does not consider the effect of spent fuel thennal output and potential loss of coolant on the magnitude and characteristic of a respirable release.

The NRC must consider loss of coolant in resulting fuel rod perforation in determining worse case health effects. DuE:s own technical studies establish the need for such consideration:

11Current spent fuel rail cask employ auxiliary cooling systems to aid in removal of internally generated heat. If the auxiliary cooling system were to become inoperative as a result of a severe transportation accident, and no corrective action is taken to cool the cask, it is conceivable that a total loss of cavity coolant might occur.

The cavity coolant serves normally as transfer medium tor heat generated in spent fuel elements by the radioactive decay of fission products.

If emergency action is not taken to cool this spent fuel following an accident in which cavity coolant is lost, the temperature of the fuel rod may rise significantly. For one rail cask design it has been calculated that a loss ot cavity coolant could result in an equil ibrium fuel pin temperature of 858~C (1576°F) being attained after several hours.

Experiments have shown that fuel rods will perforate as a result of several hours exposure to a temperature above 650°C (1200°F), releasing all the volatile fission products in fuel rod void spaces and a fraction of the cesium. Metallic cesium has boiling point of 670~C (1238°F).

A recent NRC study has been made of cesium releases from it radiated fuel in a transportation accident.

Thi s study estimates that 6 x 10-4 of the cesium inventory in a spent fuel rod may be in the form of metallic cesium which has migrated to void boundaries and may be available for release as a result of fuel rod perforation in a high temperature environment" (DOE/ET-0028), vol. 4,

p. 6.2.14].

The Commission's postulated attack scenario underestimates the potential severity of a worse case incident and the resulting respirable release. It has considered only one mode of attack, capture and penetration by HED.

An analysis must consider other modes, such as remote attack by shoulder fired anti-tank or anti-aircraft missile, or suicide attack by truck bomb.

Mr. Samuel Chilk - September 24, 1984

4.

The studies that the Co11111ission uses i ndicate that a certain amount of knowledge of the sophistication of weapons is needed to conduct a terrorist attack.

However, a determined group even with the unsophisticated equipment and knowledge could be capable of causing much destruction.

An example would be the 1970 explosion of the Math Research Center on the University of Wisconsin-Madison campus.

The material used was less than one ton of fertilizer (a11111onium nitrate),

kerosene and primer cord. Given these considerations the elimination of armed escorts does not ensure safety and in this case could encourage attempts of subversion.

The Co11111ission has not clearly defined the maximum time duration of an attack and capture incident.

The experiments conducted by the studies appear to be premised on a maximum duration of 200 to 300 minutes.

An analysis should assume that the attacking force is able to prevent recapture of the cask and containment of releases for some stated credible time period.

The Co11111ission acknowledges that "even more severe threats cannot be rule out if an adversary is granted protracted control of a shipment and uninhibited movement". They have assumed an adversary will seize a spent fuel shipment and will detonate one charge before authorities can intervene. This assumption does not take into account the possibility the use of multiple, simultaneous or sequential high explosive devices (HED).

lhe U.S.

Army's Bolistic Research Laboratory suggested that such an action could happen and that no analysis was conducted on the extensive shrapnel effect that an HED would have by itself.

The Co11111ission should investigate the significance of thermal output for respirable releases from a large capacity cask, such as rail cask carrying 10 PWk spent fuel assemblies. There is no basis for the assertion that "for more than 3 PWR assemblies (a fully loaded rail cask could contain 10 PWR assemblies) the upper bound of release would likely increase roughly in proportion to the square root of the total number of assemblies contained in the cask." Appropriate scaling measures must account for the considerably greater thermal load for larger casks.

For example, a NLI 10/24 dale cask carrying 10 PWR assemblies has a maximum thermal load of 97 KW, compared with the 11.5 KW maximum thermal load tor an NFS-4 truck cask carrying a single PWR.

The experiments conducted by DOE and NRC do not serve as a technical justification for the moderation of current requirements for the protection of spent fuel shipments.

The "extremely severe threat scenario" developed and used in both programs did not address the following factors:

(1) thermal output of spent fuel - the experiments did not simulate the thermal environment of a cask containing spent fuel.

(2) potential for release of radioactive particles in steam from cavity coolant and cask water jacket during and following loss of cooling capability.

(3) effect of heat and radiation on fuel rod fracture behavior.

(4) basis for scaling up from subscale tests.

There is no technical justification for the Co11111ission.

1s selection of 150 days cooling time as the threshold for less stri ngent shipping security requirements.

Under the proposed rule, spent fuel 151 days out of the reactor would be treated

Mr. Samuel Chilk - September 24, 1984

5.

the same as spent fuel cooled for 10 years. Spent fuel does not suddenly become less radioactive or thermally hot at 151 days cooling.

The available data on cooling t ime relation to radioactivity and thermal output could just as easily be used to argue for the prohibitation of shipping spent fuel cooled less than 150 days, and retention of the current restrictions for spent fuel cooled less than 10 years.

Based on the cost estimates presented by NRC the net cost savings the proposed changes would have appears to be $140 per shipment.

Compared to the total cost of shipping high level waste this is not an unreasonable amount to lessen potential consequences and insure the confidence of the public.

For the reasons previously stated we strenuously object to the modification of 10 CFR Part 73 and wish to keep in place the interim regulations.

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ENERGY FACILITY SITE EVALUATION CQhr.C:ll Mail Stop PY-11 Olympia, Washington 98504 *

(206) 459-6490 ** (se1/4 ~J5-6f 9f? :Q 1 September 13, 1984 Secretary of the Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention :

uocketing and Service Branen

Dear Sir :

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OOCKE-ING & SER BRANCH The state of Washington is transmitting comments to the Com-mission in response to Public Affairs bulletin number NRC :

V-1984 concerning NRC proposal for "Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments," 10 CFR Part 73, pub-lished in the June 8, 1984 Federal Register.

You will recall that in a letter dated September 7, 1984, we informed you that these comments would be slightly delayed beyond the due date of September 10, 1984.

It is our view that there may be certain portions of the existing regulations which should be retained.

These would include state route approval for shipments and advance co-ordination with local eriforcement agencies.

In addition, we have concerns that the analysis undertaken by Sandia,which is used as a basis for the amendments, concentrates on the radio-logical consequences of sabotage.

In fact, there are other concerns (physiological,political and socioeconomic) which are also important and require careful consideration before re-ducing security requirements.

I have attached to our comment letter the detailed responses of several state agenci es which have participated in the review of these proposed regulations.

Thank you for your considera ion of these comments.

NDL:lm Attachments :

3 Acknowledged by cart! ** 1k/~

Chairman

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101 DOCKET!. G /l I_,,

OFFICE Ot Posit;" r1, Co~.,

Jt lHN ',PELL MAN Governor DEPARTMENT or EMERGENCY SERVICES

-UlO E. Martin W<1y Olympi,1, V\\/c1shmNI< 11 1-J

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. l<J I (SCAN) 214-5255 HUGH FOWLER Dire-tor September 6, 1984

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SEP 07 199,i ENERGY FACILITY SITE EVALUATION COUNCIL TO:

FROM:

SUBJ:

w f't;M EMO RAND UM NICHOLAS D. ~l),(r,HAIRMAN ENERGY FACILITY SITE EVALUATION COUNCIL

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,v HUGH H. FOWLER, DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COMMENTS ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO NRC REQUIREMENTS (CFR PART 73)

GOVERNING USED NUCLEAR FUEL SHIPMENTS The above referenced document has been reviewed as requested.

Safeguards proposed and requirements for prior notification of the state seven days in advance of a shipment are adequate for pre-planning purposes and should not pose a breakdown in response capability.

HHF:LDM:cc 3

J< >HN SPELLMAN Governor Sl ATE OF WASHINGTON W ASHINGTON ST A TE PATROL NEIL W MOLONEY Chief General Administration Building AX-12

• Olympia Wa~hington 9850-1 (206) 753-6540 (SCAN) 234-6540 September 1 O, 1984 Mr. Nicholas D. Lewis Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council State of Washington Mail Stop PY -11 Olympia, WA 98504

Dear Mr. Lewis:

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SEP 1 ~~ 19S ENERGY FACILITY SITE EVALUATION COUNCIL This is in reply to your letter of July 19, 1984 regarding Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proposed amendments to requirements covering used nuclear fuel shipments (10 CFR Part 73).

I feel that the interim requirements for route approval of shipments and advance coordination with local enforcement agencies should be continued. My rationale is that without coordination of routes, NRC would perhaps have to re-route shipments due to route closures or other conditions. The coordination with local enforcement agencies would facilitate surveillance, security, or other desirable actions if NRC should determine there is a need.

Although the removal of all four requirements will have limited impact on state jurisdictions, I feel the two identified should be continued for the best interest of NRC and the state through which shipments must travel.

Sincerely,

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CHIEF NEIL W. MOLONEY-.-r--*

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August 9, 1984 TO:

Nicholas D. Lewis, Chairman Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council FROM:

John A. Beare, M.D., M.P.H.

Di rector L).,)

Divis ion of Hea 1th ET-21

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SUBJECT:

MODIFICATION TO 10 CFR PART 73 lR)~©§O\\'!J§~

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AUG 1 J 19~-l FNERGY FACILITY SITE EVALUATION COUNCIL Staff and I have reviewed the proposed changes to 10 CFR 73 p~rtaining to the security of used nuclear fuel shipments while in transport.

Relaxation of security surrounding the shipments of older material may not be in the public's best interest.

The Sandia report seems to concentrate on radiological consequences of sabotage.

It would seem that the mere act of sabotage aimed at one of these shipments would in itself cause significant political and social impact, whether or not there were a significant radiological hazard.

It would seem, therefore, that the current armed escort requirements should be maintained for both the older and the newer materials.

Thank you for coordinating the response from the various affected state agencies.

• JuCKET rm:t.B£R p R _ 7 g PROPOSED RULE ____.,_

L-'19 Fil,t.3JJ'~7 MIDDLE SOUTH SERVICES, INC./B0X 61OOO / NEW 0RLEAN5', ~

.7' :, I ~ (f 04) ~?~-5262 FELIX M. K I L LA R, JR.

MA N A G ER, NUCL E AR FU E L SU PP L Y Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary September 14, 1984 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Attn:

Docketing and Services Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Re:

Modification of Protection Require-ments for Spent Fuel Shipments, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,867 (June 8, 1984)

These comments regarding the proposed modification of the physical pro-tection requirements for shipment of spent fuel, published at 49 Fed.~

23,867 (June 8, 1984) (hereafter termed the "proposed rule 11

) are submittecl" by Middle South Services, Inc. (MSS) on behalf of Arkansas Power & Light Co.,

Louisiana Power & Light Co., and Mississippi Power & Light Co., members of the Middle South Utilities System.

The MSU System has a significant interest in the safe, prudent, and economical transportation of the nuclear materials which are essential for the operation of nuclear power plants.

MSS is, therefore, concerned that the Commission 1s requirements for the physical protection of spent fuel transport provide an adequate level of protection against potential sabotage without imposing on licensees burdensome requirements that do not add appreciably to the safety of the general public.

In regard to the specific questions posed by the Commission, we provide the following responses:

l) Is more research justified for safeguards of shipments of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days before shipment?

2)

Should the NRC simplify its safeguards regulations by prohibiting shipment of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days before shipment?

In accordance with Appendix E of the Department of Energy standard contract for spent nuclear fuel and/or high level radioactive waste disposal, the great majority of fuel assemblies shipped to a disposal facility will have been cooled at least five years; therefore additional research on less t han.150 day>

or 11short-cooled11, fuel has little justification. AdditionalJy, the current JOCFR73.37 safeguards provide a quite adequate level of protection for 11short-cooled 11 shipments.

Acknowledged by card.,*.~:;iil:!.

SERVING : M IDDLE S O U TH U T ILITIES, INC.,

A R KANSA S POWER 6. LIGH T C O M PANY

• LDUISIA~ POWER 6, L..IGHT COMPANY

• M ISSISSIPPI POWER 6. L..IGHT COMPANY

• NEW O R L E ANS PUBLIC S ERVICE INC

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 14, 1984 Page two Therefore, it is recommended that the substance of the current rule be made applicable only to shipment of 11short-cooled 11 fuel and that the proposed moder-ation of the current rule be made applicable to fuel cooled more than 150 days.

This two-tiered approach is thought be more productive than a prohibition against shipment of 11short-cooled 11 fuel.

3) Are the NRC cost estimates in accord with licensee experience?

Since no shipments of spent nuclear fuel have been made from MSU System reac-tors, there is no basis for a response to Topic (3). However, the NRC estimates provided seem reasonable.

In general, the proposed moderation of the physical protection requirements for shipment of spent nuclear fuel cooled 150 days or more are well-supported by recent research and analyses, and t hey would seem to provide adequate pro-tection against the risks of sabotage.

There is concern, however, that the Com-mission is proposing to retain the present requirements for the protection of shipment schedule information, with sole responsibility for protection of such informatidn resting with the licensee. While it is debatable that the physical protection of spent fuel shipments may be increased by safeguarding shipment scheduling, it is unreasonable to hold the licensee responsible for disclosure of information by third parties who are legally entitled to that information.

It is recommended that the requirements for protection of shipment schedule information be deleted from 10CFR73.37.

If, however, the commission elects to retain the protection of information requ irements, the co11111ission should abandon its pol icy of licensee responsibility for disclosure by others.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit these comments.

If there are any questions do not hesitate to call me at (504) 569-4555.

FMK/LLS/nb File: 041-01 094-65 cc:

Dr. T. W. Schnatz Mr. G. W. Muench Mr. L. L. Kittrell Mr. J. F. Fager Nuclear Fuel Subcommittee NED/QA Managers Ms. L. M. Weinzapfel

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~tute of ~l1o~e ~slmt anD Jroui~ence f lantations J. JOSEPH GARRAHY GOVERNOR EXECUTIVE CHAMBER PROVID~Cli~ :: £..

",H September 10, 1984 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

I am pleased to submit this response to your Federal Register notice of June 8, 1984 on behalf of the Rhode Island crystalline Rock Project Review Team.

The Project Review Team was established last year to address issues in the Department of Energy's crystalline rock repository program, including transportation concerns.

While route surveys may not be necessary for shipments cooled 150 days or more, the Project Review Team urges NRC to require that licensees travel only those routes that avoid major population centers to the extent practicable and major public drinking water supplies.

Under current requirements, public drinking water sup-plies do not necessarily enjoy this protection.

Rhode Island, for example, has gone quite literally through years of negotiation with licensees to re-route shipments of spent fuel away from Route 6, which traverses the Scituate Reservoir.

our experience indicated that the general public has perceived and will continue to perceive a threat to their drinking water supply if a shipment of nuclear waste is allowed on a bridge which crosses a reservoir, no matter how long that shipment has cooled.

Such perceptions, whether totally accurate or not, have important political impli-cations, as I am sure you can appreciate.

A clear~PoliQy from NRC stating that the routing of shipments will del£~erately avoid major public drinking water s upplies will help conyince the public that even with the more lenient regulations pronos.e.d for shipments

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Acknowledged by card.* 9 ~

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GOVERNOR'S ENERGY OFFICE -~lmANJS:~IN", PROVIDENCE, RI 02903

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4 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Page Two cooled 150 days or more, the NRC is assuring that nuclear waste will be transported across states in a manner posing a minimal amount of risk, whether the danger comes from a saboteur or simply from an accident on the highway.

Notification of a governor or his or her designee prior to the shipment of waste within or through the state is important enough to merit delivery by certified rather than first-class mail.

Notification by certified mail will assure that the intended person is reached within the time allowed in §73.37 (g) (1) of the proposed rulemaking {49 FR 23872).

With these two additions, the Project Review Team believes that public confidence in the NRC regulations covering the shipment of spent fuel will be enhanced significantly.

We welcome the opportunity to comment.

Any questions may be directed to me at (401) 277-3500.

Sincerely, Project Facilitator Crystalline Rock Project Review Team

"84 SEP 14 A11 :39 COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA H. KIM ANDERSON State Coordinator A. E. SLAYTON, JR.

Deputy Coordinator Secretary State Office of Emergency and Energy Services September 10, 1984 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn:

Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

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310 Turner Rood Richmond, Virginia 23225-6491 (804) 323-2899 Reference NRC Proposed Rule to 10CFR 73 as described in the Federal Register, Vol 49. No. 112, subject: Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments.

The Commonwealth of Virginia takes exception to the pending rule change to reduce escort requirements for spent fuel shipments.

Virginia is now one of the most heavily used states for spent fuel shipments, and starting in 1985, the Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) will be shipping more than 160 spent fuel shipments over a three-year period within the state.

The reduced escort proposal is not in keeping with the Safeguards concept that we have found to very adequately meet the requirements to provide for the health and safety of the citizens of Virginia.

The transport of spent fuel is a most vocal topic in Virginia, and any changes in the security aspects of the shipments will result in serious public concern.

The discussion of minimum long-range health consequences that could result from a breached cask does not impress the public.

Reduced security and potential safety problems are one way to arouse the public, and as usual, the public outcries fall upon the states to answer and not the NRC.

There does not appear to be any good, solid reason to reduce security.

The radiological consequences have been with us for years and have not changed.

The economic advantages (in favor of the nuclear/transportation industry), described in the proposed rule, certainly do not warrant the severe reduction in security requirements.

U. S

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Secretary Page Two September 10, 1984 We take serious exception to the rule change, and most certainly hope that the Commission will cancel the proposed rule.

You have not justified this change, and certainly have not taken into consideration public backlash that will most certainly occur and fall upon the individual states to answer.

A. E AESjr/JDH/sdg J

GENERAL fj ELECTRIC GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, 175 CURTNER AVE., SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 951 25 September 10, 1984 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:

DOCKETING AND SERVICE BRANCH N UCL EAR 0~ ~f!:~ Y 1X NRC BUSINESS OPE RATIO N S

• a4 SEP 13 p 1 : 16 01.,.. 1 ING & Sf, BRANCH

SUBJECT:

MODIFICATION OF PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS, PROPOSED RULE 10 CFR PART 73

REFERENCE:

FEDERAL REGISTER VOL. 49, NO. 112, DATED FRIDAY, JUNE 8, 1984 Gentlemen:.

General Electric Company, as a shipper of spent fuel, is in complete agreement with the proposed rule.

Based on our experience, there will be no increased risk to these subject shipments and the changes will be cost effective without compromising intransit safeguards.

If the proposed changes are final ized, the only area that would impact the cost effectiveness of this change will be when transitting states that have adopted the federal regul ations and when those states are not willing to amend their laws.

F. D. Flowers, Manager International Traffic

& Hazardous Materials M/C 512, Telephone: (408) 925-5325 FDF:jd

U, S. NUCLEAR r;-

..J ATORY C0MISSION DO 'K 0

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78 Elmwood Avenue, Buffalo,.New York 14201

• 716-884-1000 228 East 45th Street, New York, N~!{ prk 0 -10017

• 212-687-2950

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• a4 SEP 13 P 1 :1 4 l ~

l=/l. tA3"4 1 CX)r-tITS BY THE SIERRA CI.DB RADIOAc:r'IVE WAS'IE CAMPAIGN ON PROPOSED RULE 10 CFR PAR!' 73 MODIFICATION OF PROIECTION REQQIREN FOR SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS

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GENERAL COMMENT

S Prepared by Dr. Marvin Resnikoff Box 92 with the Blairstown, NJ 07825 assistance of:

Lindsay Audin Based on research findings by Sandia Laboratories and Battelle Memorial Institute, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to re-duce safeguard requirements for irradiated fuel shipments in densely populated areas.

Armed escorts, notification of local law enforcement agencies and route inspections, would no longer be required.for irrad-iated fuel aged more than 150 days.

Because the NRC has not analyzed the most likely and effective sabotage scenarios and explosive devices, the number of latent cancers and economic damage likely to be caused by successful sabotage is grossly understated.

Since the NRC safeguard requirements have also, as a spin-off, increased the safety of the ship-ments, further relaxing the requirements will, for the most part, in-crease the likelihood of successful sabotage and, also, a serious acci-dent.

Because of our concern that over-trained armed escorts could shoot innocent citizens, we support the disarming of escorts, preferr-ing instead to have law enforcement matters handled by responsible state and local officials.

The cost of maintainingpresent safeguard requirements is trivial in comparison to the economic and human health cost if prodigious amounts of radioactivity are released in densely populated areas.

The present regulations cost much less than auto liability insurance and should be retained.

We would relax the present requirement that escorts be armed, but would retain escorts in independent vehicles.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS

1.

Sabotage -of an irradiated fuel shipment could be relatively fast and simple, with explosive devic_es that are commercially avail-able.

Because of its long association with the military, Sandia Laboratories tested the military M3Al shaped charge device, weighing 45 pounds.

While this weight and much more are not over-riding fact-ors, effective devices weighing much less, on the order of l1/2 pounds are available.

A conical-shaped charge, with an incendiary device, sierra club radioactive waste campaign

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I 'sierra Club Radioactive Waste Campaign Page 2 described in Pyrotechnics in Industry, by Richard T. Barbour, McGraw-Hill Book Company (attached), would be much more effective.

Such* a device could pierce 14 inches of metal, thus entering and exiting a shipping cask.

The interior of the cask could be heated to 1,649°c.

This would ignite the zirconium cladding, further raising thetemp-erature until the oxygen in thecask were exhausted.

These tempera-tures would vaporize certain of the radionuclides, such as cesium.

'l'hese devices are commercially available and in use in well-drilling, spaceship and other applications.

They are also available to secular regimes such as Iran.

We therefore disagree with the NRC assumption that tens to hundreds of pounds of explosives are needed to disperse radioactivity from a shipping cask.

Since the tests by Sandia and Battelle do not use in-cendiary devices, the NRC should institute such tests before the prop-osed rules go into effect.

Tests by Sandia Labs would be tainted by their heavy dependence on DOE funding,

their intimate association with the nuclear industry, and the continued zeal of representatives of Sandia's Transportation Technology Center to reassure the public on nuclear transportation, rather than to objectively analyze data.

Any testing agency should have the complete public trust.

2.

By simply unbolting the end of a shipping cask, it may be opened without explosive. devices.

For some casks, a cutting torch would be needed to cut through sheet metal.

A grappling hook could 11 pull off the cask cover and remove the fuel assembly, at which point explosives could effectively shatter the fuel and disperse the radio-activity.

This scenario requires time, but it is possible if the truck crew is taken out.

We disagree with the NRC that only radioactivity in respirable form is of concern.

All radioactivity released will contribute to radiation doses.

If cesium is released, the background radiation levels would increase.

The public might have to be evacuated while the area was decontaminated.

This would be very costly.

3.

By relaxing the requirement that an escort be in a separate vehicle, it is possible for both members of the crew to be taken out of action together.

On the other hand if an escort were in a separate vehicle, this would be a much more difficult task.

If the truck were attacked, the escort could radio local police authorities for assist-ance.

This is also true in case of a severe accident, in which both the driver and escort were injured or killed.

Thus, an independent escort serves an important safeguard and safety function.

The small additional cost, $13,000 per shipper per year should be considered liability insurance.

Considering that automobile ow~ers pay $500 per year for $100,000 liability insurance, the cost of $13,-000/yr/

shipper for $2 billion coverage is a small price to pay for this important protection.

4.

The Club supports pre-notifying local pol ice and firefighters of impending irradiated fuel shipments.

A national computerized sys-tem should be established by the NRC so that shippers need only send one notice.

Presently, local prenotification is quite arbitrary, dep-

sierra Club Radioactive Waste Campaign Page 3 ending on the particular Governor.

Greater safety could be achieved by having local fire companies on the ready.

A long duration fire could lead to a greater release of radioactivity ; if fire companies were pre-notified, a fire could be handled more rapidly.

5.

The Campaign, suports, in part, one aspect of the proposed regulations, the disarming of escorts.

Drivers and escorts are trained to recognize ruses, so the shipments could not be diverted into a sab-otage set-up.

However, our fear is that over-trained and fatigued heavily-armed escorts could shoot an innocent civilian.

We suspect this is the most probable way for a citizen to be injured by a nuclear fuel shipment, other than a highway accident.

Armed protection of these shipments should be accomplished by local and state law enforce-ment agencies, accountable to thepublic, not by a private nuclear army.

6.

A rule requiring irradiated fuel shipments to avoid densely-populated downtown areas during daytime business hours would achieve a two or threefold increase in safety.

The population density in many downtown areas during weekday business hours often exceeds 62,000 personsper square mile.

According to the study, The Next Nuclear Gamble, by the Council on Economic Priorities, cities such as Boston, Hartford, San Francisco, Chicago and St. Louis, have population dens-ities exceeding 62,000 persons per square mile.

Most cities have by-passes to accomplish this avoidance of downtown areas.

In the case of cities like Milwaukee and New York, shipments would ~ave to pro-ceed at night or use a lternate shipping modes.

7.

The Campaign recommends that the NRC continue its practice of surveyingproposed routes.

These surveys, which were carried out for safeguard purposes, were very important for safety.

Unsafe route conditions, such as low weight limit restrictions or road construct-ion, were often detected by NRC Safeguards staff.

Without NRC over-sight, this important safety function will be lost.

The US Depart-ment of Transportation has little experience or interest in the safety of irradiated fuel shipments.

Thus, a void will be left if NRC staff abandon these surveys.

• u j A

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PyrOtechnics in Industry Richard T. Barbour Pyrotechnics Design Engineer Space Shuttle Program McGraw-Hill Book Company New York

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.- be Shaped Charges 47 CONICAL SHAPED CHARGE (CSC)

A conical shaped charge is, as the name implies, a body of revolution rotated around the axis of symmetry. Table 5-l illustrates a typical CSC and tabulates the geometric characteristics and performance capabilities for a family of Table 5-1. Geometric, Weight, and Performance Characteristics of Conical Shaped Charges Shaped charge number 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 Booster--

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Main charge_

Length Cavity liner r1-L.

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Penetration Copper cavity liner, ROX explosive Explosive Gross Approximate Approximate weight, g weight, g 00,in 011erall length, in Penetration, in*

1.1 20 0.63 0.83 0.75 3.7 48 1.00 1.32 2.00 8.5 96 1.61 1.74 2.50 15.5 152 1.90 2.09 3.21 19.0 189 2.00 2.25 3.40 11.5 106 1.62 1.75 4.60 20.0 205 2.06 2.35 5.50 414.5 743 3.50 6.00 14.0

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diameter, In*

0.20 0.30 0.40 0.46 0.52 0.31 0.37 1.75

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y 48 Pyrotechnics in lndwtry charges. The explosive material used in these CSCs is granular RDX (see Chapter 2) compressed into the case under pressure in excess of 15,000 pounds per square inch (1,055 kilograms per square centimeter}. The tremendous amount of explosive energy released and focused by the CSC configuration is emphasized by the last entry in the table: Into a mild steel target a hole 1. 75 inches (44.5 millimeters) in diameter with a penetration of 14 inches (356 millimeters). Users of these 01: slightly modified CSCs are the oceanographic industry for cable cutters, armed forces for demolition, construction contractors for drilling aids, and the steel industry for tapping open-hearth furnaces. The oil industry's application for perforating oil well casing is simplified in the illustration of Figure 5-7. By lowering a detector into a well casing, geologists are able to locate oil deposits in stratum at considerable distances from the casing itself. The problem of tapping into Electric detonator firing cable Detonating----

cord FIG. >7. Oil-well casing and stratum penetrators.

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detonatin detonati 11 detonator When,

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material, composi11-oil pool, ti through t pumped t Torpecl single cha penetratio preclude t at each le, level.

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Sinped Charges 49 the adjacent oil pools without the added time and expense of drilling another well is resolved by inserting a "torpedo" into the casing and lowering it to the level of the oil pool(s). The torpedo consists of several levels of CDCs. The illustration depicts four levels with six CDCs per level. Torpedoes with twelve levels and twelve CDCs per level have been used. The torpedo is attached to a cable with a bridle at one end. An electric firing cable is entwined around the support cable and terminates at a detonator at the top of the torpedo.

The detonator detonates a string of detonating cord (see Chapter 4) that traverses the length of the torpedo. As can be seen in the section, the detonating cord is located at the hub of the six radially oriented CSCs. The detonating cord simplifies the detonation of twenty-four CDCs with a single detonator.

When detonated, the CDCs penetrate not only the well casing but also the surrounding stratum for a considerable distance. Penetrations of several hundred inches (nearly a thousand centimeters) are not uncommon in Berea sandstone (a common oil-bearing stratum). Penetration is primarily depef_!d-ent on the number of conical-shaped charges nestled into each level of the torpedo, the inside diameter of the well casing, thickness of the casing, casing material, number of concentric casings (up to four is not unusual), and the composition of the oil-bearing stratum. After the CSCs have penetrated the oil pool, the oil will immediately flow into the voids of the penetrations and through the holes in the casings. When inside the casing the oil is easily pumped to the surface.

Torpedoes have been built with a single CSC at each level. Obviously, a single charge designed to the full diameter of the torpedo will have greater penetration than multiple CSCs designed within the same diameter. To preclude the necessity of radial orientation of the torp.edo with a single CSC at each level, a different radial orientation of each CSC is employed at each level.

The discovery of petroleum deposits under the sea created the need for many new techniques to recover oil from the new source. Problems connected with drilling platforms, special support vessels, and in many other areas were resolved by modifying techniques used in the standard land recovery meth-ods. The task of laying the pipeline from the floor of the sea to the shore presented a unique problem in many areas, particularly in rock-and coral-encrusted coastal reefs and shoals. These areas quite often are shallow in depth, which precludes the use of deep-draft floating platforms from which to dig a trench for the pipeline to rest protected from the elements and possible entanglement with ships' anchors. In some cases the rock and coral formations are too hard to be economically removed with standard ditching or dredging equipment. One solution to the problem is the class1cal method of drilling bore-holes in the rock or coral formation, placing an explosive charge in each hole, and blasting to break or crush the dense formation.

Needless to say, this is a slow and costly process.

The final solution came with the development of a conical shaped charge

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50 Pyrotechnics in Industry about the size of a small milk can. Instead of filling the CSCs with granular or solid explosives, and transporting them under rigid safety regulations to faraway places where they were needed, a liquid explosive was developed whose constituents can be shipped in separate containers by commercial transport to the using site. As can be seen in Figure 5-8, even when filled with the liquid explosive, more than half of the internal volume of the CSC is void. If placed in water the CSC would float inverted. This anomaly is overcome by placing the base of the CSC in an oversized box and filling the gap with concrete. CSC case segments are often molded plastic and the cavity liner is a deep drawn steel cone. The total assembly weighs approximately 40 to 50 pounds ( 18.14 to 22.68 kilograms). Handholds are provided in the box to facilitate carrying the CSC on land and maneuvering it into position under water. The stable liquid explosive ingredients are mixed and poured into the case through a hole in the top. The stopper serves a dual purpose-it is also the detonator. To the detonator is attached a length of detonating cord.

Figure 5-9 is a series of pictures of the insensitive liquid explosive chemicals and CSC cases being transported to the using site. There the liquid explosive constituents are mixed; cases are assembled and placed in handling boxes where concrete is poured around the base of the CSC. The liquid explosive is poured into the case and topped with a detonator and a short length of detonating cord (see Chapter 3). Barges are loaded with numerous Void Ballast rJ Detonating cord Standoff I

t--10 in diameter___J (254 mm)

v Case (3 pieces)

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Cavity liner (metal) g/Handholds Base FIG. 5-8. Liquid explosive CSC used in trenching and dredging operations.

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FIG. 5-9. Transporting, filling, positioning, and firing of CSCs for underwater oil pipeline operations. (a) Pallets loaded aboard air freighter. (b) Transporting pallets to using site. (c)

Assembling CSCs. (d) Filling CSCs with liquid explosive. (e) Positioning CSCs along trenching line. 1/) Detonating cord attached to CSC detonator. (g) Underwater trench being excavated. (h)

Final positioning of oil pipe in trench through shoal.

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52 Pyrotechnics in Industry CSCs for transporting to the underwater trenching site. At the trench site, up to several hundred CSCs are placed in rows about 4 feet (1.2 meters) apart on either side and along the centerline of the trench. The short lengths of detonating cord from each of the stationed CSCs are knotted to a longer detonating cord strung the length of the positioned CSCs. Attachment of an electric detonator to the end of the long detonating cords attached to the CSGs completes the trenching preparations. After detonating the CSCs, subsequent dredging is not usually required. The oil pipe is then placed in the trench and the job is complete. The following summary is typical of the underwater CSC trenching operations around the world:

Mexico:

Isle Del.oho-Pipeline trench from offshore drilling platform to island storage facility.

Trench specifications: Width-Depth-Length-Feet (Meters) 14-6-2,300 (4.2-1.83-701) Operation completed in 4 days.

Egypt: El Alamain-Pipeline trench from mainland to offshore tanker loading facility.

Trench specifications: Width-Depth-Length-Feet (Meters) 16.5-6.5-1,-

650 (5-2-503) Operation completed in 10 days.

Iran: Kharg Island-Pipeline trench from mainland to island storage facil-ity.

Trench specifications: Width-Depth-Length-Feet (Meters) 40-8 to 14-3,050 (12.2-2.4 to 4.3-930) Operation completed in 25 days.

Trucial States: Jebel Dhanna-Pipeline trench from mainland to offshore tanker loading facility.

Trench specifications: Width-Depth-Length-Feet (Meters) 6-8-2,500 (l.8-2.4-762) Operation completed in 7 days.

Alaska:

Cook l!_tlet-Pipeline trench from offshore platform to mainland.

Trench specifications: Width-Depth-Length-Feet (Meters) 4-7-2,500 (l.2-2.1-762) Operation completed in 4 days.

The same types of CSCs used in the above trenching operations can also be used in harbor and river dredging. Here the CSCs are placed in a checkerboard pattern, laced together with detonating cord, and detonated.

When solid rocket motors (SRMs) are launched, the capability must be provided to terminate the mission due to some malfunction of an onboard system, i.e., guidance, thermal control, etc. Unlike liquid propellant rockets, the SRMs cannot be shut down once they are ignited. If the SRM is of the type that has an open hole through its entire length, the propellant burns from the inside radially outwards over the entire length of the SRM. A simple method of terminating the thrust is to fire several conical shaped charges (by radio command) through the forward closeout dome of the SRM. The burning propellant will then exhaust through these forward holes, creating co, created by t Some SR from their.

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Some SRMs, however, don't burn radially their entire length. They burn from their aft end forward over the entire inside diameter of the rocket.

Terminating the thrust of these SRMs necessitates reliable rocket igniters as well as conical-shaped charges. A dual-purpose CSC is shown in Figure 5-10 that includes a cylindrical exothermic pellet built into its base. The cylindrical geometry of the exothermic pellet allows the jet of the CSC to pass through its center after which it penetrates the forward dome of the SRM. The tail of the jet then ignites the pellet as it is pulled inside the dome of the SRM.

Once inside, the burning pellet, 3,000°F (l,649°C) smears through the exposed SRM propellant-igniting it. Neutralizing thrust from the forward dome of SRMs is usually short-lived. The cylindrical walls will most often rupture a few seconds after the thrust termination CSCs have penetrated the SRM's dome due to internal overpressure.

LINEAR SHAPED CHARGE (LSC)

In cross section, the linear shaped charge has many similarities to the conical-shaped charge with the main exception being the included ai:igle of the cavity liner. Where the cavity angle of the CSC was shown to be approximately 60 degrees (see Table 5-1), the included angle of the LSC cavity liner is nearly 90 degrees. LSCs are generally fabricated in lengths up to 12 feet (3.66 meters) with explosive core loading up to 3,200 grains per foot (680 grams FIG. 5-10. Cutaway of SRM thrust termination CSC with exothermic pellet.

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'84 SEP 13 P 1 :o5 OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE tiOC,,_ -~NG & SEt 0 RANCJ.f 201 WEST PRESTON STREET

• BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201

• AREA CODE 301

• 383-Adele Wilzack, R.N., M.S., Secretary Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretar y of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

TTY FOR DEAF: Saito. Area 383-7555 D.C. Metro 565-0451 William M. Eichbaum, Assistant Secretary September 11, 1984 I have reviewed the proposed changes to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73, "Modifications of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments," published in the Federal Register on Friday, June 8, 1984.

Although based on the information from the new studies on the consequences of successful sabotage of an irradiated fuel shipment, I agree that it may be acceptable to amend the current interim rules on the protection for spent fuel shipments.

I believe there is another issue which should be considered prior to the adoption of these modifications.

The public perception of these protective regulations must be factored into the decision to change these regulations.

The public believed that the presence of a guard or escort for shipments of spent fuel decreased the possibility of sabotage and increased the amount of protection they were being afforded.

This may or may not have been based on available scientific data.

The public may or may not be aware of the data now available showing the decreased risk.

They may view changes in the regulations as a lessening of their protection and as increasing the possibility of attack on a spent fuel shipment.

Any shipment which is provided a guard or escort is perceived as being less vulnerable to attack.

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Mr. ~amuel J. Chilk Page 2 It is my considered opinion that the issue of public perception of a change in the requirements for shipment of spent fuel must also be included in the decision to amend regulations.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on cations.

/JlfvNf urs,

Max Eisenberg, Ph. D.

Director Science and Environmental Health ME : jm

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!"\\A com.pany Houston Lighting & Power P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 (713) 228-9211 Secretary of the Convnission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washington, D. C.

20555 September 10, 1984 ST-HL-AE-1127 File No:

G3.25 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

Comments Regarding the Protection of Plants and Materials Proposed Rule "84 SEP 13 ~8 126 Your notice in the Federal Register on June 8, 1984 regarding 10 CFR 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials, requested conments on several specific topics.

One of those topics concerned prohibiting shipment of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days.

A prohibition of this nature could prove extremely costly for nuclear power facilities that may be required to ship spent fuel offsite for destructive examination of an anomaly.

If the situation arose that the plant could not be returned to operation until the cause of the anomaly was determined, an extra 150 days would automatically be added to a forced outage.

The consideration of such a rule change merely to simplify current regulations is inappropriate.

If you have any questions regarding our comment, please contact me at

{713) 922-2033.

MAM/na cc:

G. W. Oprea, Jr.

J. H. Goldberg J. G. Dewease W28/L002MM/o Very truly yours, M. R. Wise burg Manager Nuclear Licens ing C. G. Robertson T. M. Sobey STP RMS

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_ 1,,1 t EdwinA.Wiggi't'tO;h,_ JNu & S[Y' Executive Vice President t.,RANt,;H September 10, 1984 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 ATTENTION:

Docketing and Service Branch

REFERENCE:

Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments, *49 Fed. Reg. 23, 867 (June 8, 1984)

Dear Sir:

The following comments on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's proposed modification of physical protection requirements for spent fuel shipments represent input from the Subcommittee on Transportation of the Atomic Industrial Forum's (AIF) Committee on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.

We generally support the thrust of the proposed modifications, particularly to the extent that the resulting regulations are predicated on sound technical research and analysis.

Based on the results of recent Department of Energy research, it appears that the original technical basis for existing requirements is no longer valid.

Therefore, existing requirements should be modified.

In addition, we offer the following responses to specific questions posed by the Commission:

o Need for Additional Research for Safeguard of Spent Fuel Shipments Cooled Less than 150 Days Prior to Shipment--We do not believe that additional research is justified on the need to safeguard shipments of spent fuel coqled less than 150 days prior to shipment.

We believe the current safe-guard requirements provide an adequate level of protection against the risks associated with potential sabotage of such shipments.

Further, the likelihood of many shipments of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days is quite low.

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Prohibition of Shipment of Spent Fuel Cooled Less than 150 Days Prior to Shipment--The Commission should not prohibit the shipment of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days prior to shipment.

Although there are likely to be very few of those shipments, instances may arise when it is necessary to ship spent fuel cooled less than 150 days for either safety, economic, or system-reliability reasons.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule modification.

EAW:slw Sincerely, Edwin A. Wiggin Executive Vice President

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DON ETCHISON DIRECTOR Mr. Carl B. Sawyer

( 4<1 Fil~ g ft;, 7j SEP 11 All :45 STATE OF ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY 1035 OUTER PARK DRIVE SPRINGFIELD 62704 (217) 546-8100 September 6, 1984 TERRY R. LASH DEPUTY DIRECTOR Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washington, D.C.

20555

Dear Mr. Sawyer:

RE:

Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments.

10 CFR Part 73.37 (49 Fed. ~

- 23867-23872, June 8, 1984).

On behalf of the State of Illinois, the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IONS) hereby submits its comments on the proposed changes to 10 CFR Part 73.37, which would modify the procedural requirements for the physical protection of shipments of irradiated (

11 spent 11

) reactor fuel. These IONS conments are based on the State's extensive experience with inspecting and escorting irradiated fuel shipments in Illinois, and they reflect the State's increasing and serious concern about the safety of future shipments.

After considerable expression of public and legislative concern about spent fuel shipments, Governor James R. Thompson in July, 1983, issued a directive requiring IONS to inspect and escort all irradiated fuel shipments traveling into or out of Illinois. Governor Thompson also required the Illinois State Police to inspect and escort the trucks carrying these shipments, and the Illinois Conmerce Conmission to provide similar safety inspections for rail shipments. During the past year, IDNS has inspected and escorted one rail shipment and more than 200 truck shipments of irradiated fuel.

As a result, Illinois has had more experience with inspecting and escorting spent fuel shipments than any other state.

Illinois ' concern about the proposed rule changes is he~ghtened by its central geographical location, the presence of several nuclear power plants storing irradiated fuel, and the fact that the General Electrf.c Company's irradiated fuel storage facility--the nation's onl r *w.a~f~-reactor facility--is located at Morris, Illinois. Shipments of*irradiated fuel traveling in Illinois are expected to continue at a significant rate for several years. Moreover, the number of irradiated fuel or high-level waste shipments through Illinois are expected to increase dramatically when the U.S.

Department of Energy develops a permanent repository for spent fuel.

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Mr. Carl September 6, 1984 The Illinois public is deeply concerned about the future shipments of spent fuel.

In order to allay these safety concerns, the State of Illinois must be fully informed about all shipments and have the capability to monitor and inspect them.

IONS must be able to assure the Illinois public and its political representatives that such shipments are fully protected and that they pose no significant risk to the public health and safety. To fulfill its responsibilities, the State of Illinois desires to see the Nuclear Regulatory Conmission's (NRC) proposed rule strengthened.

The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety specifically has the following five principal reconmendations concerning the proposed changes in the rule:

1.

The requirement for a communications center must be retained rather than dropped as proposed.

Under the existing Part 73 (73.37 (a) (4), (5), and (11)), a continuously staffed communications center must be maintained by shippers and contacted by shipment escorts at least every two hours. In the proposed rule, contact with the communications center is dropped from the requirements for shipments of irradiated reactor fuel that have been cooled for 150 days or more.

IONS considers this proposed change highly inadvisable. By dropping the requirement for contact with the comrrunications center, the NRC loses the ability to track shipments in a timely manner.

Knowing the location of a shipment could be very important for providing safety and responding to concerns in situations arising from unpredictable events such as inclement weather, accidents, delays, and drivers taking wrong routes. The existing requirement to call in regularly provides the shipper, the NRC, and state officials with a location from which to begin a search if the driver fails to contact the communications center on schedule. Without the involvement of the conmunications center, accurate tracking would be extremely difficult and time consuming, which could adversely affect public health and safety.

Rather than dropping the conmunications center, IONS suggests that the call-in could perhaps be required less frequently, perhaps every three hours, in order to reduce the burden of frequent stops on drivers, when they are unable to communicate by radiotelephone. With a somewhat longer call-in frequency, the NRC would still retain the vital ability to track shipments in a timely fashion, but with less disruption on the schedule of the shipment.

Mr. Carl September 6, 1984 In addition, state authorities should be able to contact the co1T1T1unications center in order to determine the whereabouts of shipments in route. This capability would have substantial benefit to the State of Illinois since the inspection and escort personnel could more precisely determine the arrival time of shipments at the Illinois border.

2.

The use of a second driver as the only escort is not acceptable.

3.

Under the proposed change {10 CFR 73.37 (f) (4)), the NRC would require only one unarmed escort, who would "maintain visual surveillance of the shipment during periods when the shipment vehicle is stopped or the shipment vessel is docked." That escort may be the second driver under the proposed change.

The State of Illinois strongly opposes the deletion of the armed escort provisions. Indeed, the State of Illinois urges NRC to require an armed escort in a separate vehicle in both heavily and lightly populated areas.

Such escorts would protect vehicles as well as the shipments from attack, and they would also help reassure the public about the safety of shipments.

Because of the length of time that truck shipments are on the highways, a driver normally puts in a ten hour shift and then sleeps when the second driver takes over.

In our experience the second driver is asleep much of the time during the shipment.

We believe, therefore, that as a practical matter the second driver often would not be able to maintain the required visual surveillance.

The notification requirement must be strengthened in order to assure timely notification of state officials.

For the State of Illinois, timely written notification to IONS is essential, because extensive arrangements have to be made for meeting, inspecting, and escorting the shipments. The lack of timely shipping information could prevent the Department from performing its assigned duties, or using its resources efficiently, or both. Over the past year, insufficient advance notification has often caused the State substantial difficulties. IONS, therefore, strongly urges NRC to strengthen its noti fi cation requirements.

In particular, IONS suggests that shippers be required to assure that states receive written notification of shipments at least four (4) days prior to arrival at the states' borders. The current requirement for mailing notification at least seven days in advance is inadequate.

In some cases IONS has received its notice only two days prior to a shipment.

Mr. Carl September 6, 1984

4.

Licensees should be required to provide "safe havens" for shipments that cannot reach their destinations.

Poor weather and road conditions during the winter have prevented spent fuel shipments from reaching their destinations in Illinois, because the routes have included travel on county roads. County roads can be closed to trucks carrying heavy loads, such as spent fuel casks, by local officials without approval from state authorities. In such cases, spent fuel shipments may need to be diverted to "safe havens," where they can remain secure until road conditions improve sufficiently. In the past, these situations have occurred without adequate advance planning by carriers of spent fuel.

In the future, the State of Illinois believes that carriers should be required to make advance arrangements for 11 safe havens 11 to insure that fuel shipments will not be stranded along the road or parked at other inappropriate places during bad weather.

5.

The shipment of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days should be prohibited, except for special circumstances.

There does not appear to be a pressing need for nuclear reactors to ship spent fuel that has been cooled for less than 150 days.

Indeed, in light of the large inventories of 11aged 11 spent fuel at reactors today, there should be no need to ship 11hot 11 spent fuel (i.e., fuel cooled less than 150 days) for the indefinite future.

An exception might be spent fuel intended for research purposes.

Prohibiting the shipment of spent fuel that has been cooled for less than 150 days would simplify the NRC's regulations and reduce the public's concern about the safety of spent fuel shipments. Such a prohibition, moreover, would reduce the need to conduct research to evaluate the consequences of attacks that could release the iodines and other radionuclides that are present in much higher concentrations in "hot II fuel.

Your serious consideration of these recoJTmendations is appreciated. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to call Dr. John Cooper, Manager, Office of Waste and Transportation Management.

DE/cs Sincerely, Don Etchison Di rector

September 5, 1984 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attn

• Docketing and Service Branch Mr. Samuel Chilk, Secretary Dear Sir; DOCKETED USNP.~

"84 SEP 11 AlO :06

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'CCI.L i!N(j & C:(f

• BRANC~

I am responding to the June 8, 1984 Federal Register notice regarding "Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments. 11 I have reviewed the notice and all documents related to the issue. I have also been involved i~ privately sponsored research on spent fuel shipments and co-authored a book on the subject (entitled "The Next Nuclear Gamble"). For the r*easons st.c;1.leo below, I do noL agr~e that the research cited in your notice is sufficient to conclude that safeguards on spent fuel shipments should be relaxed.

1. There are irregularities in the research performed and the analyses that serve as basis for the proposed rule.

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2. The peer revtew of the research was incomplete in several important areas.

3. The reference charge and cask do not represent the worst case scenario.

4. The utilization of cancer fatalities as the only* criteria for safeguards is inappropriate, especially in the urban context.

5. The economic savings resulting from the proposed rule are insufficient to justify the rule change.

6. More cost effective altematives to relaxation of safeguards (such as re-routing away from urban areas) were not examined in the proceeding.

The rest of this letter details the above concerns. In response to the three questions raised on page 23871 of the Register notice, I hold the following views:

L

1. is more research justified for safeguards of shipments of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days before shipment? answer~ Such research i.s not needed unless new cask designs are under consideration that would allow shipment of such "young" spent fuel.

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2; should the NRC simplify t:s safeguards regulations by prohibiting shipments of spent fuel less than 150 days out of the reactor? answer:

This seems like a simple solution.

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3. are the NRC cost estimates in accord with licensee experience?

answer: not being a licensee, I choose not to comment.

1. Irregular.-ities in the Research on Sabotage 2

The fuel utilized in the Battelle Columbus Laboratory (BCL) tests had been cooled for 6 1/2 years. It therefore did not present the same fission product inventory or thermal characteristics as the 150 day old fuel later assumed in the calculations. These items are important because:

- numerous relatively short lived isotopes were not present in the 6 1/2 old samples or the inventory used in the computer simulation; such isotopes could have yielded a different conc,,ntration of fission p_r"Opu?ts-in smaller particles, thereby increasing the impact of respirable particles while also i.nftuenctng the extent of environmental contamination

- such isotopes are also chemically reactive in ways differ ent from thos e surviving after 6 1/2 years and such reactivity could influence the dis-proportionation factor discussed in chapter 5 of the BCL report (NUREG/CR-2472)

- the t:Rermal output of fuel only 150 days old is about ten times greater thab at 6 1/2 years, yielding a temperature increase of the fuel in cask of about 5oo0F; the potential for re-oxidation of the fuel as a result of the breeching of the cladding, fuel thermal output and the additional thermal input of the reference charge could therefore not have been analyzed by the BCL tests (see NRC research information letter no. 139 for discussion of re-oxidation and the resultant particle formation).

Vaporized materials were not analyzed by the BCL tests. For example, some fission products such as iodine and plutonium can combine chemically to form compounds (e.g., Put3) that volatilize at the tempel"'atures involved in the SCI _ tests. BCL only ex::lmined samples captured in filters; I saw no indication of chemical filtration to analyze volatilized or gaseous fission prod~ts or corrosion products. Such materials do not exhibit the rapid settling of particles and so could cause a disproportionately greater problem because of their increased residence time in the environment. Once a~ain, the use o f 6 1/2 year old fuel would also have eliminated some volatile.

fission products even if analysis of gaseous products had been performed.

The BCL study identifies actinides as the primary hazardous fission products.

No consideration appears to have been given to the cor.rosion products present in the crud on the surface of the fuel rods. Due to its abundance and gamma emission, Co-60 was seen as the siglificant isotope in NUREG/CR-0743, which examined the release of Co-60 in an accident. This isotope originates in the surface crud which seems to have been ig,ored by both the BCL and

3 Sandia analyses of sabotage. Again, use of 6 1/2 year old fuel would reduce the impact of Co-58, Co-60, M-l-54, Fe-59 and Cr-51, all of whi.ch are present in fuel crud. While these isotopes were missing from BCL's analysis, others are not even listed i.n table 4.6.2 of SAND82-2365, or are listed at much lower curie content than more recent documents on the subject. For example, Co-60 is listed at 5.17 x 101 curies i.n table 4.6.2 but NUREG-0575 uses a value almost 6 times larger (after correcting for fuel weight and decay time; see table G.12 of that document). Similarly, the Sandia report uses lower values for Co-58, Sr-89, Zr-95, Nb-95, Pu-239, Pu-241, Am-241 and Cm-242 while missing numerous other iso-topes completely. Table 4.6.2 was taken from the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400)whtch was produced before 1974. The tables I used were produced in 1978 by updated inputs to the ORI GEN computer model.

The discrepancy is accou,ting for c-.rud isotopic content is fiJrther ~hanced si.nce crud will flake off of cladding at 1 ooOC into respirable particles (see NUREGICR-0163). Sandi.a stated that the temperature approached 185o0 c in i.ts full scale test. I believe the potential exists for a much greater impact if corrections are m a de for the missing isotopes, curies and respirable particles that I have detailed.

As previously mentioned, the lack of attention to the thermal output of the fuel may affect the results of the analysis of a sabotage event. Re-oxidation of uo2 (to U 0 8) is Jq-\\own to occur when the fuel is exposed to a ir at a temperature atove 500°F (easUy within the realm, by the way, of 150 day old fuel even witrout the thermal input of the reference charge).

The Sanaia report, rowever, states that the "x-ray diffractometer data showed only uo2; no other forms of uranium oxide were present!' Some evidence of u3o 8 should have been detected unless the x-ray diffractometer analysis was in error since the temperature of the blast was far beyond 500° F. Consideration of this phenomenon is of importance because re-oxidation results ln creation of respit"'able and other very fine particles.

Furthermore, the phenomenon was never included in either the CRAC or METRAN codes, so the distribution of particle* sizes used in the event simulation also underestimates both tl-)a proportion of fuel tt:at could be aerosolized and the real impact of a release.

Another questionable action taken in the analysis was the failure to resolve the incidence of breakdown of the sintered fuel matrix. When one test resulted in a ratio of 125: 1 (spent fuel to uo2), it was averaged with ~thers thereby diluting its effect (or, conversely, skewing the other results improperly). It was assumed that "grain swelling in the reactor environ-ment" resulted in breakdown of the matrix, but there was no discussion of how o~en such breakdown occurred. Past studies seem to srow that grain swelling (and other fuel failures) have come tn spurts, possibly the result of occasional fuel production deficiencies. As recently as 1983, at least one fuel core exhibited failed fuel o f one type or another tn 15o/o of its assemblies. To properly factor the 125: 1 ratio, some idea of the fraction

4 of actual grain swelling in reactors is needed before the final ratio of spent fuel to depleted uo2 can be used with any credibility.

The last test procedure I wish

• to question concerns the effect of the chamber used in the full scale test. As indicated on page 43 of SAND82-2365, a higher aerosol concentration leads to more particle agglomeration and therefore larger particle size and more rapid settling. The relatively small chamber enclosed the aerosolized particles in a manner that could easily increase theirinteraction prior to sa-n pltng, thereby yielding spurious results once they were captured by filters. _No attempt appears to have been made to assess this efrect of the chamber on particle size distribution. At the very least, it decreased the respirable f'raction but to what degree is unknown. The subscale tests do not cast any light on this matter either: they also involved relatively small chambers and, in one case, (test 6) a mass was unaccounted for that was 10 times greater than the amount determined to be present as an airborne aerosol. The particle size of the "lost" mass was assumed to be larger than respirable but no justification was given for this conclusion.

2. Incomplete Peer Review The most glaring deficiency in the peer review by the U.S. Army Ballistics Research Laboratory (BRL) was its acknowledged lack of analysis of the experimental tecmiques used to measure the release of r-adioactive material.

It appears that no agency has reviewed this most important aspect of the tests. I personally find it astonishing since an error at this level would have direct bearing on the rationale to relax safeguards.

In my _discussions with NRC and DOE officials, I was also surprized to leam that the appendices mentioned in the table of contents of SAND82-2365 have yet to be assembled, let a lone reviewed. BRL states that "such infor-mation would permit independent confirmation of conclusions regarding HED (high explosive device) performance". The lack of such data, one would then conclude, precludes verification of the results of the explosive aspects of the tests. In August, 1984 (in a phone call with DOE's Paul Grimm) I also teamed that the data may not be available for review for another year.

Finally, niether Sandia nor BRL examined the possible use of a comr(lercially available sh~ped charge that includes a high temperature exothermic ~ellet in its base. Such a charge could penetrate the cask and then ignite the fuel with the exothermic pellet (see "Pyrotecmics in Industry" by Richard Barbour, McGraw-HU l, 1981). The combination of breeched fue 1 and high temperatures could yield a significant quantity of re-oxidized fuel in aerosol form.

I therefore believe that the peer review was incomplete and should be redone with attention to the above mentioned items.

5

3. Worst Case Scenario Not Examined The reference cask was assumed to be of a design used to ship commercial spent fuel, apparently because such containers ca r ry the largest volume of spent fuel. They are not necessarily the most vulnerable, however. A research reactor cask may carry an equivalent number of fission product curies in a dry state with no water jacket in the cask (also assumed tn the reference) and the fuel may be significantly more vulnerable due to thinner steel plating on the cask and more delicate fuel and cladding.

While I have not examined all spent fuel casks, the MH-1A carrying HFBR fuel could exhibit the following properties:

- 630, 000 curies of fission products in only 14.4 kg of fuel (after 300 days* out of the reactor)

- an outer steel shell only,50 inches thick, inner lead shell of 7.62 inches and an inner steel shell. 62 inches thick

- fuel elements consist of. 50 inch thick highly enricred uranium plates clad in aluminum. 015 inches thick

- aluminum cladding is designed for operations below 1 OO<>°F (see "Materials For Nuclear Power Reactors", Reinhold Publishing, 1955)

- fuel basket has only.177 inches of boral with

• 063 inches steel

- fuel is dry, cask has no water jacket

- assemblies are held vertically such that several would be impacted by a single breeching charge

- fuel temperature is over eoo°F in the cask.

I believe an attack on such a shipment would yield a much larger release than indicated in the Sandia analysts for the reasons stated above. The data provided above also demonstrates that the choice of' the NFS-4 cask is not conservative due to the greater thickness of steel, more resit tent fuel and cladding and more di.lute fission products involved in such coo,m-ercial fuel shipments. I believe that other research and submarine fuel casks should be also examined to assess their vulnerability if they are to be covered by the proposed relaxation of safeguards.

The sabotage scenario also assumed no fire or incendiary tnput a~er the shaped charge blast. I believe that such an explosion could touch off a secondary explosion and fire tn the fuel tanks of the transport vehicle, thereby providing a continued mechanism For dispersal and fuel damage (again, via re-oxidation of the now exposed fuel). A saboteur sophisttcated

6 enough to breech the cask may also be aware of t:t"le fuel's vulnerability and intentionally set fire to the fuel tanks, may do so to complicate t:t-ie event, or such an action could take place during an exchange of gunfire with security forces. Finally, the scenario could be worsened through the use of the shaped charge with an exothermic pellet (as covered in item 2.).

Combini.ng the more vulnerable cask and fuel with the extended fire and/or exothermic pellet capability would yield a worst case scenario worthy of examination. Recent terrorist activities (such as the attack on American forces in Lebanon) indicate a surprizing level of sophisitication in explo-sives so I believe my proposed scenario is (unfortunately) quite credible.

4. Cancer Fatality is Not a Solely Sufficient Criterion 5. Cited Economic Savings are Not Significant The only indicator of damage utilized in the sabotage analysis was loss of li.fe, yet the primary reason for relaxing the safeguards is the saving of money (according,he Federal Register notice). It would be more con-sistent to compare the potential financial damage of an urban sabotage event with the savings by eliminating the guards and paperwork involved.

On the one hand, NRC estimates that $4<:5~000 a year will be saved by relaxing the safeguards. On the other hand, the 1980 "Urban Environs" study (NUREG/CR-0743) found that over $2 billion damage could be done by a release of only the fuel crud on a commercial fuel assembly. Others have found that study greatly underestimated the economic consequences.

A sabotage event would be even harder to deal with due to the much grea~er release of nucli.des that would occur. While much of it would be in particles too large to be inhaled, those same particles would enter air conditioning ducts and open windows, contaminate buildings and streets and in effect destroy properly while causing massive losses in wages and production.

Perhaps very few deaths would result, but isn't the economic li.fe of a cily also worth saving? Compared to the expense of private and public security forces err1ployed to protect urban properly, $40, O~O a year i.s an i.nsignif'icant cost for sabotage "insurance". When one~"COnsiders the potential social and organizational chaos a saboteur could wreak by damaging a shipment near a facility such as the Wor.ld Trade Center or the United Nations, the dollar savings cited are inconsequential.

I suggest that other criteria be added to the decision-making process, specifically:

- economic damage, of all types

- potential polltical disruption doe to loss of a city or state govemment headquarters

- socia 1 disruption due to evacuation and cessation of* urban services.

7

6. Altematives to Relaxing Safeguards were Ignored It may be possible, in many cases, to avoid even the small cost of guards by simply re-routing shipments away from urban areas. In the case of New York Ctty, for example, use of a short ferry route (done successfully in the past) would allow the City to be easily bypassed whi.le still complying with DOT' s preferred use of interstate highways. The cost of the ferry and the extra two hours travel time is much less than the cost of the extra guards. Similarly, slight increases in travel time through the use of interstate highways in less populated areas would be much cheaper than hiring the guards required to use shorter routes through urban areas. No major increase in radiological impact would result from the longer transit period s ?nee the population density near the longer route is lower than an urban route. A generic case study of such re-routing could probably demon-strate its economic effectiveness sufficiently to encourage industry usage of altemate routes, thereby mitigating the need for a change in the safeguards regulations.

Conclusion I do not believe the proposed safeguards reductions are justified by the sabotage event analyses (which are flawed), by the rationale that few lives would be lost (which ignores other important criteria) or by the small potential savings involved (which are miniscule compared to urban security costs or the potential damage of a sabotage event). I believe that the same end may be achieved by minor e lective route alterations that allow elimination of guards through the avoidance of urban throughfares when transporting spent nuclear fuel.

Thank you for this opportu,ity to comment on the proposed regulations. I would appreciate notification of the Commission's action on this matter.

Yours truly,

,L.+ ~

Lindsay Audin One Everett Avenue Ossining, N. Y. 10562

0 Wisconsin Electr,c POWER coMPANY *

, 0 231 w. MICHIGAN, P.O. BOX 2046, MILWAUKEE, WI 53201 84 SEP I PS :58 September 10, 1984

• oc Secretary of the Commission U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Washington, D. C.

20555 Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch Gentlemen:

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE 10 CFR 73 MODIFICATION OF PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS For more than a year, Wisconsin Electric Power Company has been conducting a shipping campaign which will result in the return of 223 spent fuel assemblies to Point Beach. Nuclear Plant from interim storage facilities at Morris, Illinois and West Valley, New York.

All shipments have been made in accordance with the safeguards requirements of 10 CFR 73.37.

Based on our experience with shipping spent fuel in the current regulatory climate, we are pleased to note the significant improvements which will be realized upon adoption of the proposed rule.

While we have actively participated in the development of comments which will be submitted by the Electric Utility Companies' Nuclear Transportation Group, we consider the proposed rule to be sufficiently important to warrant the submission of additional comments on our own behalf.

With respect to the three questions which were posed in the Federal Register, we offer the following responses:

1.

Additional research on shipments of spent fuel with less than 150 days cooling is probably not justified due to their anticipated low frequency at this time.

It is recommended, however, that such research be conducted sufficiently to prevent the application of unnecessary safeguards requirements to a ~igher volume of shipments.

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2.

Prohibition of the shipment of spent fuEV;- with less than 150 days cooling is not warranted by the**anticipated consequences of an act of sabota"ge~\\'\\~t~n~¢'¥-PPlication I

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Secretary of the Commission September 10, 1984 of current safeguards requirements in 10 CFR 73.37 to such shipments will provide sufficient protection until such time as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has completed its research program.

3.

We do not believe that there will be any increase in costs to the industry as a result of adoption of the proposed rule.

The savings which the NRC has estimated the industry will derive for escort costs and administration are understated.

In order to highlight its importance, the escort issue is addressed separately in the following paragraphs.

Wisconsin Electric's experience with escort costs is that they tend to be much greater on a per shipment basis for shipping campaigns of longer duration.

Once the local or state officials become aware of the escort requirement for shipments through densely populated areas, pressure is applied to the shipper to provide armed escorts over the entire route.

This has resulted in Wisconsin Electric being required to provide escorts over the entire shipment route in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and Wisconsin, as well as the NRC-required escorts for Gary, Indiana.

This proliferation of escort commitments was the result of the need to avoid confrontations which threatened to prevent, or at least significantly delay, our schedule for movement of spent fuel.

As a result, it is estimated that the escort costs for our 223 spent fuel shipments will be approximately

$250,000.

We believe that the motivation for individual jurisdictions to impose escort requirements is the implication in the current regulations that the safety of spent fuel shipments is enhanced by armed escorts.

Once NRC acknowledges, through adoption of the proposed rule, that armed escorts are not required on the basis of safeguards or security considerations, the industry will be able to more effectively oppose the imposition of such requirements by state and local authorities.

It should also be pointed out that local law enforcement agencies have frequently declined to provide escort services when requested, making it necessary to contract with private security firms.

While the service provided by such private firms has been satisfactory, it has not always been possible to arrange for personnel in the immediate area of the escort requirement.

As a result, we have found it necessary to provide private escorts from the Chicago area for shipments through both Gary, Indiana and Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

This situation has produced significantly higher escort and coordination costs for our shipments.

Secretary of the Commission September 10, 1984 Wisconsin Electric, therefore, strongly supports the NRC's proposed rule on modification of protection requirements for spent fuel shipments.

In our judgment, removal of the armed escort requirement for shipments of spent fuel which has cooled more than 150 days will significantly reduce the costs and administrative burden attributable to such shipments without adverse safeguards or security consequences.

While the changes which the NRC has included in its proposed rule represent a significant improvement in the safe-guards and security requirements for shipment of spent fuel, we believe that the rule should also address the confidentiality restrictions on schedular information.

The realities of a spent fuel shipping campaign often make it convenient to respond to the myriad of questions on the schedule for, or progress of, shipments with the response that NRC regulations require us to keep that information strictly confidential.

On the other hand, such confidentiality creates a feeling of distrust and apprehension among the people who perceive that they are affected by the shipments.

Since the NRC has demonstrated that the consequences of sabotage are not sufficient to warrant continuation of the requirement for armed escorts in heavily populated areas, we question the need for protecting information related to the shipping schedule.

Not only is it possible to effectively determine the schedule by other means, but the opportunity exists for someone having the right to receive such information to "leak" it to the media in hopes of "compromising the security" of the shipment and, thereby, causing its cancellation.

Since the NRC's enforcement authority is generally limited to its licensees, the innocent party (i.e., the shipper ) is most likely to suffer the consequences of a violation of the confidentiality restriction.

In recognition of the inability to demonstrate improved safeguards or security as a result of the confidentiality restriction and the extreme difficulty faced by the shipper in ensuring that schedule information is protected by all parties, we recommend that the confidentiality restriction be removed from 10 CFR 73.

We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on the NRC ' s proposed rule for modification of protection requirements for spent fuel shipments and would be pleased to discuss these matters further if you should so desire.

Very truly yours, Vice ~~Nuclear Power C. W. Fay

BALT IMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC CHARLES CENTER

• P.O. BOX 1475

• BAL Tl MORE, MARYLAND 21203 JAMES P. BENNETT ATTORNEY Secretary September 7, 1984 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch Gentlemen:

Re:

Comments to Proposed Ruling Regarding Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments - 10 CFR 73.37 OOC.KfTEr:

LISNRC On June 8 1984, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published a proposed rule in the Federal Register entitled Modification of Protection Requirements For Spent Fuel Shipments, amending Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73.

The following comments are submitted on behalf of the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, which owns and operates two nuclear reactors subject to NRC regulation.

Our Company supports this regulation insofar as it seeks to relieve unnecessarily restrictive requirements designed to safeguard against the potential consequences of successful sabotage of irradiated fuel shipments.

It is necessary, however, that our Company point to one aspect of the proposed modifications which deserves further clarification.

The new subparagraph (r) is susceptible or the interpretation that a licensee who delivers fuel for

., transport to-a ~--la-avartbelua rupoaa1bl1.tor N.QbU*billJ securitJ procedures for such shipments.

This requirement is peculiarly within the control or the carrier and not the licensee-shipper.

The carrier should also have the responsibility for providing trained armed escorts and maintaining records evidencing training and qualification of the carrier's personnel.

In response to the questions proposed at Page 23871 of the Federal Register, the following are our Company's comments:

1.

No.

required at less disproportionate to number of shipments.

There will be only a very small number of shipments than 150 days.

The cost of further research is the benefit which could be anticipated from such a small

2.

No.

There still may be a need to ship less than 150 day old fuel.

Examples might include test or experimental fuel shipped to test reactors.

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We have made only one shipment under the interim regulation.

The costs of that one shipment were within the range of the NRC estimate.

Obviously more accurate estimates would be available when future shipments are made.

With the exception of the foregoing request for additional clarification, our Company is in support or the proposed rule.

Respectfully submitted, JPB/sml

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute September 7, 1984 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

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Modification to 10 CFR Part 73 These comments are in regard to the proposed modifications for physical protection requirements for spent fuel shipments published in 49 Fed-Reg 23,867 (June 8, 1984).

In response to the questions posed by the Commission, the following comments are offered.

1.

Additional research to investigate safeguarding shipments of fuel with less than 150 days cooling does not seem justified.

As a practical matter this is a moot question as such shipments are not expected to occur.

2.

It i s not recommended that shipments of fuel cooled less than 150 days be prohibited.

While few if any such shipments are expected, to prohibit such movements could impose unwarranted restrictions in those isolated cases where such movements are necessary.

3.

EPRI is not in a position to comment on safeguard costs experienced by licensees.

As a general comment, EPRI is pleased at the proposed reduction in safeguard requirements in that this,actions makes the regulations consistent with the most recent technical evaluations.

We endorse the philosophy that regulations should be based on technical justification and the recent data clearly justifies a reduction in physical protection requirements.

,Acknowledged by card. -~

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3412 Hillview Avenue, Post Office Box 10412, Palo Alto, CA 94303 Telephone (415) 855-2000 f Washington Office: 1800 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20036 (202) 872-9222

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Mr. S. J. Chilk Page Two September 7, 1984 In keeping with the above philosophy, however, we also feel that there is not justification for retaining the schedule protection part of the regulation.

In light of the notification requirements now in place, it is unreasonable to assume that shipping schedules can be truly protected.

The general opinion is that even under the current secrecy rules, any interested party can obtain schedule information with only minimum effort.

The process of attempting secrecy therefore becomes only an exercise that produces little or no benefit and, in view of the minimum risks involved, is not warranted.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on these changes in PT73 regulations.

KES:RWL:gg Respectfully Submitted,

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Karl E. Stahlkop f Director Nuclear Systems & Materials Dept.

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JOHN SPELLMAN Governor ST ATE OF WASHINGTON ENERGY FACILITY SITE EVALUATION COUNCIL Mail Stop PY-11 Olympia, Washington 98504 (206) 459-6490 (SCAN) 585-6490 September 7, 1984 DOCKETED

• a4 SEP 10 P3 :48 Secretary of the Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 GFF'tct o;:- :El.Kc.

OOCKETING & Sff BRANCH Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir :

This is in response to Public Affairs bulletin number NRC :

NICHOLAS D. LEWIS Chairman V-1984 concerning NRC proposal for "Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments," 10 CFR Part 73, pub-lished in the June 8, 1984 Federal Register (copy attached).

The state of Washington has comments to submit on the proposed amendments to Part 73.

These comments will not arrived at your office by the published due date of September 10, but will be submitted on or near September 14, 1984.

We will appreciate your onsideration for the delay in our submittal of comments.

NDL:lm Att.

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REGION V 1450 Marla Lane, Suite 210, Walnut Creek, CA 94596 Russ Marabito 415/943-3809 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE (Mailed - Friday, June 8, 1984) fPJ~~~~w~~

NRC PROPOSES ELIMINATING SOME u \\~

lW REQUIREMENTS GOVERNING USED NUCLEAR FUEL SHIPMENTS JUN 11 193.. 1 ENE~GY. FACILITY SITE The Nucl ear Regulatory Comm1ss1on 1S proposing to amend,ts rr~r~t:tW,~ COUNCIL to eliminate some interim requirements for safeguarding certair1 ~h,pm~nt~ ~f used nuclear fuel.

As proposed, the changes would apply to shipments of used fuel which had been discharged from a reactor for 150 days or more (all shipments to date fal l into this category).

The requirements which would be eliminated are: (1) the use of armed guards in cities; (2) advance NRC approval of routes for shipments; (3) establishment of a communication center; and (4) advance coordination of planned shipments with local enforcement agencies.

The interi m requirements which would be retained are: (1) unarmed escorts and surveillance of shipments; (2) onboard mobile telephones or CB radios; (3) immobilization capability for truck shipments; (4) advance notification of States through which shipments are routed; and (5) protection of information regarding schedules of shipments.

The interi m requirements for safeguarding shipments of nuclear fuel became effecti ve in July 1979 and, at that time, it was made clear that they would be subject to change as additional data became available.

The interim requirements were based on the results of a draft study by Sandia (New Mexico) Laboratories showing that the potential radiological consequences of explosive sabotage of a spent fuel shipment could be severe.

The draft suggested the potential consequences could be tens of early fatalities and hundreds of latent cancer fatalities for a truck shipment.

At that time, all reviewers of the Sandia draft agreed that the actual consequences of an act of successful sabotage would be directly related to the amount of used fuel released in respirable form.

However, little information was available to predict the amount of material which might be released and consequence calculations were subject to large uncertainties.

Since that ti me, the NRC and the Department of Energy have sponsored separate, but coordinated, experimental programs which have now been completed.

They involved the use of explosives against real and simulated used fuel casks containing fuel.

"more"

The results of one of these programs show that - even from a perfectly-executed sabotage of a three-assembly truck cask - the likely release of respirable particles of used fuel would be less than 18 grams; the results of the other program show the likely release to be less than 34 grams.

That compares to up to 14,000 grams predicted by the earlier Sandia draft study.

Therefore, the estimated health consequences can be reduced correspond-

ngly.

It now is estimated that successful sabotage of a truck cask in a heavily populated area probably would result in no early fatalities and about four latent cancer fatalities.

This characterization applies to used fuel which has been out of a reactor for at least 150 days but not necessarily to fuel that has been cooled for substantially less time.

Comments on the proposed amendments to Part 73 of the Commission's regulations should be submitted in writing by September 10, 1984.

They should be addressed to the Secretary of the Commission, Nuciear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.

20555, Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch.

HAL B. TUCKER P.O. BOX 33189 CHARLOTTE, N.O. 28242 VIOE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR PRODU0TION September 6, 1984 Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Proposed Rule 10 CFR Part 73

Dear Sir:

Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments

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P3 :43 TELEPHONE (704) 373-4M1 The NRC requested in a Federal Register Notice dated June 8, 1984 (Vol 49, No. 112 FR 23867-23872), comments on the subject proposed rule 10 CFR Part

73.

In response, Duke Power Company offers the following for consideration.

Duke supports the overall concept of this rule.

Section (f) (4) of the proposed rule implies one individual can act in all the capacities for the shipment.

If this is correct, then (f) (4) should be so clarified.

The Federal Register notice states the relatively small health consequences of sabotage of a spent fuel shipment even in a densely populated area.

Therefore, requirements for protection of schedule information as stated in 10 CFR 73.21 (b)(2)(ii) should be deleted and proposed 73.37(g) should also be changed to delete references to protection of information.

Section (f)(7), (9) and (10) should be modified to provide some communications flexibility between the transport vehicle and local law enforcement agencies (LLEA).

The transport vehicle should be allowed to communicated directly with LLEA and/or communicate directly with a central control location which would contact LLEA and others necessary to implement an emergency plan.

Section (g)(l) and (4) covering governor's notification requirements, based on the relaxation of the requirements, should be appropriately changed to reflect the pre-notification period and update from 7 days and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> respectively to 3 days and 1 day.

These periods would be less burdensome to maintain for each shipment yet would maintain the effectiveness of the notification requirement.

In responding to the first and second solicited questions, we feel available shipping casks would not be able to transport fuel cooled less than 150 days due to the characteristic high radiation and decay heat levels. It would

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Secr~tary of the Commission September 6, 1984 Page Two seem appropriate therefore to prohibit shipments of this nature such that additional regulations for such shipments (less than 150 days) would not be necessary.

Prohibiting shipments of fuel less than 150 days cooled would also resolve the question as to whether or not further research is justified for safeguards of these shipments.

As to the third question, we agree with the general figures for cost savings resulting from the implementation of the proposed regulations.

A revision to NUREG 0561 will be both necessary to reflect the regulation changes and helpful guidance to shippers who will be utilizing these new regulations.

Your consideration of this matter is greatly appreciated.

If there are any questions or problems concerning this subject, please advise.

Very truly yours,

~ ~~

Hal B. Tucker JWD:slb

520 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK, NY 10022 500 KEARNS BUILDING 136 SOUTH MAIN SALT LAKE CITY, UT 8-4101

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-47 BERKELEY SQUARE LONDON WIX SOB, ENGLAND "84 SEP 1 0 P 3 :42 September 10, 1984 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Attn:

Docketing and Service Branch Re:

Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,867 (June 8, 1984}

Dear Mr. Chilk:

These comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's

("NRC" or "Commission"} proposed modification of the physical protection requirements for spent fuel shipments published at 49 Fed. Reg. 23,867 (June 8, 1984} ("proposed rule"} are submitted on behalf of the Electric Utility Companies' Nuclear Transportation Group (the "Group"}.

The

• The current members of the Group are Alabama Power Company, Arizona Public Service Company, Baltimore Gas &

Electric Company, Boston Edison Company, Carolina Power &

Light Company, Commonwealth Edison Company, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Duke Power Company, Duquesne Light Company, Florida Power & Light Company, (Footnote Continued}

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 10, 1984 Page 2 Group is composed of 35 utilities around the country that are operating or constructing 99 nuclear power reactors.

It is essential that members of the Group be able to transport the fuel cycle materials that are crucial to the operation of nuclear power plants safely, prudently and economically.

Therefore, the Group is vitally interested in ensuring that the Commission's requirements for the physical protection of spent fuel in transit provide an adequate level of pro-tection against the potential risk from sabotage of spent fuel shipments, without imposing burdensome requirements on licensees that are unnecessary or do not add appreciably to the level of protection.

(Footnote Continued)

Georgia Power Company, Houston Lighting & Power Company, Illinois Power Company, Indiana & Michigan Electric Company, Kansas City Power and Light Company, Kansas Gas and Electric Company, Middle South Services, Inc., Nebraska Public Power District, New York Power Authority, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Northeast Utilities, Northern States Power Company, Pacific Gas & Electric Company, Pennsylvania Power

& Light Company,' Philadelphia Electric Company, Public Service Company of Colorado, Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, Southern California Edison Company, Texas Utilities Generating Company, Union Electric Company, Virginia Electric & Power Company, Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation and Yankee Atomic Electric Company.

The Edison Electric Institute supports the Group financially and participates in its activities.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 10, 1984 Page 3 In addition to answering the specific questions posed by the Commission, the Group will provide its general comments on the proposed rule.

Answers to Questions Posed By The Commission

1.

For two reasons, the Group does not believe that more research is justified on the need to safeguard ship-ments of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days before shipment.

First, the current safeguard requirements provide an adequate level of protection against the potential risk from sabotage of a shipment of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days prior to shipment.

Second, the number of shipments of spent fuel cooled 150 days or less is too low to justify additional research.

2.

The Group does not believe that the Commission should prohibit shipments of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days prior to shipment because, although there are likely to be few such shipments, in some cases it may be necessary for a licensee to ship fuel that has been cooled less than 150 days.

3.

The Group believes that the Commission's estimates of the cost savings to the industry resulting from the proposed modifications of its physical protection requirements are too low.

For example, the

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 10, 1984 Page 4 Commission's estimate of a $27,000 cost savings due to the elimination of the need for armed escorts, or $200 per shipment, vastly understates the cost of armed escorts.-

General Comments on Proposed Rule In general, the Group believes that all regulations should be technically justified.

Since the results of the research programs sponsored by the Department of Energy and the NRC, described in the proposed rule, differ significantly from the results of SAND77-1927 which provided the technical justification for the current requirements, the Commission's physical protection requirements should be modified accordingly.

Generally, it is neither legally justifiable nor sound policy to promulgate, maintain and enforce regulations that are not supported by the technical studies underlying their issuance.

If, as the Commission notes in its notice of proposed rulemaking, "the original basis for the rule is no longer valid," then the rule must be modified.

49 Fed. Reg. at 23,869.

The Group believes that, with the exception of the continued requirement for protection of shipment schedule information, the proposed modifications of the physical protection requirements for shipments of spent fuel cooled 150 days or more (i) are supported by the results of the

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 10, 1984 Page 5 most recent research studies and (ii) will provide an appropriate level of protection against the potential risk of a successful sabotage event.

For the reasons discussed below, the Group believes that the requirement for the

_protection of schedule information should also be eliminated for shipments of spent fuel cooled 150 days or more.

Protection of Shipment Schedule Information The Group is concerned that there is a lack of technical justification for the Commission's decision to retain its present requirements for the protection of shipment schedule information.

In a February 27, 1984 memorandum from William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations, to the Commissioners, suggesting modification of the physical protection requirements for spent fuel shipments based on the studies referenced in the proposed rule, Mr. Dircks proposes that the Commission drop the requirement that shipment schedule information be protected because it is "not warranted".

The only explanation of the probable basis for the Commission's decision in the prop9sed rule to continue to protect schedule information is the statement that the moderated requirements should "deny an adversary easy access to shipment location information."

49 Fed. Reg. at 23,870.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 10, 1984 Page 6 The research, data or other facts supporting this statement are neither identified nor explained.

Moreover, in the Group's opinion, it-is by no means clear that the retention of the requirement that schedule information be protected will, in fact, act as an additional deterrent to the sabotage of a spent fuel shipment.

It is the Group's belief that the retention of the requirement that shipment schedule information be protected will provide only very limited, if any, additional pro-tection against the sabotage of a shipment, because an adversary probably can determine shipment scheduling infor-mation with modest effort.

Potential indicators of the irrnninence of a shipment campaign include newspaper accounts, increased-activity at a reactor site, or the arrival on site of an empty cask.

In addition, because shipment schedule information is provided to state governors or their designees prior to shipment, and, as noted in the proposed rule, such information is often provided to local law enforcement agencies en route, there is a strong likelihood that a potential saboteur could breach security procedures relatively easily and obtain access to scheduling informa-tion.

Moreover, by obtaining access to protected schedule information and deliberately leaking it to the press, an

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 10, 1984 Page 7 individual or group may be able to interfere with or temporarily prevent scheduled shipments~

Recent shipping experience supports the Group's belief that it is very difficult to protect scheduling information against unauthorized disclosure.

For example, in some cases shipment schedules have been publicized in violation of the nondisclosure requirement.

See Nuclear Assurance Corporation; Application For Inconsistency Ruling; Public Notice and Invitation to Comment, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,496 at 21,497 (1983).

In those cases where unauthorized persons have gained access to protected shipment schedule information there has not been any demonstrable adverse impact on public health and safety or on the common defense and security.

The effect of the unauthorized disclosure of shipment schedule information, however, has been to delay the efficient and timely implementation of scheduled spent fuel shipments.

Because of the lack of a factual basis for retaining the requirement that shipment schedule information be protected, the Group also questions whether the retention of this requirement satisfies the provisions of Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, added by Public Law 96-295, June 30, 1980.

Section 147 states that the Commission, in

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 10, 1984 Page 8 exercising its authority to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of safeguards information, shall act:

(A) so a*s to apply the minimum restrictions needed to protect the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security, and (B) upon a determination that the unauthorized disclo-sure of such information could reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security by significantly increasing the likelihood of theft, diversion, or sabotage of such material or such facility.

42 U.S.C.A. § 2167(a) (A)-(B) (Supp. 1984).

The legislative history of this provision indicates that Congress rejected a provision that could have been interpreted as allowing the NRC to withhold information without demonstrating even the slightest probability that disclosure of the information would have a significant adverse effect.

In its place, Congress adopted a provision that is intended to "require a showing by the NRC of some probability that disclosure [of safeguards information] would have a significant adverse effect" on the public health and safety or the common defense and security.

House Conference Rep. No. 96-1070, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong.

Ad. News 2260, 2278-79.

The NRC Staff has suggested dropping the requirement for the protection of schedule information, stating that

"[b]ecause of the likely low consequences that would result

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 10, 1984 Page 9 from even successful sabotage of a spent fuel shipment, the staff believes that criterion B [of §147 of the Atomic Energy Act} is not satisfied."

Memorandum from William J.

Dircks to the Commissioners on Moderation of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel S?ipments, Enc. 2 at 3.

The Group agrees with this statement, and also believes that retaining the requirement that shipment schedule information be protected would be contrary to criterion A of §147 of the Atomic Energy Act because the Commission would not be applying the "minimum restrictions needed."

The Group believes that neither the research studies referenced in the proposed rule, nor experience in shipping spent fuel, nor the requirements of S 147 of the Atomic Energy Act supports the retention of the present require-ments for the protection of shipment schedule information.

Accordingly, this requirement should also be eliminated.

If the Commission nevertheless determines that this requirement is authorized, necessary and appropriate, the Group believes that, particularly in view of the practical difficulties in preventing the unauthorized disclosure of schedule information, the Commission cannot hold a licensee responsible for an unauthorized disclosure or detain scheduled shipments in the event of disclosure absent a

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 10, 1984 Page 10 finding by the Commission that, under the circumstances, adherence to the shipment schedule

[can] reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse impact on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security by significantly increasing the likelihood of theft, diversion, or sabotage of such material or such facility.

42 U.S.C.A. S2167 (a) (B).

On a related matter, the Group takes this opportunity to direct the Commission's attention to the fact that many states have enacted or are considering the enactment of legislation governing the shipment of spent fuel through their jurisdictions.

These laws impose different requirements on shippers, including, for example, the payment of a fee prior to shipment, prenotification, and insurance requirements.

However, they are premised at least in part on the belief that a successful sabotage of a spent fuel shipment would have serious radiological consequences.

The Commission's adoption of the proposed rule, together with elimination of the c~rrent requirement for protection of shipment schedule information, should serve to alert the states that the imposition of requirements on spent fuel shippers, differing from or in addition to NRC and Department of Transportation requirements, is not necessary to protect the public health and safety from successful sabotage of these shipments.

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 10, 1984 Page 11 Conclusion The Group commends the Commission for carrying out a continuing series of studies on the need for regulations to protect shipments of spent fuel against successful sabotage, and for proposing to modify its regulations based on the results of its latest research studies.

These steps help to place in proper perspective the potential risk to public safety resulting from spent fuel shipments.

For the reasons discussed above, with the exception of the proposed retention of the requirement that shipment schedule information be protected against unauthorized disclosure, the Group supports the proposed modifications of the Commission's physical protection requirements for spent fuel in transit.

Thank you for allowing us the opportunity to submit these comments.

Respectfully submitted, Leonard M. Trosten, Esq.

Mindy A. Buren, Esq.

LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE 1333 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.

Suite 1100 Washington, D.C.

20036 (202) 457-7500 Attorneys for the Electric Utility Companies' Nuclear Transportation Group

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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission SEP O 7 1984 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments (10 CFR, Part 73)

Dear Mr. Chilk:

SEP 10 p3 :J9 Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) has reviewed the proposed rule, Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments, and agrees in general with the proposed modification.

Carolina Power & Light Company does, however, have specific comments regarding the proposed rule (attached).

The conclusions as set forth in the supplementary information of the proposed rule provide a realistic analysis of the possible threat posed during shipments of spent fuel.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed rule.

Yours very truly, SR.'!f'**-

s.

Zimmerman Manager Nuclear Licensing Section DJK/pgp (512SNP)

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CP&L's Comments Regarding Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments

1.

The impact of not relaxing the requirements for fuel less than 150 days cooled will be small.

The amount of fuel shipped that is less than 150 days cooled is so small that the cost of further research is not readily justifiable. Also, there are few casks which are licensed to ship fuel less than 150 days old.

2.

There may at some point be a need for a utility to ship fuel less than 150 days cooled due to some emergency, i.e., a problem with a spent fuel pool.

Therefore, we do not recommend restricting all shipments to fuel greater than 150 days cooled.

3.

For fuel cooled 150 days or more, we agree with the deletion of the following requirements:

a)

Armed guards in cities.

b)

Advance approval of the routes by NRC.

c)

Establishment of a communication center.

d)

Advance coordination of shipments with the local law enforcement agencies.

4.

If the requirement for the protection of shipping schedules and routes is retained, the NRC should not hold a licensee responsible for any unauthorized disclosure or detain scheduled shipments in the event of such disclosures.

5.

From a common sense standpoint, CP&L agrees with the decision to require the following:

a)

Unarmed escorts for surveillance.

b)

Onboard mobile communications capability.

c)

Advance notification of states through which a shipment will pass.

(512SNP/pgp)

Law Department

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~}6{~R 216/623-2487 September 5, 1984 ATTENTION:

Docketing & Service Branch TO:

THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Re:

Proposed rule for modification of protection require-ments for spent fuel shipments, written comments.

On June 8, 1984, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published a proposed rule at 49 FR 23867 relating to the above-captioned matter.

In the preamble to the proposed rule, comments were invited by the Commission.

On behalf of the Chessie System Railroads, I am pleased to offer comments on the proposed rule for the movement of spent fuel shipments.

Our principal concern is with the new proposed Paragraph(f)of Section 73.37.

This paragraph purports to offer "liberalized" escort requirements for the protection of shipments of spent fuel cooled 150 days or more.

One of those key proposals is to permit the carrier to provide an escort for the move-ment of fuel.

Such escort, according to the proposed regulations,can be a shipment vehicle operator, in effect, an employee.

A review of the proposed duties for such escort indicatesthat the responsibilities imposed upon employee escorts are unduly burdensome.

These responsibilities are beyond those nor-mally part of a railroad employee ' s work on a railroad train.

We believe that the escort responsibilities and the duty to provide an escort is more ap-propriately imposed upon the shipper of the spent fuel and/or his agent.

The shipper and/or his agent should be working in concert with the federal govern-ment, if the federal government is not the actual shipper of the spent fuel.

If the federal government is the shipper, it should provide the escort.

With respect to the proposed communications capability which the regu-lation seeks to impose upon such shipment of spent fuel by rail, it is our belief that the shipper or government-provided escort should bring his own communication capability with him to satisfy the proposed requirements of the regulation.

If the regulation as proposed contemplates a communications capacity above that normally found on a standard railroad train i n,,,1 Jd Acknowledged by card..* f/ttff.,.---f-.

The Chessie System Railroads, a unit of CSX Corporation, are the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway~

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, Western Maryland Railway and affiliated lines.

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the railroad industry, such requirement is an unfair burden.and imposition upon the railroad.

Such burden,again, should be appropriately op-posed upon the shipper-provided escort.

We stand ready to assist in the development of regulations which are consistent with the needs of the public interest, the nuclear fuel industry and the transportation industry.

We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the proposed regulations.

HPB/bjt This letter submitted in triplicate.

Certified Mail No.

P473 130 724 Return Receipt Req.

Very truly yours,

~P.~

Harvey P. Blank Assistant General Attorney

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Environmental Quality Board C:.-1-9 rll ~.5r~7) 100 Capitol Square Building 550 Cedar Street St. Paul, Minnesota 55101 Phone _______ _

August 31, 1984 Mr. Samuel Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nucl ear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chil k:

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The State of Minnesota has reviewed the proposed rule modification to 10 CFR Part 73, which relaxes previously adopted interim safeguards measures for spent fuel shipments.

We request that the attached comments be entered into the record and considered by the staff and the Commission.

Sincerely,

~d>>l!<at~l-* -

Tom Kalitowski, Chairman Governor's Task Force on High-Level Radioactive Waste Attachment cc: Crystalline States Congressional Delegation State of Minnesota, Washington D.C. Office SEP 1 o p 3 :JfJ Aoknowle~ged by oard ** 9/tt/li.~

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER f

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STATE OF MINNESOTA COMMENTS ON THE MODIFICATION OF PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS Cl0 CFR PART 73)

The State of Minnesota urges the Commission to retain the current safeguard requirements for armed escorts and prior route approval.

The following comments are offered in support of this position:

1)

Elimination of Armed Escorts The Commission proposes that armed escorts be eliminated because recent studies have shown the risk to be less than that assumed at the time the interim rule was promulgated.

The discussion of related research in the Federal Register notice (June 8, 1984, page 23868) indicates that the NRC and DOE research programs were based on single-assembly casks.

Recently proposed rail shipments of spent fuel in Minnesota would utilize special movement trains carrying two casks, each with a capacity of 18 BWR fuel assemblies.

We do not believe that the NRC and DOE study results can simply be extrapolated, as they were in the notice, to extend their applicability to rail casks of this size.

Other factors related to scale could significantly affect the release levels and health consequences.

Furthermore, the Commission is willing to maintain current requirements if the spent fuel has cooled less than 150 days because detailed consequence calculations for such fuel have not been carried out (page 23870).

Based on the apparent absence of similar detailed consequence calculations for higher burn-up fuel (40,000 MWd/MT versus 33,000 MWd/MT), as well as for large scale casks, it appears that the Commission is inconsistently and arbitrarily extending the safeguard protection.

Regardless of the risk associated with radioactive releases, successful or unsuccessful sabotage attempts could endanger the lives of escorts, drivers, and the public along shipment routes.

The Commission notes this in the related research discussion by observing that, "the number of fatalities from a sabotage explosion would be greater than the number of radiologically induced fatalities" (page 23868).

The Commission's concern over public health and safety should extend to these non-radiological injuries or fatalities if they occur in the course of a spent fuel shipment.

If armed escorts are effective in deterring attempted sabotage of shipments, the basis for their retention should not be radiation release potential alone, but should also include consideration of their value in protecting the well-being of shipment personnel and other unrelated members of the public along the route from non-radiological harm.

Finally, the estimated industry expenditure of $27,000 annually for armed escorts (page 23870) can certainly not be considered burdensome.

Given uncertainties regarding both generic cask simulations and the specific circumstances surrounding a potential act of sabotage, the use of armed escorts is an inexpensive precautionary measure that provides the public with an added degree of safety assurance and confidence that the licensee can ship the waste with minimum risk.

We recognize its value in Minnesota because we have observed the negative public and law enforcement agency reaction to this proposed relaxation of the rule which, coincidently, was released at the time of the announcement of the 30 proposed rail shipments of spent fuel from Northern States Power Company ' s Monticello reactor.

e 2)

Prior Route Approval The Commission suggests that Department of Transportation (DOT) routing requirements in 49 CFR Part 177.825 are duplicative of the Commission's safeguards routing policy and, therefore, prior route surveys and approval by the Commission are no longer necessary (page 23870).

We have reviewed the DOT routing rules, as well as the DOT Guidel ines f or Selecting Preferred Highway Routes for Large Quantity Shipments of Radioactive Mate r ial s and find that these rules do not duplicate those of the Commission.

First, the DOT routing rules apply~ to highway shipments, not rail or waterborne shipments.

The current NRC rules (10 CFR Part 73.37 (b) (7) require advance approval for road mg rail shipments.

We object to any proposed modification that would result in the elimination of any route review or approval for rail shipments.

Second, the highway routing rules and guidelines cited above focus on accident potential, not suitability related to intentional acts of sabotage.

We believe there should be a difference in the criteria used by the NRC and DOT in route approval, based on this distinction between accidental and intentional events, and do not understand how one rule can replace the other.

Third, according to the DOT rules, the choice of routes is left to the carrier in the absence of any preferred highway route.

Because the carrier may not always operate on routes that emphasize safeguards considerations, the Commission should, at a minimum, continue its review and approval of any shipments that do not travel on preferred routes, as defined by the DOT.

2 -

NOTE TO RECEIPIENTS OF PR-73 (49 FR 23867)

Please note that Comment No. 4 docketed on 08/15/84 from Transnuclears Inc. should be coded as Comment No. 4A.

Docketing & Seruice Branch Office of the Secretary 0( KtT[ro USNRC

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Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 SEP 6 1984 Secretary of the ColTlllission ATTN:

Docketing and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

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The Department of Energy (DOE) provides the foll owii~~ 1oimo, ~Etg 1your proposed rulemaking changes on "Modification of Protection Requi rements for Spent Fuel Shipments," 10 CFR 73, as published in the Federal Register on June 8, 1984.

The DOE recognizes the statutory requirement applicable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensees to provide advance notification for spent fuel shipments.

However, the DOE believes that notification is not an appropriate shipment safeguard requirement.

In fact, a strong case can be made that the probability for shipment interdiction may increase due to shipment infonnation being made readily available.

The Department of Transportation (DOT) is currently investigating the value of State and local prenotification systems as a safety control for hazardous materials in general.

The DOE position is that any benefits derived from advance notification procedures are solely safety-related.

The two most often stated reasons for advance shipment notification are better State law enforcement and emergency preparedness. These considerations are legitimate "safety" concerns, just as packaging compliance and transportation accident prevention are safety concerns. However, advance notification requirements should not be advocated as a shipment safeguard measure.

For this reason, the DOE respectfully requests that the NRC remove advance notification from the safeguard section and that such requirements be placed within a reporting section of the regulations.

Sincerely,

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~tatt l.\\tpartmtnt of ~ taltb HON. TERRYE. BRANSTAD July 20, 1984 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 LUCAS STATE OFFICE BUILDING DES MOINES. IOWA 50319-0075 Attention Docketing and Service Branch Ladies and Gentlemen:

DOC;K£TE't USNRC GOVERNOR NORMAN L. PAWLEWSKI COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HEAL TM 134 SEP -6 P 3 :29 Of='

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SEcRt OOC,ET ING & SER BRANCH Reference is made to your notice in the June 8, 1984, Federal Register relating to revision of 10 CRF 73. 37 entitled, 11Modifi cation of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments.

11 The proposed rule change would reduce safeguard requirements relating to irradiated reactor fuel shipments which have been cooled for a period of time greater than 150 days following removal from a nuclear reactor.

These rule changes are not intended to reduce the safety criteria associated with fuel shipments, but are intended only to modify safeguard requirements which pertain to security measures against possible sabotage.

It is noted that the relaxation of safeguard restrictions is based on information obtained from a

recent research program which demonstrates that potential consequences of the successful sabotage of a shipment of irradiated fuel, which has been cooled for greater than 150 days, would be small compared to what had been previously assumed.

Since this type of an evaluation has not been carried out for spent fuel cooled less than 150 days the current requirements will continue to apply to these shipments, including the provision of armed escorts through densely populated metropolitan areas.

In Iowa the affected areas would include Cedar Rapids, Council Bluffs, Davenport, Des Moines and Waterloo.

It is important that law enforcement officials be aware of shipments requiring armed escorts.

Therefore, it would appear that additional information is required under the state notification process.

It is requested that 10 CFR 73.37(g){2) be amended to include the following two added items of information:

l) A statement as to whether spent fuel being shipped has been cooled more or less than 150 days.

This information is necessary in those cases where the Iowa State Patrol is to serve as an escort for the shipment.

2) A statement of the number of vehicles or rail cars being used in multiple cask shi pments.

This information would be helpful for highway regulati on purposes as well as in emergency response.

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John A. Eure, Director Environmental Health Section 515/281-4928 Chairman Interagency Coordinating Council on Radiation Safety JAE/bf cc: Max Miller, The Governor's Office Andrew Varley, Commerce Commission ICCRS Members Emery Sobottka, Iowa State University

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August 22, 1984 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Secretary,

f'OtKETEfl In response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commi;8s\\ oAGOs27 PS :02 request for comments on modifi cation of protection requirements for spent fuel shipments (10 OF.H* 73J,~,.t~e Missouri Department of Natural Resources offfGfrs -J~llili SE following observations.

MICH Whereas certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.37 would be eased, dropping of those requirements would be mitigated by other provisions.

Thus, it appears that the proposed rule changes should have little adverse effect on spent fuel transportation safety.

The NRC also asked for input on whether more research is justified for shipments of spent fuel that have been cooled for less than 150 days.

One proposed alternative to the research is to simplify the regulations by prohibiting such shipments.

The Department's comments are that in the absence of research on this type of shipment, no easing of requirements should be contemplated.

However, since there appears to be no significant need to transport spent fuel within the 150 day time frame, prohibiting it seems reasonable, will simplify the regulations, and will save money by removing the need for the additional research.

If you have any questions on these comments, or need further information from this Department, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

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Ron Kucera Deputy Director RK:nnk cc:

Roland Lickus, Region III NRC Missouri Office of Administration Christopher 5. Bond Governor Fred A Lafser Director

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August 13, 1984 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch

'84 Re:

Proposed Rule-Modification of Protection AGO ts °'

,12,'25 Requirements for Spent Fuel (FR Vol. 49 No. 112)

Gentlemen:

Transnuclear, Inc. is a fuel cycle service company providing engineering and operating systems worldwide for radioactive material handling, packaging, transport and storage.

We are currently involved in several major spent fuel shipping campaigns.

These include shipment of 206 fuel assemblies from West Valley, New York to the Dresden Nuclear Power Station in Illinois, shipment of 224 BWR fuel bundles from "{r:'est Valley to the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station in New Jersey and the shipment of spent fuel from foreign test and research reactors to USDOE facilities in South Carolina and Idaho.

Over 200 of these research fuel shipments have been performed over the past six years and have required us to meet past as well as present safeguard regulation.

At the time the present rules became effective, Transnuclear was opposed to the increase in safeguard requirements because we believe the threat of sabotage as well as the postulated con-sequences resulting from a successful breeching of a spent fuel cask were exagerated.

We also felt that once regulations were put ~nto plqpe_t tqey could not easily be revoked at a later date, even if they we~e shown not to be necessary.

The presently proposed rule to reduce the safe~ua~d je~¥}rfments for greater than 150 day cooled fuel would appe~l!" *~~ *f1rs~ glance ACknowie<lgtcl by tm*U.,.f /rJ/!!l.'1:

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Secretary of the Commission August 13, 1984 Page Two to reduce costs for performing such shipments and also reduce the time required to coordinate the shipments.

However, now that the rules have been in effect for several years, local and state regulatory and enforcement officials have accepted the theme of the present federal rules and have initiated their own rules.

In most cases these state rules are more comprehensive than the federal rules and typically require armed escorts for all spent fuel transports within the state boundary rather than only in high population density areas.

It appears that the presence of armed guards has led to some relaxation of concerns by some public officials and the general public.

There is, therefore, no assurance that elimination of the armed guard requirements in the federal regulations will be followed by similar changes by the individual states.

To the contrary, states which currently rely on the federal regulations may now impose new regulations to fill the gap.

If such is the case, costs will probably increase, not decrease, and shipment coordination will become more difficult.

Transnuclear is in favor of any rule which truly will reduce transport and manpower costs, but it is not clear that the proposed rule will in fact accomplish that goal.

yours, Man us i Manage -Ope r ations JM:nb

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I, JOHN D. LEONARD, JR.

VICE PRESIDENT

• NUCLEAR OPERATIONS August 1, 1984 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

• a4 AGO -6 A10 :1 O

Subject:

Request for Public Co111T1ent on the proposed rule change to 10CFR Part 73 - "Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments"

Dear Mr. Chilk:

On Friday, June 8, 1984, the NRC published the subject request for comment in the Federal Register. The Long Island Lighting Company wishes to comment in favor of the recommendations.

In the light of the NRC sponsored researches as noted in the request for comment we wish to register concurrence with the conclusion that relaxation is warranted regarding certain rigorous safeguards to shipment of properly cooled reactor fuel assemblies in approved casks and routings.

While LILCO presently does not have sufficient experience in shipping of spent fuel to make a judgement on the validity of NRC cost estimates, we consider these proposals as prudent and designed to effect savings in plant operating costs which will accrue to utility rate payers.

It does not appear that the number of shipments in the foreseeable future of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days before shipment would justify additional research however, such shipments should not be prohibited. The NRC sponsored research data to date may be extrapolated with reasonable confidence to conclude that the hazard does not justify such prohibition.

LILCO wishes to commend the Commission on these and similar research efforts which examine aspects of public safety and the efficiency of operation of the nuclear power industry.

W. Tunney NOSD File SR2

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• WADING RIVER, N.Y. 11792 JOHN D. LEONARD, JR.

VICE PRESIDENT

• NUCLEAR OPERATIONS August 1, 1984 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Request for Public Conment on the proposed rule change to 10CFR Part 73 - "Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments"

Dear Mr. Chil k:

On Friday, June 8, 1984, the NRC published the subject request for comment in the Federal Register. The Long Island Lighting Company wishes to comment in favor of the recommendations.

In the light of the NRC sponsored researches as noted in the request for comment we wish to register concurrence with the conclusion that relaxation is warranted regarding certain rigorous safeguards to shipment of properly cooled reactor fuel assemblies in approved casks and routings.

While LILCO presently does not have sufficient experience in shipping of spent fuel to make a judgement on the validity of NRC cost estimates, we consider these proposals as prudent and designed to effect savings in plant operating costs which will accrue to utility rate payers.

It does not appear that the number of shipments in the foreseeable future of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days before shipment would justify additional research however, such shipments should not be prohibited. The NRC sponsored research data to date may be extrapolated with reasonable confidence to conclude that the hazard does not justify such prohibition.

LILCO wishes to commend the Conmission on these and similar research efforts which examine aspects of public safety and the efficiency of operation of the nuclear power industry.

.er! truly yours,

(

t 'v -< J.k, )Nu,;/1

/

---

d\\D. Leonara, Jr.

,L

< _;;i. President - NucX~ r Operations MJG ck W. Tunney NOSD File SR2 Bee; J. L. Smith B, R.. McCaffrey G. J. Gisonda

July 18, 1984

w. E. Steiger E. J. Youngling Notice of Proposed Rule -

10CFR73 "Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments,"

Federal Register/

Vol. 49, No. 112/Friday, June 8, 1984 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 w.o.

10/44430 NLR 84-0010 The NRC is considering the amendment of its regulations to relax certain safeguards for the physical protection of irradiated fuel in transit.

The comment period for these changes expires September 10, 198 4.

While it is recognized that LILCO contemplates no shipments in the very near term, we may want to comment favorably upon these rule change s which will eventually have their impact on Shoreham's operations.

It is proposed that a letter simila~ to the attached be transmitted to the Commission.

Briefly, the proposed changes take into account new information and conclusions which have emerged from the Commissions research programs which study the possible effects to the public of sabotage of fuel shipments with attendant release of respirable radioactive materials from credible broaching of shipping casks and damage to reference fuel assemblies.

e The reference fuel used was based upon a burnup of 33,000 megawatt days per metric tonne at a power density of 40 kilowatts per kilo-gram of the heavy metal.

The fuel was then cooled for 150 days before shipment.

The proposed rule takes into account the new information and conclusions which have emerged from the research program.

The important features of the proposed rule are:

0 The performance requirements for protection of spent fuel shipments have been modified to emphasize protection against sabotage with high consequence.

High consequence refers to the levels of consequence that prompted issuance of the original interim rule.

For a truck shipment, high consequence refers to tens of early fatalities and hundreds of latent cancer fatalities.

/ -

Page 2

° For shipment of spent fuel cooled less than* 150 days, the current requirements would continue to apply, because detailed consequence calculations for such fuel have not been carried out.

° For shipments of spent fuel cooled 150 days or more, a new set of moderate requirements would apply that are consistent with the experimentally determined level of consequence.

The requirements call for a shipment to be accompanied by an unarmed escort (who may also serve as driver, rail employee, or ship's officer) who would carry out prescribed security procedures.

In addition, present requirements for protection of shipment schedule infor-mation, onboard communications (all transport modes), and immobilization (truck mode only) would be retained.

Among other requirements considered no longer needed (for ship-ments of fuel cooled 150 da*ys or more) are those for route surveys and advance coordination with local law enforcement agencies (LLEAs).

New DOT requirements for routing (49CFR177.825) issued in the interest of safety and recently put in force apply to NRC licensees and require them to use routes consistent with NRC safeguards routing policy.

With respect to LLEA coordination, a separate NRC rule (the present §73.37(f) requires the notification of governors (or designated state officials) whenever spent fuel is to be trans-ported within a state to enable the state to contribute to the safety, security and ease of transport of the shipment.

State LLEAs typically are informed of impending shipments through this process.

!),.£;t/:J J. L. Smith MJG:ck Attachment cc: J. D. Leonard B. R. Mccaffrey J. P. Morin R. Reen

w. J. Tunney J. A. Rigert R. A. Kubinak J.M. Kelly NOSD File SR2 NOSM-81+-00ll+

NOSF File

Federal Register / Vol. 49, No. 1.12 / Friday, June 8, 1984 / Proposed Rules 23867 pellet material shall be recon1tlitutucl in distilled water and inoculated into a flask containiJl8 75 cm 2 of a 30 to 50 percent confluent monolayer culture of primary porcine cells or a porcine cell line of proven equal PPV susceptibility.

An additional flask of cella ahall he held as a negative control.

(2) The teat and control monolayera shall be maintained for at leaat 14 days and subcultured at least once durin,t the maintenance period.

(3) At the end of the 14-duy

-maintenance period, and 4 to 7-days after the last subculturing, monolayers shall be tested for the presence of porcine parvovlrua by the fluorescent antibody technique as prescribed In I 113.47(c).

(e) A sample of serum *from each donor hone used to produce a,lot of equine serum used in the preparation of bioloaical products recommended for use in horses shall be tested at a laboratory approved by Veterinary Service* uainl the Couina te1t for equine lnfectioua anemia antibodies. If antibodies to equine infectioua anemia are found. the lot of serum is unsatisfactory.

f 111.15 Delactlon of extraneous....-

In.......... VlruL F.ach Master Seed Vi.rua (MSV) ahall be tested aa prncribed in this section. A MSV found IIDHU.factory by any prescribed tut shall not be used. A serial of bioloSical product shall not be released if produced frem a MSV that ia found anaatiafactory *~ any p,ncribed lest.

(a) Atlea1t a 1.0 ml aliqlldl per cell culture of MSV shall be *diapenaed onto monolayers (at least 75 cm I in are&) of:

(1) Vero (African,reen monkey) cell line; (2) F.mbryonic cells, neonatal ceU., or a cell line of the apecies.for which the vaccineiarecommeaded:and (3) Embryonic cells, neonatal aella, er a cell line of the 1peciea of cells in which the MSV is presently beins propagated if different than prescribed in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section. Cell line used shall have been found satisfactory when tested aa prescribed in I 113.52 and primary oella used shall have been found satisfactory when tested as prescribed in I 113.51.,ff the MSV ia cytopathic for or causes hemadaorption in the cell* in which *it,is to be teated, the MSV aha)) be neutralized with apecific antibody-free blockin, sera supplied or approved by Veterinary Services (VS) or counteracted by a method approved by VS.

(b) At leRBt one monolayer of each cell type used in the test shall be maintained as an unlnoculated control.

(c) Each monolayer shall be maintained for at least 14 days.

(d) Cells shall be aubcultured at least once during the maintenance period. All but the last subculture shall result in at least one new monolayer at 'least 75 cm 2*

The last aubculture ahall meet the minimum area requirement Bpe(lified in H 113.46 and 113.47.

. (e).Monolayers shall be examined regularly throusJtout the 14-day maintenance period for evidence of cytopathopnic agenta. If evidence.of a cytopath019NC agent is found, the MSV ia unsatisfactory.

(f) At the conclusion of the 14-day maintenance period, monolayers ahall be tested for:

(1) Cytopathosenic and/or hemadsorbiJl8 *&genta as prescribed in I 113.46:

• (2) Extraneous asenta by the ftuoreacentantibodytechniqueas prescribed in I 113.47.

(37 Stat. 832-133: Z1 U.S.C. 151-158}

Done at Waabin,ton. D.C., this 5th diiy of Juge 1984.

• o. F. SchwiMemen, Acting Deputy Administrator, 'Veterinary Sen*ica.

(FIi Dec. ~1-Plied 6-7.... ; M& -1 IIUING com..,......

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10CFflPa171 llodltlcation of '""9cllon

,........,... tor Spent fuel Shlpmenta AGl!NCY: Nuclear Re.,u)atoey Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

MIMIIAIIY: The Nuclear Replatory CommiNion is consideriJl8 amendill8 ita regulations for the physical protection-of irradiated reactor fuel in transiL The issue under consideration is one of Nfesuard* rather than safety. The amendment, would take into account new data from a research prosram and from.other aourcea that indicate that the consequences of tucce11ful sabotaae of an irradiated fuel shipment in a heavily populated area would be small compared to the consequence estimates that prompted issuance of the current rule. For certain apent fuel shipments, these amendment, would provide continued protection qainat aabota9e, while at the aame time relievins the licensee of non-essential requirements.

DATE: Comment period expires September 10, 1984.

ADDRESSES: Written comments should be submitted to t))e Secretary of the Com1nission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, WashiJl8ton, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch. Copies of comments on the proposed rule may be examined and copied for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW, Washinston, DC

• FOIi FUfffHEII INf'ORMATION CONTACT:

Carl B. Sawyer, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.

Nuclear Replatory Commision.

WashiJl8ton, DC 20555, Telephone: 301-427--4188.

SUPPU!MENTARV IN,ORMATION:

Background

The NRC carries out a continuina series of studies to aid in determining the measures that are needed to protect radioactive material, including irradiated (spent) fuel, against sabotage.

During the mid-19708, studies (NUREG-0194, "Calculations of Radiological Conaequencea from Sabotage of Shippins Casks for Spent Fuel and High*

Level Waste," February 1971: and NUREG--0170. *~Final Environmental Statement on.the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes," December 1977). estimated the health effects of a radiol09ical release in a non-urban area resultin, from a high-explosive assault of a spent fuel cask.

The estimated riab were not considered to be substantive enoup to warrant rqulatory action. A aubNquent study by Sandia Laboratories included a chapter on the sabota1e of spent fuel in urban areas of hiah population density (SAND 77-1927, "Transport of Radionuclide, in Urban Environa: A Workin, Draft Aaaenment"J. Thia study suueated that the sabotase of spent fuel

• ahipmentl had the potential for producins aerioua ndiolOBical conaequencea in areas of high population density. The Commission concluded that. in order to protect health and minimize dall88f to life and property (sections 181b and 181i(3) of the Atomic Enel"8)' Act of 1954, aa amended), it was prudent and desirable to,require certain interim safquarda measures for spent -fuel shipments. The focus of concern was on possible successful acts of sabotage in densely populated urban areas. Because of the possibility that spent fuel shipment, could be hijacked and moved from low popul*tion areas to hish population areas, the interim requirements applied to all ahipmentl, even though the

'/.,

Federal Register / Vol. 49, No. 112 / Friday, June 8, 1984 / Proposed Rules 23069 The program sponsored by DOE included one full-scale and several small-scale experiments. The full-scale experiments used a reference charge ogainst a full-scale cask containing a single unirradiated surrogate fuel assembly. Again the quantity of material released from the cask was measured, and the released.quantity was analyzed to determine what fraction was composed of respirable-sized particles.

About three grams of respirable surrogate fuel was released. On the basis of the results of small-scale fuel characterization experiments which had been conducted separately, it was determined that a release of three grams of surrogate fuel was equivalent to a maximum release of 17 grams of irradiated fuel. Using the CRAC computer code for health consequences (the second of the computer codes used in SAND 77-1927 and NUREG/CR--0743 and a code which generally predicts higher health consequences than the METRAN code) and again assuming 150-day cooling, researchers found that the average radiological consequence of a 17-gram release in a heavily populated area such as New York City would be no early fatalities and about 2 latent cancer fatalities. 1 The peak consequences appearing in the computer runs were no early fatalities and about 7 latent cancer fatalities. Values of average or peak consequences should be doubled to account for the case of a three-assembly truck cask.

Conceivably, an adver.sary could use more than one shaped charge in attacking a cask, and that possibility was considered. For shaped charges the size of the reference charge, the likely result is that the release would be in proportion to the number of charges used. The use of larger shaped charges is conceivable but less credible. These types of charges would probably have to be custom-\\11Bde, thereby introducing a formidable new problem for an adversary. There is no known technology that would allow a dispropdrtionately large increase in production of respirable particles with credible increase in a saboteur's explosive resources.

Most consequence calculations discussed herein are based on fuel subjected to bumup of 33,000 megawatt days per metric ton of heavy metal (MWd/MT) at a power density of 40 kilowatts per kilogram of heavy metal 1 The current CRAC code that i1 cited here (1on1elime referred to a CRAC Z) i1 a modified venion of the code that was u1ed in SAND 77-1927 and NUREG/CR--0743. The modified ve,.ion predicta conequencea a few percent higher than the earlier ve,.ion: the ntimted conequence1 are baaed on 1h11 modified version.

(KW / Kg), ~ hich is termed reference fuel. The possible transport of spent fuel subjected to higher burnup was considered. although these shipments are not now being made. For fuel subjected to 40,000 MWd/MT (which.is typical of the higher burnups being

• considered) at a power density of 36.4 KW /Kg, the calculated consequences of successful sabotage are about 45 percent higher than the consequences of successful sabotage of reference fuel.

Additional information on the NRC-sponsored program can be found in a report entitled "Final Report On Shipping Cask Sabotage Source Term Investigation." Additional information on the DOE-sponsored program can be found in a report entitled "An Assessment of the Safety of Spent Fuel Transportation in Urban Environs." A peer review of both research programs was carried out by the U.S. Army's Ballistic Research Laboratory. The review focused on the interaction between explosives, cask, and fuel and on the experimental techniques used.

The conclusions in the peer review report generally confirm the reasonableness of the approaches taken in the research, and based on the assumptions of the research approach, confirmed the estimated release levels.

The two research reports, the peer review report, and SAND 77-1927 are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street

• NW., Washington, DC. NUREG/CR--0743 is available from the NRC/GPO Sales Program, U.S. Nuclear Resulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

Conclusiona For the following reasons, the Commission concludes that moderation of the current interim rule (10 CFR 73.37) for tl;ie protection* of spent fuel shipments against sabotage is justified:

1. Issuance of the interim rule was based chiefly on consequence estimates set forth in SAND 77-1927. A baseline estima le, a high estimate, and a low estimate were provided. At the time the rule issuance was under consideration, the high consequence estimate was based on 14,000 grams of respirable release for a truck cask containing three fuel assemblies and on 47,500 grams of respirable release for a rail cask. At the time, the high-estimate releases could not be ruled out. The calculated average consequences for truck cask sabotage were summarized as several tens of early fatalities and hundreds of latent cancer fatalities. The calculated averase consequences for a rail cask were summarized H hundreds of early fatalities and thousands of latent cancer fatalities. The research recently completed has shown that the likely respirable release from sabotage and the resulting consequences are but a tir,y percentage of the estimated values which originally prompted issuance of the rule. Accordingly, the original basis for the rule is no longer valid.

2. The value of consequence now predicted (no early fatalities and about four latent cancer fatalities average for reference basis sabotage of a three-assembly cask) is obtained only when a set of assumptions very favorable to the saboteur are made. The effects of assumptions less favorable to a saboteur are discussed below:

a. Fuel burnup and cooling.

Consequence calculations are based on reference fuel cooled for 150 days.

Because of lower burnup and longer cooling, assemblies currently being shipped typically contain a radioactive material inventory 0.2 to 0.5 as hazardous as the assumed inventory for reference fuel.

b. Population density. The.release of radioactive material was postulated to take place within an area with population density in the range between 62,000 and 200,000 persons per square mile. Very few (perhaps only one) locations in the U.S. are characterized -

by this population density.

Consequences decline markedly for lower population density.

c. Lifetime of respirable particles. A respirable particle tends to adhere to the first sizeable particle it encounters or to serve as a condensation site for vapors (such as water), thus possibly limiting its lifetime to one that is shorter than that necessary for human inhalation and deep deposition in the lung. In an actual sabotage, products of the explosion would undoubtedly provide numerous larger-than-respirable particlea that would act as agglomeration sites for respirable particles. In both sets of experiments, the products of the explosion were isolated from the cask to keep the measurement problems manageable. Water particles (fog-like droplets) would also serve as agglomeration sites. Finally, water vapor or materials vaporized by the explosive earlier do not account for a water jacket or annulus of wet material present in all truck casks now in use. An experiment has ahown that the presence of water (water jacket and water-filled cavity) between the explosive and the fuel reduces the ttaantity of respirable material released by a factor of 40.

Simultaneous occurrence of worst-or near-worst-caae values for each of these factors, plus an assumption of successful sabotage appears remote in the extreme.

Federal Register / Vol. 49, No. 112 / Friday, June 8, 1984 / Proposed Rules planned shipment route did not pass through a densely populated urban area.

The interim requirements were to be in effect until the results of confirmatory research became available and were analyzed.

The interim rule, which set forth physical protection requirements in 10 CFR 73.37, was issued on June 15, 1979, and was made effective on July 3, 1979.

The rule was issued without benefit of public comment, but at the time of publication public comment was invited.

Afte reviewing the public comments and after taking into account its experience in administering the rule, the NRG, on June 3, 1980, published amendments to the rule. The amendments were made effective on July 3, 1980, and the amended rule is currently in effect as 10 CFR 73.37(a) through (e).

Related Research SAND 77-1927, which prompted issuance of the protection requirements, A

contained estimates which were W unavoidably subject to large uncertainties due to a lack of technical data. A later draft of the Sandia report

("Transportation of Radionuclides in Urban Environs: Draft Environmental Assessment") was published by the NRC as NUREG/CR-0743. Although this draft predicted less serious consequences, a significant degree of uncertainty still remained that could be resolved only by further study and experiments.

Investigators at that time agreed and continue to agree (1) that consequences of an act of sabotage would be a direct function of the quantity of spent fuel that would be released in respirable form, and (2) that the only credible means of malevolent generation of respirable particles would be through Athe use of a large quantity (tens to Whundreds of pounds) of high explosive skillfully applied. Little information was available to aid in predicting the response of spent fuel and spent fuel casks to explosive sabotage.

The NRC and the Department of Energy (DOE) responded to this need for technical data by sponsoring separate but coordinated experimental programs.

Both programs were designed to yield information about the release from a specified reference sabotage event, which was defined as follows. Saboteur skills were specified as those of an experienced military or commercial explosive demolition specialist.

Familiarity with a wide range of kinds and configurations of explosives was assumed. Use of up to hundreds of pounds of military or commecial explosives was permitted. For the special case of shaped charges, use of the U.S. Army M3At was assumed. It is the largest shaped charge readily available. 'An MJAl causes damage through form a tin of a high pressure particulate jet which may be a fraction of an inch in diamter and has the capability to penetrate two or more feet of metal, eroding everything in its path.

From the outset, it was expected that a shaped charge would be more efficient than other configurations in producing respirable particles. For that rea11on the M3Al was designated as the reference explosive. The refernece cask was specified as a single-assembly cask. The specificaton is conservative since a single-assembly cask has smaller dimensions than a multias11embly cask and is, therefore, more likely to yield a greater quantity of respirable particles (per assembly) in response to a given level of explosive sabotage.

A series of experiments using model (small-scale) explosives against simulated casks containing irradiated fuel characterized the NRG-sponsored program. These experiments used pressurized water reactor (PWRJ fuel with a burnup of approximately 30,000 megawatt days per metric ton of heavy metal and approximately six-and-a-half-year cooling. Measurement of the quantity of released material revealed the fraction that was made i,p of particles of respirable size (those having a diameter of less than four microns).

Upward scaling permitted the data to take into account the effect of the reference explosive and a full-scale cask. Scaling led to the conclusion that less than nine grams of spent fuel would be released in respirable form if the reference charge were used successfully against a cask containing a single PWR spent fuel assembly. Using results of the METRAN computer code for health conseuences (one of two health consequence codes used in SAND 77-1927 and NUREG/CR-0743) as set forth in Table 5-6 of NUREG/CR-0743 and assuming 150-day rather than six-and-a-half-year cooling, reserachers found that the average radiological consequence of a release in a heavily populated area such as New York City would be no early fatalities and less than one (0.4) latent cancer fatality. Early fatalities are those that occur within one year after exposure to the radioactive material.

Latent cancer fatalities are those that occur at any time following the exposure*

and could result from the intitial exposure or from any long-term exposure to low levels of contamination.

The average consequence values just cited were selected as being the most representative of the values that were calculated for the specified release.

Either higher or lower consequence values can be obtained, depending on the circumstances that are assigned. The following is an example from among the higher values that can be obtained from the data. For the most densely populated area studied (up to 200,000 persons per square mile), at evening rush hour on a business day, and in the most unfavorable location for a release, the calculated radiological consequence (peak consequence) based on data from Table 5-4 of NUREG/CR-0743 is no early fatalities and less than three (2.9) latent cancer fatalities.

The results of an explosive sabotage experiment vary from experiment to.

experiment, and only a limited number of experiments can be performed. The results of the NRC-sponsoi;ed program are based on four scaled experiemcnts using irradiated fuel, and the largest measured release value was used to derive the nine-gram value cited. In addition, a number of supporting tests were performed to establish shaped charge jet characteristics and jet-to-fuel-pin interaction.

Results of the NRC-sponsored research program (as well as those of the DOE program to be discussed subsequently) assume sabotage of a single-assembly cask, while the original SAND 77-1927 and NUREG/CR-0743 estimates assume a three-assembly cask. For the levels of release under consideration here, the releases and the health consequences for a three-assembly cask are calcµlated to be, at worst, double those for a single-assembly cask. The presence of additional assemblies in a cask would increase the likely release, but only in proportion to the number of assemblies that lie in the roughly atraight line path of the jet. For more than three PWR assemblies (a fully loaded rail cask could contain 10 PWR assemblies) the upper bound of release would likely increase roughly in proportion to the square root of the total number of assemblies contained in a cask. On the basis of energy release from the explosive, it is expected that the number of fatalities from a sabotage explosion would be greater than the number of radiologically induced fatalities.

Explosive charges other than shaped charges were considered. In other experiments, scaled charges

• representing full-scale charges of up to several hundred pounds of explosive did not breach the cask's inner containment components. Accordingly, such full-scale charges appear unlikely to produce any release of spent fuel and hence unlikely to cause radiological consequences.

23870 Federal Register / Vol. 49,

• No. 112 / Friday, June 8, 1984 / Proposed Rules Calculated consequences reported herein are reduced by factors of up to hundreds if values other than the most favorable are assigned.

3. Although the experiments have reduced the uncertainty in the quantity of material likely to be released as a result of successful sabotage, there are limitations to the conclusions of the program that must be taken into account. The reduced consequences described herein are necessarily subject to several assumptions, including that of a reference explosive. While the shaped charge selected for the explosive threat represents a very severe threat, even more severe threats cannot be ruled out if an adversary is granted protracted control of a shipment and unhindered movement. In a similar vein, consequence modeling assumptions more severe than those postulated in NUREG/CR~743 can also be conjectured (e.g., localized areas, such Ai*stadiums, with extremely high W opulation densities), if completely unrestricted movement of the shipment and unrestrained use of sabotage resources against the shipment are allowed. For these reasons a set of moderate requirements that would continue to provide a significant level of protection against protracted loss of control of a shipment and unhindered movement of a shipment by a saboteur is being considered. The requirements should (a) deny an adversary easy access to shipment location information; (b) provide for early detection of malevolent moves against or loss of control of a shipment; (c) provide a means to quickly summon assistance from local law enforcement authorities; and (d) provide a means to impede unauthorized movement of a truck A

ipment into a heavily populated area.

..... ummary of the Proposed Rule A rule is proposed that takes into account the new information and conclusions which have emerged from the research program. The important features of the proposed rule are:

1. The perfonnance requirements for protection of spent fuel shipments have been modified to emphasize protection against sabotage with.high consequence.

High consequence refers to the levels of consequence that prompted issuance of the original interim rule. For a truck shipment, high consequence refers to tens of early fatalities and hundreds of latent cancer fatalities.

2. For shipment of spent fuel cooled kss than 150 days, the current requirements would continue lo apply.

because detailed consequence calculations for such fuel have not heen CillTit!d OU t.

3. For shipments of spent fuel cooled significant economic impact upon a 150 days or more, a new set of moderate substantial number of small entities. The requirements would apply that are rule, if promulgated, would apply to consistent with the experimenll1lly licensees who transport or deliver to a determined level of consequence. The carrier for transport a shipment of spent requirements call for a shipment to be fuel in a quantity in excess of 100 grams.

accompanied by an unarmed escort Typical of the licensees who deliver (who may also serve as driver, rail spent fuel to carrier for transport are employee, or ship's officer) who would nuclear power reactor operators, carry out prescribed security independent spent fuel storage pool procedures.. ln addition. present operators. and research institutions.

requirements for protection of shipment None of the licensees who deliver spent schedule information, onboard fuel to a carrier for transport are known communications (all transport modes),

to be small entities. Licensees who and immobilization (truck mode only) transport spent fuel are typically large would be retained.

carriers who specialize in the transport Among other requ_irements considered of radioactive materials and other no longer needed (for shipments of fuel hazardous materials and who have cooled 150 days or more) ere those for many employees. No small entities are route surveys and advance coordination known to be within this licensee group.

with local law enfol'cement agencies The NRC has estimated the cost (LLEAs). New DOT requirements for impact of these amendments upon the routing (49 CFR 177.825) issued in the licensed industry. According to these interest of safety and recently put in estimates licensees would incur the force apply to NRC licensees and following costs, assuming continuation require them to use routes consistent of the current approximately 135 with NRC safeguards routing policy.

shipments annually. One-time costs for With respect to I.LEA coordination, a the proposed amendments have already separate NRC rule [the present been expended due to the same I 73.37(0] requires the notification of requirements under the present interim governors (or designated state officials) rule. Annual maintenance cost of whenever spent fuel is to be transported equipment required by the proposed within a state to enable the stale to amendments is estimated at $14,000.

contribute to the safety, security, and Annual planning and administration ease of transport of the shipment. State cost is estimated at $7,000. Total cost to LLEAs typically are informed of licensees is therefore estimated at impending shipments througl! this

$21,000 annually.

process.

One savings to industry under the Environmental Impact: Negative proposed amendments would be the Declaration elimination of about $27,000 expended The promulgation of these annually for armed escorts presently required under the interim rule.

amendments would not result in any Simplification of administration is activity that affects the environment.

estimated to result in an additional Accordingly, the Commission has saving of $ll,OOO annually. Further determined under the National information regarding these estimates is Environmental Quality guidelines and set forth in a document entitled the criteria of 10 CFR 51.5(d) that neither "Modification of Protection an environmental impact statement nor Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments:

environmental impact appraisal to Regulatory Analysis" and is available support a negative declaration for the for inspection and copying in the NRC proposed amendments to Title 10 is Public Document Room, 1717 H Street required.

NW., Washington, D.C.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement Any small entity subject to this This proposed rule amends regulation which determines that.

information collection requirements that because of its size, it is likely to bear a are subject to the Paperwork Reduction. - disproportionate adverse economic Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) by impact should notify the Commission of reducing the burden. This rule has been this in a comment that indicates:

submitted to the Office of Management (a) The licensee's size in terms of and Budget for review of the proposed unnual income or revenue and number revised paperwork requirements.

of employees; (b) How the proposed regulation Regulatory Flexibility Certification would result in a significant economic Based on the information available at burden upon the licensee as compared this stage of the rulemaking proceeding to that on a larger licensee; and and in accordance with the Regulatory (c) How the proposed regulations Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), a could be modified to l11ke into 11ccmmt

s.

I

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:l,'.

Federal Register / Vol. 49, No. 112 / Friday, June 8, 1984 / Proposed Rules 23871 the licensee's differing needs of cap;ibilities.

Public Comment Solicited Although it welcomes public comment on any aspect of the proposed reg_ulation, the Commission particulfJry solicits comment on the following topics:

1. Is more research justified for safcgurads of shipments of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days before shipment?

2. Should the NRC simplify its*

safeguards regulations by prohibiting shipment of fuel cooled less than 150 doys before shipment?

3. Are the NRC cost estimates in accord with licensee experience?

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73 Hazardous materials-Transports lion, Incorporation by reference, Nuclear materials. Packaging and containers, Penalty, Reporting requirement.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, notice is hereby given that adoption of the foliowing amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 is contemplated.

PART 73-PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS ANO MATERIALS

1. The authority citation for Part 73 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: Sec:s. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 030. 948. as amended, sec 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201}: scc. 210, 88 Stat. 1242, RR amended. sec. 204, 88 Stat. 1245 (42 U.S.C.

5341. 5844}.

Sections 73.37 (g) and (h} are also issued under sec. 301, Put,. L.00-295, 94 stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as 11mendod (-i2 U.S.C. 2273): §7:1.21, 73.37(h),

73.55 arc iSAucd under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); §§ 73.20.

73.24, 73.2S, 73.26, 73.27 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.50, 73.55, 73.67 are issued under sec. 1G1 i, fi8 Stal. 949, aa amended (42 U.S.C. 2201 (ill:

and §§ 73.20 (cl(l), 73.24 (bl(l), 73.26 (b)(3),

(h)(6l. and (kl(4), 73.27 (a) and (b), 73.37 (~)

and [h). 73.40 (bl and (d). 73.46 (gl(6) and (h )(2). 73.50 (g)(2). (Jl(iii)(b) and (h), 73.55 (hl(Z). end (4)(iiil(B), 73.70, 73.71. 73.72 ere i~sued under sec. 1610. 68 Stat. 950. as amend_ed (42 U.S.C. 2201(0)).

• Z. Section 73.37 is amended as follows:

a. Paragraphs (a)(l)(i), (a)(Z)(iii), and (b)-(e) are revised.

b. Existing paragraphs (f) and (g) are redesignated as paragraphs (g) and (h) respectively and are revised.

c. A new paragraph (f) is added.

§ 73.37 Requirements for physical protection of Irradiated fuo! In transit.

(a) Performance objectives.

(1) * * *

(i) Minimize the.possibilities for high consequence radiological sabotage of spent fuel shipments; and (2) ***

(iii) Impede attempts nt high consequence radiological sfJbotage of spent fuel shipments or attempts to illicitly move spent fuel shipments containing materials with high consequence potential, until response forces arrive.

(b) General requirements for protection of shipment of spent fuel cooled for less than 150 days. The licensee, in order to achieve the performance objectives of paragraph (a) of this section, shall provide for a physical protection system that has been established, maintained, or arranged for fuel that has been used as part of an assembly to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain reaction at any time during the 150-day period before the date on which the fuel is loaded aboard a transport vehicle for transport. This physical protection system must include the following:

(c) Shipments by road of spent reactor fuel cooled less than 150 days. In addition to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this section, the physical protection system for any portion of a spent fuel shipment i;ubjcct to paragraph (b) of this section that is by rood must provide that:

(d) Shipments by rail of spent reactor fuel cooled less than 150 davs. In addition to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this section, the physical protection system for any portion of a

~pent fuel shipment subject to parngraph (b) of this section that is by rail must provide that:

(e) Shipments by sea of spent reactor fuel cooled less than 150 days. In addition to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this sec!ion, the physical protection system for any portion of a spent fuel shipment subject to paragraph (b) of this section that is by sea must provide that:

(f) Requirements for protection of shipments of spent fuel cooled 150 days or more. To achieve the performance objectives of paragraph 73.37(a) of this section, a physical protection system established, maintained, or arranged for by the licensee for fuel which has not been used as part of an assembly to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain reaction at any time during the 150-day period before the date on which the fuel is loaded aboard the transport vehicle for transport shall:

(1) Provide for notification of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in advance of each shipment, in accordance with § 73.72 of this part; (2) Include procedures for coping with circumstances that threaten deliberate damage to a spent fuel shipment and with other safeguards emergencies; (3) Provide that shipments are planned so that scheduled intermediate stops are avoided to the extent practicable; (4) Provide for at least one escort, who may be a shipment vehicle Qperator or an officer of the shipment vessel, and who maintains visual surveillance of the shlpment during periods when the shipment vehicle is stopped, or the shipment vessel is docked; (5) Assure that the escort has been familiarized with, and is capable of implementing the security procedures; (6) Include instructions for each escort that. upon detection of the abnormal presence of unauthorized persons, vehicles or vessels in the vicinity of a i;pent fuel shipment, or upon detection of a deliberately induced situation that has the potential for damaging a spent fuel shipment, the escort will:

(i) Determine whether or not a threat exists; (ii) Assess the extent of the threat, if any; (iii) Inform local law enforcement agencies of the threat and request assistance; and (iv) Implement the procedures developed in accordance with paragraph (f)(Z) of this section:

(7) Provide, for shipments by road, a capnbility for an escort to communicate with local law enforcement agencies through the use of the following equipment located on the transport vehicle:

(i) citizens band (CB) radio; and (ii) radiotelephone or other NRG-approved equivalent means of two-way voice communication; (8) Provide, for shipments by road, NRG-approved features that permit immobilization of the cab or cargo-carryin.g portion of the vehicle:

(9) Provide, for shipments by rail, a*

capability for an escort to communicate with local law enforcement agencies through the use of a radiotelephone or other NRG-approved equivalent means of two-way voice communication, which must be available on the train: and (10) Provide, for shipments by water in U.S. territory, a capability for an escort to communicate with local law

I

• l I

23872 Federal Register / Vol. 49, No. 112 / Friday, June 8, 1984 / Proposed Rules enforcement agencies through the use of radiotelephone or other NRG-approved equivalent means of two-way voice communication.

(g) Prior to the transport of spent fuel within or through a state a licensee subject to this section shall notify the governor or the governor's designee. The licensee shall comply with the following criteria in regard to a notification.

(1) The notification must be in writing and sent to the office of each appropriate governor or the governor's designee. A notification delivered by mail must be postmarked at least 7 days before transport of a shipment within or through the state. A notification delivered by messenger must reach the office of the governor or the governor's designee at least 4 days before transport of a shipment within or through the state. A list of mailing addresses of governors and governor's designees was published in the Federal Register on June 7, 1982 (Vol. 47, No. 109, pages 24671-24673). An updated list will be published annually in the Federal Register on or about June 30.

(2) The notification must include the following information:

(i) The name, address, and telephone number of the shipper, carrier and receiver:

(ii) A description of the shipment as specified by the Department of Transportation in 49 CFR 172.202 and 172.203{d);

(iii) A listing of the routes to be used within the state; and (iv) A statement that the information described below in I 73.37(g}{3) is required by NRC regulations to be protected in accordance with the requirements of I 73.21.

[3) A licensee shall provide the following information on a separate enclosure to the written notification along with a statement that the information is required by NRC regulations to be protected in accordance with the requirements of I 73.21.

(i) The estimated date and time of departure from the point of origin of the*

shipment; (ii) The estimated date and time of entry into the governor's state; (iii) For the case of a single shipment whose schedule is not related to the schedule of any subsequent shipment, a statement that schedule information must be protected in accordance with the provisions of§ 73.21 until at least 10 days after the shipment has entered or originated within the state; and (iv) For the case of a shipment in a series of shipments whose schedules are r.:ilated, a statement that schedule information must be protectP.d in accordance with the provisions of I 73.21 until 10 days after the last shipment in the series has entered or originated within the state and an estimate of the date on which the last shipment in the series will enter or originate within the state.

(4) A licensee shall notify by telephone or other means a responsible individual in the office of the governor or in the office of the governor'*

designee of any schedule change that differs by more than 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> from the schedule information previously furnished in accordance with paragraph (g)(3) of this section. and shall inform that individual of the number of hours of advance or delay relative to the written schedule information previously furnished.

(h) State officials, state employees, and other individuals, whether or not licensees of the Commission, who receive schedule information of the kind specified in paragraph (g){3) of this section shall protect that information against unauthorized disclosure as specified in I 73.21.

Dated at Wahington, DC, this 5th day of June, 1984.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Chilk, Secretory of the Commission.

(Fil Doc. N-t54el Plied 11-7-M: 1:4$ m) lltUJNQ COO£ 711CM1..

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Flrearma 27 CFR Part 55

[Notice No. 530)

Information Gathering on Safe Handllng of Explosives Materials fn the Fireworks Industry AGENCY: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Treasury.

ACTION: Request for comments.

SUMMARY

The Bureau of Alcohol.

Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) is responsible under 18 U.S.C. Chapter 40 for protecting interstate and foreign commerce against interference and interruption by reducipg the hazard to persons and property arising from misuse and unsafe or insecure storage of explosives materials. Accordingly, regulations have been promulgated in 27 CFR Part 55, Subpart K, which prescribe standards for the storage of explosives materials.

Nevertheless, accidental explosions causing death, injuries and property damage have occurred at fireworks manufacturing/ assembly facilities.

Therefore, the Bureau is soliciting suggestions from members of the explosives industry and other interested persons as to whether more effective safety standards are needed in the regulations in order to reduce the hazard to.the general public. Suggestions should be forwarded to the address set forth below.

ATF will not recognize any material as confidential. Any materials submitted may be disclosed to the public. Any material which the transmitter considers to be confidential or inappropriate for disclosure should not be included in the suggestion. The name of the person submitting the 1uggestion is not exempt from disclosure.

DATE: There is no official comment deadline.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Arthur Cunn, Firearms and Explosives Operations Branch, 202-566-7591.

ADDRESS: Chief, Firearms and Explosives Operations Branch, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, P.O.

Box 1~. Washington. DC 20044.

Copies of this notice, and all suggestions received pursuant thereto, are available for public inspection during normal business hours at: Office of Public Affairs and Disclosure, Room 4407, Federal Building, 12th and PeMsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC20226.

Signed: June 1, 1984.

Stephen E. Higgine.

Director.

(FR Doc. N-1154711 Flied W-M: MIi m)

IIIU.INCl CODE *1WMI DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Office of Surface Mining Reclamatlon and Enforcement 30 CFR Part 915 Publlc Comment Procedures and Opportunity for Publlc Hearing on Proposed Modlflcatlona to the Iowa Permanent Regulatory Program AGENCY: Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM),

Interior.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY

OSM is announcing procedures for a public comment period and for requesting a public hearing on the substantive adequacy of program amendments submitted by Iowa as amendements to the State's permanent

Secretary of the Commission

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attn:

Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

July 10, 1984 OO(KfTE lJSNRC JUL 16 P 1 :24 DOCK NG & S BRANCH I wish to comment on the proposed amendment to 10 CFR Part 73, Modification of Protection Requirements for Spend Fuel Shipping.

I concure totally in your removal of the interim rule for fuel which is cooled more than 150 days.

You have specifically solicited public comment for one of three questions on Page 23871 of the Federal Register.

I feel in response to Questions 1 that no more research is justified at this point for shipments cooled less than 150 days.

This seems a very viable option for nuclear utilities to meet therefore, it would be my opinion that they should either meet the existing rule or not ship fuel less than 6 months discharged from the reactor.

2.

Should the NRC simplify its safeguards regulations by prohibing shipment of fuel cool less than 150 days before shipment?

No If you have any questions regarding my comments, please contact me

• Sincerely, a-::.e-~-

R. R. 1 Stoddard, WI 54658 JDP:sks WPl.2.28 Acl,nowl,dgca by cari. 1/11!/. f 1.PL

U S. NUCLEAR REG!J~J.-:-ORY COMMISSION DOCKETING & ~f:R'/ ICE S~CT ION O~F n= 0: T: ;: ~.'.:C~q A"Y u: 1' '": ( 0,.'/,i,S!v, I

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THE UNIVIBSITY OF IWNOIS AT CHICAGO

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Department of Chemistry 4500 Science and Engineering South 82 9 W est Taylor Street

'84 JUL 11 A10:59 June 25 ' 1984 Box 4348 Chicago, Illinois 60680 (3 12) 996-3 16 1 Secretary of the Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir or Madam:

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OOCKt.1 l~lli & St:.1, '

BRANCH I think the proposed amendments to Part 73 of the Commis-sion's regulations are unwarrented and unwise.

First, to the best of my knowledge, there is no urgent rush to ship any used fuel that would warrent abandoning advanced approval of routes by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

This coupled with greater secrecy is going in entirely the wrong direction.

In fact, citizens should be allowed to comment on proposals to ship used fuel through their commu-nities.

They should be able to prevent shipments from going too close to schools, petrochemical and explosives plants, if they choose.

Should they wish to leave the area during a shipment, that should be their choice.

Certainly local police and emergency agencies should be involved in advance planning, since they are likely to know about potential hazards, events, and road conditions which might not be obvious to outsiders.

As to testing of the casks, I ' m sure this was done rational manner.

Unfortunately, those most likely a shipment are those least likely to be rational.

more, such an attack might be directed against an sealed or defective cask.

in a most to attack Further-improperly The changes seem to reflect a desire to keep the publ i c and local officials unaware of these shipments and whatever haz-ards may be involved.

In light of the aforementioned con-siderations, and until more experience with used nuclear fuel shipments is gained, how can you defend taking less than the maximum precautions?

Sincerely, 6~~~~

Be *amin Ruekberg~

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Transportation of Specific Commodities Nationwide Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

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"84 JUL -5 P 1 :49 July 2, l 9~Jr.

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OJLr~!,Jt.. ~L BRANCH

Subject:

10 CFR 73 Proposed Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipment.

Reference:

Federal Registar Volumn 49, No. 112 dated Friday, June 8, 1984.

Based on our current experience, we see no increased risk to spent fuel shipments if the above rule changes are adopted.

We support these changes as cost effective without compromising intransit safeguards.

CHM:pk cc: M. J. LaRue Tri-State Motor Transit Co.

Post Office Box 113 Joplin, Missouri 64801 4176243131 Very truly yours, TRI-STATE MOTOR TRANSIT CO.

Vice-President Nuclear & Hazardous Materials Division

"' : ()t,.*,V!SSION

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NUCLEAR,REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 73

[7590-01]

DOCKETED USNRC Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fue~1h~n~s P4:08 AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Conmission.

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I ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Conmission is cons,idering amending its regula-tions for the physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit. The issue under consideration,is one of safeguards rather than safety. The amend-m~nts would take into account new data from a research program and from other sources that _indicate that the consequences of successful sabotage of an irradiated fuel shipment in a heavily populated area would be small compared to the consequence estimates that prompted issuance of the current rule. For certain spent fuel shipments, these amendments would provide continued protec-tion against sabotage, 1 while at the same time relieving the licensee of non-essential requirements

• DATE:

Conment period expires SEP 10 ig84 ADDRESSES:

Written comnents should be submitted to the Secretary of the Corrmission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co11111ission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch. Copies of corrments on the proposed rule may be examined and copied for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Carl B. Sawyer, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co1T1Tiission, Telephone: 301-427-4186.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

BACKGROUND The NRC carries out a continuing series of studies to aid in determining the measures that are needed to protect radioactive material, including irradiated (spent) fuel, against sabotage. During the mid-197Os, studies (NUREG~O194, "Calculations of Radiological Consequences from Sabotage of Shipping Casks for

, Spent Fuel and High-Level Waste, 11 February 1977; a'nd NUREG-O17O, "Final Environ-mental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other

• Modes, 11 December 1977), estimated the heal th effects of a radiological rel ease in a non-urban area resulting from a high-explosive assault of a spent fuel cask.

The estimated risks were not considered to be substantive enough to warrant regu-latory action. A subsequent study by Sandia Laboratories included a chapter on the sabotage of spent fuel in urban areas of high population density (SAND 77-1927, NTransport of Radionuclides in Urban Envirpns: A Working Draft Assessment").

This study suggested that the* sabotage of spent fuel s~ipments had the potential for producing serious radiological consequences in areas of high population density. The Commission concluded that, in order to protect health and minimize danger to life and property (Sections 161b and 1611(3) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended), it was prudent and desirable to require certain interim safeguards measures for.spent fuel shipments. The focus of concern was on possible successful acts of sabotage in densely populated urban areas. Because of th~ possibility that spent fuel shipments could be hijacked and moved from low population areas to high population areas, the interim requirements applied to all shipments, even though the planned shipment route did not pass through a densely populated urban area. The interim requirements were to be in effect until the results of confirmato~y research became available and were analyzed.

The interim rule, which set forth physical protection requirements in 10 CFR 73.37, was issued on June 15, 1979~ and was made effective on July 3, 1979.

The rule was issued without benefit of public corranent, b~t at the time of publication public comment was invited.

After reviewing the_public comments and after taking into account its experience in administering the rule, the NRC, on June 3, 1980, published amendments to the rule.

The amendments were made effective on July 3, 1980, and the amended rule is currently in effect as 10 CFR 73.37(a)'through (e).

RELATED RESEARCH SAND 77-1927, which prompted issuance of the. protection requirements, contained estimates which were unavoidably subject to large uncertai.nties due to a. lack of technical data.

A later draft of the Sandia report (

11Transportation of Radionuclides jn Urban Environs: Draft Environmental Assessment 11

) was published by the NRC as NUREG/CR-0743.

Although this draft predicted less serious conse-quences, a significant degree of uncertainty still remained that could be resolved only by :further study and experiments_.*

Investigators at that time agreed and continue to agree (1) that consequences of an act of sabotage would be a direct function of the quantity of spent fuel that would be released in respirabl~ form, and (2) that the only credible means *of malevolent.generation of respirable particles would be through the

• use of a large quantity (tens to hundreds of, pounds) of high explosive *skill-fully applied.

Little information was available.to aid in predicting the resp'onse of spent.fuel and spent *fuel casks to explosive sabotage.

The NRC and the Department of Energy (DOE) responded to this need lor tech-nical data by sponsoring *separate but coordinated experimental programs.

Both programs were designed to yield information about the release from a specified reference sabotage event, which was defined as follows.

Saboteur skills were specified as those of an experienced military or commercial explosive demolition specialist. Fami1iarity with a wide range of kinds and config-urations of explosives was assumed.

Use of up to hundreds of pounds of military or commercial explosives was pennitted. For the special case of shaped charges, use of the U.S. Army M3Al was assumed. It is the largest shaped charge readily available. An M3Al causes damage through fonnation of a high pressure particulate jet which may ~ea ftaction of an inch in diameter and has the capability to penetrate two 'or more feet of metal, eroding everything in its path. From the outset, it was expected that a shaped Charge would be more efficient than other configurations in producing respirable particles. For that reason the M3Al was designated as the refer-ence explosive. The reference cask was specified as a single-assembly cask.

The specification is conservative since a single-assembly cask has smaller dimensions than a multiassembly cask and is, therefore, *more likely to yield a greater quantity of respirable particles (per assembly) in response to a given level of explosive sabotage.

A series of experiments using model (small-scale) explosives against simulated casks containing irradiated fuel characterized the NRG-sponsored program.

These experiments used pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel with a burnup of approximately 30~000 megawatt days per metric ton of heavy metal and app.rox-imately six-and-a-half-year cooling. Measurement of the quantity of released material revealed the fraction that was made up of particles of respirable size (those having a diameter of less than four microns). Upward scali.ng pennitted the data to take into account the effect of the reference explosive and a full-scale cask. Scaling led to the conclusion that less than nine grams of spent fuel would be released in respirable form if the reference charge were used successfully against a cask containing a single PWR spent fuel assembly. Using results of the METRAN computer code for health conse-quences (one of two health consequence codes used in SAND 77-1927 and.NUREG/

CR-0743) as set forth in Table 5-6 of NUREG/CR-0743 and assuming 150-day rather than six-and-a-half-year cooling, researchers found that the average radio-logical consequence of a release in a heavily populated area such as New York City would be no early fatalities and less than one (0.4) latent cancer fatality.

Early fatalities are those that occur within one year after exposure to the radioactive material. Latent cancer fatalities are those that occur at any time following the exposure and could result from the initial exposure or from any long-term* exposure to low levels of contamination

• The average consequence values-just cited were selected as being the most representative of the*values that were calculated for the specified release.

Either higher or lower consequence values can be obtained, depending on the circumstances that are assigned. The following is an example from among.the higher values that can be obtained from the data. For the most.densely popu-lated area studied (up to 200,000 persons per square mile}, at evening rush hour on a business day, and in the most unfavorable location for a release, the calculated radiological consequence (peak consequence} based on data from Table 5-4 of NUREG/CR-0743 is no early fatalities and less than three (2.9) latent cancer fatalities.

The results of an explosive sabotage experiment vary from experiment to experi-ment,' and only a limited number of experiments can be perfonned. The results of the ~RC-sponsored program are based on four scaled experiments using

-irradiated fuel, and the largest measured release value was used to derive the nine-gram value cited.*

In addition, a number of supporting tests were perfonned to establish shaped charge jet characteristics *and jet-to-fuel-pin interaction.

Results of the NRG-sponsored research program (as well as those of the DOE program to be discussed subsequently) assume sabotage of a single-assembly cask, while the originaJ SAND 77-1927 and NUREG/CR--0743 estimates assume a three-assembly cask.

For the levels of release under consideration here, the releases and the health consequences for a three-assembly cask are calculated to be, at wo.rst, double those for a single-assembly cask.

The presence of additional assemblies in a cask would increase ~he likely release, but only in proportion to the nu111ber of assemblies that lie in the roughly straight line path of the jet. For more than three PWR assemblies (a fully loaded rail cask could contain 10 PWR assemblies} the upper bound of release would likely increase roughly in proportion to the square root of the total nUllDer of assemblies contained in a cask.

On the basis of energy release from the explosive, it is expected that the number of fatalities from a sabotage explosion would be greater than the number of radiologically induced fatalities.

Explosive charges other than shaped 'Charges were considered.

In other experi-ments, scaled charges representing full-scale charges of up to several hundred pounds of explosive did not breach the cask's inner containment components

• Accardi ngly, such full-seal e charges appear unlikely to produce any rel ease of spent fuel and hence unlikely to cause radiological consequences.

The program sponsored by DOE included one full-scale and several small-scale experiments.

The ful 1-scal e experiment used a reference charge against a full-scale cask containing a single unirradiated surrogate fuel assembly.

Again the quantity of material released from the cas~ was measured, and the released quantity was analyzed to detennine what fraction was composed of respirable-sized particles. About three grams of respirable surrogate fuel was released.

On the basis of the results of small-scale fuel characterization experiments which had been conducted separately, it was detennined that a release of three grams of surrogate fuel was, equivalent to a maximum release of 17 grams of irradiated fuel.

Using the CRAG computer co~e for health consequences (the second of the computer codes used in SANO 77-1927 and NUREG/CR-0743 and,

a code which generally predicts higher health consequences than the METRAN code) and again assumi~g 150-day cooling, researchers found that the average radio-logical tonsequence of a 17-gram release in a heavily populated area such as New York City would be no early fatalities and about 2 latent cancer fatalities.*

I The peak consequences appearing in the computer runs were no early fatalities and about 7 latent cancer fatalities.

Values of average or peak conseauences should be doubled to account for the case of a three-assembly truck cask.

Conceivably, an adversary could use more than one shaped charge in attacking a cask, and that possibility was considered.

For shaped charges the size of the.

reference charge., the likely result is that the ~ele_ase* would* be in proportion to the number of charges used.

The use of larger shaped charges is conceivable but less credible. These types of charges would probably have to be custom-made, thereby introducing a formidable new problem for an adversary.

There is no known technolcgy that would allow a disproportionately large increase in production of respirable particles with credible increase in a saboteur 1s explosive resources.

Most consequence calculations discussed herein are based on fuel subjected to burnup of 33,000 megawatt days per metric ton of heavy metal {MWd/MT) at a power density* of 40 kilowatts per kilogram of heavy metal (KW/Kg), which is tenned

• The current CRAC code that is cited here (sometimes referred to as CRAC 2) is a modified version of the code that was used in SAND 77-1927 and NUREG/

CR-0743.

The modified version predicts consequences a few percent higher than the earlier version; the estimated consequences are based on this modified version.

reference fuel.

The possible transport of spent fuel subjected to higher burnup was considered, although these shipments are not now being made.

For fuel sub-jected to 40,000 MWd/MT (which is typical of the higher burnups being considered) at a power density of 36.4 KW/Kg, the calculated 5onsequences-of successful sabo-tage are about 45 percent higher than the consequences of successful sabotage of reference fuel.

Additional infonnation on the NRC-sponsored progrcUTI can be found in a report entitled "Final Report On Shipping Cask Sabotage Source Term Investigation."

Additional information on the DOE-sponsored program can be found in a report entitled "An Assessment of the Safety of Spent Fuel Transportation in Urban Environs." A peer review of both research programs was carried out by the U.S.

Army I s Ba 11 i st i c Research Laboratory.

The review focused 6n the-fnteract ion---*

between explosives, cask, and fuel and on the experimental techniques used.

The conclusions in the peer review report generally confinn the reasonableness of the approaches taken in the research, and based on the assumptions of the research approach, confirmed the estimated release leveTs. The two research reports, the peer review report, and SAND 77-1927 are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW, Washington, DC.

NUREG/CR-0743 is available from the NRC/GPO Sales Program, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

CONCLUSIONS For the following reasons, the Commission concludes that moderation of the current interim rule (10 CFR 73.37) for the protection of spent fuel shipments against sabotage is justified:

1.

Issuance of the interim rule was based chiefly on consequence estimates set forth in SAND 77-1927.

A baseline estimate, a high estimate, and a low esti-mate were provided.

At the time the rule issuance was under consideration, the high consequence estimate was based on 14,000 grams of respirable release for a truck cask containing three Juel assemblies and on 47,500 grams of respira-ble release for a rail cask.

At the time, the high-estimate releases could not be ruled out. The calculated average consequences for truck cask sabotage were summarized as several tens of early fatalities and hundreds of latent cancer fatQlities. The calculated average consequences for a rail cask were summarized as hundreds of early fatalities and thousands of latent cancer fatalities. The research recently completed has shown that the likely respirable release from sabotage and the resulting consequences are but a tiny percentage of the estimated values which originally prompted issuance of the rule. Accordingly, the original basis for the rule is no longer valid. -

2. The value of consequence now predicted (no early fatalities and about four latent cancer fatalities average for reference basis sabotage of a three-assembly cask) is obtained only when a set of assumptions very favorable to the saboteur are made.

The effects of assumptions less favorable to a saboteur are discussed below:

a. Fuel burnup and cooling. Consequence calculations are based on reference fuel cooled for 150 days. Because of lower burnup and longer cooling,

_assemblies currently being shipped typically contain a radioactive mate-rial inventory 0.2 to 0.5 as hazardous as the assumed inventory for reference fue 1 *

b. Population density. The release of radioactive material was postulated to take place within an area with population density in the range between 62,000 and 200,000 persons per square mile.

Very few (perhaps only one) locations in the U.S. are characterized by this population density. Con-sequences decline markedly for lower population density.

c. Lifetime of respirable particles. A respirable particle tends to adhere to the first sizeabl_e particle it encounters or to serve as a condensation site for vapors (such as water), thus possibly limiting its lifetime to one that is shorter than that necessary for human inhalation and deep deposition in the lung.

In an actual sabotage, products of the explosion would undoubtedly provide numerous large'.-than-respirable particles that would act as agglomeration sites for respirable particles.

In both sets of experiments, the products of the explosion were isolated from the cask to keep the measurement problems manageable.

Water particles (fog-like droplets) would also serve as agglomeration sites.

Finally, water vapor or materials vaporized by the explosive would condense on respirable particles. The results reported earlier do not account for a water jacket or annulus of wet material present in all truck casks now in use.

An experiment has shown that the presence of water (water jacket and water-filled cavity) between the explosive and the fuel reduces the quantity of respirable material released by a factor of 40.

Simultaneous occurrence of worst-or near-worst-case values for each of these factors, plus an assumption of successful sabotage appears remote in the extreme

• Calculated consequences reported herein are reduced by factors of up to hundreds if values other than the most favorable are assigned.

3. Although the experiments have reduced the uncertainty in the quantity of material likely to be released as a result of successful sabotage, there are limitations to the conclusions of the program that must be taken into account.

The reduced consequences described herein are necessarily subject to several assumptions, including that of a reference explosive.

While the shaped charge selected for the explosive threat represents a very severe threat, even more severe threats cannot be ruled out if an adversary is granted protracted control of a shipment and unhindered movement.

In a similar vein, consequence modeling assumptions more severe than those postulated in NUREG/CR-0743 can also be conjectured (e.g., localized areas, such as stadiums, with extremely high popu-lation densities), if completely u~restricted movement of the shipment and unrestrained use of sabotage resources against the shipment are allowed.

For these reasons a set of moderated requirements th~t would continue to provide a significant level of protection against protracted loss of control of a ship-ment and unhindered movement of a shipment-,by a saboteur_is being considered.

The requirements should (a) deny an adversary easy access to shipment location infonnation; {b) provide for early detection of malevolent moves against or loss of control of a shipment; (c) provide a means to quickly surmnon assistance from local law enforcement authorities; and {d) provide a means to impede unauthorized movement of a truck shipment into a heavily populated area.

SUMMARY

OF THE PROPOSED RULE A rule is proposed that takes into account the new information and conclusions which have emerged from the research program.

The important features of the proposed role are:

1. The performance requirements for protection of spent fuel shipments have been modified to emphasize protection against sabotage with high consequence.

High consequence refers to the levels of consequ~nce that prompted issuance of the original interim rule.

For a truck shipment, high consequence refers to tens of early* fatalities and hundreds of latent cancer fatalities.

2.

For shipments of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days, tne current requirements would continue to apply, because detailed consequence calculations for such fuel have not been carried out *.

3.

For shipments of spent fuel cooled 150 days or more, a new set of moderated* requirements would apply that are consistent with the experimentally determined level of consequence.

These requirements call for a shipment to be accompanied by an unanned escort (who may also serve as driver, ra1*1 employee, or ship's officer) who would carry out prescribed security procedures.

In addition, present requirements for protection of shipment schedule information, onboard communications (all transport modes), and immobiliazation (truck mode only) would be retained.

Among other requirements considered no longer needed (for shipments of fuel cooled 150 days or more) are those for route surveys and advance coordination with local law enforcement agencies (LLEAs).

New DOT requirements for routing (49 CFR 177.825) issued in the interest of safety and -recently put in force apply to NRC licensees and require them to use routes consistent with NRC safeguards routing policy.

With respect to LLEA coordination, a ~eparate NRC rule [the present §73.37(f)] requires the notification of governors (or designated state officials) whenever spent fuel is to be transported within a state to enable the state to contribute to the safety, security, and ~ase of transport of the shipment.

State LLEAs typically are informed of impending shipments through this process.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT:

NEGATIVE DECLARATION

• The promulgation of these amendments would not result in any activity that affects the environment.

Accordingly, the Corrrnission has determined under the.

National Environmental Quality guidelines and the criteria of 10 CFR 51.5{d) that neither an environmental impact statement nor environmental impact appraisal to support a negative declaration for the proposed amendments to Title 10 is required.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT This proposed rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to I

the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) by reducing the burden.

This rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for review of the proposed revised paperwork requirements.

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION Based on the information available at this stage of the rulemaking proceeding and in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b),

the Commission hereby certifies that, if promulgated, this rule will not have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities. The rule, if promulgated, would apply, to licensees who transport or deliver to a carrier for transport a shipment of spent fuel in a quantity in excess of 100 grams.

Typical of the licensees who deliver spent fuel to a carrier for trans-port are nuclear power reactor operators, independent spent fuel storage pool operators, and research institutions.

None of the licensees who deliver spent fuel to a carrier for transport are known to be small entities.

Licensees who transport spent fuel are typically large carriers who specialize in the trans-port of ~radioactive materials and other hazardous materials and who have many employees.

No small entities are known to be within this licensee group.

The NRC has estimated the cost impact of these amendments upon the licensed industry.

According to these estimates licensees would incur the following costs, assuming continuation of the current approximately 135 shipments annually.

One-time costs for the proposed amendments have already been expended due to the same requirements under the present interim rule.

Annual maintenance cost of equipment required by the proposed amendments is estimated at $14,000

• Annual planning and admini$tration cost is estimated at $7,000.

Total cost to licensees is therefore estimated at $21,000 annually.

One savings to industry under the proposed amendments would be the elimination of about $27,000 expended annually for armed escorts presently required under "the interim rule.

Simplification of administration is estimated to result in an additional saving of $13,000 annually.

Further information regarding these estimates is set forth in a document entitled 11Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments: Regulatory Analysis 11 and is available for inspection and copying in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW, Washington, DC.

Any small entity subject to this regulation which determines that, because of its size, it is likely to bear a disproportionate adverse economic impact should notify the Commission of this in a corrment that indicates:

(a) The licensee's size in terms of annual income. or revenue and number of employees; (b) How the proposed regulation would result in a significant economic burden upon the licensee as compared to that on a larger licensee; and (c) How the proposed regulations could be modified to take into account the licensee's differing needs of capabilities

• PUBLIC COMMENT SOLICITED Although it welcomes public corTment on any aspect of the proposed regulation, the Commission particularly solicits comment on the following topics:

1. Is more research justified for safeguards of shipments of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days before shipment?

2.

Should the NRC simplify its safeguards regulations by prohibiting shipment of fuel cooled less than 150 days before shipment?

Are the NRC cost estimates in accord with licensee experience?

LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 73 Hazardous Materials - Transportation, Incorporation by reference, Nuclear Mate-rials, Packaging and Containers, Penalty, Reporting Requirement.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 i_s contemplated.

I PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

1.

The authority citation for Part 73 is revised to read as follows:

AUTHORITY:

Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 94~, as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat.

780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 210, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, sec. 204, 88 Stat. 1245 {42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844).

Sections 73.37(g) and (h) are also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.2273); §§73.21 1 73.37{h), 73.55 are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended {42 U.S.C.

2201{b)); §§73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.40, _73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, 73.67 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended {42 U.S.C.

2201{i)); and§§ 73.20{c)(l), 73.24{b){l), 73.26{b)(3), (h){6), and (k)(4), 73.27 (a) and (b), 73.37 (g)and (h), 73.40(b) and {d), 73.46{g)(6) and {h)(2), 73.50(g)

(2), (3){iii)(B) and {h), 73.55{h)(2), and {4)(iii)(B), 73.70, 73.71, 73.72 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended {42 U.S.C. 2201(0)).

2.

Section 73.37 is amended as follows:

a.

Paragraphs (a)(l)(i), (a){2)(1ii), and {b)-(e) are revised.

b.

Existing paragraphs (f) and (g) are redesignated as paragraphs (g) and {h) respectively and are revised.

c.

A new paragraph (f) is added.

§13.37 Requirements for physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in trans it.

(a) Performance objectives.

(1)

(i) Minimize the possibilities for high consequence-radiological sabotage of spent fuel shipments; and (2)

(iii) Impede attempts at.high consequence radiological sabotage of spent fuel shipments or attempts to i1licitly move spent fuel shipments containing materials*

with high consequence potential, until' response forces arrive.

(b) General requirements for protection of shipment of spent fuel cooled for less than 150 days.

The licensee, in order to ach.i eve the performance objec-tives of paragraph (a) of this section, shall provide for a physical protection system that has been established, maintained, or arranged for fuel that has been used as part of an assembly to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain reaction at any time during the 150-day period before the date on which the fuel is loaded aboard.a transport veh-icle for transport.

This physical protection system must include the following:

(c) Shipments by road of spent reactor fuel cooled less than 150 days.

In addition to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this section, the physical protection system for any portion of a spent fuel shipment subject to paragraph (b) of_this section that is by road rrrust provide that:

(d) Shipments by rail of spent reactor fuel co6led less than 150 days.

In addition to the provisions of paragraph {b) of this section, the physical pro-tection system for any portion of a spent fuel shipment subject to paragraph (b) of this section that is by rail must provide that:

(e) Shipments by sea of spent reactor fuel cooled less than 150 days.

In addition to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this section, the physical protec-tion system for any portion of a spent fuel shipment subject to paragraph (b) of this section that is by sea must provide that:

(f) Requirements for protection of shipments of spent Juel cooled 150 days or more.

To achieve the performance objectives of paragraph 73.37(a) of this section,"a physical protection system established, maintained, or arranged for by the licensee for fuel which has not been used as part of an assembly to sus-tain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain reaction at any time during the 150-day period before the date on which the fuel is loaded aboard the transport vehicle.for transport shall:

(1) Provide-for notification of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in advance of each shipment, in accordance with §73.72 of this part; (2) Include procedures for coping with circumstances that threaten deliberate damage to a spent fuel shipment and with other safeguards emergencies;

. (3) Provide that shipments are planned so that scheduled intermediate stops are avoided to the extent practicable; (4) Provide for at least one escort, who may be a shipment vehicle operator or an officer of the shipment vessel, and who maintains visual surveillance of the shipment during periods when the shipment vehicle is stopped, or the ship-ment vessel is docked; (5)

Assure that the escort has been familiarized with, and is capable of implementing the security procedures; (6) Include instructions for each escort that, upon detection of the abnormal presence of unauthorized persons, vehicles or vessels in the vicinity of a spent fuel shipment, or upon detection of a deliberately induced situation that has the potential for damaging a spent fuel shipment, the escort will:

(i) Determine whether or not a threat exists; (ii) Assess the extent of the threat, if any; (iii) Inform local law enforcement agencies of the threat and request assist-ance; and (iv) Implement the procedures developed in accordance with paragraph (f)(2) of this section; (7) Provide, for shipments by road, a capability for an escort to communicate with local law enforcement agencies through the use of the following equipment located on the transport vehicle:

(i) citizens band (CB) radio; and (Ji) radiotelephone or other NRG-approved equivalent means of two-way voice communication; (8) Provide, for shipments by road, NRC-approved features that permit immobilization of the cab or car~o-carrying portion of the vehicle; (9) Provide, for shipments by rail, a capability for an escort to communicate with local law enforcement agencies through the use of a radiotelephone or other NRG-approved equivalent means of two-way voice communication, which must be available on the train; and (10) Provide, for shipments by water in U.S. territory, a capability for an escort to communicate with local law enforcement _agencies through the use of radiotelephone or other NRG-approved equivalent means of two-way voice communi-cation.

(g) Prior to the transport of spent fuel within or through a state a licensee subject to this section shall notify the governor or the governor 1s desigAee.

The licensee shall comply with the foll_owing criteria in regard to a notification.

(1) The notification must be in writing and sent to the office of each appro-priate governor or the governor 1s designee.

A notification delivered by mail must be postmarked at least 7 days before transport of a shipment within or_through the state.

A notification delivered by messenger must reach the office of the governor or the governor 1s designee at least 4 days before transport of a shipment within or through the state.

A list of mailing addresses of governors and govern-or's designees was published in the Federal Register on June 7, 1982 (Vol. 47, No. 109, pages 24671-24673).

An updated list will be published annually in the Federal Register on or about June 30.

(2) The notification must include the following information:

J (i) The name, address, and telephone number of the shipper, carrier and receiver; (ii) A description of the shipment as specified by the Department of Trans-portation in 49 CFR §172.202 and §172.203{d);

(iii) A listing of the routes to be used within the state; and (iv) A statement that* the information described below in §73.37(g){3) is required by NRG regulations to be protected in accordance with the requirements of §73. 21.

(3) A licensee shall provide the following information on a separate enclosure to the written notification along with a statement that the information is required by NRC regulations to be protected in accordance with the requirements of §73.21.

(i) The estimated date and time of departure from the point of origin of the shipment; (ii) The estimated date and time of entry into the governor's* state; (iii) For the case of a single shipment whose schedule is not related to the schedule of any subsequent shipment, a statement that schedule information must be protected in accordance with the prov_isions of §73.21 until at least 10 days after the ship~nt has entered or originated within the state; and (iv) For the case of a shipment in a series of shipments whose schedules are related, a statement that schedule information must be protected in accordance with the provisions of §73.21 until 10 days after the last shipment in the series has entered or originated within the state and an estimate of the date on which the* last shipment in the series will enter or originate within the state.

(4)

A licensee shall notify by telephone or other means a responsible individual in the-office of the governor or in the office of the governor's designee of any sthedule change that differs by more than 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> from the schedule infonnation previously furnished in accordance with paragraph (g)(3) of this section, and sha*ll inform that individual of the number of hours of advance or delay relative to the written schedule information previously furnished.

(h) State officials, state employees, and other individuals, whether or not licensees of the.,Commission, who receive schedule infonnation of the kind specified in paragraph (g)(3) of this section shall protect that information against unauthorized disclosure as specified in §73.21.

,..ft L

Dated at Washington, DC, this

~ -

day of e

, 1984.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

0 Commission.