05000346/LER-1978-083-03, /03L-0:on 780720,containment vessel-to-annulus Differential Pressure Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Personnel & Procedural Error.Rate of Pressure Increase Too Great for Shift Check Monitoring.St 5099.01 Modified

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/03L-0:on 780720,containment vessel-to-annulus Differential Pressure Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Personnel & Procedural Error.Rate of Pressure Increase Too Great for Shift Check Monitoring.St 5099.01 Modified
ML19326A072
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 08/15/1978
From: Fulmer S
TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML19326A068 List:
References
LER-78-083-03L, LER-78-83-3L, NUDOCS 8001310642
Download: ML19326A072 (3)


LER-1978-083, /03L-0:on 780720,containment vessel-to-annulus Differential Pressure Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Personnel & Procedural Error.Rate of Pressure Increase Too Great for Shift Check Monitoring.St 5099.01 Modified
Event date:
Report date:
3461978083R03 - NRC Website

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4 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PRC8ASLE CONSECUENCES h l o 121 l' At 0820 hours0.00949 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.1201e-4 months <br /> on 7/20/78, it was noted that containment vessel to annulus differential l l pressure exceeded the TS 3.6.1.4 limit of +25 inches water gage by 1 inch water gage.

I o 3 Contain-I gTlq l At 1047 hours0.0121 days <br />0.291 hours <br />0.00173 weeks <br />3.983835e-4 months <br /> on 7/20/78, the purge of the conta4=ent building commenced.

lo i s i I ment vessel to annulus differential pressure was within allowable limits at 1050 hours0.0122 days <br />0.292 hours <br />0.00174 weeks <br />3.99525e-4 months <br /> ;

There was no ' threat to the health and safety of the public or unit person g Io is 1 l on 7/20/78.

The slight increase above the TS limit would not cause contaiment vessel inter y fij-l7l l nel.

(NP-33-78-100) nal pressure to exceed the design pressure if a LOCA had occurred.

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p TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-100 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: July 20, 1978 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Containment Vessel to Annulus High Differential Pressure on Plant Startup Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 3, with Power (WT) = 0, and Load (MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: At 0820 hours0.00949 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.1201e-4 months <br /> on July 20, 1978, it was noted that coneminment vessel to annuius differential pressure exceeded the Technical Speci-fication limit of +25 inches water gage by 1 inch water gage. This placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.6.1.4.

Plant Startup Frocedure, PP 1102.02 was in progress. At 0350 hours0.00405 days <br />0.0972 hours <br />5.787037e-4 weeks <br />1.33175e-4 months <br /> on July 20, 1978, a courninment purge permit was initiated due to a containment vessel to annulus differential pressure of +23 inches water gage. At 0820 hours0.00949 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.1201e-4 months <br /> on July 20, V) At 1047 hours0.0121 days <br />0.291 hours <br />0.00173 weeks <br />3.983835e-4 months <br /> on July 1978, the containment vessel to annulus differential pressure exceeded +25 inches.

s 20, 1978, the purge of the containment building commenced.

Containment vessel to annulus differential pressure was within allowable limits at 1050 hours0.0122 days <br />0.292 hours <br />0.00174 weeks <br />3.99525e-4 months <br /> on July 20, 1978, which removed the unit from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.6.1.4.

Designation of Apnarent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence is both procedural and personnel error. The containment vessel to annulus differential pressure was being monitored by ST 5099.01, " Miscellaneous Instrument Shift Check",

uhich is performed once every eight hours. The rate of increase of containment vessel to annulus differential pressure was too great to be adequately monitored by the shift check.

Additionally, the time span between initiation of corrective action (preparation of the containment purge permit) and actual commencement of die containment vessel purge (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and 57 minutes) was ercessive. Proper urgency and followup with regard to the processing of the contaicment purge permit would have prevented e:.-

ceeding the technical specification limit.

l Analysis of Occurrence: There was no threat to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. The slight increase above the technical specification limit would not cause containment vessel internal pressure to exceed the design pressure of 40 psig during a loss of coolant accident condition.

V LER #78-083

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,e TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION PAGE 2 SUPPLDfENTAL INFORE\\ TION FOR LER NP-33-78-100 ST 5099.01, " Miscellaneous Instrument Shift checks" has been

Corrective Action

modified to provide additional guidance to the operator concerning when to initiate Containment vessel to annulus corrective action to prevent exceeding the limit.

differential pressure has been added to the control room reading sheets (read approximately once every four hours) to provide the operator with trend information.

All affected personnel will be notified of the delay in implementing the release Permit and requested to accelerate this process.

the containment vessel to annulus differential Failure Data:. On October 18, 1977, pressure technical specification limit was exceeded (Licensee Event Report NP-33-7 It was believed the cause of the October,1977 occurrence was the operation of only j

j one contain= ant air cooler; therefore, the startup procedure was modified to assure Since both containrient air coolers two containment air coolers were in operation.

were in operation prior to this occurrence, this addit'ional operational experience has shown further corrective action was necessary.

LER #78-083 i

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