ML20003E505
| ML20003E505 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/05/1981 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003E503 | List: |
| References | |
| FRN-42FR39364, REF-10CFR9.7, RULE-PR-70, RULE-PR-71, RULE-PR-73, TASK-RIA, TASK-SE SECY-81-095, SECY-81-95, NUDOCS 8104030792 | |
| Download: ML20003E505 (72) | |
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RULEMAKING ISSUE (Affirmation)
~ For:
The Commissioners From:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
NRC TRANSPORTATION RULEMAKING PROCEEDING
Purpose:
To summarize actions and responses under the NRC Transportation Rulemaking Proceeding and to recommend that it be closed.
Issue:
Should the Commission endorse the staff view that no immediate changes to the NRC's transportation regulations are needed, and close the transportation rulemaking proceeding by publishing the Federal Register notice contained in Enclosure "A"?
' Discussion:
===1.
Background===
The Commission issued an advance notice of rulemaking proceed-ing in 1975, stating its intention to reevaluate its regula-tions governing the air transportation of radioactive mate-rial and asking for public comments on selected issues.
The staff issued a " Draft Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes, NUREG-0034, in 1976 and a " Final Environmental State-ment," NUREG-0170, on the same subject in 1977.
Public com-ments were requested on both occasions.
The environmental t
statement included consideration of other transport modes because of the requirement to consider alternatives contained in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
Closure of the proceeding, scheduled for 1978, was held in abeyance pending the completion of considerations related to the-Department of Transportation's (DOT) rulemaking proceeding on the highway routing of radioactive material.
In response to publication, in January 1980, of DOT's proposed rule on
Contact:
Steven Bernstein, SD 443-5946 1810.4 0 3 077As
O 3
o The Commissioners 2
this subject, the NRC provided comments to DOT in November 1980, as described in SECY 80-305.
It is the staff's view that the transportation rulemaking proceeding should now be closed and attention focused on several aspects of trans-portation identified in the course of the proceeding as need-ing further study.
These studies, which are discussed in Enclosure "G", include an environmental assessment of trans-porting radioactive material through urban areas, a transport worker exposure study, emergency response guidance for trans-portation accidents involving radioactive material, a study to examine mode-dependent packaging standards, and an examina-tion of controlling the physical / chemical form of transported radioactive material to reduce the possible consequences of severe accidents.
A chronology of the rulemaking proceeding, including conclusions of the Final Environmental Statement (FES) cited above and the staff response to public comments, is detailed in Enclosure "B".
2.
Findino of Adecuacy.
Based on the FES, the NRC staff has determined that the environmental impacts of normal transportation of radioactive material and the risks attendant to accidents involving radio-active material shipments are sufficiently small to allow continued shipments by all modes.
Because transportation conducted under present regulations provides adequate safety to the public, the staff concludes that no immediate changes to the regulations are needed to improve safety.
Three changes to the transportation regulations are currently being proposed that are either not related to safety or are Congressionally mandated.
One change would improve compati-bility of the regulations with those of the IAEA.
Another change would improve transportation safeguards for shipments of special nuclear material of moderate strategic signifi-cance in transit at the same time.
The final change imple-ments the Congressior.al mandate to notify Governors of nuclear waste shipmerts in their State.
These changes are described in Enclosure "C."
The staff believes a Commission finding that present regula-tions are adequate is important to eliminate industry uncer-tainty concerning changes to the NRC transportation regulations that may occur as a result of the proceeding.
Although the FES evaluates the environmental impact of actual transporta-tion as opposed to the hypothetical impact possible if all shipments were in minimal compliance with the regulations, the staff believes it is an adequate basis for judging the acceptablity of the regulations and recommends the Commission make this finding of adequacy.
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The Commissioners 3
3.
Closing the proceeding The purpose of the proceeding was to review NRC's regulations and procedures concerning the transportation of radioactive materials with a view to the possible amendment of its regu-lations in 10 CFR Parts 71 and 73.
Particular emphasis was placed on evaluating the adequacy of packaging.
Regulatory responsibility for packaging is shared between the NRC and the 00T.
As outlined in a memorandum of understanding, the NRC is primarily concerned with the packaging of fissile and larger quantities of radioactive material while the DOT is primarily concerned with the packaging of smaller quantities and of low specific activity material.
The staff believes an adequate review has been completed.
Public participation in Wie proceeding was aggressively sought.
Public comments were requested on certain issues at the time the original notice, announcing the reevaluation, was pub-lished.
The FES was widely distributed to Federal and State agencies, to industry and environmental organizations, and to individuals who requested copies.
Public comments on the FES were requested.
The FES was also reviewed in two public meetings held by the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor. Safeguards.
Public response was moderate with 125 letters of comment in all phases of the proceeding and only limited attendance, less than 50 participants, at the two public meetings.
A detailed breakdown of the public comments is given in the chronology of the proceeding, Enclosure "B".
A paper containing an analysis of the safety record of radio-active material transport is given in Enclosure "D".
The analysis was performed by Sandia National Laboratories using data supplied by the NRC and the DOT.
The paper was pre-sented at an international symposium, " Packaging and Trans-portation of Radioactive Material (PATRAM) 80."
The analysis indicates that a total of-659 accidents and incidents involv-ing radioactve material have been reported to either the COT or the NRC in the period 1971 through June 1980.
Of this total, only 31 events involved a release of radioactive material.
Of these 31 events, only 5 events involved a
~ transportation accident. The other 26 events were handling accidents.
None of these events, in which radioactive mate-rial was released, resulted in a serious radiological effect on people or the environment.
Based on the results of the review, consideration of the comments, and the safety record of radioactive material transport (Encle;ure "D"), the staff has concluded that the NRC's present transportation safety regulations are adequate
The Commissioners 4
to provide a reasonable degree of public safety.
The staff believes the broad consideration of the proceeding should now be terminated and attention focused on the more narrow issues of the follow-on studies described in Enclosure "G".
4.
Related Activities Since the notice of rulemaking proceeding in 1975, the Commis-sion has taken several actions to improve safety and safe-guards aspects of the transportation of radioactive material.
Some of these actions involved changes to the regulations after issuance of the FES.
At the time the FES was issued, the staff believed that no immediate changes to the regula-tions were necessary.
Those changes made since issuance of the FES were due to considerations outside of the rulemaking proceeding.
These rule changes, along with other activities related to the rulemaking proceeding, are discussed in Enclosure "C".
5.
Summary The staff's reevaluation of its transportation regulations disclosed no major deficiencies and supports both a determina-tion that present regulations are adequate and a decision
-to close the rulemaking proceeding.
Several follow-on studies will be conducted to identify cost-effective methods of further reducing the already low risk of radioactive mate-rial transport.
' Closure of the transportation proceeding involves no new resource requirements.
~ Recommendation:
That-the Commission:
1.
Approve issuance of the Federal Register Notice in Enclo-sure "A", setting forth the position that present NRC trans-portation regulations are_ adequate to provide a reasonable degree of safety for the public, and that no immediate changes in the regulations are needed to improve safety, but that several follow-on studies will be undertaken to determine whether regulatory revisions would be cost-effective in further reducing transportation impacts.
2.
Note:
.a.
%f W ro piate Congressional Committees will be
.F w at of this action.
Draft letters are in
- nD...re "E".
The Commissioners 5
b.
A public announcement such as Enclosure "F" s*ll be issued when the Commission's notice is filed with the Office of the Federal Recister.
Qck c
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
CA" - Federal Register Notice "B" - Chronology.of the Rulemaking Proceeding Appendices.-to Enclosure "B" 1 - Public Comments on June 1975
. Advance Notice of Rulemaking
. Proceeding - Staff-Responses 2 - Commission Memo - June 28, 1977 3 - Notice of Issuance of NUREG-0170 4 - Public Comments After Issuance of FES - Staff Responses "C" - Related" Activities "D" -' Transportation Safety Record "E" - Draft Congressional Letters "F" - Public Announcement "G" - Follow-on Studies Commissioners' comments' or consent should be provided directly.to the Office of.-the' Secretary by~c.o.b.~ Tuesday, February 24, 1981.
Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the
' Commissioners NLT Tuesday, February 17, 1981, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that'it requires additional ' tine for analytical review and comment, the Connissioners and.the Secretariat should be apprised of when.canments may be expected.
This paper is~ tentatively scheduled for affirmation at an open meeting during the week of March 9, 1981.. Please refer to the appropriate Weekly Commission Schedule; when published, for a specific date and time.
. DISTRIBUTION
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[7590-01]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Parts 71 and 73 RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL Packaging and Transportation by Air AGENCY:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ACTION:
'lithdrawal of Advance Notice of Rulemaking
SUMMARY
The' Nuclear Regulatory Commission has reevaluated its trans-portation regulations concerning the air transportation of radioactive materials, including packaging.
The intention to reevaluate those regula-tions was announced on June 2, 1975 (40 FR 23768).
Public comments were requested for early consideration in the proceeding.
Public comments were also solicited when a draft environmental statement was issued in 1976, and again when the final environmental statement was issued in 1977.
The environmental statement included an examination of the transportation of radioactive material by all modes of transport.
Considering the infor-mation developed and received and the safety record associated with the transportation of radioactive material, the NRC has determined that the l
present regulations provide a reasonable degree of safety and that no immediate changes in the regulations are needed to improve safety.
How-ever, several follow-on studies will be undertaken by the Commission to determine whether ~egulatory revisions would be cost-effective in reduc-r ing transportation impacts.
Having made the determination that no immediate 1
Enclosure "A"
[7590r01]
changes to its regulations are needed to improve safety, the NRC is clos-ing the.rulemaking proceeding and focusing its efforts on the follow-on studies.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mr. Steven Bernstein Office of Standards Development U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Telephone : (301) 443-5946 s
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) announced on June 2,1975 that it was reevaluating its then existing transportation regulations, originally issued by the Atomic Energy Com-mission, concerning the air transportation of radioactive materials, including packaging, with a view to the possible amendment of its regula-tions in 10 CFR Part 71, " Packaging of Radioactive Material for Transport and Transportation of' Radioactive Material Under Certain Conditions," and Part 73, " Physical Protection of Plants and Materials." The NRC invited public comments on specific issues related to that reevaluation, estab-lished an interim position that air transportation of special nuclear material could continue during the'rulemaking proceeding, and noted that the NRC' staff would prepare a generic environmental impact statement (EIS) on the subject.
The.public comments submitted in response to the June 1975' notice were useful in providing an indication of public concerns
- which.needed to.be addressed in' developing the EIS.
The EIS also included consideration of other transport modes because of the requirement to con-sider' alternatives contained in the National Environmental Policy Act of 2.
Enclosure "A"
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[7590-01]
1969.
A total of 69 letters of comment were received in response to the announcement, 26 of them dealing with the interim position taken on air transportation of special nuclear material.
These comments and the NRC staff's analysis of them are vailable in the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H Street NW., Washington, D.C.
In a FEDERAL REGISTER notice published February 9, 1976, (41 FR 5627) the NRC affirmed its interim position that special nuclear material could continue to be shipped by air, but recognized that air shipment of plutonium had,been foreclosed by Public Law 94-79.
This law prohibited the NRC from licensing any plutonium air shipments (except certain medical devices) until "a safe container has been developed and tested which will not rupture under crash and blast-testing equivalent to the crash and explosion of a high-flying aircraft."
In August 1978, NRC certified to Congress that such-a package had been developed and tested.
By NRC crder dated September 1,1978, plutonium air shipments in that package were authorized.
l The NRC issued a Draft Environmental Statement, " Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes" (NUREG-0034), in March 1976.
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After consideration of the 28 letters of comment received from the public i
and from Federal, State and local agencies, a final statement on that subject was prepared.
That final statement contained the 28 public com-ments on the draft statement and the NRC staff's analysis of them.
Before l
issuance, the final statement was extensively reviewed within the NRC, and was reviewed twice in public meetings (February 1977 in Atlanta, GA; November 1977 in Chicago, IL) by the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
-3 Enclosure "A"
[7590:01]
The Final Environmental Statement (FES), " Transportation of Radioac-tive Material By Air and Other Modes" (NUREG-0170), was issued in December J
1977. 'It included a cover sheet requesting comments from persons with views on-the content or conclucions of the final environmental statement which might be helpful to the NRC in considering the disposition of the rulemaking proceeding announced on June 2, 1975.
NUREG-0170 analyzes the impacts of the normal transportation of radioactive material, the impacts of transportation accidents, and deliberate misuse of radioactive material in transportation.
These analyses are based on the numbers and characteristics of real shipment as identified in a 1075 survey of shippers, the results of which were detailed in " Survey of Radioactive Material Shipments-in the United States," BNWL-1972, dated April 1976.
NUREG-0170 shows that the environmental impact from normal transportation of radioactive material is small, adding about one latent cancer fatality per year to the existing total of approximately 300,000.
The impact from transportation accidents is shown to be only a small fraction of the nor-mal-impact, and the risk from deliberate misuse is qualitatively shown to be "sufficiently small to constitute no major adverse impact on the environment."
Of the eleven letters offer _ing post-issuance _ comments, five supported NUREG-0170 as an adequate representation of transportation impacts.
Three of the letters criticized the scope of the report (two, too limited; one, too broad), and three said that consideration of alternatives was inadequate.
One commenter noted that the report. purports to'be neither an EIS for NRC licensing actions nor an EIS for actions'of 00E,.00T, FAA or the State 4
Enclosure "A"
[7590-01]
Department with rc:, acct to transport of radioactive material.
- Finally, three commenters were critical of specific partions of the impact analysis in NUREG-0170.
With respect to the NRC's action on the rulemaking proceeding, two commenters suggested that we implement the concept of "as low as reason-ably achievable" in transportation, and two suggested that we have a
-strong enforcement program to assure adequate implementation of the trans-portation requirements.
Four commenters suggested closing the proceeding, and one suggested that the NRC consider the urban environment, carrier aspects.of transportation, and military shipments in deciding on any follow-on action.
Single suggestions were received to educate transport workers, require consignees to identify themselves, to eliminate any exposures to the general public above background, to prohibit high-level waste shipments by air, and to improve the safeguards physical protection requirements.
The public comments. submitted in response to the June 1975 notice were useful in expressing public attitudes which needed to be addressed in the environmental statement.- The public comments after issuance of the FES did not claim, except in two cases, any large deficiencies in either the FES or in the current transportation requirements.
In no case did the latter public comments present convincing or supporting evidence of.any-significant deficiency in transportation requirements.
Closure of this transportation rulemaking proceeding had been scheduled for 1978, but was held in abeyance pending the completion of considerations related to the Department of Transportation's (00T) 5 Enclosure "A"
[7590-01]
rulemaking proceeding on the highway routing of radioactive material.
In November 1980, the NRC provided comments to 00T in response to publica-tion, in January 1980, of DOT's proposed rule on this subject (45 FR 7140).
The NRC advice was to require routing of shipments so as to minimize total annual health impacts, including nonradiological impacts.
Now that these routing considerations are complete, closure of the transportation pro-ceeding can be accomplished.
Based on the analysis developed in the rulemaking proceeding, on the public comments received, on the safety record, and on other information, the NRC has concluded that present regulations are adequate to protect the public against unreasoaable risk from the transport of radioactive materials.
However,. prudence dictates that regulatory policy concerning transporta-tion of radioactive materials be subject to close and continuing review.
In its continuing review, the NRC distinguishes between safety matters and safeguards matters.
Safety deals with protection against adverse consequences from accidents or natural causes while safeguards deals with protection against deliberate, malevolent acts by man.
Concerning safety regulation, several studies are in progress or contemplated.
The object of the studies is to find cost effective measures to further reduce public dose.
The study subjects include environmental effec +,s of transportation in urban areas,~ transport worker-doses, physical and chemical forms of materials
.being shipped, and package test standards for extreme accidents in each
~ transport mode.
A draft technical assessment of the environmental effects of transporting radioactive material through an urban area ~has been 6
Enclosure "A"
[7590-01]
issued by Sandia National Laboratories under contract to the NRC.
Its availability to the public was announced in the Federal Register on September 17, 1980 (45 FR 61838).
This assessment will form the basis of the NRC's Environmental Impact Statement on this subject that is sche-duled to be issued in 1981.
Additionally, a proposed rule change, announced on August 17, 1979 (44 FR 48234), would improve compatiblity of the transportation regulations with those of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
In connection with safeguards regulation, follow-on studies on sabotage of spent fuel shipments and transportation of high
-level waste are in progress or contemplated.
A proposed rule change, announced on January 14, 1980 (45 FR 2657) and modifled on February 21, 1980 (45 FR 11503), would strengthen transportation safeguards by elimi-nating multiple, simultaneous shipments of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance. As the regulatory process proceeds, these studies and proposed rules may result in the issuance of new regulations.
In a separate' regulatory action, the NRC issued on December 9,1980, (45 FR 81058) a proposed regulation as a first step in carrying out the Congressional mandate in Public Law 96-295 to notify the governor of a state concerning shipments of radioactive waste within or through the state.
In another separate action, the NRC, in cooperation with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other federal agencies, is cur-rently developing guidance material'to be used by state agencies in developing emergency response plans for transportation accidents involv-ing radioactive material.
7 Enclosure "A" m
[7590401]
J Since the purpose of the rulemaking proceeding announced on June 2, 1975 has been completed, i.e., present transportation regulations have been adequately reassessed, that rulemaking proceeding is now closed.
Persons who wish to view the public comments received under tti rule-
- making proceeding or the staff's analyses of these comments at the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H Street NW., Washington, D.C., should refer to Docket Number PR 71, 73 (40 FR 23768).
- Authority:
Secs. 53, 161b and i; Pub. L.83-703, as amended; 68 Stat. 930, 948 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2201(b) and (i)); Sec. 201; Pub. L.93-438, as amended; 88' Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841).
Dated at Washington, D.C. this _
_, day of
, 1981.
For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission m
- 8 Enclosure "A" g
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ENCLOSURE B l
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CHRONOLOGY OF THE TRANSPORTATION RULEMAKING PROCEEDING On May 15, 1975 the Commission approved a Notice of Rulemaking Proceeding (SECY-75-221) on the Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air.
In this notice, the Commission indicated that the then existing NRC air transportation regulations were being reevaluated, invited public comments on specific issues related to that reevaluation, established an interim position that air transportation of special nuclear material could continue during the rulemaking proceeding, and noted that the NRC staff would prepare a generic
- environmental impact statement on the subjed.
A total of 89 letters of comment were received in response to this Notice, 26 of them dealing with the interim position taken on ai'r transportation of special nuclear material. The Commission's notice and the staff's summary and analysis of the comments are included in Appendix 1 to this enclosure.
In a FEDERAL REGISTER Notice published February 9,1976, the Commission l_
affirmed its interim position that special nuclear material could continue to be shipped by air, but recognized that air. shipment of plutonium had been l
temporarily foreclosed by Public Law 94-79 (Scheuer amendment).
The staff issued a Draft Environmental-Statement, " Transportation of Radio-active Mr,.erial by Air and Other Modes" (NUREG-0034), in March 1976.
After-consideration of the 28 letters of comment received from the public and from l-Federal, State and local agencies, the' staff completed a Final Environmental Statement (FES) in February 1977.
The' Commission chase to review the document 1
Enclosure "B"
prior to issuance.
Commission comments, contained in memorandum dated April 21, 1977, requested a review of the contemplated follow-on action plan subsequent to the issuance of the FES.
The follow-on action plan provided for inclusion of an opportunity for public coaments after the FES was issued.
The plan also provided for inclusion of a Commission decision on the adequacy of then existing transportation requirements, on continuing staf f actions, and on closing the Transportation Rulemaking Proceeding.
The Commission instructed the staff (memorandum dated June 28, 1977 -
Appendix 2 to this enclosure) to thoroughly edit the FES and ask ACRS to review it again before issuance. The ACRS review was completed in November 1977, and the FES (NUREG-0170) was issued in December 1977.
The FES indicates that the environmental impact from normal transport is small, adding one latent cancer fatality per year to the existing total of approximately 300,000 and that the impact from transportation accidents is only a small fraction of the normal impact. However, even though the probability is low. the conseq'uences of a major release of certain radionuclides in a densely populated area could be severe, with one early fatality expected from radiological causes, and as many as 150 latent can fatalities over a 30 year period.
In addition, up to 60 persons would be expected to suffer some lung injury.
The FES was widely distributed to Federal and State agencies, to industry and environmental organizations, and to individuals who requested copies.
Dis-tribution exceeded the initial prir. ting of 2,300 copies. An issuance notice included with each copy (Appendix 3 to this enclosure) invited public comments for consideration by the Commission in deciding on the disposition of the Trans-portation Rulemaking Proceeding.
A total of eleven letters of comment were received from Federal-and State agencies and from the nuclear industry.
These 2
Enclosure "B"
comments are included in Appendix 4 to this enclosure, as is the staff's analysis of those comments.
In' addition, there were eight State responses offering no comments.
Of the eleven letters offering post-issuance comments, five supported NUREG-0170 as an adequate representation of transportation impacts.
Three of the letters criticized the scope of the report (two, too limited; one, too broad), and three said that consideration of alternatives was inadequate. One d
commenter noted that the report purports to be neither an EIS for NRC licensing actions nor an EIS for actions of DOE, DOT, FAA or the State Department with respect to transport of radioactive material.
Finally, three commenters were critical of specific portions of the impact aralysis in NUREG-0170.
With respect to the NRC's action e tne Rulemaking Proceeding, two commenters suggested that'we implement the concept of "as low as reasonably achievable" in transportation, and two suggested that we have a strong enforce-ment. program to assure adequate implemem.ation of the transportation require-ments.
Four commenters suggested closing the proceeding, and one suggested
'that the NRC consider the urban environment, carrier aspects of transportation, and military shipments in deciding on any follow-on action.
Single suggestions were received to educate transport workers, require consignees to identify themselves, to eliminate any exposures to the general public above background, to prohibit high level waste shipments by air, and to imp'ove the safeguards l
physical protection requirements.
The public comments submitted in response to 'the June 1975 notice were useful in expressing public attitudes which needed to be addressed in the environmental statement.
The public comments after issuance of the FES did not claim, except.in two cases, any large deficiencies in either the p
3 Enclosure "B" o
FES or in the current transportation requirements.
In no case did the latter public comments present convincing or supporting evidence of any large defi-ciency in transportation requirements.
In SECY-77-92A, the follow-on action plan now calls for a Commission decision on the adequacy of existing transportation regulations to allow continued shipment of radioactive materials by all modes while protecting the public from an unreasonable health and safety risk.
The plan also includes Commission conside-ation of public comments received (Appendix 1 to this enclosure)-in response to the original Notice of Rulemaking Proceeding in 1975, the analysis and conclusions in the FES (NUREG-0170) and the public response to it (Appendix 4 to this enclosure), and the safety record for the transportation of radioactive material as discussed in Enclosure "D" to this Commission Paper.
Closure of the proceeding had been scheduled for 1978, but was held in abeyance pending the completion of considerations related to the DOT's rulemaking proceeding on the highway routing of radioactive material.
NRC provided comments to 00T, as described in SECY 80-305, in response to public.-
. tion of DOT's proposed rule on this subject.
Now that these routing considera-tions have been completed, closure of the NRC proceeding can be accomplished.
4 Enclosure "B"
APPERIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE "B" PUBLIC COMMENTS ON JUNE 1975 ADVANCE NOTICE OF RULEMAXING PROCEEDING - STAFF RESPONSES TABLE OF CONTENTS Page A.
Advance Notice of Rulemaking Proceeding (40 FR 23768) 8 B.
Public Comments - Staff Responses Number Commenter
~1 Hittman Nuclear Battery Corporation 11 2
Irene L. Munday 11 3
General Electric Company 12 4, 47 Energy Research and Development Administration 12, 41 5-The Society of Nuclear Medicine 12 l
6 American College of Nuclear Physicians 13 7
Burns Security System, Inc.
15 8, 36 Minnesota Po11utica Control Agency 15, 33
'9 Cencer for Law and Social Policy 17 10, 45
- State of New York - Atomic Energy Council 18, 40 11-British Embassy 18 12, 49 State of New York - Department of Law 19, 46 13 Citizen Action for the Environment 21 14 State of New York - Exacutive Chamber 21 15, 52 United States Environmental Protection Agency 22, 52 16, 41 Exxon _ Nuclear Company, Inc.
22, 36 l
5 Enclosure "B"
17 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
23 18 State of Kansas - Dept of Health and Environment 23 19 University of Cincinnati 24 20 Environmental Defense Fund 24 21 State of Maine - Dept of the Attorney General 26 22 Westinghouse Electric Corporation 28 23 Testimony of Lee V. Gossick, USNRC 28 24 C. Sheldon 29 25 General Atomic Company 29 26 The Johns Hopkins Hospital 29 27 The Society for Pediatric Research 29 28 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts - Attorney General 30 29 Chicago Bridge and Iron Company 30 30 Nuclear Associates, Inc.
30 31 University of Arkansas 31 32 Health Industry Manufacturers Association 31 33' American College of Radiology 31 35 U.S. Dept of Health, Education and Welfare 32 37-Tenn.essee Valley Authority 34 l
f 38 University of California - LA5L 35 i
39 Commonwealth Edison 35 l
40, 48 New England Nuclear 36, 42 42-Technical Operations, Inc.
38 43 U.S. Department of Transportation 39 44 Air Transport Association of America 39 46 Gallan, Kharasch, Calkins & Brown, Attorneys at Law 40 6
Enclosure "B"-
a 50 Independent Phi Beta Kappa Enviror. mental Study Group 52 51 Neal Kilminster 52 53 Environmental Analysis Laboratories 53 54 Donald Gjerdevig 53 55 N. Joan Sandler 53 56 Marianne K. Moutoux 53 57
-Penelope S. Waites 54 58 Joyce A. Murphree 54 59 Vann S. Johnson 54 60-Lin'2 E. Schwehr 54 61 United Airlines 55 62 Patricia Campbell 55 63 Linda Budowski 56 64 Mrs. John Pilmulder 56 65 Clara L. Fayette 56 66 Meredeth Puterbaugh 56
-67 Virginia Day 56
~68 Virginia Karstedt 56 69 Claire McCarthy 56 70 Tim Vorce 56 71.
Eberline Instrument Corporation 57 i
7 Enclosure "B'_'
237ti8 PROPOSED AULIS a
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s NUCLEAR REGUI.ATORY
. COMMISSION (10 CFR Parts 71 and 73]
RADICACTWE MATER!AL Packaging and Transportation by Air Policwing its criani:stics under the Energy Recrgn=1:acen Act of 1974 (Pub-
!!c IAw 93-438), the Nuclear Rer21stery Commission (NRC) has stated its bten.
den of reviewt:g those of its rer;Iaficns and procedures pe.".aining to the it' ens.
ing and regulatica cf nuclear f2CJties and materials which were cr'.ginally promulgated by the Atcmic Energy Cammie<frm with a view to consider.=g what changes should be made. As part of thaa effort, the NRC is ***M
? a rule making proceeding concerning the air transportation of radicaccre materials.
including ;*ehr"*r atth a view to the possible am*ar** ent of its regulations in 10 CFR Parts 71 and 73 adc;ted pursu.
ant :o the Atomic Energy Act cf 1354. as amended. T?.e NRC cc=siders the re.
evaluaticu of these particular reg 4:1 tiens to be especially t'mely is view of concerns that have teen recently ex.
pressed by public c2cials and et"ers as to the safety and sect.ity c! sir sh!;.
=ent of ;btcnium and other spectal nuclear =sterials thrcush highly ;c;:u.
Isted r..etre;clitan areas.
T..e Depart:: tat of T 2.r.s;crtat'ca (DC1") has everia;;bg ju:isdictic"*. cier punaAL 3sg!**te. Vot. 44, No.106--MCMcAY,.'UNg 2,1973 8
r.=1::rre "3" w
(
e P00R ORl8lp" PROPCSED RULES 23760 safety in ;ackaging and transporta*!on NRC packaging standards are applica-a=d la ge quantity packages. The DOT by air of rarth tive materials under the ble to shipments by NRC heensees. while develops safety standarcs governing I
Transpcrtation of Explosives and Other DCyr regulations are applicable to trans-handling and storne of all radicactive Dangerous Materials Act (18 U.S.C. 831-portation of radioactive material by material packages while tn possession of 333) and the Transportation Safety Act land in interstate and foreign com=erce a commen, contract or pMvate carr:er.
of 1974 (Pub. I.93-633, 88 Stat. 2156). On civil aircraft, and on water. DC ; as well as standards for Type A pack-and the Feder21 Aviation MminMtration regulations in Titie 49 of the Code Jf ages / COT requires AEC (now NRC) i has similar overlapping jurisdiction un-Peder21 Regulaticcs and F1. l regnia-approval prior to use of all Type 3. as-l der the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 ::ons in 14 CFR Part 1C3 cover labeling s1Ie and large quantity package dest.ns.
U.S.C.1421-1430.147hb) ). It is expected and conditions for shipment and car-DOT is the National Competent Author-that the expertire of these agencies will riage as well as certain packaging. NRC ity with respect to foreign shipments be utilized m tLe s.tbject rule maMng regulations exempt carriers from their under the IAEA transt: ort standards, proceeding.
application in view of the controls exer. IAF.A Certifcates of Competent Author-Background of present regulations. cised over carriers by DOT and its com-ity are issued by DOT with te*fM as-Following a prohibition against ship-ponent parts. including FAA.
sistance provided by NRC as requested.
ment of radioactive material by mailin
.Por the purpose of developing and Re-erclustfon of present regulations.
1936 to protect unexposed SIm. safety impleraenting consistent, comprehensive Consistent with the considerations ex-regulations for shipping radioactive and ejective regulations for the safe pressed h the Srst paragraph of this no-material were adopted by the Interstate transport of radioactive material and to tice, the NRC has decided cat its regu-Commerce CommWon in.1948. Those avoid duplication the DOT (then ICC) lations gover=ing air transportation of l
regulations were based on a repcrt of a and the AEC (NRC's predecessor) en-radioactive material, including packas-National Academy of Sciences-National tered into a Memorandum of Under-ing. should be re-evaluated from the Research Council S* committee on standing in 1966 which was superurded standpoint of radiological health safety Transportation of Rs acactive Material. by a revised Memorandum of Under-and prevention of diversion and sabo-The basic principl% refected in those standing signed on March 22.1973. Un-tag as well. In connection with O re-evaluation. the NRC has instructed its regulations were reviewed and adcpted. der. e revised memorandum, the AEC with minor modifestions and some staf to commence preparation of a w
elaboration, by the International Atomic (now NRC) develops performance generic environmental impact statyent Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1961 and re-standards for package designs and re* on the air transportation of radioactive Sected in reco= mended International views package designs for Tn:e B ' n.tsile materials. McLuding ;ackag=g and re-SM*ds for the Safe Transport of lated ground transpcrtatien. The state-Radioactive Material. In 1964. on the
=ent will be directed at air trancorta-basis of shipping ez;erfence up to that physicai protection (security) of stra:eric tien. However other trr.nsportation nfg
. m$ modes 'and and water tra. sport-mil e
ma date and an analysis of transportation quant spec p
,a be considered in I!sht of the re%iremen*
accidents prepared by the United King-spatec as to the mode of transport.
of the National Environ = ental Pol!cy dom Atomic Energy Authority the IAEA 8 Container dutgns nquaed to mat ac.
issued revised transport regulations in-ctdent conditions an evaluated under cur. Act of 1969 (NIPA) that the relative corporating specine accident damage test nnt ngulattens agamat the tonowtst acct. costs and beneats of alter..stives to cer-standards which were !=corporated into cent test conditione in sequence: so-tocc tain proposed Federal actions be fully the NRC (then AEC) and DOT (then :ne drep of the container :n the most dam
- considered. It is anticipated that the within the furisdiction of the ICC) regu. aging postcon onto a cat. essenuany un-draft generic environmental i= pact
-tsch a
lations by 1968. Except for changes in the {
{,u]t w
a nct. statemint will be available my the time regulations to deal with speciSc problems so. minute nn tus at 1Cs* F and 3-toot that any proposed changes to the regu-(e.g, leak testing Cf packages Contain* water inunersion test far eight hous. The lations eventuaths from this rule mak-ing liquids. prompt pickup and monitor" puncture test and the drop test are e:gt* ing proceeding are published for ing of packages. restrictions on ship-neering qualtiestion *.ests. The test conci-omment in the Fces.u. RIc:s:Is. While ments of plutonium on passenger air-tions were chosen to.provtce nyreductb;e e, gene;tei=p2cg3tagen,3
- 3in p;,p.
craft. opening and closing procedures), laboratory conditione nyresentauve of severe ton. impact statements or impact transportauon accident enmonmats. For gl*,',y,j' py"t* '",3[* $ a. !aisals for individual NRC !!censms the safety regulations have rmeed es.
accons related to the transportation of sentially the same since that time.
The safety standards for transporta* which are mon seven than drope of see-radioactive materials, such a.s import li-tion, as set forth in NRC's regulation in eral thousand teet onto targets such as censes for signiacant quantities of plu-10 CFR Part 71 and DOT regulations in tand, wster, or even etty streets whten wouM tenium and other special nuclear =ste-49 CFR Parts 170-178, are based on two tend to yteld when struer by the package. rial, will be prepared as required by main considerations: (1) Protection of aecause of the conservaus=2 of most designs. NEPA and M CFR Par-31.
the public from external rad!ation and packages, when suMec ed to tute intole=E In order to aid the NRC in this re-t m m eh gnate d
evaluation of existing regulations per-(2) assurance that the contents are un.,rne g g,
,n_n taining to radioactive material trans-likely to be released during either normal or conunued to contain their codtents. Fcr or accident conditions of trar. sport or. mie, a nunw og pectagee wh:ch paea ported by air, interested persons are in-if the container is not designed to with-the NaC q= muon testa have also been vited to submit !=fermauen. comments stand accidents, that its contents are so tested under extra seven condtuona such and suggestions with respect to those as-limited-in quantity as to preclude a as a :so-toot free tall onto an eenenuant pects of the above-referenced NRC significant radiation safety problem if unytetding eurface. Packages currently ap*
regulations. The NRC is particularly in-released. These safety standards are ap. proved tw bum shipment or plutantumn orace terestedin receiving v'.ews on the follow-and attrate win survtre euch teet eendittons.
pl! cable to packages used in all models of transport and were developed with Ne,'$'c7,,13,r u$h ta sa$
1.
Whether radioactive materiala ts the objective of providing an acceptable runner as aircrar cisht neorders, could shou ld continue to be transported by level of safety for transpoTt of radioac* survtte severe air acetdants. A description of air, CCnsider'ng the need for, and the tive material by any mode.' W1th respect these *.ests
',s set forth in SC-DR-72 0507 henefts dertved from such transporta-to air shipments. it was considered that, (Sept.1372h "Special Tests for Plutonturn tien. the risks to public health and safe-taking into account the high 1stegrity Shipping containers 62f. SP572s. and I,.to*,
a copy at which :s avausbie for pubue m-ty and the coa =cn defense and sec=t7 cf the packaging' and the Icw accideng 89'Ct1 8 ** th.' Commison's PutW Docu* associated with such transportaticn. an.i probabi!!ty for air transportation (no * * "
8 the relative risks and be.nefts of other more than one wWt per 100 million C
miles, the risk of an air accident result-d Type 3 pa
=cdes of transport.
is ed !w p.
ing in a release of radioactive materm tines in excess of a few =nneurias and uptto fro'n a package was sma2, Co. coo-so,cco curtes depending upon the rs-
- A T/pe A package is required f r less than dicelucDde. Such pectages are required to be Type B quanttttes of radicac*tve =stertal LIn contrast to the safety standards de-designed to withstand accident con, itions as and is required to be designed to withstand d
scribed above, NRCis requiremente for the wett as normal conditions at transp.rt.
normal conditions of transport only.
FEDERAL REC 1sTle, VCt. do, NO. Ic6-MONDAY, JUNE 2.1973 9
hicsu: e "3"
=
23770 PRCPCSED RULES i
- 2. Asswatt t just!facle need4cr air rooms throughout the natloc. Copies of pursuad durtig the penciency of this mle transporte of radioacuve materiais, such bac2;:ound information are avail-making prtceeding and puh11sh its cen-t to what extent should safety require-abIe toon request in wrtting to the Ct".ce cIusicus in the Frarau. Ras:svra. Cur-ments be based on:
of Standards Development. UA Nuclear rently efective regulations w111 continue (a) Accident probabintiest Regulatory Commission. Washington. to be applied unt:1 a decision on th:s =15-(b) Packaging:
D.C.20555.
ter is made.
~
(c) Procedur21controla:
laterin e:alsaffas. Recently there As indicated above, related specif.c !s-
- (d) Combinations of the above?
have been several requests that air ship. sues will be, or are presently, the subject e 3. What is the relative nsk of trans. ments of plutentum and other special of cons: derat:en in other rule making port of radioactive matenal by air ccm-nuclear matenals eand relatad ground proceedings. and the NRC will continue 4
pared to other modes of trs= sport, and transportation of special nuclest mate-to take appregnate action, as justif.ed by to other hazards faced by the public nals inc: dental thereto) be suspended the circumstances, to assure that the which may or may not be the subject of pending reeefution of presently as-risk =<**sted with the trs=sportation regulation?
p!! cable resuistions. In assesamt the ap-of radioactive materials re-ah
- small.
- 4. Are improvements in applicable propriateness of such action ar. this time.
sted at Washington, Dr. this 2Mh regulations necessary, and if so, what the NRG has considered the foCowings day M W M5.
improvements abould be considered?
- 1. In more than 25 years cf shipping Documentation supporting the views special nuclear matertal including plu-For the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-expressed by interested persons would be tanium. in civilian aircraft. there have sion.
helpful to the NRC in re-evaluation of been no mar accidents involving the ma-Saastrsr.J. Carr.2c.
Its regulations relating to air transporta-terial.
Secretary of the Commssston, tion of radioactive materials and con-
- 2. The experience in shipping thou-
[yaDoc. s-tsats yued s v-s:45amt r
sideration of possible changes to such sands of packages per year of all forms of radioactive materials by all modes of regulations, P should be noted that there are some transport under existing NRC. DOT. and related issues which will be, or are pres. PAA regulations has been very favorable.
i ently, the subject of consideration in
- 3. The requests that hava been received other rule m = Wg proceedings as:. do not set forth any sir.:iScant new in-therefore, will not be included in this for=ation which wood incicate that proceeding.They are:
present package or se'.urity requirements
- 1. Physical security protection re-are inadequate.
quirements for stra*egic quantities of
- 4. In view of the physical security special nuclear mater:a! that would a::= =cascres no* required by 10 C73 Part ply to all modes of transport (39 IT. 73, the protectica provided against se-vere accidents by the high integrity 40038).
- 2. Itequirements for advance notice of
=fm** required by NRC. DOT. and shipments of strategic Caantities of spe. FAA. regulations (summarized supra),
clat nuclear material (40 FK 15098).
the consistency of these requirements
- 3. Quality assurance requirements for with International standards. the low ac.
packages for all special nuclear material cident probability (supra), and the fa-vorable esperience to date, the risk in (38 FR 35190).
- 4. Radiation levels from sdloactive volved in the trar.sportation of radioac.
material transported in passenger air. tive material under current:y efective regulations is believed to be small.
craft.
I! It subsequently appears that add!-
Acc rdingly. it is presently the view cf tional issues should more properly be the NRC. subject to cocsideraften of treated in a separate proceeding. or pro-comments to be received, that its cur-coedings, appropriate notices to that ef-rently efective regulations can conth2ue fact will be published in the Fzassar, to be app!! cable dunna the period in which this rule eng proceecing !s in Raststra.
Interested persons should send com-progrese. More particularly. In light of ments and suggestions, with supporting present info.mtion as to the safety and documentation, tc the Secretary of the secunty of air shir-ents of radioactive Cammialan 17.3. Nuclear Regulatory material. the Cat '.ssior ' 's no sound CammMan. Washington. D.C. 20555, basis. for the res ocs staw. above, for Attention: Docketing and Service Sec. requiring the suspension of such shi?-
tica by August 1.1975. Ccptes of com-ments.
menen* received may be ='amined fn the Notwithstanding the foregoing. in view NRC Pubile Document Room at 1717 g of the concerns expressed and the fact that requests have been received for the StrestNW Washington.D.C.
suspensionof airshipmentsof plutonium After comments have been received and considered the NRC will pubusa its and other special nuclear materials, com-ments are specincany invited on the mat-views as to NRC :ules pertainmg to air ter of whether suspension or other limi-tranr ortation of radioactive mate:*.31 F:staar. Erstarsa. When the.tations on the air transportation of la tk o aforementioned draft environmentalim-plutonium and other special nue. ear ma-terials are !ustided during the period pact statement is prepared, notice of i'4 that the s' bject rule making preceeding availability will be puo!!shed in the fin-usar. Rzotst:a ann :pportunity fcr tu=-
!s being conciucted. Views on his par-ticular matter. t:Kethcr with :he sup-lic com:nent ador:!cd pursuant to NRC porting basis fer these views should be 4
regulations implementing the National Enttromnental Poucy Act of 1963 (10 submitted to the Secretary of the,Cqm-CFR Pr.r: 51). In addition, background m! amen. U.S. Regulatory Ccmmissan.
Wulan; ton.
D.C.
20555. Attention:
information en the subject of repuistion Docket'.n7 2nd Serv:ce Section by July 2.
of transpcrtation of radioactive mate.
rials has hc placed in the NRC Pub-13*5. The NRC nil decice, after evalu-
. lle Document Acom at 1717 H Etreet sting the views and cem=ents received.
NW., and at its local public document whether ~ a diferent course shou!d be esosaAt stoisTsa, vot. 40. No. to6-McNoAY. JWs 2,19r3 10 E:.ch sure "5"
APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE "B" PI'. IC COMMENTS ON JUNE 1975 ADVANCE NOTICE OF RULEMAKING Pk3CEEDING - STAFF RESPONSES Comment 1:
Hittman Nuclear Battery Corporation Packaging requirement of a Type B container affords trivial prot'ection above
-that given by the inherent encapsulation of pacemakers.
=3,o, Staff Response:
Exceptions to package standards for special form materials are being considered.
Comment 2:
Irene L. Munday a.
Three tablespoons of plutonium could give lung cancer to 9 billion people.
b.
Nothing less than a 100 percent guarantee of safety is sufficient.
-Staff Response:
The lethal dose of reactor grade plutonium to an average individual flas a.
been estimated under the assumption of uniform distribution throughout the entire lung mass by several authors as follows:
Cohen 37.8pg l
L NRC-NAS(BEIR) 8.0pg Gofman-Tamplin 2.0pg One gram of Pu would thus cause death by lung cancer to a population between 2'and 38 million people if it were carefully administeced to each individual.in the population such that a uniform distribution of Pu in one lung mass of each individual could be achieved.
Assuming a table-
-spoon holds'four grams, between 0.024 and 0.45 billion people would be 11' Enclosure "B" I'
affected if and only if all of the material in 3 tablespoons is distributed correctly.
Conditions of careful administrations are necessary to effect the awesome lethality of Pu in Munday's letter (although it would be difficult to find nine billion people to kill even in today's crowded population environment).
b.
-A 100 percent guarantea of safety cannot be provided in any situation.
Smaller guarant are commonly accepted in dangerous situatior.s.
s Comment 3: General Electric Company, Vallecitos Nuclear Center Noting that FAA and NRC safety regulations have recently been updated, the Nuclear Energy. Division recommends that air transportion of plutonium continue under the current regulations.
Staff Response:
This coniment is addressed to the NRC interim position, which was answered in a pub 1fc notice (41 FR 5627, February 9,1976).
The interim
. position is that no sound basis exists for suspending air shipments of SNM, noting that.the question for plutonium has been foreclosed by Public Law 94-79.
Comment 4:
USERDA, W. A. Brobst, Chief, Transportation Branch The ERDA concurs with the NRC that no sound basis exists for suspension of air shipments of SNM during the public rulemaking proceeding.
Staff Response:
See Comment 3.
Comment 5:
Society of Nuclear Medicine Appendices A, B,-C, D and E of the comment are identical to.similarly identified
~
appendices.of Comment 6 below.' The-Society summarizes:
.a.
Over 9 million patient studies projected for the year depend upon air transport of radioactive materials 12 Enclosure B"
b.
Medical benefits to such a large segment of the population outweigh the risks to the general publ*/
c.
The Society of Nuclear Medicine has agreed to changes in regulations on air transport of radioactive materials for medical use.
Staff Response: These arguments were considered in the environmental impact statement.
NRC rulemaking in the present instance would not address the t
exclusion of radiopharmaceuticals from air transport.
l l
Comment 6:
American College of Nuclear Physicians a.
Radioactive materials for medical use should be allowed air transportation for the following reasons:
1)
Speed is essential.
2)
Benefits to a sizeable population sample far exceed the risks of air transport.
3)
Demonstrated safety record indicates that the current packaging and procedural controls are quite adequate.
b.
Cost impact is levied on patient if radionuclides are not transported by air.
c.
Radiopharmaceuticals should be redesignated to a lower hazard rating on the Hazardous Materials List.
SUMMARY
OF APPENDICES i
l Appendix A - Briner Testimony Before Senate Commerce Committee June 13, 1974 I
One out of 3.4 patients in the 63 percent of hospitals with more than 100 beds having nuclear medicine is examined with radionuclides.
Appendix B - Soc. Nucl. Med. meetine paper by Lester Rogers, AEC, June 11, 1974 Accident record of past 25 years shows 350 reportable accidents in all modes of transportation of radioactive materials.
Two recent incidents involved a leaky container and an improper packaging procedure.
The AEC (now NkC) nas
-instituted quality assurance requirements for packaging.
13 Enclosure "B"
Appendix C - Soc. Nucl. Med. meeting Daoer by Chet Holifield (D-Calif)
June 12, 1974 A distinction should be made between short-lived radiopharmaceuticals which could lead to a nuisance and long-lived radiation sources which could lead to serious harm in accidents.
Pocket dosimeters should be used to check the passenger compartment before takeoff.
Appendix 0 - Letters to Congress Air Line Pilots Association embargo on radiopharmaceuticals on passenger airplanes is opposed.
Appendix E - Letters from Congress Legislation on air transport of hazardous materials woula allow radionuclides for medical use and research on passenger planes.
R endix F - Briner statement to Hazardous Materials Regulation Board, A
Febr'ue v 10, 1975 Air Line Pilots Association wants ban on passenger plane carriage of most
. hazardous materials (HM), limit on cargo plane carriage of HM, flight crew briefing, prohibitior, on hazardous and non-hazardous cargo mixing, personnel training and licensing of shippers.
Appendix G - Briner and Goodrich comments on Carriage of Radioactive Materials Notico 75-2, 40 FR 24, 4 Feb 1975 Concerned with transport index, loading, dose rate, personnel training, labeling, licensing of shippers, inspection, and penalties in air transport of radioactive material s.-
Briner and Goodrich comments on recort of JCAE Soecial Panel on Transoortation, 17 September 1974 l
Shipping cost is significant fraction of cost to patient.
Restricting markets to closest suppliers is anti-free enterprise.
Resci.eduling examinations is impractical. A large amount.of negative evidence exists for effect below doses of 1 rad and dose rates of 15 rad /yr.
Equating hazard with half-life overlooks lack of external hazard or short residence time in body.
Briner and Goodrich comments on EPA report on Air Transport. December 1974 l
Transportation costs are a significant fraction of total ptient costs.
-Staff Response to Comments and Apoendices l-These arguments were considered in the environmental impact statement. The rule changes recommended in Appendices F and G have been considered in prer' sed p
l 14 Enclosure "B" l'
f I
rulemaking by 00T. No substantive information is included to assist the current rulemaking proceeding of NRC.
Comment 7:
Burns Security Systems, Inc.
Establish retention schedt'e for records and reports required by 10 CFR Part 73.
Staff Response: This comment lies outside the scope of this rulemaking proceeding, since it does not apply to safety or safeguards standards but instead is an administrative requirement.
Comment 8: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency a.
Air transport is justifiable only for radionuclides whose half-lives are less than several air transit times or for a medical emergency.
Convenier.:e and flexibility do not justify air transport.
-b.
Unique risks arise from air transport:
~
(1)- Crashes near population centers.
(2)
Toxicity of'Pu0 i Type B containers fail at aircraft impact velociti$s.s great. Conclude that all transport of SNM should be prohibited on public safety grounds.
c.
More opportunities exist for aircraft sabotage than for other modes.
d.
Theft and diversion vulnerability due to aircraft speed and range is greater than for other modes.
Prohibit SNM shipment on diversion vulnerability.
e.
Potential accident situations have not-been addressed.
Staff Response:
a.
' Air transport of radioactive materials is justifiable i1 the resulting benefits outweigh the risku involved.
The reliability of air transport must be considered in determining the benefits.
Usually public acceptance of-a process is tied-to a demonstration of the safety _of a process and air transport'of radioactive materials is such a process.
15 Enclosure "B"
b.
The environmental statement evaluates the risks with respect to both crashes near population centers and toxicity of plutonium. While the risks of air transport may be unique and the consequence of severe accicents may be significant to a few nearby individuals, the risks to puolic health and safety are not severa.
c.
Not true for cargo air transport. A system of surveillance and control could be devised to effectively limit sabotage.
d.
The vulnerability of a shipment of SNM to theft or diversion is related to the effectiveness of the safeguards program instituted to reduce the vulnerability.
A physical protect. ion system can be devised that would prevent a successful theft or diversion attempt on air cargo shipments of formula quantities of strategic SNM.
In the recently upgraded safeguards regulations, the level-of threat that needs to be considered by licensees in' preparing their physical protection system for these shipments has been expanded.
The rule includes, in the threat, a conspiracy between individuals having access to or knowledge of the transport facilities or activities or who may have items that could facti: tate theft.
In addition, the rule requires two armed escorts to accompany the shipment.
e.
The environmental-statement.does address potential accident.
<ations and highly unlikely worst consequence situations in particular, namely aircraft and other vehicle crashes in.high population density areas, release of; plutonium frem packages on board, and dispersal of the released material.
16 Enclosu-e "B" 5
Comment 9: Center for Law and Social Policy a.
Air transport of Pu carries two risks:
(1) Crash in populated area requires containment of Pu.
(2) Hijacking, sabotage, and theft of Pu must be prevented.
b.
No need for speed exists with Pu transport.
No inconvenience is introduced on banning air shipments of Pu.
c.
Extreme toxicity of Pu is well-documented.
A microgram causes cancer in animals.
Release of significant quantity of Pu into the atmosphere could have deadly effects.
Staff Response:
a.
This qualitative assessment of the risks inherent in air transport is accurate for any hazardous material. These risks are considered in the environmental impact statement.
b.
It'is true that for plutonium, the speed of air transport is not necessary
-in terms of the half-life of the material.
Use of the air mode for plutonium shipments may still be desirable because of economics, schedule reliability, or security. These shipments should be allowed since a physical protection system can be devised to provide the necessary l
safeguLtds.
I c.
Agreed.
Several authors have s'.udied the quantitative description of the l
effects.
The environmental impact statement evaluates with the most recent information the health effects of possible but improbable plutonium I
releases in urban areas.
17 Enclosure "B"
Comment 10:
New York Atomic Energy Council a.
Not aware o' any study showing that present packaging requirements are adequate to protect the public.
b.
Must consider consequences of package failure.
c.
Must consider alternative transport modes besides air.
d.
Recommend suspension of air shipment of Pu, SNM in interim except for small quantities in non-dispersible form (e.g., cardiac pacemakers, sealed sources, etc.).
Datum New York electric utilities generally rely on land transportation for delivery of fuel and transport of wastes. Therefore, suspension of Pu air transport would not adversely affect New York energy supply.
Staff Response:
The environmental statement documents several studies, including package a.
testing, of packaging adequacy.
b&c. The environmental statement includes a determination of the consequences of package failure and examines other transport modes as an alternative for shipment by air.
d.
Requiring Pe to be in special form is a worthy consideration.
- However, it's bound to be costly.
Pu powder could be locked in a compound or encapsulated'to meet the requirements.
Extra proc.tsing before and after trips would be required, but outer containment requirements on packagings could be relaxed.
Comment 11:
British Embassy Datum UKAEA, Brit. Nucl. Fuels Ltd., and Radiochemical Centre Ltd. have had considerable experience in safe packaging and transportation of radioactive materials by air, including Pu and SNM under IAEA Regulations.
18 Enclosure "B" e
Comments a.
IAEA Regulations are adequate.
b.
NRC Regulations are adequate.
c.
Urge NRC to continue approving air transport of Pu.
d.
Risk studies are under way in UK and other member states of IAEA.
Staff Response:
a.b.c.
As part of the process of reevaluating its transportation regulations, the NRC will examine the transport regulations of the IAEA.
Air transport of plutonium will continue to be allowed during the reevalua-tion if it is packaged in accordance with current requirements.
d.
These studies may be helpful to the rulemaking proceeding.
Comment 12:
State of New York, Department of Law Draws conclusions from NY vs NRC et al. affidavits:
a.
Present containers are inadequate for air crashes.
b.
Air crashes are far more severe in impact and complexity than are surface
. mode accidents.
l l
c.
Dispersal of SNM is a distinct possibility, and could result in deaths of millions of citizens.
l d.
Air safeguards are notably inferior to ' chose of other transport options; the U.S. military has superior safeguards capability to transport SNM by
[
surface modes thari does commercial air transport; use military bases as transport nodes.
i Staff Response:
a.
This contention depends on the material being carried.
For plutonium, shipments are now required to be made in packages that can withstand severe aircraft crashes.
For special nuclear materials other than plutonium, L
19 Enclosure "B"
the NRC has tentatively concluded that no sound basis exists for suspending air shipments (41 FR 5627, February 9, 1976).
For other radioactive materials, the environmental iepact statement indicates the risk to be substantially less than for plutonium.
b.
Questionable.
Impact may be obviously different for head on collisions, but the puncture mode can be ignored for air accidents, according to a recent study, (SLA-74-0001) and is quite complex for surface accidents.
Fire is probably present in less than half of all air crashes, and water immersion applies to both air and surface accidents.
No doubt that accidents are complex phenomenh.
c.
The possibility is remote, not distinct.
SNM is hazardous, but is difficult to disperse for such catastrophic results.
Preventive actions preclude such results, d.
Commercial cargo air transport as distinguished from passenger air transport is not believed to be especially vulnerable to terrorism, under the current system.
A successful hijacking of an air cargo shipment of SNM is highly improbable.
Recent amendments to NRC safeguards regulations (10 CFR 73) increase the level of protection given to, air cargo shipments of formula quantities of strategic SNM. Applicable safeguards improve-ments contained in these amendments include, among others, expanding the level'of threat that must be considered in developing a physical protection system and requiring that two armed escorts accompany these. air shipments.
In addition, safeguard requirements have also been adopted for shipments containing less than a formula quantity of strategic SNM.
20 Enclosure "B"
The use of paramilitary forces for surface transportation safeguards has been found unnecessary in another NRC study (Security Agency Study, NUREG-0015).
Comment 13:
Citizen Action for the Environment a.
Against air transport of SNM.
b.
Problems associated with air transport of Pu are immense and potentially insoluble.
c.
Numerous risks far outweigh any possible economic benefits.
d.
Pu is substance of unprecedented toxicity, e.
Relation between package tests and actual plane crash or trucking accident is a little hard to see.
f.
Abandon Pu recycle.
g.
Develop renewable energy resources.
Staff Response: Most of these comments are subjective feelings.
Comments f and g are outside the scope of the current review.
Comments
-h.
Diversion or sabotage of plutonium in transport is a disastrous problem.
i.
Over 124 people knew some significant details of a shipment of plutonium from Brussels, Belgium, to Cheswick, Pa.
Staff Response: We recognize that the threat of theft or sabotage of plutonium
'during transport is a serious problem. We do believe this threat can be managed and be made an acceptable risk.
Comment 14:
Governor of New York
. Suspend air transport of Pu in New York until safety is improved.
21 Enclosure "B"
Staff Response:
No sound basis for suspension of air shipments of SNM exists.
For plutonium, shipments are now required to be made in packages that can withstand severe aircraft crashes.
Comment 15:
Environmental Protection Agency a.
Examine potential consequences in Pu air transport accident release in highly populated urban area.
b.
Consider alternative airports for Pu air transport to reduce risk until the risk assessment is completed.
Staff Response:
a.
The environmental impact statement includes such consequences in its risk assessment.
In addition, NRC is supporting research at Sandia Labs on package integrity.
b.
Plutonium air shipments are now required to be made in packages that can withstand severe aircraft crashes.
This action will substantially reduce the risks associated with plutonium air transport.
Comment 16:
Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc.
Conceivably, air shipments of some radioactive materials, properly controlled and packaged, could result in the least adverse impact on health, safety and safeguards.
Staff Response:
We agree that the inherent remoteness from population during the air operation phase of air transportation of radioactive material limits the number of persons receiving radiation and reduces the vulnerability of SNM
'to. theft or sabotage.
We also believe that measures of control over the ground operation phases of air transportation of SNM by cargo aircraft reduces 22 Enclosure "B"
4 the overall vulnerability to theft or sabotage of SNM to an acceptable level within reasonable costs.
Comment 17:
National Resources Defense Council, Inc.
a.
Quotes Conway report that risk of air transport of Pu is sufficient to restrict transportation to surface modes.
b.
Quotes Resnikoff affidavit that 2,000-46,000 lung cancers could develop from 2.8 percent release under possible meteorological conditions and 100,000 under less probable conditions.
c.
Since Pu half-iffe is 24,500 yr, air speed is not required.
Staff Resoonse:
a.
This point is being investigated in the environmental impact statement.
b.
Resnikoff's analysis contains conservative assumptions that render its valuations too high. The worst case analysis in the environmental impact statementinchicatesthattheradiologicalhealtheffectswouldbeno early fatalities and 70-150 latent cancer fatalities.
This is for a severe crash in a high population density urban area of an aircraft carrying plutonium in packages of current designs.
i c.
Requirements for air transportation are not based on half life alone, but may also include emergencies, unforeseen circumstances, economics, schedule l
reliability, and security.
' Comment 18:
Kansas Dept. Health and Environment a.
Speed of air transport appears to reduce handling time and allow greater quantity deliveries of small half-l_ife nuclides.
b.
Air _ transport allows smaller quantities to be shipped econcaically.
23 Enclosure "B"
c.
Air transport appears necessary and beneficial.
d.
Safety requirements should be based on thorough study of accident probabilities, packaging standards, and procedural controls.
e.
Air risks do not appear significantly gra3ter than surface risks.
f.
Current regulations appear adequate if adequately disseminated and enforced.
g.
These comments are based on the department's experience, which does not include experience with SNM or high level radioactive wastes.
Staff Response: These comments will be considered in the rulemaking proceeding.
Comment 19:
Univ. Cincinnati, College of Medicine a.
Any limitation in transport will increase health hazards.
b.
Increase in transportation costs increases medical costs.
c.
Air transport of radioactive materials carries smaller risks than does surface transport.
d.
Concern is over air shipment of industrial nuclides.
Staff Response:
These points are discussed in the environmental impact statement.
Comment 20:
Environmental Defense Fund a.
-Suspend air transport of SNM.
b.
Superior alternative transport technologies-exist.
c.
Maximum security conditions (secrecy) are incompatible with the need for alerting post incident reaction forces such as civil defense, aviation authority, and law enforcement officials.
d.
Investigate air shipments between remote military installations.
e.
Consider surface transport of SNM only.
f.
Ordinary decision rules such as benefit-cost analysis are not applicable to this problem in uncertainty.
g.
-Public _is more risk averse than federal agencies or privat'e firms.
24 Enclosure "B"
Staff Response:
a.
No sound basis for such suspension exists (see 41 FR 5627, Febryary 9, 1976).
b.
This point is considered in the environmental impact statement.
c.
We have recognized the dilemma of limiting knowledge of SNM movements to those individuals who have a proper role to play in its safeguarding.
To involve state police more formally would increase the number of personnel having specific. route and other movement information, but such an increase may be acceptable.
The 1980 NRC Appropriations Authorization Act (Pub.
L.96-295) provides for the NRC to issue regulations to prohibit unauthor-ized disclosure of sensitive safeguards information.
d.
The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC 1385, prohibits the use of Armed Forces for civil law enforcement, which would include protection of private property, unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or by statutes.
.None of the present authorizations would permit the use of Armed Forces I'
personnel except in emergencies caused by civil disorder, calamity, or disturbance, or when State authority has broken down or there is armed insurrection.
Even if this legal impediment did not exist, there is no need or justification for using military forces and equipment to protect against the postulated threat.
The physical protection deemed necessary i
j.
to defeat this threat can and is being provided by the private sector.
l i
.25 Enclosure "B"
e.
This point is considered in the environmental impact statement.
f.
Disagree. We believe that benefits of alternative transport modes can be evalucted in terms of risk and cost.
g.
This is a subjective opinion and is difficult to verify.
The concept of
" acceptable risk" is being examined with regard to transportation regulations.
-Comment 21:
Maine Attorney General a.
Suspend air transport of SNM during proposed rulemaking proceeding.
b.
Air transport of Pu has been commonplace.
c.
Recent tests show that SNM containers could be damaged in air crashes.
d.
It is quite possible for an SNM container to be punctured and for the contents to be released in an air accident..
+
e.
Cites experts that the cost minute quantities of Pu0 could result in 2
over 100,000 deaths.
f.
SNM_is attractive to terrorists and saboteurs.
g.-
Details of a shipment are known by hundreds of people.
h.
Air transport of SNM is in violation of NEPA.
Staff Response:
a.
No sound basis exists 'm such a suspension (see 41 FR 5627, February 9, 1976).
'b.
The NRC has determined that 30 domestic air. shipments and 7 export air shipments of Pu were made by licensees in 1974 (Affidavits by Joseph V.
Catania and G. Wayne Kerr, New York vs NRC et al.-).
This amount of traffic hardly makes the air shipment of Pu commonplace.
26' Enclosure "B"
c.
Plutonium air shipments are now required to be made in packages that can withstand severe aircraft crashes.
d.
This sequence of events has to be corsidered as credible, but it is remotely possible, not quite possible.
e.
Although the experts referred to are not identified, a calculation with a similar result was submitted in the New York vs NRC et al. case. This calculation contains conservative factors which yield a result that is too large.
The environmental impact statement's worst case analysis indicates that-the radiological health effects of a severe crash of aircraft carrying plutonium in pre-crash-resistant packages in an urban area of high population density would be no early fatalities and 70-150 latent cancer. fatalities. Air shipments of plutonium are now required to be made in packages that can withstand severe air crashes so that the consequences of an air accident would be less than indicated.
f.
SNM_is escorted by guards when it is shipped in strategic quantities.
Such shipments are also provided with other safeguards measures.
These precautions are taken to inhibit unauthorized use or theft by terrorists and saboteurs.
g.
A trial concept for rulemaking now-under consideration seeks to require personnel. clearances for security escorts of SNM shipments.
In this way, the number of people with need to know the details of the shipment ought to be minimized, and the probability of information leaks ought to be 27 Enclosure "B"
e e
s 4
reduced.
The 1980 NRC Appropriations Authorization Act (Pub. L.96-295) provides for the NRC to issue regulations to prohibit unauthorized disclo-sure of sensitive safeguards information.
h.
An environmental impact statement has been written.
Comment 22: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Power Systems a.
Supports NRC on no sound basis to change status quo.
b.
Decision to suspend air transport of SNM without appropriate notice would violate due process.
Staff Response:
Opportunity for hearing is required for suspension; hence no violation of due process will occur.
See Comment 3.
Comment 23:
L.V. Gossick Affidavit in New York vs NRC et al.
a.
SNH is used extensively at home and abroad for power, medicine, research, industry.
b.
Use, handling, transport of SNM is regulated.
c.
No reason is evident to suspend air transport of SNM.
-(1) No air accidents involving SNM have occurred in past 25 years.
(2) Risk of exposure is believed to be small, because of
-(a) High integrity packaging.
-(b) Physical security measures required.
d.
The NRC is reviewing new and existing import or export licenses for
'significant quantities of SNM.
A significant quantity of SNM is defined as one kilogram of Pu, one kilogram of U-233, or the mass of uranium multiplied by the square of _its enrichment in the U-235 isotope, expressed 1
as a weight fraction between_0 and 1.
In contrast, a strategic quantity of SNM for which safeguards are required is 2 kilograms of Pu, 2 kilograms of U-233, or 5 kilograms of_ U-235 in uranium of 20 or more weight percent enrichment.
28 Enclosure "B" L~
Staff Resoonse:
These comments are incorporated into the environmental impact statement.
Comment 24:
C. Sheldon Despite the "very low probability of serious air accidents," if there is an accident,15 million New Yorkers could get lung cancer.
Please ban these flights.
Staff Response:
See Comment 21.e.
Comment 25: General Atomic Company If air transport (of SNM) is further restricted, the less reliable schedules which characterize other modes of transportation will reduce the effectiveness of the safeguards system for monitoring movements and for assuring that shipments are promptly picked up by consignees at their destinations.
Staff Response: The NRC announced its tentative conclusion that no sound basis exists to suspend
- air shipments of SNM.
The results of the reevaluation of the NRC's transportation regulations support this conclusion.
. Comment 26:
Johns Hopkins Hospital, and Comment 27:
The Soci-for Pediatric Research a.
Requests NRC to keep in mind the need to not disrupt medical diagnoses, treatment and research.
b.
Most shipment of radioactive material have small quantities, low levels of radiation, and short half-lives.
Staff Response: These comments have been incorporated into the environmental impact statement.
29 Enclosure "B"
Comment 28: Attorney General of Massachusetts Suspend air transport of SNM during the rulemaking proceeding.
Staff Resoonse:
See Comment 3.
Comment 29:
Chicago Bridge and Iron Company a.
Industrial radioactive sources in air transport do not pose a threat to the safety of passenger aircraft operations as do combustible, flammable, explosive or corrosive materials in air transport.
b.
Exposure to individuals is less in air transport than in surface mode transport because the transit time is smaller.
Staff Resoonse:
These comments have been incorporated in the environmental
' impact statement.
Comment 30:
Nuclear Associates, Inc.
.a.
Tritium air transport should be prohibited because of substantial release if packaging is inadequate.
b.
Tritium and beta-emitters are long-lived so transportation speed is not obligatory.
c.
Detection of spillage is difficult since no adequate field survey instruments exist.
d.
Transportation companies and airlines should " spot-check" material for leakage.
Staff Response:
a-c. Increased attention to containment of liquids may be a valid requirement.
d.
Inspection and " spot-checking" of packages for spillage would be a DOT regulatory responsibility.
30-Enclosure "B"
Comment 31:
University of Arkansas a.
Safety requirements for radioactive materials should be based on packaging requirements.
b.
Monitoring of a shipment prior to acceptance by the air carrier with a
" charge" for this function could improve airline passenger protection.
Staff Response:
a.
Packaging of radioactive material in forms not susceptible to escape if the container is breached may be a means of enhancing safety and acceptance of air shipments.
b.
If such a fee practice is established, it should be done by the FAA.
Comment 32:
Health Industry Manufacturers Associatice a.
Most radioactive material shipped by air has between 1 and 50 microcuries activity.
b.
.The NRC should adopt FAA rules by reference rather than issue more ccaflicting, overlapping regulations.
Staff Resoonse:
a.
This comment has been incorporated into the environmental impact statement.
b.
The NRC and the DOT, of which the FAA is a part, do have an overlapping authority to regulate esiety of transportation of radioactive materials.
The NRC and the 007 have entered into a revised (1979) Memorandum of Under-standing to avoid conflict and duplication of regulations.
The NRC has incorporated by reference certain DOT regulations'.
' Comment 33: American College of Radiology Testimony previously given to the House Commerce. Committee by Dr. J. L. Quinn on April 25, 1974 was reproduced.
31 Enclosure "B"
a.
Nuclear medicine is desirable to American health care.
b.
Development of short-lived radionuclices has improved nuclear medicine.
c.
Scheduled passenger flights offer the only national network capable of meeting the needs of patients for these radionuclides across the country.
Staff Response: These statements are considered in the rulemaking proceeding.
Comment 34:
No comment was docketed under this number.
Comment 35:
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bureau of Radiological Health a.
General features of radiological health considerations for air transport of radioactive materials are reviewed.
b.
Package and storage requirements to provide assurance of proper radiation levels should be simplified rather than be changed to increase regulatory activity or carrier personnel training.
This recommendation is based on cost effectiveness.
c.
Federal inspection programs are mandatory. The failure to do such studies and periodic reevaluations has brought on the present controversy.
Staff Response:
a.
These considerations are examined in the envirrnmental statement.
b.
00T has completed its rule making proceeding involving the air transport of radioactive materials and has amended its. regulations in Parts'173 and 175 of 49 CFR.
l
- c.
A survey of radioactive materials packages in the present day transportation system is presently being conducted.
The NRC does have a strong inspection program, as do the agreement states.
The public and the idea of cost effectiveness apr'ar to better served by individual licensing inspections than by requiring regular industry-wide surveys.
32 Enclosure "B"
Comment 36: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency a.
Proposed rulemaking should include consideration of radiation levels on passenger planes; need and alternatius for air transport of medical isotopes; air transport criteria based on atomic number, half-life, shipping distance, total transit time, and total actual flight time, range of package stresses in air accidents; consequences of air accidents; frequency of shipment inspections; prohibition of air transport of SNM except for national security shipments in military aircrafts between military airfields; and provisions for decontamination, federal support for local enforcement, and package requirements for armor and corrosion resistance.
b.
The important transit time is from consignor portal to consignee portal.
Air transport is reasonable only if flight time dominates the total transit time.
c.
Half-lives of industrial and research isotopes can be considered greater than 1 oi ? months. A table summarizing half-lives for medical isotopes is submitted. A lower limit of 15 days for air transportable half-life is recommended.
Air transport of some actinides would be allowed by this criterion, even though their health effects are unknown.
d.
Relevant subjects to consider for safety requirements are probability of perilous conditions leading to accidents; correlation of accident severity
-with package damage and dispersal of contents, size of exposed population, and probability as well as consequences of accidental spills.
Staff Response:
a.
All these subjects are considered in the environmental impact statement.
i l
b.
Air transport is used to reduce the total transit time which would be incurred by some other mode. More often than not, the flight time is a j
small part of the total transit time.
, c.
Several other factors beside half-life should determine whether air transport of radioactive materials should be permitted.
These include
. emergencies, unforeseen circumstances, schedule reliability, and security.
d.
. Agreed,.-but these factors cannot be well controlled.
33 Enclosure "B" t'
SUPPLEMENTARY COMMENTS Cargo in air transport should be able to withstand ground impact at free fall velocities, crush and impact from airplane components, shrapnel impacts, corrosive agents, fires in the neighborhood of 1800-2000 F, and should be able to float.
Current containment vessel designs appear to underestimate the magnitude of these threats.
Staff Response: The environmental impact statement examines the environmental impacts and associated risks of aircraft accidents involving radioactive material.
Characteristics of air mode accidents were considered in the develop-ment of packaging standards to be applied to packages used for the air transport of plutonium.
A testing program was conducted at Sandia Laboratories that examined the response of plutonium packages to air mode accident environments.
Comment 37: TVA Office of. Agricultural and Chemical Development a.
Information was given on usual shipping practice at TVA.
b.
The shipper should be required to monitor packages in the presence of a shipping agent, since many airports are not equipped with monitoring devices.
c.
A label for easy identification of materials to be used in research, medical diagnosis, or medical treatment should be devised.
d.
Speed and lack of disruption for transportation.of radionuclides is needed.
Staff Response:
a,d. This information is considered in the environmental impact statement.
b,c. These comments are beyond the scope of this rulemaking proceeding since they do not involve regulations contained in Parts 71 or 73 of 10 CFR.
With regard to_ comment b it should be noted that the lack of monitoring devices is equally true for other modal carriers.
Requiring additional Enclosure "B" 34
monitoring above that required to determine the TI to be applied to the package label would increase occupational exposure without a significant reduction in exposure risk.
Comment 38:
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory a.
Review of more than 30 years intense involvement in nuclear programs shows radiological risks to be less than conventional industrial risks.
b.
Nuclear electricity generation saved $100 million/yr in the Chicago area.
c.
Complete risk-benefit analysis must include evaluation of industrial isotope use, d.
Current estinates are that 40 million patients per year utilize radio-pharmaceuticals.
e.
ALPA embargo has been a significant impediment to the research efforts of LASL.
f.
Altering the regulations is not needed, but assurance of compliance should be strengthened; however simplification and stabilization of regulations is more important than increased enforcement of them.
Staff Response:
a-e. This information is considered in the environmental impact s+.atement.
f.
The regulations are being simplified by consolidating several separate regulations (for example, incorporation of FAA and Coast Guard regulations in 49 CFR and incorporation of 1973 IAEA regulations in both 49 CFR and 10 CFR Part 71). Hopefully, these changes will increase stability as well.
I Comment 39:
Commonwealth Edison i
a.
Regulations are adequate.
b.
Retain the ability to ship by air irradiated or contaminated items or hardware.
Such items present little hazard to the public but could be of significant benefit in repair or diagnostic purposes, especially in connection with the operation of nuclear power plants.
35 Enclosure "B" l
O
c.
Review of regulations and possible revision of them is a desirable alter-native to a ban of air transport.
Staff Resoonse:
This information is considered in the environmental impact statement.
Comment 40:
New England Nuclear Letter promising later delivery to NRC of bibliography of pertinent enclosure material.
Comment 41:
Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc.
a.
Evaluate cost-risk-benefit optimum of alternative transport modes for each general SNM form, type, and packaging.
b.
Base licensing on package design and procedural controls.
c.
Proposed rulemaking proceeding is assumed to determine relative risks, establish acceptable releases, and establish acceptable exposure limits.
d.
The NRC should license standard packages on generic basis, e.
Define acceptable tests which an applicant can use to prove that a particular container is able to withstand an aircrash without exceeding the accident release limit.
~
f.
Designate a Federal facility, such as Sandia Laboratories, to certify specification containers and special packages and to assure consistent test conditions.
g.
Publish outline for shipping package license application.
h.
Formalize review procedure for complex packages so as to eliminate uncertainty of procurement and testing before the applicant can be assured that the packaging.can be licensed.
Staff Response:
a.
This evaluation is carred out in the environmental impact statement.
36 Enclosure "B"
b.
The concept of licensing is to designate what (performance standards) is expected of a package, not how it should be achieved.
This concept is internationally accepted and is consistent with government of free enterprise.
c.
The rulemaking proceeding will determine the relative risks associated with radioactive materials transport.
Risks arising from exposures that are within acceptable limits and exposures resulting from small releases of gasses and liquid coolant that are recognized as being unpreventable in certain accident situations are included in this determination.
d.
Althougn the recommended procedure may expedite the licensing process, it would not result in any significant health or safety berefit.
e-f. As a result of the development of packaging standards to be used for the air transport of plutonium, test criteria and acceptance standards were established for air mode accidents.
Requiring all tests to be performed at Sandia Laboratories seems to present an undesirable potential for restricting rather than for regulating safe commerce in radioactive materials.
g.
A regulatory guide on package license applications has been issued.
h.
Efforts to streamline the review procedures for a package license applica-tion are always subject to upgrading by suggestions from individuals.
NRC management of this process is very formal now.
37 Enclosure "B"
Comment 42:
Technical Operations, Inc.
a.
Radiography practice predominatly uses Ir-192, which has a half life of 75 days; thus 1 percent is lost each day.
Such sources cannot be economically stockpiled.
An average source is transported 2 or 3 times during its life, and thus would spend an appreciable fraction of its life in transit if it were required to be transported by surface.
b.
Air freight business is much more tightly organized than the trucking business, including the following considerations:
(1) Rapid cargo handling on transhipment by air.
(2) Fewer transfers on long hauls by air.
(3) Frequent cargo breakdowns and delays by trucks.
(4) Frequent cargo misplacement with trucks.
(5) Air shipments more easily traced, better controlled.
(6) Air personnel better trained, less likely to mishandle packages.
c.
It is almost impossible to contaminate surroundings with special form
- material, d.
Only one incident related to an air shipment has been reported in last 20 years; it did not involve injury and could have been preveted by compliance with regulations.
Minor exposures have been reported from
-several incidents, e.
Radiographic materials are of such small quantity that they can not interfere with aircraft operation, even if unshielded.
f.
Transportation regulation authority should be put solely in hands of Secretary of Transportation. We recnemend also certification and inspection of shippers; provision of penalties for violations of regulations, including mislabeling of shipments; and monitoring by carriers.
g.
Present regulations are adequate, but mechanisms for enforcement should be improved.
Staff Response:
a-e. These comments are considered in the environmental impact statement.
f.
These recommendations are within the domain of 00T.
These ideas are considered in ongoing rulemaking proceedings.
38 Enclosure "B"
g.
This observation is under consideration.
Comment 43:
Department of Transportation (Materials Transportation Bureau)
Rulemaking should be confined to:
a.
Adequacy of Type "B" package of SNM of high radictoxicity.
b.
Safeguards (physical protection) of SNM during air transport.
Staff Response:
a.
Consideration is also required for Type 8 packages of materials other than SNM, for example radioteletherapy units.
b.
Consideration is also required for aspects of safeguards other than physical protection of SNM; risk-benefit evaluation of international and domestic shipments, evaluation of sabotage potential, and evaluation of economic burden of safeguards requirements.
Comment 44: Air Transport Association of America a.
Packages for air transport must meet stringent safety requirements estab-lished by the federal government and must be. marked for clear recognition by the freight forwarder and the carrier.
i b.
Consider accident probability, packaging, and procedural controls in combination.
Also consider accident conditions.
c.
Beef up regulation and enforcement.
d.
Air transport risk pales in comparison to life's risks.
Consider though:
(1) An airplane pilot's inability to stop and check out an irregularity.
(2) Captivity of passengers.
e.
The shipper should be responsible for safety.
f.
Limit air transport to RadWhite I, RadYellow II, and medical generators with transport index equal to 3 mrem /hr.
39 Enclosure "B"
-w
i g.
The seat level should be less than 1 mrem /hr.
h.
Emphasize prompt pickup.
i.
A RadWhite I package should be able to hold a 200 lb. top load.
Increase other package requirements.
j.
Air carriers are not able to and should not be required to monitor packages.
Staff Response:
These comments are more properly addressed to the 00T than the NRC.
The quantities apparently being discussed are those of Type A packages, which are in DOT's province.
However, the comments are considered in the environmental impact statement.
Comment 45:
New York Atomic Energy Council a.
Radioactive material must be transported by some means.
b.
Decide need for air transport on whether benefit exceeds risk and on whether air transport risk is comparable to surface mode transport risk.
~
c.
Average accident probability per mile may not be an appropriate measure, since risks occur near airports.
d.
Verify proper packaging, limit package contents, and limit the number of packages in particular shipments.
e.
For plutonium, require special form and design packages to withstand maximum credible accidents.
Staff Response:
This information is considered in the environmental impact.
statement.
Comment 46: Galland et al. for Japan Air Lines a.
Continue air transport of radioactive materials.
b.
No system exists to require shippers to have adequate facilities and personnel.
Put quality assurance into shipper's licenses.
Provide airlines with. list of licensed shippers.
Spot check licensed shippers.
c.
License, check contr,act packers.
40 Enclosure "B" e
v d.
Requiring air carriers to monitor packaging is proper.
e.
Train air carrier personnel in packaging documentation requirements, emergency handling of radioactive materials on ground, loading guidelines and all other training necessary for safe air transport.
f.
Inform shippers of departure time after shipment is booked.
Prohibit delivery to air terminal before 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before plane departure.
g.
Prohibit cargo mixing.
Keep radioactive cargo accessible.
h.
U.S. regulations should be consistent with IAEA regulations.
Consolidate air, sea, and land transport regulations.
Staff Response:
These comments are more appropriately addressed to the 00T rather than to the NRC.
Comment 47:
ERDA Comment 47a:
Comments of W. Brobst, Division of Environmental Control Technolooy a.
Continue air transport of radioactive materials.
b.
Environmental impact report should include cost-benefit relationships.
c.
Continue air transport of Type A packages, d.
Continue air transport of Type B packages, but with justification.
- e.
Reexamine survivability of Type 8 packages in typical air crash (150 mph).
f.
Air transport accident probability is less than that of surface transport.
g.
The contamination prcblem near a city is the same for air and surface
. transport.
Not a catastrophe in either case.
l l
h.
Consider package requirements to be more important than accident probabil-j ities, which in turn are more important than procedural controls.
i.
Increase fines and publicize them more widely.
Suspend licenses for 30-90. days.
.j.
The risks of air transport of radioactive materials are comparable to those of surface transport of these materials.
k.
. Risks of-air transport of radioactive materials are less than other risks
. of -li fe.
1.
Recent June 24, 1975 air crash in New York resulted in 110 deaths, some of which resulted from flammable liquid aboard.
t 41.
Enclosure "B"
m.
Simplify the rules and improve perspective with respect to air carriage of other hazardous materials.
i n.
Weakest point of regulations is compliance.
Comment 47b:
Comments of H. Rickover, Division of Naval Reactors (NR) a.
NR prohibits passenger air and cargo air shipment of radioactive material except in justified and approved emergency.
b.
NR accepts Conway recenaendations to restrict air transport of radioactive material.
Staff Response:
These comments are considered in the environmental impact statement.
Comment 48:
New England Nuclear Bibliography Refer to Comment 40.
Enclosures of most interest are summarized below. 8w, Dr. J. L. Quinn's testimony before Congress on April 25,19'/5, has been discussed under Comment 33.
Comment 48a:
New England Nuclear a.
Parts 30-34 and 71 should be amended so that no licensee can offer a package of radioactive materials for shipment unless the licensee hcids a specific shipper's license under a new paragraph of Part 71.
b.
This new control over shippers should be made a national responsibility of.the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Inspection of licensees in Agreement States would be contracted to the Agreement State licensing and inspecting organization. The slowness of Agreement States to adopt desirable new NRC rules and the lack of homogeneity in their rules would require national enforcement of shipper's licenses.
c.
It is still possible for a shipper to offer packages containing naturally-occurring or cyclotron produced radioactive materials without a license from NRC.
In some cases the packaging of these materials is not good.
The NRC should work for a change in statutes to brina all radioactive material under its control.
Staff Response:
a,b. Exercising regulatory responsibility over the transport of radioactive material that is within'the scope of Part 71 is accomplished through the issuance of general licensees and certificates of compliance approving 42-Enclosure "B" w
w
for use certain packaging.
The use of other regulatory schemes has been considered.
However, these other schemes often involve unnecessary work on the part of the Commission and its licensees, can cause delays in shipments and complicates regulatory requirements without adding to safety of shipments.
Transport requirements are imposed upon Agreement State licensees thro--Jn regulations of the 00T.
Agreement States do not adopt NRC transportation regulations.
The requirement for Agreement State licer. sees to use NRC approved packages for certain shipments is established in the DOT regulations.
c.
This comment is beyond the scope of this rulemaking proceeding.
Comment 48b:
Air Transport Association of America a.
Inadequate enforcement of present regulations exists.
b.
Limit radioactive materials in air transport to short half-life medical or research isotopes.
LiInit the TI and spacing of packages.
c.
d.
Establish central monitoring facilities at airports, licensed by the l
federal government.
l l
e.
00T should review its regulations.
l (1) Prohibit air transport of radioactive materials on safety grounds.
(2) Labeling, etc., requirements should be reviewed.
(3) Shippers' education requirements should be reviewed.
f.
Inspect shippers.
g.-
Penalize wrongdoers.
i 43' Enclosure "B" i
i e
a Staff Resoonse:
00T has considered these comments in its rulemaking proceeding on the air transport of radioactive material and has amended its regulations in Parts 173 and 175 of 49 CFR.
Comment 48c:
SNM Newsletter, Nov. 1974 Data In 1961, 200,000 packages of radioactive materials traveled by air.
In 1973, 600,000 packages went by air.
Comments a.
Limit TI to 3 or less.
b.
Ban Radioactive Yellow III category packages from air transport except if the half life is less than 30 days.
c.
Load Radioactive Yellow II and Radioactive Yellow III category packages on the floor of the cargo hold.
d.
Establish dose rate limits of 2 mrem /hr at any air passenger saat and a limit of 1 mres/hr on the average.
Staff Resoonse:
See staff response to Comment 48b.
Comment 48d:
ALPA Embargo, Nov. 18, 1974 a.
Ban hazardous materials from transport on passenger airplanes except:
(1) Radiopharmtceuticals in Radioactive White I or Radioactive Yellow II category packages,
_(2) Dry.fce, and (3)~ Magnetic materials rackaged according to regulatioss.
b.
Cargo is to be inaccessible to crew, c.
Crew'is-to be briefed on the hazardous materials included in the cargo.
d.
Inspect the overpacks accepted for air transport.
e.
Ban cargo with mixed categories of hazardous materials.
44 Enclosure "B"
i l
f.
FAA should require minimum training for air crews.
g.
Air carriers must accept only packages from licensed shippers.
l h.
Require air lines to monitor packages rather than rely on shipping papers describing them.
Staff Response:
See staff response to comment 48b.
Comment 48e:
H.J. Paas, Jr. AECIDO, " Maintaining Persoective... (on I-131 spill)..."
a.
Deposition of I-131 was identified in 59 people.
b.
Th radiological incident is one of the least important and less frequent
'of man's hazards.
Staff Response:
This information is considered in the environmental impact statement.
Comment 481:
Capt. J.A. Echols for ALPA, Sept. 22-27 1974 a.
Lists 8 areas of concern in air transport of radioactive materials.
(1) Are limits on Radioactive Yellow III category packages low enough?
(2) Do cargo stowage plans on passenger aircraft allow enough separation of radioactive materials packages?
(3) Are loading personnel trained well enough?
(4)' Are dose regulations as low as practicable?
(5) Do shipping agents' engage in unsafe practices?
(6) Do differences exist between licensee controls and controls on
_ packages within the transportation system?
(7) Are cargo handlers adequately protected?
(8) Are federal regulations adequately enforced?
b.
Average cargo-hold height:
75 in.(8747, L1011, DC10), 20 in.
-(Convair 24,340,580,600, YS-11), 45 in. (others).
c.
Surveys have shown deviations from regulations to be more frequent than should be tolerated.
45 Enclosure "B"
d.
Survey of training programs shows crabbed approaches.
Staff Response:
See staff response to comment 48b.
Comment 48v:
Brantlev, J.C.:
" Industry's Role in Transoortation of Radio-pharmaceuticals," Soc. Nuc. Med. Ann. Mtg (June 12, 1974)
Data
- Packages presently on passenger planes flow from 5 cities to 550 airports, thence to 1500 cities by surface, and thence to 3300 hospitals by surface.
With cargo air transport, packages can flow from 5 cities to 40 airports by air, thence to 1500 cities by surface, thence to 3300 hospitals by surface.
On weekends by cargo air transport, packages can flow from 5 cities to 20-25 airports.
Staff Resoonse:
These numbers are considered in the environmental impact statement.
Comment 49:
State of New York Department of Law (Affidavits by Dr. John Gofman and Peter N. Skinner included) a.
Failure to file an adequate environmental impact statement requires that air transport of SNM must cease.
b.
Commercial. air transport of SNM, particularly ur. der security conditions...
at JFK in NYC and other major metropolitan airports, is far more vulnerable to terrorist diversion and attack than military surface transport.
In view of the... vulnerability to diversion and attack, air transport of SNM should be discontinued.
This is particularly true for enriched U-235, U-233, plutonium in any form.
[ Refers to Skinner affidavit of New York vs NRC et al.]
c.
Safety requirements should not be based on accident probabilit'es.
Accidents should oe considered likely_ events.
d.
Specify package standards certifiable to JCAE for all forms of SNM.
Explore possibility of requiring Pu to be shipped in bulk ~ oxide form to reduce danger of dispersion.
e.
Procedural control of SNM shipments is sporadic and ineffective.
Shipments of SNM have been packaged in contravention of existing regulations and have been mishandled.
As a result, leaks have occurred.
f.
"Even if this' hazard (of air transport of SNM] were not far greater than many othc.rs, there would be no justification for the-Commission's failure to' ground the transport of SNM."
46 Enclosure "B" s
F-m--
-re-
- ~ -
g,
g.
Regulations should require that shipments of SNM be made by military surface transport, using military bases as points of shipment and interim storage.
Staff Resoonse:
a.
The NRC's interim position is that no sound basis exists to prohibit air transportation of SNM (41 FR 5627, February 9, 1976). An environmental impact statement has been written, issued for public comment and a final environmental statement has been issued.
b,g. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC 1385, prohibits the use of Armed Forces for civil law enforcement, which would include protection of private property, unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or by statutes.
None of the present authorizations would permit the use of Armed Forces personnel except in emergencies caused by civil disorder, calamity, or disturbance, or when State authority has been broken down or there is armed insurrection.
Even if this legal impediment did not exist, there
~is no need or justification for using military forces and equipment to protect against the postulated threat.
The physical protection considered necessary to defeat this threat can and is ceing provided by the private sector.
The Skinner affidavit calculates critical mass for various enrichments of U-235. Air transport of these amounts requires physical protection measures, since they exceed the minimum amount (5 kg) for which such protection is required.
c.
Accident probabilities are used to determine the relative risks involved in certain. transport activities.
Safety. requirements are t?.sn developed 47 Enclosure "B"
based upon consideration of the relative risks involved and the costs and benefits resulting-from the requirement.
d.
This step is considered in the environment impact statement.
e.
These declarations are not supported by the record.
f.
This statement is a value judgment.
ARGUMENT OF G0FMAN AFFIDAVIT
-5 a.
The lung cancer dose, estimated from an absolute risk value of 2.54 x 10 j year / man-rem, should be one fourth the BEIR estimate and one twentieth tha Cohen estimate, if Pu is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the whole lung mass.
b.
The lung mass at risk is that of the bronchi (about 1 gm in standard man), particularly the epithelium, not the pulmonary tissue (about 570 gm in standard man).
s c.
Cigarette smokers are about 10 times more at risk to lung cancer. from inhala' tion of Pu than are nonsmokers.
d.
The affidavit reports the number of lung cancer doses per pound of Pu in the economy.
It argues that calculation of lung cancer doses per pound of all toxic chemicals is relevant.
48 Enclosure "B"
s i
e.
The affidavit predicts an overkill factor of 4.5 for cigarette smoking occupational workers, a fatal lung cancer in one out of thirty nonsmoking occupational workers, 7 million lung cancer doses in the smoking USA public at large, and 60,000 lung cancer doses in the nonsmoking USA public at large over a 30 year period if everyone inhales and deposits the permissible lung burdens established for occupational workers and individuals in the public at large, respectively.
S+.aff Resoonse:
a.
The estimate may be valid, but only for the assumed conditions.
b.
According to the BEIR report, "An important unresolved issue is the question of whether the radiation exposure to local areas is the critical
-datum or whether an effect extending over the entire respiratory epithelium is more likely to lead to caricer. This is important because lung cancers usually arise at bifurcations of the bronchial tree.
Most analyses have concluded that the issue is basically a probabilistic one, in that a more widespread exposure is likely to subject more cells to the carcinomatous transformation." Gofman's argument that the relevant tissue is the epithelial layer of the bronchi has been analyzed in several recent publications (Snipes, Brooks, Cuddihy, and McClellan, Lovelace Foundation, LF-51 or UC-48 (September 1975); BEIR Ad Hoc Committee on Hot Particles,
'" Health Effects of Alpha-Emitting oarticles in the Respiratory Tract,
" EPA-520/4-76-013).
49 Enclosure "B" O
'c.
Gofman faults the model proposed by the ICRP Task Group on Lung Dynamics because of its reliance on the assumption of normally functioning cilia, which is an inaccurate description of cigarette smokers.
His factor of 10 is not supported. The BEIR report declares tne recent increase in lung cancer is not uniform all over the world nor is it correlated in all instances with cigarette smoking, but other less well defined environmental
-carcinogenic factors, such as air pollution and chemical agents, also evidently play a role.
7 d.
No consideration by Gofman is tendered the differences between quantities of Pu.that are transported or handled from those that are released, dispersed, inhaled, and actually deposited in the bronchial regicn.
Gofman's calculations are based on the assumption of deposited Pu, however.
The information conveyed by implication that the amount of Pu in the economy can be represented by an equivalent number of potential lung cancers is incomplete.
Information must also be given on the distribution of the deposited material wi+hin the exposed population.
Risk should properly be expressed in terms of-the probability that a given amount of
, material will be deposited in the lung as well as the consequences of the deposition of that material. The concept of a lung cancer dose suggests 1that a threshold quantity of deposited material exists, below which no effect.is achieved, and above which only a single.effect is achieved, no
-matter how much material is deposited.
e.
The lung cancer dose threshold suggestion is not taken consistently by Gofman.
For example, he argues that for. smoking occupational workers
-inhaling Du-239, the -lung cancer dose is 0.058 =icrograms,' resulting in 50
,nclosure "B" c
7 l
an overkill factor of 4.5, since the permissible lung burden is 0.26 micrograms.
The threshold suggestion thus applies to smokers.
- However, he argues that for nonsmoking occupational workers inhaling Pu-239, the lung cancer dose is 7.3 micrograms, resulting in an expectation that one such worker out of thirty would develop fatal lung cancer at the permissible dose.
If the threshold s'uggestion applied to nonsmokers, his expectation would be that no such worker would develop fatal lung cancer at the permissible dose.
In other words, he confuses the probability and con-sequence factors of risk.
Gofman's predictions about the public at large do not follow from use of the threshold suggestion.
If every individual inhaled the permissible lung burden of Pu-239, 0.0082 micrograms, for the public at large, no one would encounter a fatal lung cancer, since even by his calculations the lung cancer dose is a larger quantity for both smokers and nonsmokers.
ARGUMENT OF SKINNER AFFIDAVIT a.
Refers to Willrich and Taylor, " Nuclear Theft:
Risks and Safeguards,"
which points out the safeguards problem posed by high enriched UF I"
6 fuel cycle.
b.
Calculates that 158 kg UF enriched to 79 w/o-U-235 would yield sufficient 6
U-235 metal for 4 to 5 fission bombs.
'51 Enclosure "B"
)
Staff Response:
a.
Formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) are afforded safeguards protection in transit under present regulations.
These materials and quantities include amounts exceeding 5 kg U-235 in uranium enriched to 20 w/o or more, 2 kg U-233, and 2 kg Pu.
b.
The calculation of critical masses of U-235 in 158 kg of 79 w/o enriched UF is reasonable, although we calculate 84 kg U-235 rather than 6
107 kg U-235 as stated in the affidavit, but fails to note that a good neutron reflector is implicit in the Willrich and Taylor estimates or that.far smaller amounts of such material are safeguarded in transit.
Comment 50:
Independent Phi Beta Kappa Environmental Study Group "If NRC is to protect public health and welfare as a primary mission,... no shipments of powdered plutonium or plutonium in any form should pass through
' Kennedy airport or through New Yorx City."
Staff Response: These comments are considered in the environmental impact statement.
A Comment 51:
Neal Kilminster Air shipments of plutonium are not justified, since the danger to the public is. intolerable. All shipments of plutonium should be discontinued pending a thcrough study of the dangers.
Staff Response:
See Comment 3.
The dangers of such shipments are considered in the environmental impact statement.
Comment 52:
Environmental Protection Agency a.
NRC should consider the use of alternative air terminals to reduce the population risk'until a risk assessment is completed.
52 Enclosure "8" v--
w--
w-u
---er
b.
While the risk assessment should contain detailed developments of both the probability and,the consequences of an accident, special attention should be given to the probable package damage and probable release of radioactive contents.
Staff Resoonse a.
See Comment 3.
b.
Information on the performance of some packages in certain accident environments has been developed in a testing program conducted at Sandia Laboratories.
Comment 53:
Environmental Analysis Laboratories Samples of Pu and Am scheduled for analysis by this laboratory are encountering transportation problems to the laboratory.
Proposed rulemaking should not restrict laboratcry analysis work.
Staff Response:
The laboratory's receiving problems are probably the result of the ALPA embarq: of 1974 and Congressional action of 1974-75.
No NRC rules to eliminate ar-radi.oactive materials from any made of transport are being contemplated.
Comments 54-60:
Private Individuals a.
Donald Gjerdevig Pu should not be transported by any method - danger to this and future generations are too great.
b.
N. Joan Sandler Pu is too deadly to be handled in a public place, particularly in powder form.
Risk of international contamination is extremely high at JFK, or any transportation site.
c.
Marianne K. Montoux Pu in powder form is highly vulnerable to theft or sabotage.
53 Enclosure "B"
d.
Penelope S. Waites No strong, permanent container has been devised which can contain Pu for the immense time periods required.
e.
Joyce A. Murphree "The chance of an accident may be small but the risk we are taking is too great to chance."
f.
Sandra Johnson The transportation of Pu is a serious accident waiting to happen.
g.
Linda E. Schweber The last place Pu belongs is in a public place because it is of extreme toxicity and is all that much more easy to steal.
Staff Resoonse:
a.
Regulations require Pu to be contained within packaging designed to withstand both accident and normal conditions of transport.
Results of the environmentai impact statement indicate that the risks associated with the air transport of plutonium are small, b.
Same as response to Comment a.
c.
Not true.
Formula quantities of strategic special nuclear materials, which include Pu, are required by regulations to be guarded in transit.
All quantities and forms of Pu are packaged to prevent release of Pu to the atmosphere.
The risk of theft or sabotage is small, not large.
d.
.This comment appears to be addressed at plutonium as a waste product and is beyond the scope of this rulemaking proceeding.
54 Enclusure "B"
e.
The risk of surface made transportation of Pu to public health and safety has been shown to be less than the risk of other commonly accepted situations.
The risk of air transport of Pu is evaluated in the environmental impact statement, f.
The same statement applies to other situations in life.
The frequency of serious accidents has been estimated as very low.
It is impossible to predict when, if ever, a serious accident involving plutonium may occur.
s g.
Same as response to Comments a. and c.
Comment 61:
United Airlines a.'
Fissile material should be prohibited from passenger and cargo air transport, since the operating environment is sensitive and since alternate transport modes are more amenable to safeguards requirements.
b.
Radioactive materials allowed on aircraft should be limited to those related to medical research, diagnosis and treatment.
Staff Response:
a.
Safeguards requirements for air shipment of SNM are discussed in the l
environmental impact statement.
In addition, see Comment 3.
b.
This comment was considered in the 00T rulemaking proceeding on the air
[
transport of radioactive material.
l Comment C2-70:
Private Individuals a.
Mrs. Patricia Camobell The risk of exposing millions of pecole to this toxicity (of Pu) is too great in a flight operation.
55 Enclosure "B" h
b.
Linda Budowski The possible dangers to life posed by the handling of plutonium far outweigh any other consideration.
c.
Mrs. John Pilmulder Flying plutonium in and out of Kennedy Airport is a violation of public safety.
d.
Clara L. Fayette Flying nuclear waste products in and out of Kennedy Airport should not be done.... There is no known way of disposing of them and they could--if there were an accident--cause death and cancer to a great many people.
e.
Meredith Puterbaugh Flying radioactive material into Kennedy Airport poses a needless hazard to life.
An airplane crash dispersing plutonium oxide would be catastrophic.
f.
Virginia Day Plutonium is incredibly toxic and also is a fissionable material, which can be used in the making of bombs.
An AEC report has labeled security precautions as highly inadequate in regard to nuclear wastes, and I feel that just accents the point that it should not be transported in and out of a huge, crowded airport.
g.
Virginia Karstedt Wide scale use and production of radioactive materials will accmulate through little accidents-a higher world radioactivity than life can handle.
h.
Claire McCarthy Unwise and irresponsible measures, such as shipping plutonium powder via Kennedy Airport in New York, on the part of an agency whose alleged purpose is to safeguard the public from misuse or diversion of nuclear materials might account for its present credibility dilemma.
i.
Tim Vorce Flying plutonium is alarming - an airport accident would no doubt be in the middle of.a large city, creating a real danger; mid-air accident
~could spread radioactivity over a very wide area; the danger of a terrorist blowing up or hijacking a plane carrying plutonium is greater tnan otherwise; and plutonium is the most lethal substance known to man.
Staff Resoonse:
Each of these commentors express the sentiment against air transport'of plutonium.
The risk of air transport of Pu is. evaluated in the 56 Enclosure "B"
environmental impact statement.
Present information indicates that millions of persons would not be exposed in a flight operation, including an accident, and that the risk is orders of magnitude smaller than the risk associated with any of several other commonly accepted hazardous situations.
Air shipments of plutonium are now required to be made in packages that can withstand severe aircraft crashes.
Comment 71:
Eberline Instrument Corporation In a letter to Congressman Lujan, Congress is requested to grant the NRC some administrative leeway in its enforcement of the Scheuer amendment (Section 201 of Public Law 94-79), since Congress probably didn't mean to exclude air shipment of exempt quantities of plutonium, such as the minute quantities likely to be found in any soil sample from radioactive fallout.
Staff Response:
The law permits air transportation of plutonium contaminated soil samples if they are contained in a certified package.
A rulemaking proceeding is currently underway to establish regulat' ions governing the air transport of plutonium.
i l
l l
I 57 Enclosure "B" o