ML20006G213
| ML20006G213 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1990 |
| From: | Collins S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Hall D HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9003060042 | |
| Download: ML20006G213 (4) | |
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FEBi2 31990
~ In Reply Refer'To:
Dockets:! 50-498 50-499 F
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.l Houston-Lighting & Power Company
- ATTN:' Donald-P. Hall, Group Vice President, Nuclear P.O.4 Box 1700 Houston, Texas. 77251 Gentlemen:
" Attached is a copy of the December 22,-1989, Federal Emergency Management y
Agency's' (FEMA): exercise evaluation report of the April-26, '1989, emergency preparedness exercise.
The report indicates that FEMA observed no deficiencies dering this exercise.
'If you have any further questions, please contact Mr. Nemen M. Tere at
-(817) 860-8129.
Sincerely, J
Samuel J. Collins, Director Division of Reactor Projects t
Attachment:
- As - stated:-
<t cc w/out attachment:
y Chief, Technological Hazards Branch FEMA Region 6
~
. Federal Center
~800 North Loop 288
.Denton' Texas 76201-3698 3
i cc.w/ attachment:
Brian'Berwick, Esq.
Assistant' Attorney General
~ Environmental: Protection Division-(
P.O. Box'12548 Capitol Station-Austin,-Texas: 78711 (E 90-oo
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' Houston' Lighting.and Power Company-
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Houston Lighting and Power Companyi y
ATTN: Gerald. E. Vaughn,.Vice Presidentf
. Nuclear Operations-
' P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth,. Texas 77483
- Houston Lighting and Power Company ATTN
.J. T. Westermeier, General Manager
. South Texas: Project a
P.O.. Box'289-Wadsworth, Texas.77483.:
Houston Lighting and Power Company.
ATTN:
M.-A'. McBurnett, Manager
. Operations ~ Support Licensing
- P.O. Box 289i
. Wadsworth, Texas 77483
~
City of Austin Electric Utility ATTN:.'J. C..Lanier, Director of L
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h Generation H
721 Barton Springs Road 4 Austin; Texas-78704
- City Public Service Board
' ATTN:
R. 'J.: Costello/M. T. Hardt e
' P.O.' Box.1771 San Antonio,(Texas 78296 r
Bechtel Corporation.-
ATTN: E.'T.'Molnar/L. W. Hurst
~ P.O. Box 2166
- Houston,; Texas. 77252-2166 Newman &'Holtzinger, P. C.
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' ATTN: -. Jack R. Newman, Esq.
1 1615-L. Street, NW.
Washington, D.C.
20036'
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i central. Power and Light Company j
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-ATTNb. R. P. Verret/0. E. Ward W
- P.O. Box 2121 4
~ Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 Baker & Botts ATTN: Melbert Schwartz, Jr., Esq.
One.Shell Plaza
- Houston, Texas.77002
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Washington, D.C.
20006 INPO Records Center
-1100 Circle 75 Parkway 1 Atlanta', Georgia 30339-3064 Ms. Iris J. ' Jones i
l Acting City Attorne'y'
! City.of Austin
P.O. Box: 1088 1
~ Austin, Texas 78767 Houston ' Lighting & Power Company
~ ATTN:
S.L. Rosen ;Vice President Nuclear Engineering and Construction 9
P.O. Box 289, Wadsworth, Texas -77483 Houston Lighting & Power Company
' ATTN: 'R. W.:Chewning, Vice President
- Nuclear Assurance
.P.O.! Box-289 Wadsworth,fTexas 77483
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Mr. Joseph N. Hendrie
.a 50 Bellport' Lane.
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Bellport,-New' York 11713 Bureau of-Radiation Control State of Texas
.1101 West 49th Street Austin;-Texas 78756 o
Judge, Matagorda County Matagorda County Courthouse i
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-1700 Seventh Street
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- Bay City,- Texas 77414 Licensing' Representative
. Houston Lighting and Power Company
. Suite 610' Thre'e Metro-Center
'Bethesda, Maryland 20814
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ATTN: :Rufus S. Scott, Associate-General Counsel P.O. Box'61867 Houston,LTexas 77208 U S.f Nuclear Regulatory Commission
. ATTN: -Resident Inspector P.O. Box 910'-
~
Bay City,. Texas 77414.
U S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission I
ATTN:_-RegionaU Administrator, Region.IV 611~Ryan Plaza. Drive, Suite'1000 1
Arlington',. Texas-76011-q bec.'o DMB'(A045);
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. bec'distrib. by.RIV w/ report:
Resident Inspector Inspector -
l G.< Dick, NRR Project Manager
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SEPS:RPB File a
RIV File
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bec-w/o-report:
R.'- Martin :
A.-Beach D. Powers' N
Project Engineer DRP/D_
- DRP MIS System C. A. Hackney R. Erickson,,NRR k
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Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 DEC 221989 Mr. Frank J. Congol Director Division of Radiation Protection
'i and Emergency Preparedness office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.-
20555 Dear Mr. Congel Enclosed is a copy of the exercise report of the April 26, 1989, exercise of offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans
. site-specific to.the South Texas Project Electric Generating l
Station.
The State of Texas and Matagorda County fully participated in this exercise.
This exercise report was prepared by the Region VI office staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
There were no-deficiencies identified as a result of this exercise; however, several areas requiring corrective action l
were' identified.
The State of Texas has assured the Region VI staff ~that the outstanding areas requiring corrective action will be corrected by the next scheduled exercise for the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station.
Based on the 1
results of this exercise, the offsite radiological emergency plans and preparedness for the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station remain adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be-taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency and the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on
-April 8, 1988, remains in effect.
If you should have any questions, please contact Craig S. Wingo, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-3026.
j Sincerely, l
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sH K iatkowski Assistant Associate Director i
Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Enclosure l
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rg FINAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT Nuclear Power Plant: South Texas' Project Electric Generating Station L
- Applicant: Houston Ughting and Power Location of Plant: State of Texas Matagorda County Bay City, Texas Date of Report: October 20,1989 Date of Exercise: April 26,1989
Participants:
State of Texas Matagorda County, Texas Bay City Texas Palacios, Texas Palacios VFD Ambulance Service Wagner General Hospital Federal Emergency Management Agency k
Region VI Federal Center 800 N. l. cop 288, Denton, Texas 76201 l
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FINAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT i
Nuclear Power Plant: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station
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Applicant: Houston Lighting and Power Location of Plant: State of Texas Matagorda County Bay City, Texas Date of Report: October 20,1989 Date of Exercise: April 26,1989
Participants:
State of Texas Matagorda County, Texas Bay City, Texas Palacios, Texas Palacios VFD Ambulance Service Wagner General Hospital Federal Emergency Management Agency
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Region VI L
Federal Center 800 N. Loop 288, Denton, Texas 76201
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l CONTENTB 1-A BB R EVI ATIO N S..........................................................
v INTRODUCTION AND A UTHO RITY..........................................
vi 1 EXE R CISE B AC K G RO U N D...............................................
1 1.1 Exercise Su m m ary...................................................
2 1.2 Federal Evaluators..................................................
2 1.3 Exerc ise Objec tives................................................. -
3 1.3.1 STPEG8.....................................................
3 1.3.2 State and Local Objectives....................................
7
- 1. 4 G u ideli nes......................................................... 12.
1.5 Scenario Su m m ary................................................... 15 1.5.1 Scenario Ti m eline............................................ 16 1.6 Evaluation Criteria.................................................. 21 e
2 EXE R CISE EVALU ATIO N................................................ 22 1
2.1 Texas State Operations.............................................. 22 2.1.1 Division of Emergency Management (DEM)/ State EOC............ 22-2.1.2 STPEG8 EOC (BRC Operations)................................. - 23 2.1.3 Disaster District EOC - Pierce, Texas...................... '..... 26 2.1.4 Bureau of Radiation Control Staging Area....................... 28 2.1.5 Bureau of Radiation Control Mobile Lab......................... 29 2.1.6 BRC Field Monitoring Team # 1................................ 30 2.1.7 BRC Field Monitoring Team # 2................................ 32 2.1.8 BRC Field Monitoring Team # 3................................ 33 B RC Contaminat!0n Control Tea' s............................. 34 2.1.9 m
2.1.10 Media Information Center..................................... 36 2.2 Local Government Operations......................................... 38 2.2.1 Matagorda C ounty EOC....................................... 38 2.2.2 Reception Center (Monitoring / Decontamination Function)......... 47 2.2.3 Reception Center (Reception / Care Function).................... 49 2.2.4 Palacios VFD Ambulance Service............................... 50 2.2.5 Wagner General Hospital...................................... 52
- 2. 3 U tili ty issues....................................................... 53 3 TRACKING SCHEDULE FOR STATE / LOCAL ACTIONS TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION............. 55 4 EVALU ATION OF OBJECTIVES........................................... 63 4.1 Summary of FEM A Objectives Re maining to be Met...................... 63 h:
4.2 FEM A Objectives Tracking - South Texas project........................ 63 TABLES 1 Remedial Actions for the April 26,1989 South Texas Proj ec t Ex erc ise........................................................ 56 til f
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TABLES (Cont 4
. 2. Summary of Objectives Remaining to be Met................................ 64
' 3 FEMA Objectives Tracking Chart South Texas Project Electrio Generating 8tation............................................... 65 e
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t AB8REVIATIONS Argonne National Laboratory ANL-American Red Cross i
ARC I
Areas Requiring Corrective Action ARCA Areas Recommended For Improvement ARFI Bureau of Radiation Control BRC Division of Emergency Management DEM Department of Health and Human Services DHHS Department of Energy DOE Texas Department of Public Safety 1
DPS Emergency Broadcast System EB8 Emergency Classification Level ECL Exercise Evaluation Methodology EEM Emergency Operations Center EOC Environmental Protection Agency EPA Emergency Planing Zone EPZ Emergency Response Facility ERF Food and Drug Administration FDA Federal Emergency Management Agency FEMA Houston Lighting and Power HL&P Idaho National Engineering Laboratory INEL Potassium Iodide.
KI LCO
-. Limiting Condition for Operation Loss-of-Coolant Accident LOCA Media Information Center MIC l
mR/h Millirems per hour Nuclear Regulation Commission l
NRC On-Seene Commander
~OSC Protective Action Guide PAG Protective Action Recommendation PAR Protective Action Section PAS Public Information Officer L
PIO Regional Assistance Committee RAC L
RADEF Radiological Defense Reactor Coclant System RCS Radiological Emergency Preparedness REP Radiological Officer RO Standard Operating Procedure SOP South Texas Project Electric Generating Station STPEG3 Texas Department of Health TDH Thermo Luminescent Dosimeter TLD United States Department of Agriculture USDA l
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INTRODUCTION AND AUTHORITY On December 7,
1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agoney (FEMA) to assume lead role responsibility for all off-site nuclear' power feel 11ty planning and response.
s FEMA's immediate beslo responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radiologit a Emegeney Response Planning includes j
Taking the lead in off-site emergency response plann'4 and in the e
review and evaluation of State and local government amergency
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plans ensuring that the plans meet the Federal erlteria set forth in NUREG-0054 FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 (November 1940).
Determining whether the State and local emergency response plans can ne implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of an esereise conducted by the appropriate emergency response jurledletions.
Coordinating the activities of volunteer organisations and other involved Federal agencies. Representatives of these ageneles listed below serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), whleh is chaired by FEMA.
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (F.PA)
- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
- U.S. Departitient of Health and Human Servlees (DHH8)
- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
- U.S. Departaient of Agriculture (USDA)
- UA. Department of Interior (DOI) i L
- U.S. Department of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) l t
L wt L
I L
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3 1 EXERCISE BACEOROUND The South Teass Project Electric Generating Station (STPEG8) exercise, April 24, 1989, was the second exercise designed to test the emergency response j
capabilities of offsite organisations. The faellity's initial qualifying exerelse was held on April 8,1987.
4-The State of Texas and Matagorda County (the single county within the 10-mile Plume EPZ) fully participated in the April 26th exercise.
A. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region VI (FEMA RVI) evaluation team evaluated the State and local off-site emergency response capabilities at this exerelse. The results of this
)
evaluation are contained in this report.
Exercise objectives of the STPEOS exercise for State and local off-site response were submitted to FEMA Region Yi on February 14, 1989 and, af ter review and negotiations, revised objectives were approved on March 13,1989. The exercise scenarlo i
was submitted to the Region on March 16,1989 and, following review by the Region and Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company, Inc., a FEMA contractor, was approved on March t
27,1989.
l Following the exercise, on April 26th, three review / critique meetings were held in Bay City, Texas on Aprl! 27. The first meeting, attended by the 22-member FEMA I
evaluation team, provided a detailed preliminary report of evaluator findings to the FEMA RAC Chairman. The second meeting, later that day, with Federal, State, local and utility representatives in attendance, presented a brief critique and preliminary findings resulting from the exercise.
The third meeting, the same day, presented a critique for the general public from around the nuclear faellity area and a synopsis of the l
l preliminary findings.
i-All preliminary exercise findings have now been reviewed and are consolidated in t
l this report.
Section 2 of this & port provides detalled narratives of exercise events, any Deficiencies in exercise emergency response, any Areas Requiring Corrective Action i
(ARCAs) noted by the e~alnators and Areas Recommended for Improvement (ARFis) for each of the fleid activities tested in the exercise. Section 3 provides a tabular summary listing of any Deficiencies (that would lead to a negative finding) and any ARCAs, including those requiring priority action. The tabular summary provides space for State and local jurisdiction responsa and their schedule for corrective actions. The evaluators I
found no deficiencies in this exercise. Several ARCAs have been noted that will require action 'uy the Sts,te and local participants.
Section 4 compiles, in tabular format, a listing of FEMA objectives yet to be met and a tracking table depicting the status of all objectives including those met, those not yet met and any Deficiencies or ARCAs related to those objectives.
The findings presented in this report were reviewed by the RAC Chairman of FEMA Region VI. FEMA suggests that State and local jurisdictions take remedial actions in response to each of the problems indicated in the report, and that the State submit a schedule for addressing these problems. The Regional Director of FEMA Region VI is l
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responsible for certifying to the FEMA Assoelate Director for State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C.. that any Defielencies and ARCAs have either been corrected or scheduled for correction and that such corrections have been incorporated into State and local plans, as appropriate.
The following narrative summary provides a brief overview of the exerelse performances of the State of Texas and Matagorda County. More detailed discussions of performances by individual agencies or response organisations are provided under the appropriate location in See. 2.
1.1 EXERCISE
SUMMARY
State of Texas Operstloam The Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, and the Texas Department of Public Safety, DIvlsion of Emergency Management, together with i
selected representatives of other State departments and ageneles, fully particirsted in the STPEGS emeralse. State operating locations included: the State EOC in Austin, the l
State Disaster District EOC at Pleree, the BRC staging area in Boy City, the STPEGS EOC on the plant site, and various field locations within and near the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPE) around the plant site.
With the exception of a few lasues, mostly involving communications, detailed in the Individual site narratives in Sec. 2 of this report, the State demonstrated an adequate level of readiness for responding to a radiolorleal emergency at the STPEGS plant.
Local Government Cparations:
Matagorda County, the only county within the 10-mile EPZ, fully participated in the exercise. The elties of Bay City and Palaelos participated as described in the local plan. The county developed the Radiologleal Emergency Response Plan and procedures, and the elected county offielais, emergency staff and volunteers participated in accordance with the plan. County participants demonstrated a high level of training, active Interest and enthusiasm toward their role in the emergency response efforts. An outstanding' demonstration-of leadership, coordination and team effort was again exhibited by county participants.
Individual activities of county participants are described in See. 2 of this report.
1.5 FEDERAL EVALUA1CRS Twenty-two (22) Federal evaluators participated in evaluating the April 26,1989 STPEGS exercise. These Individuals, their agonicos and their evaluation assignments are listed below 1
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Evaluator h
Evaluation Location Gary Jones FEMA Overall Evaluator Coordination Gary Kassynski ANL Matagorda County EOC, Bay City Nancy Culp FEMA
. Matagorda County EOC, Bay City Carl McCoy FEMA State EOC, Austin Travis Ratelltf FEMA State EOC, Austin Dan Santini ANL Disaster District EOC, Pierce Brad Salmonson INEL STPEG8 EOC Bill Gasper ANL STPEGS EOC Dana Cessna FEMA Media Information Center, Bay City John Benton FEMA Media Information Center Bay City Ernie Boase FEMA BRC Staging Area, Bay City Harry Harrison FEMA BRC Field Monitoring Team #1 Leon Zeliner FDA BRC Field Monitoring Team #2 Leland Peyton FEMA BRC Field Monitoring Team #3 Frank Wilson ANL BRC Mobile Lab Gene Nunn FEMA Access Control Point #1 Ed Hakala ANL Access Control Point #1 Phil Edgington DHHS Wagner General Hospital Tom Carroll ANL Palacios VFD Ambulance Service Al Lookabaugh ANL Palacios Reception / Care Center Ed Robinson ANL Palacios Reception / Care Center Marty Simonin ANL Palacios Monitoring /Decon Station 1.3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVE 8 1.3.1 WTPROS The 1989 Graded Exercise will be conducted for the purpose of assuring proper emergency response by those personnel who are assigned responsibilities within the South Texas project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) and those personnel who are assigned respensibilities as delineated in the State of Texas Emergency Management Plan and the Matagorda County Emergency Plan. Accordingly, the following objectives have been developed for the 1989 Graded Exercise.
A.
General Objeettves 1.
Demonstrate the ability of emergency response personnel to g
implement and execute the STPEGS Emergency Management Plan and appropriate Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to alert, mobillse and augment Station emergency response personnel.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to alert Federal, State and Local authorities within the speelfled time constraints.
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4.
Demonstrate the ability to activate the Technleal Support Center (TSC), the Operations Support Center (OSC), the Emergeney Operations Center (EOC), and the Media Information Center (MIC).
5.
Demonstrate the funettonal and operational adequacy of the TSC, OSC, EOC, and the MIC.
6.
Demonstrate the adequaey, operability and effective use of emergency communleations equipment, and the adequacy of commpalestions procedures and methods.
i 7.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate and interface with the Nuolear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Headquarters incident Response Center, and appropriate State and local l
governmental organisations in an emergency situation.
l l-t O.
Demonstrate the ability to provide the proper information to l
Matagorda county to support the Prompt Notifleat!on System.
1 9.
Demonstrate the ability to perform post exercise critiques.
P f
8.
Direetlos sad control j
1.
Demonstrate the ability of each emergency response facility manager to maintain command co strol over emergency response activities conducted from his facility throughout the exercise.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to initiate and coordinate emergency response activities in an offielent and timely manner.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to call upon and utilize outside support organisations if Station capabilities are exceeded or if the additional assistance is warranted.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of the STPEG8' Security group to respond to an emergency situation.
5.
Demonstrate the transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room to the TSC staff and EOC staff.
6.
Demonstrate the ability of Corporate public Information personnel to support the STPEGS Emergency Response Organization.
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7.
Demonstrate the ability of each emergency response faellity manager to periodically brief personnel within his faellity l
concerning the status of the emergency.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to mobilize manpower and material to support protreeted (long-term) operations to include recovery i
and re-entry setivities.
C.
Aseldaat Assessment l.
Demonstrate the ability of the On-Shift Emergency Oganisation and the STPEGS EmerTency
Response
Organisation to evaluate the causes of incidents, and perform mitigating. actions to place the affected unit (s) in a safe, stable condition.
l 2.
Demonstrate the ability of the appropriate emergency response faellity pernnnel to classify an emergency condition.
-l 3.
Demonstrate the ability of the appropriate emergency i
response facility personnel to analyse current plant conditions, Identify projected trends and potential consequences, coordinate with radiological assessment teams, and provide recommendation actions.
D.
Radiological Assessment 1.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate and conduct on-site, in-plant and offsite radiologleal monitoring activities.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to assess and provide projections of 5
off-elte radiological conditions to support the formulation of
]
protective action recommendations (regardless of the system J
used).
' 3.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate radiological data between the TSC and EOC.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate STPEGS off-site radiologleal assessment activities with those conducted by the 4.
State.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to direct and coordinate the deployment of on-site and off-site radiologleal monitoring teams, and coordinate with State radiological monitoring j
teams.
1 6.
Demonstrate the ability of survey personnel to perform dose rate surveys, colleet and analyse radiolorleal samples and 1
perform other prescribed on-site, in-plant and off-site radiological monitoring activities.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to obtain and analyse semples from the in-plant normal or post-seeldent sampling estems, and assess the resultant data.
L Proteettve Response 1.
Demonstrate the ability to inform and update STPEOS, State and local emergency response personnel regarding the status of the emergency.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to control the spread of contamination and emergency workers' exposure.
)
3.
Demonstrate the ability to formulate and implement on-site protective action measures.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to formulate potective action recommendations for the general public and emergency workers within the Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone.
L l
5.
Demonstrate the ability to communleate prctective action recommendations to State and local authorities, and coordinate the Protective Action Recommendations with the l
Texas Department of Health. Bureau of Radiation Control.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to continuously account for personnel assigned to, and operating out of, each emergeney response faellity.
L 7.
Demonstrate the ability of on-site personnel to provide emergency first aid to an injured, contaminated Individual prior to the arrival of the ambulance servlee.
F.
Putdie Information 1.
Demonstrate the capability to coordinate the preparation, review and release of information with Corporate personnel and Federal, State and local government agencies and provide information releases to the media.
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2.
Demonstrate the ability of rumor control personnel to address questions concerning the status of emerTency situations.
3.
Demonstrate the ability of the Media information Director or his deJ'.gnee to conduct media conferences.
l.
1.3.2 STATE AND LOCAL OBJECTIVES i
JURISDICTIONAL FEMA EXERCISE NURFC-06$4 RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION OBJECTIVE NUMBER & TEXT REFERENCE State Local (See Note A) 1.
Demonstrate the ability to D.3, D 4 X
X ALL r
monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and i
activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario. The four ECLs
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aret Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area' Emergency'and General Emergency.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to E.1, E.2 X
X ALL fully alert, mobiliae and activate personnel for both facility and fleid-based emergency functions. (See note B).
(1) 3.
Demonstrate the ability to A.I.d, X
X 1,2,3,4 s
direct, coordinate and A.2.a control emergency activities. (3) 4 Demonstrate the ability to F.(not X
X ALL p-consunicate with all appro-F.1.f) priate locations, organiza-tions and field personnel.
(5)
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JURISDICTIONAL FEMA EXERCISE NURFC-0654 RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION OBJECTIVE NUMBER & TEXT REFERENCE State Local (See Note A) 5.
Demonstrate the adequacy of G.3.a, X
X 1,2,3,4,5 facilities, equipment, dis-H.2.3 l
plays and other materials j
to support emergency opera-tions. (4) 6.
Demonstrate the ability to K.3.a, X
X 1,4,7,9,14, continuously monitor and K.3.b 16 control emergency worker es po sure.
(20) 7.
Demonstrate the appropriate I.8., I.11 X
7 equipment and procedures for l
determining fleid radiation measurements. (7) 8.
Demonstrate the appropriate I.9 I
7,8 equipment and procedures for the measurteent of airborne radio iodine concentrations as low as 107 microcurie per cc in the presence of noble gases.
(8) l 9.
Demonstrate the ability to I.10 I
7,8 obtain samples rf particu-t-
late activity in the air-l borne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses.
(New Objective)
P i
- 10. Demonstrate the ability, I.10 X
4 within the plume esposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data. (10) t I
8 9
JURISDICTIONAL FEMA EXERCISE NURFC-0654 RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION OBJECTI C WUNSER 4 TEXT REFERENCE State Local (See Note A)
- 11. Demostrate the ability to J.10.m X
4 make appropriate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PACS, availability of adequate shelter, evacus-tion time estimates and other relevant factors.
(10)
- 12. Demonstrate the ability to E.t X
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initially alert the pubile
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within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate State and/or local offi-cials(s).
(see note C).
(13)-
- 13. Demonstrate the ability to E.5, C.4.b X
X 1,2,4,5 coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accu-l race information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after f
the initial alert and noti-fication has occurred.
(14, 25) 14.
Demonstrate the ability to C.3.a, X
X 2,5 brief the media in an accu-C.4.a rate, coordinated and timely manner. (24)
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- 15. Demonstrate the ability to C.4.c X
X 5
establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion. (26)
- I
- ' = - *
- I 10 JURISDICTIONAL FEMA EXERCIS'l WURFC-0654 RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION OBJECTIVE NUMBER & TEXT REFERENCE State Local (See Note A)
- 16. Demonstrate the ability to J.10.e, X
X 1,4,7 make the decision to recom-J.10.f twnd the use of KI to eser-gency workers and institu-tionalised persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if neces-sitated by radiciodine releases. (21, 22)
- 18. Demonstrate the ability and J.10.d, X
1 resources necessary to J.10.g, implement appropriate pro-J.10.h tective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ yopula-tion (including transit-dependant persons, special needs populations, handi-capped persons and institu-tionalised persons).
(15)
- 19. Demonstrate the ability and J.9,J.10 3 X
1 resources necessary to implement appropriate pro-tactive actions for school children within the plume EPZ.
(19) 20.
Demonstrece the organisa-J.10.j X
1,9 tional ability and resources
.' ~ 19. k -
necessary to control evacua-tion traffic flow and to control access to evacuated
)
and sheltered areas.
(16, 17)
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11 JURI5DICTIONAL FEMA EXERCISE NU1FC-0654 RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION OBJECTIVE NUKSER & TEXT REFERENCE State Local (See Note A)
- 21. Demonstrate the adequacy of J.12 X
X 16 l
procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for che registration, radio-logical monitoring and de-contamination of evacuees.
(27)
- 22. Demonstrate the adequacy of J.10.h X
16 facilities, equipment and personnel for congregate care of evacuees. (20)
- 23. Demonstrate the adequacy of L.4 x
14,17 vehicles, equipment, pro-cedures, and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured or exposed indi-i viduals. (30) 24.
Demonstrate the adequacy of L.1 X
15 medical facilities equip-l ment, procedures and per-sonnel for handling conta-minated, injured or exposed individuals. (31)
- 25. Demonstrate the adequacy of K.5.a.
X X
16,1,7 facilities, equipment, sup-K.5.b plies, procedures and per-connel for decontamination of emergency workers, equip-ment and vehicles and for waste disposal. (29)
- 33. Demonstrate the ability to M.1 X
1
' implement appropriate measures for controlled re-j entry and recovery.
(35) l l
l
-m., - -
... -. ~..
-v-
12 u
l Notes:
J A.
The locations where various exercise objectives are to be demoncated are indleated by numerical codes as follows ggEE TEAM ELEMENT OR FACILITY NAME LOCATION 1.
Matagorda County EOC Sheriff's Offlee, Bay City 2.
State EOC DP8 Headquarters, Austin 3.
Disaster District Sub 2A EOC DPS District Offlee, Pierce 4.
STPEG8 EOC STPEG8 Plant Site, Matagorda County 5.
Media information Center Holiday Inn, Bay City i
(
6.
BRC Staging Area Scrvlee Center, Bay City 7.
Various Fleid Monitoring Teams 10-Mile EPZ 8.
BRC ERY and Mobile Laboratory Pad Adjacent to the STPEG8 EOC 9.
Access Control Point (s) 10-Mile EPZ 10.
Reception Centet', (Bay City)
McAllister Jr. High School, Bay City 11.
Matagorda General Hospital Bay City 12.
Ambulance Servlee (Bay City)
Taylor Brothers Funeral Home, Bay City 13.
Vehicle Deoontamination Facility Designated Car Wash, j
Bay City 14.
Ambularice Servlee (Palacios)
Palaelos Volunteer Fire Department 15.
Wagner General Hospital Palaelos 16.
Reception Center (Palaelos)
Palmelos High School Gymnasium.
17.
Vehlete Decontamination Faellity Designated Car Wash,
)
Palaelos B. Teams will be pre-positioned. Deployment will not be delayed to simulate travel time
'I from normal duty L,tations.
q C. Strens and tone-alert radios will not be activated.. EBS messages will be prepared, but will not be broadcast.
1.( GUIDELINES The 1989 Graded Exercise will be conducted for the pury:se of assuring proper
)
emergency response by those personnel who are sss!gnad responsibilities within the South j
l Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS), those perso mel assigned responsibilities as delineated in the Matagorda County Emergency Plon, and those l
personnel who are assigned responsibilities as delineated in the State of Texas Emergency Management Plan. Accordingly, the following guidelines have been developed for the l-i l
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- ~
, _.. ~...
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13 conduet of the 1989 Graded Exercise to demonstrate the capabillt.'es of the exercise
. participants to meet the objectives set for+h in Section 1.3 of this repott.
1.
The Graded Exercise wiu be conducted on April 26,1981' since exercise participants will not have prior knowledge ef the exercise. start time, all personnel should follow their rormal routines for that day.
2.
Following the establishment of Initial conditions, the exercise will start with a postulated plant condition necessitating the declaration of an emergency at STPEGS.
3.
The postulated accident conditions will result in a simulated radiologleal release whleh necessitates the consideration of proteettve actions for the general pubtle. Meteorologleal conditions may be varied throughout the execcise.
4.
Media centers will be manned and will perform their prescribed funettons; however, no exerelse press release will be made to the publie.
5.
Exercise partle! pants will perform, as appropriate, radiological monitoring and dose assessment activities.
6.
As appropriate to their exercise participation, T' tate agencies will proposition themselves in the Matagorda County area so as to commence euere!se participation at an appropriate point in the development of the exercise scenarlo.
7.
STPEOS and BRC radiological monitoring field teams will be dispatched for the purpose of testing response
- time, communleations, monitoring and sampling procedures. The field tsama will gather sample media and route such sample to the appropriate laboratory faellities for analysis.
Each rnolologleal monitoring field team will be accompanied by a controllet/tvSluator team throughout the exercise. Each field p
team will r6ndezvous with it's controller / evaluator team at the i
j Iccation from wkich it is deployed. The rendezvous locations are as follows:
I
- b. For the State Off-site Field Monitoring teams, the designated off-site statin 5 area.
8.
ParticipatNn by STPEGS onsite personnel directly involved in respondits to an emergency situation shall Oe carried to the fullest extent possible, including the deployment of in-plant
l 14 r
radiologleal monitoring teams, knd the use of protective clothing and respiratory protection equipment.
l 9.
Use of protective clothing and respiratory protection equipment shall be simulated by personnel assigned to the offsite STPEG8 radiologleal monitoring field teams.
l
- 10. As appropriate, Emergency Broadcast System (ESS) announee-monts should be prepared and passed to the appropriate stations; however, these announcements should not be released to the general publio. Sirens will not be sounded.
- 11. The Palaelos Fire Department will be involved in providing simulated on-site or off-site assistance.
i
- 12. On-site soeurity personnel should exercise their procedures for L
restricting et,emal access to the STPEGS site without actually redirecting incoming and outgoing personnel.
I
- 13. All radio and written communleations will be preceded and followed with the words "THIS IS A DRILL".
- 14. In the event an actual emergency occurs during the course of the exercise, partielpants in the affected area shall attend to the emergency situation. The Controller in the affected area shall advise the Lead Controller of the condition and the Lead Controller shall discuss with key participants the immediate i
course of the exercise.
i
- 15. On-site and off-site Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs),
including Stata tacilities in Pierce and Austin, will be manned and perform their prescribed funettons as appropriate to the development of the exercise.
- 16. If the use of barricades is directed to assirt in Traffic and Access Control, the barricades will be delivered to the T&A Control point and off-loaded. The barricades will not be placed to impede the flow of traffle. Placement will be simulated.
- 17. In order to demonstrate the capability to conduct an evacuation, l
the movement of people will be simulated. The organizational
['
ability and resources necessary to manage the evacuation will be demonstrated. Evacuees are not essential to demonstrate shelter management.
13 j
1.8 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
This exercise scenario is based upon a severe earthquake resulting in a design basis loss of coolant aceldent (LOCA), a loss of off-site power and damage to two emergency diesels, leading to fuel failure and a radiologleal release.
l 1
initial conditions establish that Unit ! is operating at 100 percent and has been for the last 45 days. The unit is in its second fuel eyele near the end of core life and is operating under a limiting condition for operation (LCO) with Emergency Diesel l
Generator (EDG) #12 tagged out for an unseheduled fuel injector replacement. Unit 2 is in a BMI outage.
l The initiating event for the scenario occurs before the morning shif t change i
- when a decontamination crew, transferring a large decon. vacuum from the 10' elevation j
to the 41' elevation storage area, attempts to transport the vacuum up several flights of stairs. The vacuum falls on one of the decon. erew, icioeking him backwards down the
{
l stalm where he la seriously injured and highly contaminated. The victim is prepared for l
transport to Wagner General Hospital and a Notifleation of Unusual Event is declared.
)
Shortly after the shift change (approximately 8:30 a.m.), a small earthquake of magnitude.04g horisontal and.05g vertleal strikes Matagorda County. Conditions are met to warrant the declaration of a Notifloation of Unusual Event. The earthquake has j
caused a loss of offsite power with an accompanying turbine and reactor trip. EDG #11 and #13 start and function as required. Inspection of the site will reveal that: The Unit 2 refueling machine has jumped it's track, a yard lighting pole has fallen across the security fences near the southeast corner of the administration building / machine shop, personnel performing a surveillance procedure on the personnel escape hatch report damage to the outer door, some seepage appears evident from the reservoir wall near the cire water outlet piping, and minor structural damage is evident on several buildings.
Approximately 30 minutes later, EDO #13 shows erratic voltage output readings and within minutes the diesel trips. Investigation will reveal that the earthquake has damaged the fuel oil supply line from the fuel oil supply tank and the tank contents have flooded the diesel eublele. The cubicle is engulfed in flames. The fire brigade is dispatched to the scene but will encounter extreme difficulty in putting out the fire.
Conditions warrant the declaration of an Alert.
i At approximately 9:30 a.m. another shock of magnitude.13g hort::ontal and.07g l
vertical triggers the Safe Shutdown Earthquake Alarm and causes a double ended shear of l
the 'A' RCS Loop Pump Suction Line. Conditions are met to declare a Site Area Emergency and to implement Accountability / Evacuation. Further inspection of the Site Area will reveal thats a crane has tipped over and is leaning on the Unit #1 Auxtllary feedwater storage tank, the inner door on the Personnel escape hatch has been sprung l
and several small buildings and trailers have been shaken from their foundations. With no safety injection available, the core water inventory soon boils off and fuel damage occurs. With three fission product barriers breached, conditions are met to declare a General Emergency.
t i
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14 i
A second train of Safety injection and containment spray will be available when the tags are removed from EDO #12. The damage to the escape hatch doors necessitates i
utillsing eentainment spray to lower containment pressure and reduee the radiologleal release rate. Repair efforts will be effected on the hatch door when pressure and dose rate have been lowered to an appropriate level.
Meanwhile, severe road damage has occurred throughout Matagorda County and is partleular.ly heavy around Bay City. Because of road damage, evacuees from the l
plume area will be routed to the Palaelos Reception Center. Several county residents will be found contaminated upon arrival at access control points or as they are passed on to the Palaelos keeeption Center.
Additionally, an injured, contaminated county res' dent will require transport to Wagner General Hospital via the Palacios Volunteer Fire Department ambulance.
1.5.1 Seenarle 11meline
]
INITIATING l
T_jjg ME88 AGE NUMBER PLANT EVENT
SUMMARY
]
0715 1
Initial conditions established.
T-00:15 0730 2
The Control Room received' word a member T+00:00 of the deeon crew has been injured in a I
stairwell by a falling decon vacuum and is probably highly contaminated.
0731 The Shift Supervisor dispatches a First Ald T+00:01 Team to the 41' level staltwell.
i 0745 3,4 The Control Room is Informed that the T+00:15 injured technielan has possible spinal injuries, lacerations to the head, neck and face and is contaminated.
The stairwell is also con-taminated.
The victim will require trans-portation to a hospital.
0815 5,6 Injured Technlelan leaves the site bound for T+00:45 Wagner General Hospital.
Conditions warrant the declaration of a Notification of Unusual Event.
- ~
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17 l
INITIATING I[MI MESSAGE NUMBER PLANT EVENT
SUMMARY
l 8
0830; 7,80,9 An earthquake of magnitude.04g horisontal T+01:00 and.0$g vert: cal strikes Matagorda County.
J Conditions warrant the declaration of a Notifloation of Unusual Event.
)
l 0830 10 The earthquake has caused a total loss of
]
T+01:00:30 offsite power with accompanying reactor and turbine trips. EmerTency Diesel #11 and #13
'{
start and load as required.
i 0836 11 Onsite inspections reveals j
T+01:08
- The Unit #1 refueling machine has j
(Time Approximate) jumped it's track.
A yard lighting pole has fallen across the security fences near the southeast corner of the Admin. building / machine shop.
There is evidence of seepage from the 1
reservoir dike near the cire water inlet piping.
]
i Minor' structural damage is evident on e
several buildings.
Personnel performing surveillance on the
]
personnel escape hatch report damage to j
the hatch outer door.
0840 1h Contingency Message:
A Notification of T+01:10 Unusual Event should be declared, if not previously done.
0855 13 The C >ntrol Room receives an EDG Cubicle T+01:25 Fire Alarm.
b
1, I
INITIATING f
II.ME MESSAGE NUMBER PLANT EVENT
SUMMARY
r 0900 14,15 Emergency Diesel #13 Indleates erratic T+01:30 output voltage and immediately trips.
Investigation will reveal that the earthquake has damaged the fuel oil line from the fuel oli supply tank, and a large portion of the contents are in the lower level of the Diesel eublele. Upon investigation it is found that i
the #13 EDO cubiele is engulfed in flames.
Conditions warrant the declaration of an Alert.
i 0905 14e The Shift Supervisor dispatches the Fire i
4 T+01:35 Brigade to the EDO Cubicle.
(Time Approximate) i i.
0910 17e Contingency Message The Shift Supervisor l
T+01:40 should declare an Alert if not previously done.
l 0930 10,19,20c,21,22 A second shock of magnitude.13g horizontal i
l T+02:00 23s,25 and.07g vertical strikes, shearing the 'A' (Time RCS Loop Pump suction line and triggering l
Approximate) the safe shutdown earthquake alarm. Condi-tions warrant the declaration of a Site Area l
Emergency and conditions are met to imple-j.
ment accountability / evacuation.
y l-l After 0930 24 Further inspection of the on-site area will T+02:00 reveal thats A crane has tipped over and 's resting on the Unit #1 Auxiliary Feedwater storage tank.
- Several trailer buildings have been knocked off their foundations.
0940 25e Contingency Message The Emergency T+-2:00 Directer should declare a Site Area Eme:pne/ if not previously done.
m a
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It I.
19 INITIATING M
MESSAGE NUMBER PLANT EVENT
SUMMARY
After 0930 26 Inspection throughout the County will reveal T+02:00 FM 457 has been severely damaged where the Missourt Paelfle Railroad crosses. It is impassable, The Colorado River bridge on highway 35 o
has been badly damaged. It is impassable.
FM 1098 la badly damaged just north of FM 521. It is barely passible.
The Tres Palaelos bridge on FM 521 has been badly damaged and it is barely impassable.
The Intersection of Highway 60 and FM 2848 has been badly damaged and is blocked by a multi-vehlete accident.
Light damage has been reported from Cain and Celanese Chemical Plants. No chemleal releases have been noted.
Several homes in Matagorda and along the river south of Matagorda have been damaged.
0945 27 Core exit thermocouple average 790'F RCB T+01:15 Rad Monitors RT 8050 and 8051 read 1.46 (Time E+4 R.
This is interpreted as positive Approximate)
Indication of fuel failure.
0945 27 Conditions warrant the declaration of a T+02:15 General Emergency.
)
(Time Approximate) 0955 28e Contingency Message Emergency Director T+02:25 should declare a General Emergency if not previously done, l
s,
4
,i n
INITIATING Hg1 MESSAGE NUMQg PLANT EVENT
SUMMARY
1908 29s With the removal of tags from EDO #12, a second train of safety injection and con-tainment spray will be restored.
after 1008 none When a second train of containment spray is T+03:36 regained, containment pressure will be redueod at a slightly-faster rate and the release rate reduced accordingly.
1930 31 The fi e in the EDO cubicle is extinguished.
T+03+05:04 1830 45 Containment pressure has decreased to T+05:00 approximately 3 psig, allowing work on the outer escape hatch door.
1230 47 A county resident is injured and con-T+05:00 taminated, requiring transport to Wagner General Hospital via the Palacios Volunteer Fire Department ambulance.
'1330 50 Repair work on the escape hatch door is T+06:00 completed. The door is (time shut and the (Time release is terminated).
Approximate) 1400 51 On-site recovery operations begin. Off-site T+06:30 recovery and reentry operations will be conducted at the discretion of the State BRC.
1500*
52 The exercise will be terminated when k
T+08:30 recovery and reentry procedures / operations have been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Lead Controller.
4
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21 1.8 EVALUATION CRrFERLA The STPEOS exercise evaluations that follow in Section 2 of this report are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section !! of NUREG 0854/ FEMA REP 1, Rev.1 (November 1980). Region VI evaluated the exercise using the Exercise Evaluation Methodology (EEM) format. Federal evaluators were Instructed to mark those sections of the EEMs "not app!! cable" whleh did not correspond to the objectives of the exerelse.
Following the narratives for each jurledletion or off-site response activity, Defieleneles, Areas Requiring Corrective Action and Areas Recommended for Improvement are presented with accompanying recommendations.
Any identifled Defieleneles would cause a finding that off-site preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vietnity of the STPEGS plant in the event of a radlelogical emergeney. At least one Deficiency in this category would necessitate a i
negative finding and require that a Remedial Drill, to demonstrate correction, be scheduled within 120 days. No deflelency was noted in this exercise.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action include those activities where demonstrated performance during the exercise was evaluated and considered faulty corrective actions are considered necessary but other factors Indleste that reasonable assurance could be given that, in the event of a radiological emergency, appropriate measures can and will i
be taken to protect the health and safety of the pubtle. This category should be relatively. easy to correct in comparison to those classified as Deficiencies, and l
correction must be demonstrated at the next regularly scheduled exercise.
Areas Recommended for improvement are also listed, as appropriate, for each jurisdiction or off-site activity. These recommendations are advisory in nature and the oppropriate jurledletion may or may not act on them as they see fit.
6 4
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4 I
3 EXERCISE EVALUATION l
On the basis of general criteria set forth in NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev.1 (November 1980), and eneroise objectives and observations, an evaluation has been performed of the ApellW,1989 exerelse at the South Texas Project Electric Generating l
Station. This evaluation, including any Defielenelea, Areas Requiring Corrective Action and Areas Recommended for improvement is presented herein. FEMA Region VI will maintain olose llatsons with the State and local governments in determining the required corrective actions - (including timeframes for accomplishing the corrections) In neoordance with all established criteria and guidelines. There were no Defielencies identified during this exercise.
i 2.1 TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS The following includes evaluations of the Texas Department of Health, Bureau of l
8adiation Control (TDH/8RC) operations at various operating locations in Matagorda i
l County. Operations of the State Emergency Management Counell at their EOC in Austin and at the Disaster District EOC in Pierce are also included.
I L
1.1.1 Divistos of Emergeoey Management (DEM) State ROC The DEM received notifleation at 8:27 a.m. of the declaration of an Unusual Event at the STPEGS plant at 8:03 a.m. At 8:30 a.m., a controller at DEM informed the State Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control of the event. The offlee of the Governor was informed of the NOUE at 8:50. Initial activation of the State EOC was ordered at 9:12 a.m. by the Senior Controller (8 tate person in charge of State EOC operations) upon receipt of the message that an Alert had been declared at 8:46 a.m. by the utility. Activation was initiated by calling the Dl ector of DPS and by simulating the calling of all other state agency representatives. The EOC was manned by ten personnel including three individuals representing the Bureau of Radiation Control. The State EOC serves as a backup to the Disaster District EOC in Pierce, Texas where primary State 1
response management authority is assigned in the event of an STPEGS emergency. If a i
situation grows beyond the control of the Disaster District, the State EOC would call on resources outside the District for support.
The State EOC is located underground in the Department of Public Safety complex in Austin, TX. It is more than adequate to support all anticipated emergency operations, with appropriate space, power, lighting, furniture, and equipment. Maps and displays in the EOC are excellent providing sufficient summary and tracking information
(
necessary for management decision making.
A change in procedures has been
/
implemented since the last exercise. Additional display boards and maps have been added, negating the requirement for the BRC representatives to bring their displays to the EOC.
State EOC communleations equipment, systems and procedures are excellent.
Telephones (12 lines), telex, hard-copy and/or radio systems conneet the EOC with all l
appropriate locations, with multiple redundaneles and back-ups in case of failure of one l
i
__. - -. _- - ~
8
)
I
,o 23 or more systems. All incoming and outgoing communications are appropriately logged, dupileated and passed to EOC staff for action or information. Frequent reviews of setion status were held to insure that no required actions or responses were overlooked.
The EOC staff, led by the DEM, demonstrated a thorough grasp of emergency
]
operations, requirementa, and procedures. The Senior Controller was very effectively in s
charge of the EOC.
He held frequent briefings to insure that all present were knowledgeable regarding the status of events and he also involved the staff and other agency representatives in discussions prior to making deelslons. He continually sought i
and found answers to problems that were not speelfleally required but which were extrapolations of scenarlo-eaused events.
1 All exercise objectives (Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6) assigned to the State EOC were adequately met.
DEFICIENCIES: None.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None.
~
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
l
==
Description:==
There is confusion by some EOC staff regarding zones end sectors. Some offlees use maps identifying zones and sectors by numbers and others identifying these areas by letters.
Recommendation Insure additional training on use of maps.
2.1.2 STFEGS BOC (BRC Operations)
The functions of the Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control at the STPEGS EOC include dose assessment, development of protective action recommendations, and direction of BRC radiologleal monitoring teams.
Emergency Classifloation Levels were received from the utility and confirmed as required. The ECLs were promptly announced to the staff and logged on the display board for a vlsual tracking of events. The BRC staff took the appropriate actions per the l
plan (i.e., dispatching of field monitoring teams, contamination control teams, hospital liaison, etc.) as the ECLs changed. This objective was properly demonstrated.
Actual mobilization of the BRC staff was not observed at the STP EOC in accordance with an agreement with FEMA that the BRC staff would be pre-staged at the staging ares.In Bay City and dispatched from there to the STP EOC when appropriate.
Under these conditions the staffing objective was successfully demonstrated. The time required to dispatch from Austin would have been approximately three hours which would not have met constraints of the scenario.
1 l
i i
i 24 The BRC Chief of Fleid Operations was effectively in control of emergency response setions and deelslons. The utility gave periodle briefings over a public address system. In addition, the BRC Chief of Field Operations kept his staff apprised of the situation as conditions changed and included them in the deelslon making process. All deelslons were effectively coordinated with all of the appropriate orTanisations and loestions. The Direction and Contml objoettve was properly demonstrated.
The communleations systems used were commercial telephone (four lines), BRC radio, DPS radio, and faestmile machine. Organisations with which communication links were established were the State EOC in Austin, Tx., Matagorda County EOC, Disaster District EOC at Pierce, the BRC staging area in Bay City, and all field teams. The primary communleation link to all locations except the field teams (radio) was telephone. As the result of an ARCA (87-1) in the last exercise, the field radiological i
i monitoring teams used the DPS radios rather than the BRC handheld units, whleh are low 1
powered (2 watts) and do not function well. However, the Contamination Control Teams i
attempted to use the handheld units and were not able to communicate with the staging l
area or the BRC staff at the STP EOC (see additional discussion regarding this under Contamination Control Teams section beginning on Page (
The STP EOC is located adjacent to the plant in the utility's Training Center.
The State's main operating area within the EOC is in a room next to the main EOC. The entire EOC is, dedicated to emergency operations and remains set up and ready for use at I
all times. The. State operations room was eramped and crowded, but adequate for the task. The communications equipment and staff are located in the same room assuring rapid transmission of messages. Based on a FEMA recommendation from the previous exercise, the State replaced the radio base station with a new one that has a headset, whleh reduced the noise level in the room. The State operations room is equipped with adequate furniture, telephones, supplies, and other material to perform it's designated function. Emergency power and other backup systems are available if needed. Utility support to the State includes clerleal assistance, security, copying, message distribution, etc. Maps, status boards and activity displays are mounted in the State operations room and were properly utilized.
Emergency worker exposure control was effectively demonstrated during the i
course of this exerelse.
Each emergency worker in the EOC was issued two direct reading dosimeters (0-200 mR and 0-20 R), as well as a permanent record TLD Identification badge. Each badge had a unique identifleation number. All dosimeters were read and zerood as required when they were lasued and periodically checked during the exercise. The fleld team coordinator maintained a status board with dosimeter readings reported by the field team members. All EOC staff were aware of the exposure limits as prescribed by the plan.
)
The BRC personnel gave a good demonstration of plume dose projection. Field team measurements provided a good definition of the plume boundaries and the field team coordinator plotted the location of the field team measurements. Plume dose projections were done on a Compaq Model 286 computer using a modified IRDAM program. The output of the program provided whole body dose rates (mrem /hr), child thyroid dose rates (mrem /hr) and a default eight-hour integrated dose for whole body and thyrold. Although the utility and the State programs are supposed to be the same, there 4
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25 was a difference la results obtained. The utility provided BRC with the estimated release rates whleh were developed from utility field team measurements.
Plume protective action deelslons were appropriately based on PARS, dose projection, and utility recommendations with respect to plant conditions. The initial i
deelslon was made at 10:00 a.m. to evacuate sectors P, Q, R, and A to 10 miles and all sectors to 5 miles. At 11r48 a.m. the recommendation was revised to shelter zones 11, 12,13, and 14. This deelslon was made based on erroneous controller input that a bridge was out on the evaeustion route and the only alternative route would have taken the evacuees through the plume. The controller error was apparently corrected at the 1
county EOC but the information was not communleated to the STP EOC State staff. The revised FAR probably could not have been properly executed because of the time delay between messages of one hour and thirty eight minutes and the affected population was probably already in the process of evacuating.
The BRC Chief of Field Operations at the STP EOC made the deelslon to lasue j
the PAR to authorise the use of KI for emergency workers.
All objectives (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,10,11, and 18) demonstrated at this location were met.
I DEFICIENCIE3s None.
AREA 8 REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
89-1 Desoripticas The BRC handheld radios uwd by the contamination control teams were unable to communicate with the BRC staffs at the STP EOC and the BRC staging area, These same radios were a source of problems in a previous i
exercise because of a very limited range. (NUREG 0654, Rev.1, l,
F.1.d) l Rooommendatless The BRC radio system should be improved to provide for continuous communication with fleid units.
89-2 Descriptions The BRC and the utility use the same computer program to calculate dose projection. For some reason (one of I
the programs may not have had recent revisions incorporated or c
different input data may not have been used) the projected dose calculations gave different results, on the two computers.
Confiloting results could have adverse efieets on deelston making. (NUREG 0654, Rev.1,1.8)
Rooommendations Review the new program revision for accuracy, update both computers with the correct revision and develop procedures to insure compatability of input data.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: None.
t i
2.1.3 Dlaaster Plotriot BOC - Fleree, Tesas The Pierce Disaster District EOC la the initial line of response to any disaster affecting Matagottia County.
The Pierce staff, empobly directed by the Disaster District Committee Chairman, demonstrated a thorough knowledge of plans and procedures for emergency response.
The staff remained continuously aware of ECLs knd was fully involved in the discussion of appropriate actions. During all ECL stages, the communications room first reco!ved messages via the hotline and then logged in the messages. A FAX message then verifled the message had been received. The staff's keen awareness of this message system was reflected one time following receipt of the General Emergancy notice. While the staff tried to resolve a prope course of response action, the Disaster District Chairman and the Radiologleal L!alson Officer quickly noticed some radiation level inconsistencies whleh were reported later in messages from the STP EOC.
The ability to taobilise was demonstrated by discussion of procedures, illustration of those procedures in writing, discussion of staff locations when off duty, and discussion of equipment used to notify the staff. The ability to acquire a back-up staff was demonstrated by producing a call-down list. The State provided a well trained Regional Llaison Offleer (RLO) and a second staffer, who was being trained to fill that position in a back-up role.
The EOC feellity, located in the Department of Public Safety Sub-District 2A headquarters in Pleree, has marginal space but is otherwise adequate to support all disaster response operations and has appropriate maps, status boards, and displays to support such operations. However, the placement of maps and status boards in the hallway outside the communications room obstructed movement and required all substantive discussions to be held while standing up. In a prolonged emergency, this could be tiring. An adjacent drivers' lleense renewal room could be used to store the maps and status boards providing the drivers' license operation was shut down. Emergency power, food, water, and other essential supp!!es are available.
Pierce EOC communleations is capable of maintaining contact with all appropriate organisations, locations and field personnel. Equipment in place includes a dedicated hotline, two regular commercial phone lines, TELETS terminals, a telefax, 14AWAS, a DPS radio system ar.d a State Health Department radio system.
The.
communications room is normally staffed by one person. Three staffers remained busy throughout the exercise. During a real emergency, two staffers should be adequate. The equipment performed adequately during the exercise.
Message logs were generally well kept. Several times, however, important times were not filled in on messages, resulting in several blank time entries on the message log. On one occasion, the communications officer was able to determine by keeping track of the numbering entry on Matagorda County press releases that a press release had not been received. A copy of the release was requested and received. Because of this incident, it is recommended that the message log include all message numbers i
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l assigned by sending organizations. It should also be mentioned that, although the telef ax records the time of receipt on incoming messages, the copying process of ten cuts off this I
Information from the top of the page. When copying messages for internal circulation, the message runner should be ours the copy includes the tisne the message was received, i
if that information is near the top edge of the message original.
i A separate DPS radio communleations group at the STP EOC operating under the Pierce DEM Disaster District kept track of offleers' locations relative to the plume. On one occasion, the group rejected a request for a trooper to drive through the plume without being accompanied by a trained radiologleal staffer to monitor exposure levels.
An ARCA from the previous exercise was resolved when the Disaster District Chairman demonstrated, by discussion, that the DEM Disaster sub-district office e.t Pteree would not issue any messages without prior coordination of those messages with j
the Media information Center.
J All FEMA exerelse objectives (Nos.1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 13) assigned to the Pierce I
Disaster District EOC were met.
DEFICIENCIES: None.
i ARRAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS None.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
l Deseription Although the telefax records times on messages, the copying process often cuts off this information from the top of the page.
i Recommendation When copying messages for internal circulation, make sure the copy includes the time the message was received, if that information is near the top edge of the original.
Deseription On several oceaalons, times on incoming messages were not filleil in which resulted in a deletion of these times on the message log sheet. Also, message numbers assigned by the sending organisation were not able to be recorded on the message log sheet.
Recommendations The message log should be made more complete by including the times for all messages and recording the destrnated message number as assigned by the sending organization.
Deseription The placement of maps and status boards in the hallway outside the communications room obstructed movement and required all substantive discussions to be held while participaists
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a 28 remained standing. In a prolonged emergency, this could become tiring.
Recommendation: Pursue plans to relocate maps and status boards i,
to the drivers'ileense room in the event of a prolonged emergency.
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2.1A Bureas of Radiation Control (BRC) Staying Area The BRC Staging Area, located at the Bay City Servlee Center, was staffed by four people meluding the Staging Area Coordinator, a telephone communications person, a radio communications /radef person, and a clerleal person, who doubled as a courier.
Know! dgee of Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs) was properly demonstrated by the BRC staff throughout the exercise. As the EC1 status changed, the staff took appropriate actions as outlined in their plan. All pertinent information was l:
i poetad promptly on display boards. bWever, it seemed BRC EOC personnel were not kwping the staging area informed promptly enough kbout tveloping and changing e.ents. On several occasions, staging area personnel appeared confused as to the time a release startsd and the status of the current situation. The staging area communications
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person telephoned the EOC several times to inquire about the status of the emergency
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situation. This procedure should have been done on a more timely basis.
The staging area was prestaged in the interest of time to meet scenario
. requirements.. Consequently, the actual staffing of this location was not obssrvable.
However, because of a prior agreement between the State and FEMA to allow prestaging, the staffing objective is considered to be met.
Communications at the staging area consisted of a radio base station for communications with the STP EOC, field monitoring teams, and contachtion control teatus. Two telephones were available for communication with the State EOC, STP EOC, and otter locations.
A problem developed when contamination control teams found they could receive messages but could not transmit. The staging area coordinator promptly dispatched a courier with a radio in her car to assist the contamination control teams in sending messages to the EOC and staging area. The contamination control teams were using two-watt radios furnished by the BRC. These same radios were used in a previous-exercise and were found to be insufficient.
Etnergency worker exposure control was properly-demonstrated.
The radef officer at the staging area lasued proper equipment, explained its use and provided
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zeroing and calibration equipment if needed.
All necessary equipment and dosage records were maintained as required by the plan.
Since the staging area operated only in support of the field teams as needed, the l
only. function they performed relative to the use of KI was to relay messages to field teams. They adequately demonstrated this objective.
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All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos.1,2,4,6 and 16) assigned to the staging area were met.
i DEFICIENCIES: None.
AREAS REQUIRING CORREC'ITVE ACTION: None.
j ARRAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
Deseription The staging area was not kept informed of situation changes in a prompt and timely manner.
b Recommendations Make sure the staging area receives situation updates in a j
more prompt and timely manner in order to perform a better job of briefing the field teams as they are dispatched.
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2.1.5 Bureau of Radiation Control Mobile Lab All sample preparation and coordination personnel demonstrated an adequate j
knowledge of ECIA and responded accordingly with each ECL change. A radio in the i
l sample preparation and coordination van was monitored for updates on changes and/or
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ECL status reports.
All State staff assembled at the BRC staging area and were dispatched from there throughout the exercise. Because FEMA and the State of Texas agreed that the staff could be prestaged in order to meet required scenario time lines, this objective was adequately demonstrated. - Dispatching of the staff in a real world crisis would be from Austin.
Primary me,ans of communications consisted of commercial telephone, radio and a runner. The radio was difficult to hear most of the time and dose assessment personnel were telephoning them the necessary sampling information. There were no apparent problems with the telephone.
There was a radio in the sample preparation and coordination van and it was monitored.
The field monitoring teams performed their sampling adequately for the presence of airborne lodine and sent their samples to the field laboratory for analysis. The sample preparation and coordination team received these samples, checked them for conis ninatio% logged them, placed them in the proper container for counting, counted th a and sent the results to dose assessment. All these tasks were efficiently and satisfactorily performed.
In accordance with State plans and procedures, the field monitoring. teams collected air samples for both particulate and radiolodine species. The samplers were directed to either bring them to the laboratory or have a courier pick them up.
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30 In the past, the mobile lab has been stationed at the training center just outside the exclusion boundary. However, in the future, the lab will be located in Bay City about 12 miles from the plant site. In this exercise, the mobile lab personnel counted field samples on a multichannel analyzer and either telephoned or hand carried the results to dose assessment. With the mobile lab relocated to Bay, City, it will be necessary to use a i
' faz machine to transmit hard copy results to dose assessment.
All FEMA objectives (Nos.1,2,4,8 and 9) were met.
DEFICIENCIES: None.
" AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None.
I AREA 8 RECOMMENDED FOR IMFROVEMENT:
Deseription Samples were not properly prioritized by dose assessment.
Recommendation: Dose assessment should prioritize both collection and analysis of all environmental sample 6.
Dese:1ption: With the mobile lab located up to 12 miles from dose assessment, the only way to transmit lab results is to telephone L
them and/or send copies by courier. This is time consuming and could cause transmission errors.
Recommendation: ' The mobile lab should acquire a ' facsimile machine. for hard copy transmission to send results to dose assessment.
The fax machine should also possess hard copy 7
L capability.
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.2.1.4 BRC Fleid Moultoring Team #1 Field nunscing teams were mobilized at and deployed from the BRC staging
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area in Bay City. The teams were comprised of BRC personnel from offices throughout Texas along with troopers from the Department of Public Safety's License and Weight Service. In agreement with FEMA, the team members were prepositioned in the Bay City area.-
Before departing the staging area, Team #1 used a written checklist to make a thorough inventory of equipment. Team #1 departed the staging area at 9:58 a.m. and went immediately to the Matagorda County Sheriff's office to simulate picking up additional health physicist's equipment and supplies. The team then departed to its first p
assigned monitoring point.-
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31 The team was lasued a BRC hand-held radio for use as a backup to the DPS radio
.that was used for field team communleations. The DPS vehicle radio, a 32-channel unit, provided consistent, reliable communleations to all appropriate locations throughout the
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exercise.
The team was also issued appropriate dosimetry equipment including self-reading and permanent record (TLD) dosimeters.
1 At field locations, ambient radiation levels were adequately determined (simulated). -
Care was taken to prevent the possible spread of contamination to equipment, vehicle and personnel. Team #1 was able to locate and navigate in the field to find all preselected points. Maps were used and team members demonstrated an adequate famillarity with the geographic area.
Team #1 was directed to take one air sample during the exercise. An air pump was used to draw a measured sample of air through a particulate filter and a charcoal-cartridge (silver zoollte cartridges were available but were not used). The air pump was L
properly calibrated for the appropriate flow rate.
Sample cartridge were quickly l
screened with the GM to determine if shielding was required during transport to the lab.
i Sample cartridges and filters were then labelled and double-bagged prior to delivery.
Subsequent exercise activities required Team #1 to also take samples of water,
-j soll and vegetation. The water sample was obtained from around a bayou bridge with a simulated bucket and cord; then transferred to a water esmple container and bagged and labelled. The soil and vegetation samples were taken with appropriate equipment using i
proper techniques at locations from which the team would have been able to get L
representative samples.
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Team #1 adequately demonstrated the -ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure through the proper use of dosimetry equipment and procedures. Each member was provided with a dosimetry kit and record keeping cards.
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- Team members read their dosimeters periodically and properly recorded dose readings.
The team was aware that the maximum radiation field in which they were working was only 2 mR/hr and that frequent dosimeter readings were not required. Team members were aware of the maximum allowable dose without authorization and that the maximum allowable exposure dose was listed on their map. They were also aware that they should leave any radiation area if the authorized exposure dose level was reached and report to the Field Monitoring Team Leader for instructions. The team was equipped with full anticontamination suits and protective equipment (i.e.,
coveralls, boots, gloves, respirators, etc.).
At 10:35 a.m., the Field Monitoring Team Leader issued instructions that the use l-of KI was recommended. This decision was based on a projected dose to the thyrold.
E Team members said instructions for use of K! were not transmitted because these Instructions had already been issued.
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Team #1 demonstrated the ability to monitor Emergency Classification Levels l
(ECLs) continuously and implement appropriate procedures, i
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All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 16) assigned BRC Fleid Monitoring Team #1 were met.
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'I 32 DEFICIENCIES: None.
l AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None.
l AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR INFROVEMENTi None.
p 3.1.7 BRC Fleid Monitoring Team #2 The actual mobilization of personnel was not observed. In the interest of time, FEMA agreed to have all State personnel pre-staged at the BRC staging area in Bay City.
Dispatching of personnel from Austin was simulated by sending staff out from the staging area as required by the scenario. The mobilization of personnel objective is considered to be met.
l The primary method of communleation was the DPS vehicle radio. Communica-tions were established with the DPS dispatcher at the STP EOC. The primary system functioned properly without any problems or undue delays. The backup procedure was to use BRC lasued hand-held radios if needed. They were not utilised.
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. The team members were issued one direct reading dosimeter with a scale of' 0-20 R, one dosimeter with a scale of 0-200 mR, and a uniquely identitled TLD. The dosimeters were charged and zerood. The Radef offleer at the staging area dispensed the equipment and briefed the team members on the proper use and frequency of reading.
Initial readings were logged on the appropriate forms prior to the team being dispatched to the field.
While in the field, the team members demonstrated that they were knowledgable in the use and reading of the instruments by taking periodic readings.
The ability of the field monitoring teams to take ambient radiation readings was l
adequately demonstrated, thus reflecting the proper level of knowledge and training.
Instruments were calibrated and the correct instruments were used in the monitoring activity.
The team had all the necessary equipment for collecting all types of 1
environmental samples and demonstrated satisfactorily the proper-methods and procedures for collecting soll, vegetation, and water samples.
Altborne lodine monitoring was successfully demonstrated. The team used the proper equipment and procedures in collecting their samples. State procedures did not require a field analysis. Rather, the samples were transported by a designated runner to the mobile laboratory located at the STP site. A charcoal filter was used to demonstrate the collection of a sample for the detection of altborne radiolodine. All samples were properly begged and labeled for transport to the mobile lab.
Field Team #2 adequately demonstrated the collection and transfer of samples to detect particulate activity. Upon a request from the Field Monitoring Team leader, a sample was taken and transported to the mobile lab in 13 minutes.
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r 33 In the staff briefing at the BRC staging area, the Chief of Fleid Operations gave Instructions to the emergency workers on the purpose of KI, side effects, time intervals between doses and the logging procedure in case they were instructed to take it. He also advised them that the decision to take the K! would be their own after it was recommended that they do so. The team was instructed to takes an extra supply of K!
for issuance to other emergency workers who did not have any in case they had to enter "High Radiation Areas."
A recommendation was made by the BRC EOF Chief of Operations for emergency workers to take El at 10:00 a.m. Fleid Team #2 simulated the taking of El as recommended.
All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 16) assigned BRC Field Monitoring Team #2 were met.
DEFICIENCIES: None.
AREA 8 REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None.
3 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT None.
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'2.1.8 BRC Field Moaltoring Team #3 Field Monitoring Team #3, along with all other BRC response teams, was l'
prestaged at the BRC staging area in Bay City to meet exercise timing constraints. The field monitoring teams, consisting of a State Department of Public Safety, Weights and Measures trooper, and a State BRC radiation technician, together with appropriate
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equipment and supplies, use a DPS vehicle for transportation. The Ram Charger vehicle used by this team was greatly superior, as monitoring team transportation, to th.! DPS sedans used in the past due to it's space, carrying capacity and off-road capability. Due to team prestaging, actual mobilization, from normal operating locations, could not be -
observed. However, State plans and procedures for mobilization are adequate.
At the staging area, prior to deployment on operational assignments, the team performed a full equipment inventory and operational checks. The team was issued a.
BRC handheld radio for use as a back-up to the DPS radio that was used for field team communications. The hand-held radio was not demonstrated during the exercise as the 4
M team said it "didn't have the range for the required use." The DPS vehicle radio, a 32-channel unit, provided consistent, reliable communications to DPS operators in the STP EOC, as well as to DPS Pierce. local law enforcement, other mobile units and other 1
radio systems. The team was also issued appropriate dosimetry equipment, including self I
reading and permanent record (TLD) dosimeters.
Staging area personnel provided briefings of all available information to the team prior to their deployment. However, much of the information that the team should have had was, apparently, not available at the staging area. It is recommended that the i
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staging area be made a more integral part of the "information loop" so that the teams can be more fully briefed prior to their departure on operational assignments. Frequent situation summaries were provided to the team via radio during their field activities.
Duritg the exercise, the team demonstrated a high degree of skill and ability in the performance of the monitoring and sample collection tasks assigned to them by team control at the EOC. They also displayed good judgement and initiative in advising their team control of field conditions, including physleal damage from the simulated earthquake, provided to them by the exercise controller. The use of a courier to collect samples obtained by the team appeared to work well, and allowed more time for actual field activities without making frequent trips to the mobile lab to deliver the samples.
The DPS trooper's intimate knowledge of the area was of great value to the team as it allowed rapid movement to various assigned locations for team activity. The binder, carried by the team, that provides locations of pre-established fixed monitoring points, requires some additional work as a number of road names are missing. A team that has less familiarity with the area could have some difficulty in locating some of the i
points.
In summary, the team adequately demonstrated all objectives assigned for this exercise (Noa. 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 16).
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DEFICIENCIES: None, i
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: None.
I t-2.1.9 BRC Contasiastion Control Teams The ability to alert, mobilize, and activate the two access control points was demonstrated adequately by both contamination control teams. Personnel were at their proper location (BRC staging area) when deployed to their access control points.
While communications equipment was available, adequate primary communica-tions capability was not successfully demonstrated at either control point. The plan called for handheld BRC radlaf to handle the primary systems. However, these radios failed to adequately funetton property to receive the transmission of messages. Two backup systems were subsequently demonstrated adequathyJa.. telephone at a nearby roadhouse at one control point and deputy sheriffs' radio units at both control points).
1-However, the sheriff's deputies had to relay messages through a central dispatch point, creating slow and cumbersome delays and creating the possibility for misinterpretation and error in re-transmission. Since there were no direct communications with the Field l
Team Coordinator at the STP EOC, the access centrol point persotinel were unable to obtain first hand Information twMIN pWeetive action recommendations or general Information regarding the exte-2 s L.mr'.
35 Both teams demonstrated a thorough know' ledge of procedures for performing
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. monitoring operations for contamination.
Emergency workers took readings at appropelate times and maintained logs as speelfled.
Exercise participants and their vehicles entering or leaving the controlled areas were monitored, and if required, were j
, directed to decontamination facilities.
BRC representatives exhibited a thorough J
knowledge of the mission exposure limits and actions necessary in the event exposure levels exceeded established limits.
However, the sheriff's deputy manning the Contamination Control Team #2 access control point demonstrated limited knowledge of required procedures and was not adequately prepared aroquipped with an emergency worker kit to work in a radiologically hazardous environment. He was, however, aware of the capabilities of the BRC personnel to advise him. At the other control point
. activated by Contamination Control Team #1, the deputy sheriff made all deelslons on whether citizens could enter the contaminated area. No one.was allowed to enter. But, had anyone actually entered, both a low range and high range dostmeter would have been i
lasued.
1 Both teams displayed a high level of training and knowledge of the tasks they were called upon to perform. All equipment was checked prior to departing the staging l
area and spare equipment was carried to the field in the event malfunctions occurred.
Calibration of equipment was within proper time limits and readings were made at appropriate times and levels with instruments properly enclosed in plastic bags. The correct logging of locations, times and date was also demonstrated.
The proper knowledge and use of K! was satisfactorily demonstrated with the staffs having been properly instructed on the use and administration of K! prior to deployment.- Once emergency workers were instructed to take KI, appropriate records were kept of the simult.tlon process.
The control of traffle and access to the - evacuated and shelter areas was adequately detaonstrated. The Contamination Control Team #2 did not receive current and timely Information on protective action recommendations, planning areas or relocation centers. However, the mission was accomp!!shed by implementing proper access control procedures. When citizens arrived, they were properly diverted from the hazardous area and instructed on alternate routing.
l All FEMA Objectives (2,4,6,16, and 20) assigned to this location were met.
DEFICIENCIES:- None.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
89-1
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Description:==
Handheld radios issued to the contamination Control Teams failed to function properly. Consequently, there was no communication with the staging area or the STP EOC i
where the Field Team Coordinator was located. (Sest ARCA 89-'1 under STPEGS EOC (BRC OPERATIONS). (NUREG 0654, Rev.1, F.1.d)
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36 Beoommendations The BRC radio system should be improved to provide for continuous communleation with field units.
AREAS RECOMMENDED POR IMPROVEMENT: None.
2.1.19 Media leformation Center The Media InformatiSi Center (MIC) for STP is located in the Matagorda Hotel and Conference Center on Highway 36 in Bay City. Spokespersons for the State Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC), Matagorda County and Houston Lighting & Power (HL&P) participated in the exercise.
The MIC was activated at 10:08 a.m. with Matagorda County and BRC PIOS in place by about 10:45 a.m.
A problem occurring in the last exercise (1987) involving the absence of a BRC spokesperson to address technleal information during most of the exercise was resolved with the appearance of a BRC representative throughout the exercise.
Another problem involving the inability of state ud county PIOS to monitor what was being presented in the press briefings from their work stations was resolved with the installation of loudspeakers in all MIC offlees.
The Site' Communleations Room was well planned. However, because of the room's limited size, a possible misinterpretation of information was created with the MIC manager trying to brief the staff above the background noise level of a nearby speakerphone being used to communicate between the MIC and the plant.
A problem still exists regarding physical arrangements in the press briefing room. As in the last exercise (1987), TV cameras and operators positioned at the front of the room blocked the view of reporters seated behind them. In a real life situation, this could pose a problent with reporters seated behind the TV cadre being unable to view media speakers or be recognized for questions.
For the most part, press briefings were clear, accurate and timely. The large, well lighted room with its excellent accoustics lends itself to the well organized
~ implementation of the briefings.
The HL&P staff la to be commended for introducing the plan to enhance the viability of the briefings by making a plant spokesman available between the formal
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' briefings and throughout the exercise to conduct one-on-one interviews with reporters f
and answer any spontaneous questions.
Presentations by BRC and Matagorda County spokespersons could be improved with better use of the large display maps next to the speakers' table. Several times, the spokespersons remained seated while reading pre-scripted releases dealing with dose assessment measurements / projections and evacuation routes out of specified sectors within the 10-mile EPZ. This important information could be better dramatized if the maps were used to point out areas referred to in the pre-scripted releases.
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37 The use of transmitting and receiving communleations equipment was adequately demonstrated ~ and all appropriate messages were handled in a timely and accurate manner. However, the system could be fine tuned a step further by having all technical data, including. dose assessment measurements and projections, transcribed by l
^ telefax/telecopter, even'If the information has also been tratismitted by phone. This redundant procedure will negate a possible misinterpretation of technical data over the l
phone and insure accuracy.
All changes in Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs) were noted in a timely and accurate manner by the staff.
l The rumor control system was well planned and handled in an organized fashion with the HL&P staff responding to more than 100 call-in questions from concerned i
citizens.
All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1,2,4,5,13,14 and 15) assigned to the MIC j
were met.
. DEFICIENCIES: None.
l AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None.
i ARRAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
Description A possible misinterpretation of important information was created in the Site Communications Room with the MIC manager trying to brief the staff above the background noise of a nearby speakorphone being used to communicate between the MIC and the plant.
s Recommendatica Designate separate areas for the MIC anger to conduct his briefings and for the M!C staff to communicate with the plant over the speakerphone.
Description TV cameras and operators continue to block the view of reporters seated behind them during presa briefings.
Recommendation Position the TV cadre to one side of the speakers' table or position the TV cadre directly in front of the table as they are now doing and make sp:cs availabic on either side for the reporters to sit.
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Description:==
Display maps used in the press brbf!ngs were not utilized to the best advantage by BRC and Matagorda County spokespersons.
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Escommendatless Have all spokespersons present their prescripted information while standing beside the display maps in the event of a i
need to point out areas effected by dose assessment readings and/or evaeustion, etc.
Dessriptions A possibility exists for misinterpreting technical data called in over the phone.
Recommendatlome Have all technical data transmitted by telefax/telecopier to assure accurate interpretation.
2.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 2.2.1 Matagorda County EOC The EOC staff did a notable job of monitoring the prescribed classifloation levels received from STP and implementing procedures in a timely manner. In addition, not i;
only were procedures followed in implementation of the operating procedures, but the staff did a commendable job of anticipating and implementing their response actions.
The elassifloation levels were prominently displayed and status boards were l
updated very expeditiously. Based on these observations, objective I was met.
b-The Notifloation of Unusual event (NOUE) was received by the Matagorda County Sheriff at 8:13 a.m. 'via'the dedicated phone line. Based upon receipt of this classifloation level, the County Sheriff, who is also designated as the County Emergency Coordinator, notified all appropriate response individuals according to his procedures.
The initial notification was completed by approximately 8:30 a.m. Concurrently,'a hard copy message of the NOUE 'was received over the telefaz at 8:17 a.m. No problems were
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Identified regarding receipt of any of the hard copy telefax messages througho,ut the exercise.
Based on receipt of the NOUE, the County Judge, the Bay City and Palacios City Mayors, the Bay City pollee Chief, tne Red Cross, the Matagorda County Health /
' Radiological Offleer, and the EB8 station were notified. The hospital was also notified due to the nature of the events leading to the declaration of a NOUE. -
At 9:04 a.m., the Alert was received, the appropriate staff were notified, and setup of.the EOC was initiated. An excellent job was demonstrated in setting up the EOC operations room in a short period of time. Staff arriving at the EOC knew their duties and responsibilities in activating the EOC.
The Site Area Emergency was received at 10 a.m. and the General Emergency was received shortly thereafter at approximstely 10:23 a.m.
Based on these observations, the ability to fully alert, mobilize tnd activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions was demonstrated; thus objective 2 was met.
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The Matagorda County Judge and the Matagorda County Sheriff (Emergency
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Coordinator) were effectively in charge of the EOC operations. They both conducted L
emergency operations in a coordinated ntanner. The Emergency Coordinator directed most of the response operations while the County Judge provided effective input into the L
'deelslon making. process. Other staff also provided input and were involved in the l=
deelston making process, as appropriate. There was also effective demonstration of keeping the staff updated on the response status through frequent briefings by the Emergency Coordinator and the Bay City Pollee Chief. The internal message handling system worked flawlessly through competent logging of Internal and external' messages, expeditious message reproduction and distribution, and prompt relaying of internal messages to the EOC staff.
There was an excellent defronstration of processing incoming information and rapid documentation on status boards.
The status board information was updated continuously and was effectively used during briefing sessions to monitor the actions being implemented. Hard copy messages and status board summaries L
were developed,. copied, and distributed to all emergency response personnel within the EOC. Overall, the Emergency Coordinator in direct consultation with the County Judge, demonstrated the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency operations.
The EOC staff demonstrated the capability to communicate with all appropriate personnel and organisations by effective use of equipment and procedures. Commercial telephones, a dedicated phone, two-way radios, and two telefaxes were used to communleate between the Matagorda County EOC and external locations.
Also l
available, but not called upon for support in the exercise, was a RACES operator. During the initial notifloation, activotion, and subsequent activities, communleations within the
' county andt to other -external contact points functioned well and proculures were
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followed. All communleations systems available at the EOC functioned well and without
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All staff were well-trained In'the use of communications
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equipment and performed professionally.in following procedures.
Based on these observations, the ability to communicate with all appropriate organizations, lacluding L
field personnel was effectively accomplished.
The Matagorda County' EOC is located in the County Sheriff's ' Department multi-purpose room in Bay City, Texas.
The facility is adequate to support !b
. emergency response activities. The facility is located outside the 10-mile EP3. -
w
.to the EOC cperations room was adequately controlled and persons were reqairec w w l
in and es with all.vlsitors being approved by the County Sheriff before entrancu was allowed. Maps,' status boards, office equipment and displays were excellent'and were effectively used throughout the exercise.
One issue involved a malfunction of the copying machines the staff immediately utilized a back-up machine and had the machine repaired without delay. The " County Emergency Response Procedures board was very useful for all EOC staff members and was updated to account for an Area Requiring Corrective Action identifled during the previous exercise; an additional column was added to the display that indicated p ocedures for " Reentry / Recovery". This display l:
board listed certain procedures that should be implemented for each of the four classification levels, including reentry / recovery.
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l; 40 05 Two areas recommended for improvement were identified for the facility l
It is suggested that provisions be made for visually preanting the g
location of ~ treffle control points (cps), road hasards and access L.
control points (see objectives 11 and 20 summaries). -
r l
The " County Emergency Response Procedure" board needs to have L
an additional procedure added that reflects requirements for siren L
activation prior to the EBS message dissemination (see' objective 12 L
summary).
Overall, apart from the two areas recommended for improvement indicated.
4
- above,- the adequacy of faellities, equipment, displays and other materials to suppo, j:
emergency operations was demonstrated.
Several issues have been identified during the assessment of the radiological l'
exposure control activities at the Matagorda County EOC. The following issues-were-identified:
No. permanent records dosimeters were available for use by the Matagorda County emergency workers, also suitable ranges of direet-read dosimeters were not availables a dosimeter is needed that measures higher level exposures in addition to the doelmeter currently available (0-200 mR).
Emergency workers entering the plume EPZ did not have an L
l-exposure record end nor were appropriate written instructions issued along with' tne dosimeters t lstributed.
The' instructions i
should include how to use the dosimeters, how often to read them, and what exposure limit is authorized.
It is suggested that
, of Revision 2 of the County plan be referenced as a guide for developing suitable instructions /recordkeeping for Matagorda County emergency workers operating in the 10-mile EPZ.
- The she5ff's deputy manning the Contamination Control Team #2 access control point, demonstrated limited knowledge of required procedures and was not adequately prepared or equipped with an emergency worker kit to work in a radiolcgically hazardous environment.
Prior to dispatch, a charger was ' used to zero the dosimeters that. were distributed. At one point, the Emergency Coordinator requested that emergency workers read their dosimeters out in the field. Because the emergency workers did not have.
permanent record dosimeters or high range pocket dosimeters (0-200 mR), the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure control was not adequately demonstrated.
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Deelslon-making for protective action recommendations received at Matagorda County EOC were reviewed by the County Judge and the Emergency Coordinator (County Sheriff).
The consultations involved other staff members as appropriate in most -
situations. Many factors were considered in the decisions to accept the protective action rnommendation and implement emergency response actions within the county.
Deelslons were made rather quickly following receipt of the recommendation. In some instances, not all factors were considered in the deelslon-making process. For instance, limited input and Interaction occurred between the deelslon-makers and the public Information representatives from the utility. This resulted in several EBS messages not completely and accurately reflecting the conditions of the actual exercise events. It is recommended that a list of all pertinent decision-making factors be developed and assessed for each protective action recommendation receh*ed at Matagorda County.
The decision-making criteria should include but not be limited to:
public instructional message content that reflects the actual emergency situation; evacuation impediments such as road conditions and hazards, e
meteorological factors, evacuation time estimates and evacuation route limitation / opportunities; -
pcpulation affected, availability of type and amount of shelter facilities; special notifications that are required for institutions, schools and handicapped Individuals.
I It is important to note that the list for items to discuss during decision-making L
situations should be developed for the unique conditions that exist for the county in the implementation of their plan.
Also, it is important to note that decision-making activities are not subject to strict timeframes; this is to ensure that all critical factors are-assessed and to allow deelslon makers adequate time to evaluate all conditions.
Finally, the previous ARCA regarding the availability of evacuation time estimates was corrected. - Apart from the issue of establishing decision-making criteria, the objective to demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions, based on appropriate and relevant factors was adequately demonstrateo.
The primary means for initially alerting the public in the 10-mile EPZ is by outdoor pole-mounted sirens; tone alert radios are used as a back-up for the siren system 1
I and also provide both an attention message and detailed emergency information. Use of either warning system must be followed by public hformation, with the primary information system being the Emergency Broadcast System. The back-up system or complementary system is the county mobile public address units. For the exercise, the i
strens were to be simulated; messages sent to EBS were demonstrated. According to the county procedures, once the deelslon has been made to implement protective actions, the County Judge Instructs the activation of the warning system and then contacts EBS (EMKS).
The EBS procedures include activation of the tone slert radios and dissemination of the instructional message over the tone alert radios and on the station's radio frequency.
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1 42 1
During the exercise, the decision to implement the initial protective action recommendatiott occurred at 10:20 a.m. following receipt of the first protective action
. recommendation at 10:15 a.m.
The first EBS message was conveyed to KMES at 10:22 a.m.; however the stren was not activated as part of the fi-st EBS message. The General Emergency was received at 10:20 a.m. and the smead protective action recommendation was received at 10:24 a.m. Both cf these messages were received while the first EB8 message was being processed. In response to the second PAR and the GE, the deelslon to sound the siren took place and this was accomplished at 10:32 a.m. The stron-sounding at this time thus provided the alert signal for the first EBS message because the EB8 repeats messages every five minutes. To ensure that the sirens are sounded in conjunction with EBS, county procedures need to be followed to assure that the strens be sounded, and that it be sounded before activation of EBS. The " County Emergency Response Procedures" board should be amended to include this procedure.
Based on these observations, the ability to initially alert the public with an instructional message within fifteen minutes was accomplished.
Nine public instruction messages were disseminatsd from the Matagorda County EOC. Utility representatives were responsible for message development. Prescripted messages were used that included descriptions of protective action zones in terms of familiar landmarks and boundaries. However, the first two EB8 messages did not contain descriptions of evacuation routes or where the pt.olic is to be evacuated; this is required according to the public information calendar.
EBS message #2 was confusing and inaccurate as to whleh zones were previously evacuated up until that time and which L
additional zones were to be evacuated.
Messages 3 and 4 included descriptions of b*
reception centers designated for specific zones, but this important information was not repeated consistently in-subsequent EBS messages 5-through 9.
Furthermore, EBS messages 7, 8, and 9 were not accurate as to whether zone 14 was included as part of the sheltering protective action. Finally, none of the EBS messages addressed sheltering l'
lasues related to meximizing protection while sheltering or instructions for transients l
without shelter; also ad hoc respiratory protection measures were not presented and no L
infot.netton was provided as to what to take or leave behind when evacuating. Overall, it is evident that the resources are available to demonstrate an effective pubile instruction process at the Matagorda Co'.mty EOC. However, training is required to address all of the shortcomings presented during the exercise based on these observations, the ability to coordinate, formulate and disseminate accurate information to the public was' not adequately demonstrated; thus objective 13 was not met.
The pelley for distribution and administration of KI is established for state and county operations. During the exercise, KI was recommended (simulated) at 10:37 a.m.
and based on the review of the policy and demonstration of implementation of the po!!cy, the objective to recommand, distribute and administer KI to emergency workers was g_
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successfully accomplished; thus objective 16 was met.
Successful demonstration (simulated) for the evacuation of handicapped persons during the evacuation phase was completed. This task was completed under the direction of the Emergency Coordinator who passed on a current index card file to the Sheriff's Department Dispatcher. The dispatcher simulated notification of all persons in the file.
The procedures indicate that a Matagorda County Sheriff's vehicle would pick-up the i.
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43 i
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_ individuals.
Based on interviews, the individuals were to be transported to j
pre-determined _ relocation center (s) with accommodations for handleapped persons.
Overall, demonstration of the ability to implement protective actions for special groups was conducted.- The actual and simulated actions were satisfactory to demonstrate this L
objective for the scope of this exercise; thus objective 18 was met.
The transportation offleer and Palacios Mayor provided information about how evacuation of schools would be handled. No actual demonstratiot.s of school evacuations took place because the schools were not in session. During the exercise, a simulated evacuation of the Tidehaven school took place at approximately 10:20 a.m.
All arrangements with school buses and drivers were simulated as well as transport of buses to the relocation centers. Based on the limited demonstration designed into the exercise,
'J the demonstration was satisfactory to meet objective 19.
Traffic control activities were demonstrated by Matagorda County by dispatchirig two sheriff's deputies to two separate traffic / access control points. The sheriff's deputies were accompanied by BRC and DPS personnel. Limited activities could be evaluated from the EOC on the actions taking place in the field; a complete assessment of the traffic control activities !s included in Section 2.1.9 of this report.
.However, as initially identified at the EOC and subsequently verified by the evaluators assessing the traffic / access control point activities in the field, it did not appear that the field pernnnel were fully and regularly apprised of the protective actions in place during the exercise as well as other exercise-specific conditions. In this regard, it is important that a map be used to identify where the location of traffic / access control points are g
l
_ located as well as to visually identify ~where road impediments / hazards are located.
Also, questions arose as to how Matagorda County emergency workers dispatched from the EOC would receive r& 3 ring and decontamination; this issue is unresolved
. regarding the - county's plau...d response to this situation.
Based on these limited observations from the standpoint of the EOC operations, the objective to provide the organizational ability - and resources necessary to control access and traffic was demonstrated; thus objective 20 was met.
A lengthy discussion took place on recovery and reentry issues at the Matagorda County EOC. This session was directed by the County Sheriff and extensive information was provided by a BRC staff member. Recovery issues were organized into four well-defined phases and the discussions were extremely effective in addressing the fundamental issues associated with each phase. The interaction and level of interest set a new standard for successfully completing the objective to demonstrate the ability to implement measures for recovery and reentry.
The Matagorda County response addressed actions that need to be taken during recovery and reentry phases of exercises -
or actual events.
Beud on the observations, the objective to demonstrate implementation of appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry was met.
L The previously identified ARCA associated with this objective was corrected and objective 33 was met.
Overall, as was also demonstrated,in the previous exercise, all EOC staff members assigned to the Matagorda County EOC were highly responsive to the requirements of the exercise.
There was excellent participation by all appropriate agencies and the staff demonstrated a sincere willingness to improve from their previous
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e 44 exerelse. In summary, the following FEMA exercise objectives were met: 1,2,3,4,5, 11,13,18,18,19,20, and 33. Objective 6 was not met and must be demonstrated in the next scheduled exercise' l
- DEFICIENCS None.
L
' ARRAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
89-3 Deserlpticos The sheriff's deputy working with Contamination Control Team #2 had only one dosimeter (0-200 mR) and no j
TLD. He did not appear knowledgeable about the radiological j
hasard threat, dosimetry or personal protective actions. (See text under Contamination Control Teams, Page
.)
(NUREG l
0654, Rev.1, K.3.a and b) 3s Rooommendation: All personnel assigned access control point /
traffic control point duties should be ~ rovided proper emergency p
worker exposure control training and emergency worker kits.
These kits should be assembled at the County EOC and should include two direct reading doelmeters, one TLD, a personal exposure /KY record card, K! tablets, and an instruction card for use of this equipment. -
89-4 Deserlption: No permanent record dosimeters were available for use by the Matagorda County emergency workers sent into the j
ll 10-mile plume EPZ.
Also, suitable ranges of direct-read l-dosimeters were not available a dosimeter is needed to measure l
h'gher level exposures beyond the dosimeter currently available (0-200mR).
Also, emergency workers entering the plume EPZ did not have an exposure record card nor were appropriate written instructions -Issued aleng with the dosimeters distributed.
l(NUREG 0654, K.3. a. & b.)
E L
Recommendations Provide emergency workers from Matagorda l
County who enter the 10-mile EPZ appropriate low and high range dosimeters as well as permanent record dosimeters. It is
]
suggested that Attachment S of Revision 2 of the County plan be 4
referenced as a guide for developing suitable instructions /
recordkeeping for the emergency workers that address the issues specified above. The instructions should include how to use the dosimeters, how often to read them, and what exposure limit is authorized.
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p 89-5 Dessriptions Following receipt of the-first protective action recommendation at 10:15 a.m., the deelslon to implement this 4
initial protective actitn recommendation occurred at 10:20 a.m.
n The EB8 raessage associated _with the first PAR was conveyed to KMK8 Radio at 10:22 a.m.; however, the stren was not sounded as part of the first EB8 message. (NUREG 0654, E.5, E.8)
Recommendations To ensure that the strens are sounded in conjunetton with EBS, procedures need to be,followed to assure that the strens be sounded, and that it be sounded before C
activation of EBS. The county procedures need to be changed and the " County Emergency Response Procedures" board should
?
' also be amended to 1.1clude this procedure.
89-6
Description:
The first two EB8 messages did not contain descriptions of evacuation routes or where the public is to be L
evacuated the public information calendar indleates that the EB8 la the primary method for public receipt of this i
information. EB8 message #2 was confusing and inaccurate as
-t to which ones were previously evacuated up until that time and L
with regard to which additional ones were to be evacuated.
Messages 3 and 4 included descriptions of reception centers L
designated for speelfle zones, but this important information was not repeated consistently in subsecuent ? EB8 messages 5 through 9.
Furthermore, EBS messages 7, 8, and 9 were not L
accurate as to whether zone 14 was included as part of the
. sheltering protective action. Finally, none of the EB8 messages addressed-sheltering issues related to maximizing protection while sheltering.or instructions for transients without shelter.
Also, ad hoc respiratory protection measures were not presented and none of the EBS messages addressed what to take or leave behind when tvecuating.
(NUREG 0654, E.5, E.6, E.7, G.4, 0.4.c)
Recommendation Training is required to address all of the shortcomings concerning public instructions noted during the exercise.
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- AREA 8 RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Description The " County Emergency Response Procedure" board l
does. not have a procedure reflecting requirements for siren activation prior to the EBS message dissemination.
Recommendation: Since this board is used regularly as a checklist for the Emergency Coordinator in carrying out his essential emergency response 6nctions, and since the procedure to sound the I
4 46 steeru & not occur during the first EB8 message, it is re&,suenk 8 that the " County Emergency Response Procedure" board be amended to include this procedure.
Deseriptions The location of traffle/aecess centrol points and road hasard areas, were not presented visually on a map. This would have helped to clearly and quickly identify the locations so that the impact of new protective action recommendations could have been more quickly and fully addressed during the deelslon-making proces8.
Reeomenendatloas it is suggested that provisions be made for visually; presenting the location of traffic control points, road hasseds and access control points on a map.
Descriptions Decisions were made rather quickly following receipt of the protective action recommendations; in some instances not all factors were considered in the decision-making process.
For instance, limited input and interaction occurred between the dee'ston-makers and the public information repeesentatives from the utility.
This resulted in several of the EB8 messages not completely and securately reflecting the conditions of the actual
. exercise events. Also, it did not appear that the field personnel were fully apprised of the protective actions in place during the exercise as well as other exercise-speelfle conditions.
Recommendations it is highly recommended that a list of all pertinent deelslon-making factors be developed and assessed for each - protective action recommendation received at Matagorda County. The deelston-making criteria should include but not be limited to publie Instructional message content that reflects the actual emergency situations evacuation Impediments such as road conditions and hasards,
.l meteorologleal
- factors, evacuation time estimates and i
evacuation route limitation / opportunities;
- population affected, availability of type and amount of shelter faellitiest special notifications that are required for field emergency e
workers, Institutions, schools and handicapped individuals.
I
i s-47 Desselyticas Questions arose as to. how Matagorda. County emergency workers dispatched from the EOC would receive monitoring and decontamination; this issue is unresolved as to the county's planned response to this situation.
Recommendations Determine if a procedure exists for emergency worker monitoring and decontamination and ensure that the emergency worksrs are aware of the precedure.
Provide, if j
necessary,' monitoring-and decontamination resources at the Matagorda County EOC for Emergency Workers returning from field activities in the 10-mile EPZ.
Descriptions The deputy sheriff working. with Contamination Control Team #2 did not receive timely notification of changes in protective actions. (See text under Contamination Control Teams, 35 Recommendatless Insure regular updated transmissions to all traffic control points advising them, in a timely manner, of changes in protective actions and any change in the access control points mission due to these changes.
3.3.3 Reception Center (Moaltoring/Decontaminatloa Function)
The function of monitoring and decontaminating evacuees and their vehicles was performed at Palacios High School in Palacios.
Evacuees entered the high school parlting lot where their vehicles were monitored for contamination by a team using u CDV-700 survey meter last calibrated in August,1997. Contamination found on any car was marked with radioactive labeled tape j
and -the vehicle was then driven to a segregated area of.the parking lot.
Decontamination would be carried out later at the bus washing area at the school..
1 Evacuees entered the school field house where initial radiation screening was conducted on their hands and shoe bottoms. The screening was performed quickly; however, one monitor was too close to one evacuee's shoes and allowed a probe to touch one. of the shoes. After being screened, the evacuee, if clean, was registered at the reception center by a Red Cross staff member. If contaminated, the evacuee was furnished shoe coverings and directed to proceed to the next point.
Detailed radiation monitoring was performed at the next point and the results recorded on a form. However, the form was.not given to several evacuees who continued on to the decontamination area.
This created a problem getting the necesst.ry information to decon area monitors. A courier subsequently carried the forms-to the decontamination area. Additionally, the monitoring results on the form for a personal article belonging to one evacuee revealed a level in excess of 0.1 mR/hr. A decon monitor subsequently released the article to the evacuee. Another evacuee was remonitored in the decon area and told to remove contaminated clothing, etc. which was
48 placed in a bag.
Mcprever, no receipt was issued to the evacuee for his personal possoasions.
Contaminated evacuees were then directed to enter a shower facility, walking on brown wrapping paper, which, after becoming wet, would tear easily.
Lack of a separation between the areas for entering and exiting the shower also created a problem for possibly clean people becoming recontaminated. After showering, evacuees were then re-monitored for contamination and, if clean, were provided with disposable clothing and directed to the Red Cross area to be registered. If still contaminated, an evacuee would repeat ths washing / showering process with a soft bristle brush and soap and be re-monitored.
Some of the emergency workers had radios in their private cars that could be used in an emergency. However, they were not monitored during the exercise. It is recommended that a backup radio system be made available to the reception center.
The capability to monitor emergency worker exposure at the reception center was demonstrated through the distribution of CDV 138 and CDV 730 dosimeters along with the proper recordkeeping cards. The emergency workers were given instructions on the reading of the instruments, time intervals for reading (30 minutes) and the recording of the reading.
Although no emergency workers showed up to demonstrate the adequacy of conducting decontamination procedures for emergency workers, equipment and vehicles and for waste disposal, it is apparent from the above demonstration of this process for evacuees that the capability exists for conducting this process for emergency workers.
Thus, FEMA objectives (Nos. 4, 21 and 25) assigned to the Palacios Monitoring /
Decontamination Station were met.
DEFICIENCIES: None.
ARRA8 REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
89-1 Deseriptions Tisere was no adequate backup communications system available.
(See ARCA 89-1 under STPEGS EOC (BRC OPERATIONS)
(NUREG 0654, Rev.1, F.1.d)
Recommendatica: The BRC radio system should be improved to provide for continuous communication with field units.
89-7
Description:
The CDV-700s used by the radiation monitors were last calibrated in August,1987. (NUREG 0654, Rev.1, H.10)
Recommendatloat CDV-700 survey instruments should be calibrated annually = tan used in the REP program in accord with FEMA-REP-2, Revision 1.
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4 49 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
Deseription: Monitors at the reception center did not, at times, maintain their survey instrument probes at a proper distance from an.evacues.. Additionally, the monitoring results for a personal
/
article belonging to one evacuee registered in excess of 0.1 mR/hr whleh resulted in the contaminated article being subsequently released to the evacues.
I i
Recommendation Reception center monitors should be provided with extra training in proper monitoring procedures and in the use of the monitoring results form.
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Descriptions The means of Ingress and egress from the shower area 1
were not separated to minimize possible recontamination.
Recommendatloan Make sure a partition is set up at the shower entrance separating the means of ingress and egress.
Descriptions-One evacuee did not receive a receipt for personal articles placed in a plastic bag for decontamination.
Recommendation:
Provide all Individuals receipts for personal articles being lef t for decontamination.
==
Description:==
Monitoring results were recorded on a form which did not accompany the evacuee to ~ the decontamination area, necessitating the forms to be delivered by a courier.
Recommendattor.1 Develop ' a more efficient procedure for the
- forms to accompany evacuees to the decontamination area.
Description The floor in the decontamination area leading.to the
- showers was only covered with thin wrapping paper which shredded-easily when becoming wet.
Recommendation The floor should be covered with absorbent plastic-backed paper to minimize possible decontamination.
2.2.3 Reception Center (Reception / Care Function)
Mobilization of emergency personnel at the Palacios Reception / Care Center and the monitoring / decontamination station was in accordance with plans and procedures and was adequately demonstrated. Members of the American Red Cross, Matagorda County
- Hospital District. County Health Department, Palacios City Police and State Bureau of Radiation Control began arriving at 10:00 a.m. and the facility was made ready to receive the first evacuee who arrived at 11:15 a.m.
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$0 The primary communications system for the reception center consisted of two dedicated telephone lines to the County EOC. One line was assigned to the Red Cross and one to the County Health Department. Both of the telephone lines worked well-except for the fact that they were overloaded. The telephones were brought to the EOC and plugged into the appropriate locations.
It is significant to note that the Red Cross people had an interagency communications system between the Red Cross supervisor and other Red Cross workers.
It was a small instrument attached to their belt with an ear piece that served as a microphone /trans mit ter-receiver. This system worked well to keep the supervisor and telephone operator in contact with each other.
L The congregate care objec+!ve was successfully demonstrated at this location.
The Matagorda County EOC not! flea the American Red Cross (Reception / Care Center Manager) at 10:20 a.m. to open the facility. The shelter Manager was aware of the l
possible nurnber of evacuees to expect at the facility. The facility had sufficient sleeping accommodations, toilets, drinking water, storage and parking space. Food would i
be prepared in the school cafeteria. The shelter was prepared to handle handicapped evacuees. They were also capable of offering crisis counseling and establishing a nurse's l
station. There was quick access to a hospital and an ambulance could be easily obtained.
l The relevant functions and activities of the Reception / Care facility were implemented in l
a manner that is consistent with established plans and procedures.
All FEMA objectives (2, 4, 5, 6, 21, and 22) assigned to this location were met.
DEFICIENCIES:, None.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
==
Description:==
The telephone system was overloaded during the exercise.
Recommendations Install an additional telephone line for the Bureau of Radiation Control.
2.2.4 PALACIO6 VFD AMBULANCE SERVICE Mobi!!zation of emergency personnel was satisfactorily demonstrated by the Palacios Volunteer Fire Department Ambulance Service.
A call was received at 1:48 p.m. that an injured contaminated individual needed transportation to the hospital.
Within three minutes the ambulance crew was enroute to the designated location and arrived at 2:08 p.m. The patient was ptoperly prepared for transportation and received the necessary care while in transit. The ambulance arrived at Wagner General Hospital in Palacios at 2:30 p.m.
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1 Communications capabilities consisted of a telephone in the central dispatch office, a radio base station, and two-way radios in the vehicle. The amoulance crew could establish radio contact with fire, police, central dispatch, and the hospital. All ambulance personnel have a fire / ambulance telephone in their homes and can be alerted simultaneously. The communication system was successfully demonstrated between the ambulance and the hospital with very clear and distinct send and receive messages. The backup system is the telephone in the central dispatch location.
The ambulance crew's knowledge of emergency worker exposure control procedures and requirements was properly demonstrated. Each crew member was issued
-l one 0-200 mR doelmeter and one uniquely identitled TLD. All dosimeters were zerood and the initial reading was properly logged for the record._ The crew was knowledgeable in the use and frequency of reading dosimeters. The maximum dose limits established in
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the plan for emergency workers was known to the crew members, as well as the action to take if the dose !!mit was reached or exceeded. Since the plan sets the maximum dose at 75 R, with only the 0-200 mR dosimeters, there was no way for them to know if and when they were approaching the maximum dose limits.
The medical services - transportation objective was effectively demonstrated by the ambulance crew. The ambulance was the raised roof type vehicle with the equipment necessary for the proper transportation and care of an injured Individual. Protective i,
clothing, draping material for inside of the vehicle, dosimetry and TLDs, and a survey l-meter were available and adequately demonstrated.
Dosimeters were zeroed and distributed with name, serial numbers and initial readings logged on a plain sheet of paper. Proper forms were not in the kit, but a plant representative said they would provide the forms immediately.
The ambulance crew was knowledgeable and well i'
trained. All procedures were adequately demonstrated in a very conscientious manner.
All FEMA exercise objectives (2, 4, 6, 23) assigned to the Palacios VFD Ambulance Service were met.
l DEFICIENCIE8s None.
AREA 8 REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
89-8 Descriptions Although the plan sets 75 R as the maximum allowable exposure dose for emergency workers for lifesaving, the ambulance personnel only had 0-200 mR dosimeters. They had no way of ascertaining if and when they had reached the
)
maximum dose level. (NUREG 0654, Rev.1, K.3 a & b)
Recoatmendations The ambulance crew members should also be l
Issued emergency worker dosimetry kits with all appropriate l
equipment.
.l.-
s 52 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: None.
2.2.8 WAGNER GENERAL HOSPITAL The South Texas Radiological Emsrgency Preparedness Exercise conducted April 26, 1989 included an on-site emergency as well as an off-site medical drill. Wagner General Hospital was to participate only in the off-site drill.
However, due to a communications problem at the plant, Wagner General was notified at 8:20 a.m. that they would be receiving an injured contaminated patient as a result of the on-site emergency. The hospital called the plant to confirm the message and began preparing the staff and the radiological treatment area for patient arrival. At 9:25 a.m. the patient had not arrived and the Hospital called the plant and again received a message that the injured contaminated worker was being sent to the hospital.
This miscommunication resulted in the staff being dressed in protective clothing from 8:30 a.m. until the off-site drill in the afternoon.
The off-site medical drill was to occur at 12:30 p.m. but was not initiated until 1:54 p.m. when the hospital was notified by the Sheriff's office that an ambulance from the Palacios VFD had been dispatched to an off-site location.
At 1:58 p.m. the ambulance radioed the hospital that they were enroute to the patient's location. At 2:20 p.m. the ambulance contacted the hospital to inform them of the extent of the patient's injuries, vital signs, and that the patient was contaminated. The estimated time of arrivel at the hospital was also given. Radio communication was again established at 2:25 p.m. to provide specific information about contamination levels and location and an update on the patient's vital signs.
Upon arrival at the hospital, three State HPs were available to assist the ambulance and hospital personnel. Ambulance security was established and one of the State HPs promptly monitored and cleared the ambulance. This addressed one of the three recommendations made from the previous medical drill. As indicated above, hospital preparations were initiated much earlier in the day because of the miscommunication. Although preparation of the area was not observed, the hospital administrator indicated that three staff members set up the treatment area in approximately 14 minutes. This addressed a second recommendation from the previous medical drill in which preparation of the treatment area was accomplished by only or.e staff member. Patient decontamination was quickly and appropriately accomplished by the hospital personnel. They were fully dressed in protective clothing and dersonstrated knowledge of protective measures necessary to decontaminate the patient without further spreading contaminated material.
One State HP assisted personnel in the treatment area while another HP was at the buffer zone providing assistance as needed.
Contamination levels and location were properly charted. The third recommendation from the previous medical drill, covering the return air vent in the treatment room, was not resolved as the air vent was not covered.
Exit procedures from the treatment area were not observed as all emergency room personnel had to respond to an actual emergency just as this phase of the drill was beginning. These procedures were discussed with hospital personnel and it was obvious that the staff had received adequate training and knew the procedures.
,,4
..t
.h' All-FEMA emereise objectives (2,14, 24) assigned to Wagner General Hospital I
were met..
j l
DEFICIENCIES: None.
1 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:-
89-9 Description The return air duct in the treatment area was not covered to prevent the spread of contaminants. (NUREG 0654, Rev.1, L.1)
Recommendation Cover the air duct as required.
j i
l 2.3 UTILITY IMUES AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENTS
==
Description:==
The Site Area Emergency was declared at 9:41 a.m.
Hard copy was received at 10:01 a.m. The General Emergency was
, ['
declared at 9:25 a.m. Hard copy was not received at the State EOC
~,'
untti 10:25 a.m.
l Recommendation: This delay in receipt of hard copy notification from the utility should be investigated and corrected.
==
Description:==
There was some confusion at the State EOC about whether the releases were in REM or in MILLIREM. Messages 5 and l.
6 reported releases in REM. BRC called the State EOC.to report that the REM on each of these messages should be changed to MILLIREM.
Messages 7 and 8 reported MILLIREM releases.
Messages 9 and 10 reverted to REM.
Recommendation: This type of confusion could be eliminated by removing the pre-printed REM from the message form.
e
Description:
There were some problems with the timeliness and accuracy of information contained in a protective action
' recommendation issued from the STP EOC. The protective action recommendation to evacuate in Sectors M & N was rescinded and altered to sheltering in those areas. The message took 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 16 minutes to develop and transmit hard copy PARS over the fax machine to state and local offsite locations.
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$4 Recommendations The system used at the STP EOC to assure the~
i rapid transmission of information on PARS to the necessary locations should be monitored more closely by utility and State personnel to assure that all locations and the public are informed as t
promptly as possible.
- - Desertptions The controller packages for the State field monitoring teams and mobile lab were extremely confusing and diffleult for the field controllers to compute the necessary information required for field team input.
Recommendation: The controllers should be given the Information in the form required to drive the field team activity and not require the controllers-to make-extensive calculations to arrive at the necessary input.
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3 TRACRING SCHEDULE FOR STATE / LOCAL ACTION 8 TO CORRECT DEFICIRNCIES AND AREA 8 REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION
. Individual exercise site _ narratives, in Section 2 of this report, have provided'
- listings of. Defielencies and/or _ Areas Requiring Corrective
- Action, with recommendations, noted by the Federal evaluators during the April 26, 1989 exercise.
i The evaluations developed by the Federal evaluators were based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section !! of NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev 1 (November 1980), and preapproved exercise objectives.
1 The FEMA Region VI Director is responsible for certifying to the FEMA
. Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any Deficiencies and/or Corrective Actions noted in the exercise will be corrected, and that such corrections will be incorporated into emergency response plans as appropriate.
FEMA Region VI will request that the State of Texas, and Matagorda County, submit measures that they will or intend to take to correct those problems noted by the j
Federal evaluators. _ If corrective actions are necessary, FEMA Region VI will request that a detailed plan, including dates for scheduling and implementing the corrective actions, be provided if such actions cannot be Instituted immediately.
1 Table 1 provides, by exercise operating location or activity group, a consolidated summary of all Deficiencies and/or Areas Requiring Corrective Action.
As noted
- previously In this report,.there were no Deficiencies identified in the April 26, 1989 exercise. The table is designed so that space has been allowed to add _ (1) the proposed corrective actions that will be undertaken by the State or local jurisdiction, and (2) the projected and actual dates of completion.
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- TAst21 REIst9f A1. ACTIGIIS SUR TWE AftIL 26, 1999 SOUN TEEAS fB NECT SEERCISE.-
FE9IA peficiencies and/or Areas Requiring Esercise State (S) and
.Freposed FE80A Evoluetion of State and Acteet' Corrective Actions -- With FEsIA/RAC Objective NUREC 9M4 tacet (L) Freposed' Complettee Intel Corrective Actione and Completion j
'tecommendatione for Correction Wo(s)
Reference Corrective actions hete
- Deternimeties of Adequacy Date
! ' STFECS EOC (SEC OPERATIONS)
BEFICIENCIES: IIONE ASEAS REquit!NC CORRECTIVE ACT105:
89-1 coscriptions h tec headbete 4
F.1.4
~
radies used by the contamimeties controt and decon support teams were moeble to c-icate with the SBC staffe et the STF EOC and the BRC staging eres, h oe same radies were e ' source of problems is a previous esercise becesse of a very limited rense.
Recommendations h BBC radie
+
system should be improved to provide for continuous communication with field units.
' O 89-2 Descriptions h 38C and -the le 1.8 ctility use the same computer 1
program to calcatete dose projec-ties.
For some reason (one ef the proereme may not have had recent revistees incorporated) the projec-ted dose calcutettene gave different reoutte, en the tue computers, when using the same impet date.
An incorrect result could have adverse
'I.
effect en decision mekles.
Receamendations Review the new program revision for accuracy and update both campeters with the correct revision.
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TastA 1 REMEDIAL ACTIONS FOR TEE APRIL 26, 1999 S0WTW TEIAS FEIMBCT EIEBCSSE FEMA
'T Deficiencies and/or Areas Requiring Esercise State (S) and Proposed FEIIA Ewalestion of State and
. Actual 2 Carrective Actione - With FEMA /RAC Objective. WUREC 9634 I4 cal (L) Proposed Completion 14 cal Corrective Actices and Completion Qricommendatione for correction IIe(s)
Reference Corrective Actione Sete Determinatlee of aa y..,y Sete SRC C0erTAMIIIATI0d COIITROL TEAIIS DEFICIEIICIES: NOIIE AREAS REqtilRIIIC CORRECTIVE ACTICII:
89-1 Descriptions llandheld radios loseed 4
F.1.4 to the contamination Centrol Tease l
failed to function property. Coese-(
quently, there was no commmmication
't with the staging area or the STF EOC l
where the Field Team Coordinator wee located.
'(See ARCA 99-1 'under STFECS EOC (RRC OPERATICIIS)
Recommendat ion s The SRC -radio system should be improved to provide for continuous commmaicaties with field units.
".J.
IIATACORDA COUIITY EOC i
DEFICIENCIES: NOME paras agqstaggIc ensereTIVE ACTICIIs 39-3 Desc ript ion The eheriff*a deputy 6
E.3.a & b working with Centaminaties Centret Team #2 had enty one doelmeter (0 -
200mR) and no 718.
We did not l
appear totally knowledgeable about the radiological hasard threat.
dosimetry or personal protection actions.
Recommendations All personnel assigned access control point /
traffic control point duties should be provided proper emergency worker
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i TASLE 1 EEMEDIAL ACTieW5 pet 74 AretL 26,1999 90erTW TEIAS FSSJECT EEESCISE
~
FEMA-l Deficiencias and/or Areas Requiring Esercise.
State (5) and Proposed FDIA Ewelection of State and Actuel Corrective Actions - With FDIA/AAC Objective IIUREC 9654 14 cal (L) Freposed Complet ion t.ecel Corrective Actless and Completion -
Recosumendations for Correction Iso ( s).
Reference. Corrective Actione Date Setermination of Adequecy Sete MATACORDA COUNTY EOC (Continued)
AREOS REQUIRIuc CORRECTIVE ACTiest (Continued) 1 hits.
These kits should be' assembled at the County SOC and should include two direct ~ reading dosimeters, one
- TLD, a personal esposure/KI record card, K1 tablete s and an instruction card for use of this equipmeet.
39-4 Descriptions eso permanent record 6
E.3.s & b dosimeters were available for use by the Metasorda County emergency workers sent into the 10-mile plume EFE.
Also suitable ranges of direct-read dosimeters were not evaltablet a dosimeter is needed to measure higher levet esposures beyond the dosimeter currently avaltable (0-200mt).
guergency workers entering the ptome EFE did not have an esposure record card mer were appropriate written instructions issued atoms with the dosimeters distributed.
Recommendations Provide emergency verkers from Mategerde Ceesty who enter the to-mile EFE appropriate low and high range doelmeters as wett as -
permanent record dosimeters.
It is suggested that i
Attachment S of Revision 2 of the Commty plan be referenced as a guide for developing suitable instructions /recordkeeping for the 6
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TAsLE 1 REMEDIAL ACTISES FOR TWE AreIL 16, 1999 SeWTu TEMAS reeJECT EsseCIst
-,7 9
FEMA t;eficiencies and/or Arees Requiring.
Esercise State (5) and Proposed FEMA Ewelmation of State end Ac t' met Carrective Actions - With FEMA /RAC
'Ob}ective NUREC 06S4 tacet (L) Proposed Completion Local Corrective Actione end Completten Qascommendations for Correction No(s)
Reference Corrective Actions Date Seterminaties of A W y Sete.
i NATACORDA COUNTY EOC (Coatinmed) s.
AREAS REQUIRINC CORRECTIVE ACTION:
(Continued) emergency workers that address the
{
issues specified above.
The instructione ~ should inctode how to use the dosimetere, how often to read them, and what espesere limit is authorised.
89-S Description Fo11owing receipt of
~
the first protective action recommendation at 19:15 a.m.,
the decision to implement - this inittet protective action recommendation occurred at 19:20 a.m.
The ESS message eseociated with the first 12 E.S. E.6
- cp PAR was conveyed to EletS Radio et e
10:22 a.m.3 however, the siren wee not sounded as part of the first ESS message.
Recommendations To eneere that the sirene are sounded in conjunction with EsS, procederee' need to be followed to oesure that the strene are sounded, and that they are sounded before activation of ESS.
The county procedures need to be
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changed and the " County Emergency Response Procedores" board should steo be amended to inciede this procedure.
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.2 37 TASEA 1 AENEDIAL ACTIcus PSE 15E ArtiL 26, 1999 Seers TEIAS peSJECT EIERCESE FEMA
~
Deficiencies and/or Areas Regelring Esercise State (S) sad proposed FEMA Eveteettom of state and acteet Carrective Actione - With FEMA /RAC Objective NUREC 0654 Local (L) propeoed Complettee Lecel Corrective Actions med Completion'-
Cecommendations for correctice me(s)
Reference Corrective Actione sete Determimeties of Adequecy.
Date 8eATAC0804 CDUNTY ESC (Contieved) 13 AREAS REQUltlNC CORRECTIVE ACTIOWs (Contiemed) 82-6 Descriptions The first two ESS E.S. 6, 7 messages did met costate descrip-C.4, tiene of evecostion routes or where C.4.c the public le to be evacuateds the Ess is the primary method for public receipt of this informaties.
ESS message. f2 wee confeeing and teaccurate as to which semes were previoesty evacuated up until that
- time, and with regard to which additiomet sones were
.to be avecented.
Nessages 3 and 4 imetoded descriptioase of reception j
eentero deelgested for specific
- semes, but this lepercent n
4 leformation was met repeated consistently.
Furthermore, EeS messages 7, 8,
and 9 were met accurate as to whether some 14 wee
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facteded as port of the sheltering i
protective action. Finetty, moes of the ESS messages addressed sheltering er imetractione for transients withe =t ehetter.
- Atee, ed hoc respiratory protection eneseres were not presented and eene of the ESS messages addressed what i
to take or leave behind when ewecuating.
Recommendations Trelaims is required to address att of the shortcomings concerning public instructione noted during the esercise.
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TAaLE 1 REMEstAL ACitems pet Tus AreIL 26, 1989 SSWTW TEIAS FeeJOCT EIEscist' FEMA Deficiencies and/or Areas Requiring Esercise State (S) and Proposed FEMA Eveteetion of' State and Actuel Carrective Actione - With FEMA /RAC Objective WUREC 9654 tacet (L) Propeeed completion Lacet corrective Actione end _Camytetten R2 commendations for Correction We(s)
Sefetence Corrective Actione Sete Detersimetion of % y mete cECEPTICII CENTER (NOMITORING/
DECollTANIIIATICII FUNCTION)
DEFICIENCIES: IIONE AREAS REQUIR111C CosaECTIVE ACTION:
39-1
Description:
There wee me adequate 4
F.1.4 backup communicatione system available.
(See ARCA 89-1 under STFECS EOC (DRC OPERATICIOS)
Rec osamenda tion s The OSC radie system should be improved to provide for continuous communication with fi le esite.
t 89-7 Descriptions The CDV-F60s need by 21 E.10 the radiation monitors were test on.
calibrated in August, 1987.
y Recommendatient CSV-700 eurvey Instrumente should be calibrated-annually when used in the BEF program in accord with FEIIA-REP-2, tevielen 1.
.t PALACIOS VFD ANGULAIICE SERVICE '
DEFICIEIICIESI IIDIIE AREAS REQUIRIWC CORRECTIVE ACTIOWs 89-8 Descriptions Althench the plan sets 6
E.3.s 6 b R as the mesiones alloueble yg esposure dose for emergency workere, the ambetence crew only had 0-200me dosimeters.
They had me - way of ascertaining if and when they had reached the monimum dose levet.
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TABLE 1. REMEM AL ACTicWS FOR TWE APRIL 26, 1999 Seems TEIAS FSOJSCT ERESCISE-FEMA
. Proposed FEMA Eveteetion of State and Actmet:
Deficiencies and/or Areas Requiring Esercise State (5) and. Complettom Local Corrective Actione and Completi se.
Carrective Actione - With FDIA/RAC Objective IIUREC 0654 Local (L) Proposed Recommendations for Correction IIo(s )
-Reference Corrective Actions Sete Setersimation of Adegency tote PALACIOS VFD AIIsutAIICE SERVICE (Continued)
AREAS REQIf18111C CORRECT!YE ACTION:
(Continued)
Recommendation The ambulance crew membero should aloe be leaved emergency worker deelnetry kite with att appropriate equipment.
WACIBER CEIIERAL IIOSPITAL DEFICIEIICIES:,IIDIIE AREAS RE.pl1RIIIC CORRECTIVE ACTICIIs 89-9 Descriptions The return air doet in 24 L.1 the treatment area wee not covered to prevent the spread of contaminants.
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Recommendations Cover the air duct as required.
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4 EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES 4.1 Summary of FEMA Objectives Remaining to be Met Table 2 provides a consolidated-listing of those FEMA objectives which, according to the FEMA RAC Chairman, have not been satisfactorily met or tested, and which should be incorporated into exercise objectives on or by the sixth year of the six-year exercise cycle in which all objectives must be tested and met. These objectives should be considered in the development of future exercise objective lists; as well as
.those FEMA objectives which, although previously tested, and satisfactorily demonstrated, must be tested and evaluated during any full-participation exercise of off-site State and local response capabilities.
4.2 FEMA Objectives Treeking - South Texas Project Table 3 provides a comprehensive tracking system of all FEMA exercise objectives, NUREG 0684 Reference Elements, latest exercise objectives, jurisdictional responsibilities, exercise dates, identified deficiencies and/or required corrective actions, and the date that specific FEMA objectives were met by State and local agencies. This system will track the progress and status of this data through the six-year exercise cycle in which all FEMA objectives must be tested and met.
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TAmt2 2 gummary of FEMA Objectives to be Not.
I FEMA Objective and'NUREG Reference Jurisdiction
~.
- 29. Demonstrate ability to project dosage States Not tested to the public via ingestion pathway 4/8/87 exposure, based on field detal and to j
determine appropriate protective j
. measures based on PACS and other relevant factors.
- 30. Demonstrate ability to implement State and'locall protective actions for ingestion Not tested 4/8/87 l
pathway hasards (J.9, J.10.a/s).
j
- 32. Demonstrate ability to determine Matagorda County:
appropeiste measures for controlled Partially met reentry and recovery based on 4/8/87 and 4/26/89 estimated population exposure, avall-able EPA PACS and other relevant factors.
34.
Demonstrate the ability to maintain State and localt staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis.Not tested 4/8/87 by an actual shift change.
and 4/26/89 l
- 35. Demonstrate ability to support an Matagorda Countyt orderly evacuation of on-site Not tested 4/8/87 personnel (J.2).
- 36. Demonstrate the ability to carry out State and locals emergency functions (i.e. activate Not tested 4/8/87 i
EOCs, mobilise staff at EOCs establish and 4/26/89 communications and complete call-down ll during unannounced or off-hours drill ll or exercise.
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' TAetA 3 FERIA EXERCISE OBJECTIVES TRACKIEC CBAST '
30WWW TEEAS PBSJECT EIACTRIC CENERATINC STATION '
Page'I of al Deficiency er Area
~
objective meq.tring correct 1we mate at this ~ Jeriodictionat NUREC e654 Esercise Responsibility. Date of.
Action (by Tracking Objective IInt-FEMA Objective Member and Description
' Reference (Ves/We)
State Local Esercies "Ilumber and ente)_
state ' ' t.ecet(s) -
l OBJECTIVE 1 - (Old Obj. No. 37) 0.4 (S&L)
Yes x
x 4/26/e9 4/26/e91.4/26/e9-ESIERCEIICY CLASSIFICATION LEVELS
' Osmonstrate the ability to monitor, understand l
and see emergency closetticetten tevole (ECL) through the appropriate. implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to the ECLe ceJEcrivE 2 - (014 Obj. me.1 & 6)
E.1, E.2, t.s Yes x
x 4/26/e9 -
4/26/es 4/26/e9 IIOetL12AT10e OF ESIERCENCY Pggenumrt (ggt)
Demonstrate the ability to fatty siert, mobillae l
and activate personnet for both facility and Elste beoed emergency functione OSJECTIVE 3 - (Old Obj.'Bo. 3)
A.L.4, A.t.a.
Yes x
-x 4/26/e9 4/26/e9 4/26/09 A.2.s (S&L)
SIRECTICII AIID COIITSOL Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and contret emergency activities
, m OsJECTtvE 4 - (Old obj. no. 3)
C.3.a. u.2.,
Yes x
x 4/26/s, '
AmCA e9-1 4/26/e9 '
4/26/e9 4/26/e9 N.3 (S&L)
Sec OPN5/EOC,-
ColeIUBtCAftops contamination semenstrate the ability to communicate with all Centret Teams, appropriate tocatione, organisations and field neception Conter pereennet OsJECitvE S - (0:4 Obj. IIe. 4)
J.to.. ' J.to.h -
Yes x
x 4/26/e9 4/26/e9 4/26/09 FACILITIES. EQUIPIIEllT AIID DISPLAYS C.3.e, 5.2, N.3 Demonstrate the adequecy of facilities, (36L) equipment, displays and other meterlate to support emergency operatione s
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TAsts 3 FEMA EIRECISE OBJECTIVES 7EACKINC CBART SelftB TEIAS reOJECT SIACTRIC CENERAT!WC STATICII Page 2 of 8-I Objective Deficiency or Aree.
at this Juriedictionet tegelries Cserective sete NUREC 0654 Emercise keepensibility Date of.
Actles (by Treebing Objective IIst, FEMA Objective Number and Description Reference' (Yes/No)
State Imcal Emereise he and Date)
State Emset(s).
4 OeJECTIVE 6 - (Old Obj. IIo. 20)
E.3.a. E.3.6 Tee x
x 4/26/e9 AaCA 89-3 4/26/99 4/26/09 4/26/09 EMERCEIICY WORKER EXPOSURE ColffBOL (S&L)
IIstagorda Co. SSC Demonstrate the ability to continuously soaltor
.. AACA 994 4/26/09 -
and contret emergency worker esposure IIstagorde Co. SOC AmCA $9-8 4/26/09 Felecles VFD Ambetence Service CnJECTavt 7 - (Old Obj. IIo. 7) 1.s. I.11 Yes 1
4/26/e9
-4/26/s9 FIELD MONITORINC (3) i Demonstrate, the appropriate equipment and '
procedures fer determiales field radiation measurements DeJECTIVE 8 - (Old Obj. No. 8)
I.9 (S)
Yes 1
4/26/09 4/26/09-RADIOIODINE SAIIPLIsIC Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for the messerement of airbornj radiolodine concentratione as low as to-a microcuries per cc in the presence of noble aseses I
i OsJECTivE 9 - (IIew Objective)
I.e. I.11 Yes 1
4/26/t?
. 4/26/e9 FARTICULATE SAMPLIIIC '
(S) i sanometrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity la the airborne plume end promptly perform field amanysis I
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TABLE 3 FERIA EIsactSE ceJeCTIVES TRACKluC cuest SOUTM TREAS FEDJECT EEACTRIC CE M EATlWC STATIe5 p.g. 3 g g' Deficiency or Aree Objective. Jurisdictienet Regelring Corrective Sete at thle
(
NUREG 06S4 Esercise Responsibility Date of Action (by Tracking Objective test i
FEMA Objective Ilumber and Description Reference (Ves/No)
State
. Local Esercise h r and Dete)-
.. Steta Lacet(s).
i 4/26/09 ARCA 89-2 4/26/09 ~
'4/26/09/
osJECTIVE 10 - (Old Obj. No. 19)
I.te (S)
Yes E
Pt.tpeE DOSE PROJECTICII GRC operatione et STFECS BOC
' Demometrate the ability, within the plume
+
exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume espesore, beoed en plant and
~~-
fiste data ceJECTIVE 11 - (otd obj. pe. to)
J.to (S) ve.
x 4/26/09 4/26/op PLimit raOTECTIVE ACfl0N DECISIONS h etrate the ability to sehe appropriate prstective action declaions, beoed on projected er actual dosage, EPA PACS, availability of s.dequats ehetter, etc.
csJECTIVE 12 - (old obj. no. 13)
E.6 App. 3 ve.
1 4/26/e9 AaCA 99-S 4/26/09
- 4/26/09 FUSLIC ALESTINC AIIO Li3ftFICAT105 (L)
Metegorda Co. BBC h etrate the ability to initially alert the-Ob public within the to-elle EFE and begin 4-dissemination of an instructional message within 13 elmetes of a decielen by appropriate State and/or tecet official (s)
OBJECTIVE 13 - (Old obj. No. 14 & 25)
E.3, E.F.
Yes I
1 4/26/89
' ARCA 99-6 4/26/09 4/26/09 4/26/09 DetacEteCT F485LIC ttBF0EstAf tg C.4.b (S&L)
Stategerde Co. SDC Denometrate the ability to coordinate the fsrentation med diesemination of accurate infermetion and instructions to the public la a timely fashion after the inittet sisrt/ notification has occurred.
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~
Objective Deficiency or Area at.this Jurisdictionat.
Rep iring Corrective puREC 0654 Esercise Seepensibility Date of Action (by Tracklag Date-FEMA Objective Number and Description Reference (Yes/pe)
State Imcal Esercise Ilumber and Dete)
. Objective Isot State Emcel(s)
.i 1
OBJECTIVE 14 - (Old obj. Ilo. 24)
C,3.a. C.4.s Yes I
I 4/26/09'
4/24/09 4/26/09 -
MfJIA SSIEFIIICS (S&L)
Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated and timely meaner osJECTIVE 15 - (014 Obj. me. 26)
C.4.c (Sat) vee I
I 4/26/09 ~
4/26/st 4/24/e9.
aunoa Conta0L h atrate the ability to estabiloh an6 operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion osJECTIVE 16 - (Old obj. No. 21 & 22)
J.10.e, J.10.f Yes I
I 4/26/99 4/26/09 4/26/09 KI FOR ENERCEI8CY If0EKERS (S&L)
Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers and isttitutionalised persons, as weit as to distribute and adminleter it esce the decleien has been made
. g, -
OBJECTIVE 17 - (Old Obj. Ilo. 21422)
J.10.e J.10.f IIe KI FOR TIIE Cgearmu pIIBLIC (S&L) h atrate the ability to make the decleion, if l
the State plan specifies to recomonad the use of 2
Et for the generat public, as well as to distribute and adelaister it esce the decielee has been made 1
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j Pags 3 of 8 j
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l Objective Deficiency or Area
' Date
- 1 at thle Jeriodictional Seysiring Corrective FEMA objective thsaber sad Beecription Reference (Yes/No)
State Lacal Esercise he and Oste)
. Objective Hets_
WUREC 3654 Esercise Beepensibility - Bote of Actles (by Trackleg State.
Local (s),
DeJECTIVE 18 - (Old obj. No. 15 & 18)
J.9. J.10 Yes 1
4/26/09
- 4/26/09 ptAINE pa0TECTIVE ACTIONS (S&L)
Demonstrate the abilitF and researcos necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted plume EF2 pop =1stice' OBJECT 1WE 19 - (Old Obj. No. 19)
J.9, J.10.g Yes X
.4/26/09 4/26/09 SCN00L pe0TECTIVE ACTIONS (L)
Demeestrate the ability and researces necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for scheet children within the plume Ep1 OsJEcrivE 20 - (Old Obj. me. 16 & 17)
J.to.J. J.10.k Yes 1
4/26/09 4/26/09-TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL (96L)
Demonstrate the orgaminatienst ability and rseeurces necessary te centret ewecestfee traf fic flew and to centret access to evacosted and sheltered areas o-ceJECTtyt 21 - (Old Obj. No. 27)
J.12 (L)
Yes 1
I 4/26/09 AACA 99-7 4/26/09
.4/26/09 4/26/09, RECI5TRATION. Nout10BINC AND DECON.
Pelselee Seceptise Demeostrate the adequecy of procedures.
' Conter i
tscilities. equipment er,d perseenet for the resistration, radiotesical meelteries ar.d decentaminaties of evacuees OsJECTavt 22 - (Old Obj. No. 2e)
J.14.h (L)
Yes 1
4/26/e9 4/26/e9-CONCaECATE CASE OF EVACUEES Demeestrate the adequacy of facilities, og sipment and perseemet for the congregate cose af evacuees
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TABLE 3 ' pSIth EEESCISE OSJECTATES TEAttlIIC CEART -
90W15 TEIAS FEBJECT ELECTRIC CEMBaff5C STATION
.Page 6 et S,
Deficiency or Aree' Objective. Jurisdictional
- seguiring Corrective tote at this MUREC 0634 Esercise Respemelbility Date of
- Action (by Tracting Objective seat ~
FEMA Object!we Ilumber and Description Reference (Ves/Ilo)
State
- tacet Esercise Number and Date)
. State
'Lacet(s).
,4/26/09 DeJECTtvE 23 - (Old Obj. No. 30)
L.4 (L)
Yes 1
4/26/09 n.
EMERCEIICY IIEDICAL TRANSPORTATICII Denometrate the adegescy of vehicloe, equipment, s
procedures and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured or esposed individuate ceJECT!vE 24 - (Old obj. me. 31)
L.! (L)
Vee
~I ARCA 99-9 4/26/09
~4/26/09 IEE*ICAL SERVICES FActLITIES Ilmener Comeret Demonstrate the adequacy of hospital facilities, Beopital l
squipment, procedores and pereennet for headling contaminated injured or esposed individuate OBJECTIVE 23 - (Old obj. 11o. 29)
K.S.a. K.S.b Vee X
X 4/26/89' 4/26/09 '4/26/09?
DECOIITAMIIRAT1011 (L)
Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, procedures and persoonel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment sad vehicles, and for weste disposal
-J als/sr 4/s/sr
-O OsJECTIVE 26 - (Old obj. me. 32 & 35)
C.t.a. C.4 II.
x x
StIFFLDIEIITARY ASSISTAIICE (FED /0TWER)
(S&L)
Denometrate the ability to identify the need for and catt upon Federal and other estelde empport (stacles for assistahce OeJECTavE 27 - (Old obj. no. 9) 1.8 (s) no x
4/s/87-1IICESTROII PATIIWAY SAIIP*.C N 8 *rTICII Demonstrate the appropriate use of equipment and procedures for collection and transport of samples of vegetation, food crepe, eith, meet, poettry, water and salmal feede I
i
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l 4
. p
.~.s g.,
m
.v 3;;
M
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TAsts 3 rana Essocisa ceJECTivEs TRACElec cumaY 6
l 305t5 TRIAS re0 JECT ELECTRIC CENERATIuc STATION
' Fase F of e a
' Deficiency or Aree ObjectEve Beguiring Corrective Bote et this Jurisdictiomet' I
uuREC 0654 Esercise aesponsibility Date of Actice (by Trocking '
objective IIst.
FEMA Objective Number and Description Reference (fee /No)
State tacal Esercise Number and Oste)
. State
.lmeet(e)
OsJEcTast 2e - (Old Obj. me. 9) 1.s (s) u.
x 4/s/sr '
INCESTICII 1ABORATORY OPERAf t0NS Denometrate the appropriate laboratory operatione and procedures for analysing samples obtained under objective 27 by fletd teeme OBJECTIVE 29 - (Old 06). Iso. !!)
s.le, 1.11, so 1
INCESTIou cost re0 JECT 1011 J.!! (s) h atrete the ability to project dosage to the puttic for ingestion pathvey esposure and to
~,
estermine appropriate protective measures booed en field data, FCA Pace and other relevent factore OSJECTIVE 30 - (Old Obj. No. 11)
J.9, J.tt No
-I 1IICESTI011 FeOTECT1VE ACTIOII IIIPLE.
(S)
Demonstrate the ability to implement both preventive and emergency protective actions for g
ingestion pathway hacerde
- p ceJECTavE 31 - (014 Obj. me. 33) n.4 (s)-
se x-4/s/sr TOTAL POPUt.ATICII EXPOStIRE Demeestrate the ability to estieste total population esposure ceJECTIVE 32 - (Old Obj. No. 34)
II.! (S&L) m I
E ASCA 37-3 4/8/0F 4/8/8F Fortletty~
metas*rds Co. sec met.
COIrfa01.1.ED arr. uter Amo ascott.ar 4/8/97 Demonstrate the ability to determine oppropriate Co. OSC meteures for controtted reentry and recovery based on estimated populatten esposure, EFA Face and other relevant factore 1
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- TacLE 3 regen EssectSE csJECTeVes Teatzlec cuant SOWN TEEAS PetBJECT EtaCMIC CEMEATING STATEGB Page 8 of 8' Deficleocy er Aree objective sep iring Corrective--
ante at this Jurisdictleast utisEC e654 Esercise Respemelbility teste of.
Action (by Tracklas
~ ebjective sent.
FEMA Objective Ilumber and Beecription Reference (Ves/Wo)
State f.ecet. Esercies Number and Sote).
State EmeeHe) ri 4/26/89 ceJECTIVE 33 - (Old Obj. No. 34)
N.1 (S&L)
Yes X
4/26/09' REENftY AND RECOVERY llertmeENTAT10Il
~
Demonstrate the ability to implement appropriate mezcures for controtted reentry and recovery -
OBJECTIVE 34 - (Old Obj. Ilo. 2)
A.2.s. A.4 10 0
_I I
24 1000E STAFFluC (S&L)
Denometrate the ability to maintain staf fing on a centinuous 24-hour basis by an acteet ehlft change-OeJECTIVE 35 - (Old Obj. Iso. 23)
J.2 (L) aso X
X EVActlATIOli 0F 000 SITE PERSOIIIIEL Demonstrate the ability to coordinate assistance to the evacuation of on-site pereoanet OBJECTIVE 36 - (re-1 sep irement)
PR-1 so X
X ma-en ARID OFF IIOURS OPERATIONS
. 4 Demonstrate the abit'. # to carry out emergency ea functions (i.e.,
act.. ete EOCs, mobitise etsf f at Eoce, establish communications and complete catt-doum duties --
-- ed or pff-heers dritt cr esercise
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