ML20078D549
| ML20078D549 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1994 |
| From: | Link B WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-94-082, CON-NRC-94-82 VPNPD-94-119, NUDOCS 9411040277 | |
| Download: ML20078D549 (36) | |
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Wisconsin ililt>CtTIC POWER COMPANY 231 W Michigart PO Bou 2046. Mdwoukee. WI 53201-2046 (414)221 2345 l
VPNPD-94-119 NRC-94-082 October 31, 1994 i
Document Control Desk U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
DOCKETS 50-266 AND 50-301 RESPONSE TO THE REOUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING REOUEST FOR EXEMPTION FROM THE REOUIREMENTS OF SECTION III.G OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50 FOR THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM-POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNITS 1-AND 2 On September 13, 1994 and October 13, 1994,'the Nuclear l
Regulatory Commission transmitted requests for additional information regarding our August 5, 1994, request for exemption from the requirements of Section III.G of' Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 for the auxiliary feedwater pump room.
We have reviewed the l
information request and have provided~our responses in the enclosed attachments.
Please contact us if you have any questions, or require any additional information.
i l
j Sincerely,
/
t Ls / ;
Bob Link Vice President Nuclear Power FDP/jg Enclosure g0[F,'
cc:
NRC Regional Administrator, Region III NRC Resident Inspector l l(
9411040277 941031 l(
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ATTACHMENT 1 RESPONSE TO THE REOUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APPENDIX R EXEMPTION REOUEST 1.0 In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12 (a) (2),
provide an explanation of the special circumstances that are present with regard to the auxiliary feedwater pump room that qualify this area for consideration of an exemption under this part of the regulation.
Describe why compliance with section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 is not readily achievable in this fire area.
Response
Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 implemented fire protection requirements that address the issues of safe shutdown l
capability, emergency lighting, reactor coolant pump lubrication, and alternate shutdown systems.
Our request for exemption concerns itself with Point Beach Nuclear Plant's safe shutdown capability.
While the original configuration of the auxiliary feedwater pump room did not meet all of the requirements of Appendix R Section III.G or III.L, modifications that have been completed and those that have been proposed in the August 5, 1994, request for exemption will serve the underlying purpose.of the rule.
Additionally, strict compliance with Section III.G or III.L of Apper. dix R would result in undue hardship and other costs that are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted.
Compliance with the regulation would necessitate a complete redesign of the auxiliary feedwater pump room.
The implementation of this redesign would be costly because it would require significant plant modifications to comply with the prescribed separation criteria in Section III.G.
For' example, this would require construction of 3-hour, fire-rated barriers around each auxiliary feedwater pump or the relocation of the auxiliary feedwater pumps to meet the 20-foot horizontal separation criteria, as well as the rerouting of electrical cabling located within the separation space between redundant trains of Appendix R safe shutdown components.
Therefore, in accordance with Part (iii) of 10 CFR 50.12, Wisconsin Electric Power Company, the licensee for Point l
Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, requests exemption for 1
Fire Area A23 from the separation requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.b which states:
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" Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards.
In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area."
l Wisconsin Electric requests exemption from the above prescriptive requirements for two separate configurations l
within Fire Area A23.
First, the auxiliary feedwater l
pumps and associated cables in the fire area are located approximately 14 feet apart on center, contrary to the 20-foot horizontal separation requirement.
- Second, intervening combustibles, in the form of cables in cable trays, are located within the separation space between i
redundant trains of Appendix R safe shutdown cables and I
components.
Wisconsin Electric believes that plant safe shutdown capability can be achieved with the existing configuration of safe shutdown components and fire protection features provided in this fire area.
This arrangement satisfies the l
intent of the separation requirements in Section III.G.2.b of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R and therefore the requested exemption should be granted.
l 2.0 Describe the type of automatic suppression system provided j
in the auxiliary feedwater pump room and the level of l
compliance with any applicable National Fire Protection l
Association (NFPA) standards.
Include an evaluation of the fire detection systems compliance with the applicable NFPA l
standard for protective signaling systems.
Include an evaluation of the adequacy of the protection provided for the in-situ and transient fire hazards present in this area.
Response
An automatic, total flooding Halon 1301 fire suppression j
system is currently provided for the auxiliary feedwater l
pump room.
This multi-zone fire suppression system is i
designed to discharge halon into one of three separate fire areas; the auxiliary feedwater pump room, 4KV vital switchgear room, or cable spreading room.
Directional valves are installed in the halon piping network to auto-matically direct halon flow to the fire area where the fire is detected.
A sufficient quantity of halon gas is available to provide the necessary halon design concen-tration for any one of these rooms.
This Halon system is designed as a single active failure proof system to assure automatic system actuation.
It has one reserve halon storage bottle on the main bank of storage bottles and is 2
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designed to automatically dump an entire reserve bank of halon storage bottles should the main bank fail to discharge.
NFPA 12A-1980, "Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems,"
was used as the design guideline and basis for the system design, installation, and testing of this system.
The system is designed in accordance with NFPA-12A to provide a halon discharge time of ten seconds providing a minimum halon concentration of 5 percent throughout the auxiliary feedwater pump room for a soak time of 10 minutes.
The actual halon concentration in the auxiliary feedwater pump l
room achieved during the initial acceptance functional test was between 6 and 9 percent for the 10 minute soak time.
j The Halon system may be actuated manually or automatically, j
It may be manually actuated at the local control panels or by actuating the dump valves at the agent storage containers.
It will be automatically actuated by the cross-zoned fire detection system installed throughout the auxiliacy feedwater pump room fire area.
NFPA 72D, " Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems" and NFPA 72E, " Standard on Automatic Fire Detectors" were used as the design guidelines for the design, installation and testing of this fire detection system.
The fire detection system provides alarms both locally and in the control room.
The fire detection system consists of both rate compensation heat detectors and early warning, photo-electric smoke detectors.
The actuation of one heat detector or one smoke detector from each of two detection zones will automatically actuate the Halon system.
l This fire protection system design is considered adequate to detect and control a fire involving'the in-situ and transient fire hazards expected in the auxiliary feedwater l
pump room.
The in-situ combustibles consist mainly of l
combustible cable jacketing material in cable trays and a small amount of lubricating oil associated with the auxiliary feedwater pumps.
Further information is provided in our responses to Questions 3 and 4.
Transient combus-tibles are controlled in this room by administrative control procedures that limit and monitor the type, quantity, and location of transient combustibles in the room.
l 3.0 Describe the types and applications of all cables that l
are considered as intervening combustibles and present an I
exposure hasard to the redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment and cabling.
Specify if the cables are IEEE-383 qualified or not and whether the cables are used for power, i
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i' control or instrumentation.
Provide a diagram showing all cable trays that are considered as a intervening combustible between redundant trains of all safe shutdown i
components located in this fire area, including those_
addressed under the 1985 exemption.
Identify the function of the existing cable tray located at the northern and of the auxiliary feedwater pump room depicted in Attachment 2 of the August 5, 1994, exemption request that is not labeled.
1
Response
The requested information concerning the cables that are considered as intervening combustibles is contained in A diagram showing all cable trays that are considered as intervening combustibles is provided in Attachments 7 and 8.
The cable tray at the northern end of a
the auxiliary feedwater pump room that was not identified
)
in our previous submittal is FV03 and is indicated on l.
Additionally, it should be noted that the majority of cables installed in-the auxiliary feedwater' pump room are not IEEE~383 qualified because_they are original i
plant design.
However, all of'the cables installed'as part of the diesel generator addition project are.IEEE 383
(
qualified.
4.0 Provide an evaluation of the actual combustible loading that could present an exposure hasard to the redundant _ trains of safe shutdown equipment and cabling, where an alternative method does not exist outside the auxiliary feedwater pump room.
Include the_ locations, types and concentrations of the intervening combustibles relative to the location of-the safe shutdown components, where alternative shutdown capability does not exist, outside of this fire area.
Response
As described in our August 5, 1994 submittal, there are three primary types of combustibles that could present an exposure hazard to the redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment and cabling in the room.
At the present time there is no alternate shutdown capability completely independent of the auxiliary feedwater pump room.
The three primary types of combustibles are:
1.
Cable jacketing materials associated with cables routed in cable trays and conduit in the room. The combustible loading associated with cable in conduit is included'in 4
e our combustible loading calculations, however, for the purpose of this response, only cable in cable trays is considered to represent a potential fire exposure hazard.
2.
Lubricating oil associated with the auxiliary feedwater pumps.
- 3. Transient combustibles that might be introduced in the room associated with maintenance or other work activities in the room.
Combustible Cable in Cable Travs There is approximately 184,000 ft of cable, including the amount installed as part of the diesel generator addition project, representing a total heat load of less than 6
553 x 10 BTUs of combustible cable jacketing material routed in cable trays and conduit in the room.
With a 2
floor area of approximately 3713 ft, this represents a 2
combustible loading of 148,000 BTU /ft,
The combustible loading / fire hazard for this room is classified by our Fire Protection Program as a moderate combustible loading / ordinary hazard.
This classification method is based on standard fire protection engineering practice recognized by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and Factory Mutual Engineering Corporation (FMEC).
An area with a moderate combustible loading is defined, by 2
our program, as having, on average, preater than 10 lbs./ft and less than or equal to 25 lbs./ft of combustible 2
material.
This translates to between 100,000 BTU /ft and 2
200,000 BTU /f t combustible loading per net floor area.
This is considered equivalent to a 2-hour ASTM E-119 standard time-temperature fire exposure lased on a method of classifying building fire loading contained in the National Fire Protection Association Handbook.
This handbook is commonly referenced in the nuclear industry.
The majority of the cable in this fire area is non-IEEE 383 rated cable.
The cables are located uniformly about eight feet off the floor.
Most of the exposed cabling is routed in cable trays in the east-west direction across the room, with the exception of three cable trays that extend in the north-south direction across the 20-foot separation zone between the FU and FR trays.
These three cable trays will be covered with metal tray covers as described in our August 5, 1994, and September 9, 1994, submittals.
1 l
e The routing of the cable trays of concern and those in the 20-foot intervening separation space are shown in l
Attachments 7 and 8.
As described in our previous sub-mittals, this cable tray arrangement does not provide a combustible pathway for fire to spread across the separation space between redundant safe shutdown cables and equipment in the room.-
This arrangement of combustibles, in combination with the complete automatic halon fire suppression and fire detection system installed throughout the room, makes it very unlikely that a fire could spread across the room to affect redundant safe shutdown cables or equipment.
Lubricatino Oil in the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps There is_approximately 1/2 gallon of lubricating oil associated with each of the four auxiliary ~feedwater pumps.
1 The lubricating oil is contained within the pump and can only potentially become ignited if it is sprayed onto a hot surface which raises its temperature above the flash point of approximately 380*F.
Each pump is located in a separate L
cubicle which is only open at the front (see Attachments 7 l
and 8).
This small quantity of oil is not expected to 2
spread over an area of more than 25-30 ft even'if.the entire quantity of oil was spilled out on the floor.
This spill would be confined to the general vicinity of the pump, l
with the majority of it remaining within the boundaries of l
the cubicle walls.
At worst case, there is a potential for a fire involving the oil to spread to any cable trays routed l
through a specific cubicle and.along the cable tray.
How-ever, since the cable trays jn the area above the pump cubicles are only routed in the east-west direction, there is no combustible pathway for a fire to spread in the north-south direction between redundant safe shutdown cables and components in the room.
In addition, the automatic halon fire suppression and fire detection system is expected to detect and extinguish or control the spread of fire in the room.
Transient Combustibles Transient combustible materials and hot work activities at Point Beach are administratively controlled by procedure and a permitting system.
The type and quantity of materials used in the room are controlled through this program.
Combustible and flammable liquids are required to be main-tained and handled in limited quantities and in approved containers.
Storage of any transient combustible materials in this safe shutdown area are restricted, unless absolutely necessary, and then only for a limited time.
Trained plant 6
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l personnel evaluate any transient combustibles for their potential fire exposure hazard to equipment in the roon.
Plant personnel also monitor the program, as well as ensure that combustibles are removed from the area as soon as possible.
Because of the administrative control of combustibles and work activities in this safe shutdown area, it is unlikely that there would be enough transient combustible materials present to create a fire exposure.that could spread over such a large area between redundant safe shutdown cables and components.
Any transient combustible fire that might occur could potentially propogate to cable trays directly over-head.
However, there is no combustible pathway for the fire to spread in the north-south direction between redundant safe shutdown cables and components.
l 5.0 Provide the fire test data or engineering analysis concerning the flame spread and fire resistance performance of cable tray assemblies provided with sheet metal covers and a single layer of ceramic fiber blanket as described in the August 5 1994, exemption request.
Response
On December 29, 1978, Wisconsin Electric submitted responses to NRC Staff positions PF-40 through PF-49 for the Point Beach fire protection review.
These positions were trans-l mitted to Wisconsin Electric on August 14, 1978.
PF-42 l
dealt with fire protection concerns in the cable spreading l
l room.
One of the concerns identified by the NRC questioned the use of cable tray covers.
We stated, in our 1978 l
response, that the-use of covered cable trays provides improved levels of fire prevention by eliminating the i
I potential accumulation'of foreign combustibles and cable i
exposure to potential ignition sources.
This conclusion is supported by SAND 78-1456, "A Preliminary Report on Fire Protection Research Program Fire Barriers and Fire Retardant Coatings Tests".
l This report demonstrates that an exposure fire to a totally
[
enclosed tray containing IEEE 383 rated cables,'similar to i
our proposed cable tray configuration, will self extinguish and will not propagate outside of the involved tray.
Addi-l tionally, the use of metal cable tray covers is recognized l
by the NRC Staff in Generic Letters 83-33 and 86-10 as a j
method'of retarding fire propagation along grouped cables in cable trays that present an intervening combustible between redundant trains.
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6.0 Provide specific details concerning the cable tray " fire breaks" installed in each and of the enclosed trays.
Include the type of material used and the fire test or industry standard used to qualify the assembly as an adequate fire stop.
Response
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The intent in providing fire' breaks is to limit flame j
propagation through passive protection.
The proposed fire l
break design has been fire tested and approved by American l
Nuclear Insurers in accordance with the requirements in Revision 0 of American Nuclear Insurer's " Guidelines for Cable Tray Fire Breaks", dated November 1987.
Each cable tray fire break will consist of nine inches of silicone foam 1
with one inch of carborundum fiberfax damming material on i
each side.
The silicone foam will fill the full depth of l
the cable tray.
Additionally, this fire break will be covered by a metal tray cover t least three feet in length, centered over the fire stop.
A representative drawing of the proposed fire break is provided in Attachment 2.
l 7.0 Verify that an adequatw hose stream can be applied from the l
floor level by fire brigade personnel to extinguish a fire i
l involving the cable trays or equipment in the auxiliary feedwater pump room using the home station installed on the north side of the fire area.
Response
Fire attack plans have been developed to provide training guidance, to fire brigade members, for combating potential j
fires that could occur in the auxiliary feedwater pump room.
In general, the fire brigade would be directed to combat and control any fire in progress in the general area of the auxiliary feedwater pump room.
Once such a fire had been extinguished or adequately controlled, the fire brigade t
would then search for and combat any localized fire involving the overhead cable trays.
A fire that might occur within the covered cable trays la expected to be contained within the' trays.
The trays sould be cooled using available hose streams.
At some point, the fire brigade may decide to remove the tray covers for cleanup operations or to extinguish any residual deep-seated fire still remaining l
in the cable bundle.
The fire brigade is equipped with the required tools to remove the cable tray covers and access the trays, should this action be required.
The local hose station is adequately sized to combat a fire anywhere in the i
auxiliary feedwater pump room.
Additional hose stations, located just outside of the auxiliary feedwater pump room, are adequately sized, to combat a fire anywherr in the room.
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i 8.0 Describe what operator actions, if any, are required in the 1
auxiliary feedwater pump room for a fire in this area to achieve hot shutdown, including the allowable time to complete the required actions.
Response
Depending on the size of, or damage caused by, a fire in j
the auxiliary feedwater pump room, plant operators may be required to enter the room in order to perform manual 1.
actions.
These actions might include:
- 1. Manual opening of the suction and discharge motor-operated valves for the necessary motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (s) may be required.
This action would only be required if valves failed to open, as designed, j
or spuriously shut because of fire damage to the affected cabling.
Each of the valves may be manually opened by disengaging the clutch and operating the attached hand wheel.
Opening the suction and discharge valves would be required in order to supply auxiliary feedwater flow to the associated steam generators.
Our thermal hydraulic computer analyses indicate that some auxiliary feedwater flow needs to be provided to at least one steam generator per unit within 40 minutes following a trip of both units.
- 2. Verification that cooling water is being provided to the bearings of the operating auxiliary feedwater pumps may also be required.
Cooling water flow to each pump's bearings is normally provided from the service water system through a normally open valve.
Fire damage, however, could potentially cause a pump's supply valve to l
spuriously shut, requiring operator action to restore cooling water flow.
The supply valve for each pump is located within the respective pump cubicle, shielding it from the rest of the room.
Additionally, an emergency backup water supply, for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, is provided from the fire protection system.
This backup supply is provided automatically j
following a loss of pressure in the service water system.
3.
Certain fire scenarios in the auxiliary feedwater l
pump room result in only certain channels of process monitoring instrumentation being available.
A matrix describing the available instrumentation for the three analyzed fire scenarios is provided in Attachment 5.
In order to ensure that auxiliary feedwater is being supplied to the steam generator in the reactor coolant a
system loop being monitored by available instrumentation, a motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump for a given train may be required to supply auxiliary feedwater to a steam 9
e.
generator in the opposite train.
An operator may accomplish this by manually opening the associated cross connect valve.
These cross connect valves are located in the respective motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump cubicles.
As stated above, our thermal hydraulic computer analyses indicate that some auxiliary feedwater needs to be provided to at least one steam i
generator per unit within 40 minutes following a trip of j
both units.
Each of the fire scenarios evaluated assumes the worst case fire, with fire damage occurring instantly when the j
fire starts.
These evaluations also assume that all of the equipment and cabling in one half of the auxiliary i
feedwater' pump room is damaged by the fire.
Realistic-ally, there are no anticipated fire scenarios in this room that would propagate as quickly, or cause as much
-damage as the evaluated fire scenarios.
In addition, we fully expect that the fire detection and automatic suppression system will have detected and extinguished any fire well before any operator actions xithin the auxiliary feedwater pump room would be required.
9.0 Specify the process monitoring instrumentation needed for i
safe shutdown located in the auxiliary feedwater pump roon j
for the 3 cases identified in the exemption request where compliance with the separation criteria of section III.G.2.b of Appendix R will not be achieved.
Response
The parameters that must be monitored in order to reach and maintain safe shutdown are as follows:
i 1.
Reactor source range flux 2.
Pressurizer level 3.
Reactor coolant system pressure 4.
Reactor coolant system hot leg temperature 5.
Reactor coolant system cold leg temperature 6.
Steam generator pressure 7.
Steam generator level A matrix describing the available instrumentation for the above parameters in the three analyzed fire scenarios is provided in Attachment 5.
It should be noted that most fire 10
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s' scenarios have several different instrumentation options available.
Plant modifications described in our August 5, 1994, exemption request and the subsequent clarification I
letter are included in the attached matrix and further enhance our operational flexibility with regards to instrumentation options for a fire in the auxiliary feedwater pump room.
10.0 In the exemption that was granted for this fire area by the NRC on July 3, 1985, the staff stated in the safety evaluation that there was no alternate shutdown capability for the service water components independent of the auxiliary feedwatcr pump room.
In the August 5,
- 1994, exemption request, the licensee states that alternate shutdown systems installed allow for the operation of two service water pumps independent of the auxiliary feedwater pump room.
Please resolve the discrepancy between the safety evaluation and the exemption request.
j
Response
I l
Subsequent to the NRC staff's July 5, 1985 approval of j
our request for exemption for the auxiliary feedwater pump i
room, Point Beach Nuclear Plant installed an alternate shutdown system.
This system provides an alternate means to power safe shutdown components following a fire in the vital switchgear room.
Since this system was installed subsequent l
to the original exenption request, it was not described in l
that exemption request..However, the August 5,
- 1994, exemption request accurately describes the current plant configuration, namely that the alternate shutdown system does allow for the operation of two service water pumps independent of the auxiliary feedwater pump room.
I 11.0 Describe any modifications-affecting fire protection and/or Appendix R in the auxiliary feedwater pump room that have been made since receiving NRC approval of the original exemption in 1985.
Response
Since receiving approval in 1985 for the original exemption for the auxiliary feedwater pump room, several modifica-i tions to the fire protection equipment have been performed.
l These modifications did not change the basic fire protection design for this room.
In 1994, a modification was performed to the fire doors that provide access to the auxiliary feedwater pump room.
This modification involved changing the direction of the fire 11 l
loors' swing to allow the doors to open out of the room.
This modification was performed to address an issue related to in-plant flooding.
Should an in-plant flooding event occur in the auxiliary feedwater pump room, any buildup of water in the auxiliary feedwater pump room could exit the room through the doors into the turbine hall.
In 1993, 3M fire barrier material was installed on the base plates that supported fire-wrapped conduit in the auxiliary feedwater pump room.
This modification was performed in response to Wisconsin Electric's internal evaluation of issues related to'Thermo-Lag.
In 1992, several conduit routed through the auxiliary feedwater pump room, associated with the installation of the plant's new swing batteries, were wrapped with 1-hour, fire-rated material.
This modification was performed to ensure that these conduits would not be affected by a fire in the auxiliary feedwater pump room.
In 1986, the smoke detectors in the auxiliary feedwater pump room were modified.
Originally, the installed smoke detectors were comprised of a photo-electric smoke sensing chamber and a thermal detection device.
The modification in 1986 involved the disconnection of the thermal detection portion of the smoke detector because the setpoint of the thermal detection device was set too close to the ambient temperature of the room.
This condition caused numerous false alarms.
We determined that the smoke detectors' additional feature was not required since we already had a separate heat detection system comprised of rate j
compensation heat detectors installed throughout the room.
Since receiving approval in 1985 for the original exemption i
for the auxiliary feedwater pump room, there have been few modifications related to the Appendix R.
As described in Question 10, two 480 volt distribution buses and a number of transfer switches were installed in 1991 to provide the plant with the capability of alternate shutdown.
This modification would allow the plant to shutdown in the event of a fire in the 4KV vital switchgear room.
In 1992, a swing 125 VDC distribution system was installed.
This modification added new 125 VDC distribution buses, 1
batteries, and battery chargers to the system, providing additional operational flexibility and alternate DC power sources.
Currently, the plant is in the process of installing two additional emergency diesel generators.
These generators are being installed for several reasons.
First, the additional diesel generators will enable the removal of any one diesel from service without entering a Technical 12 i
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i Specification Limiting Condition for Operation.
- Second, the additional diesel generators will provide a larger margin between the accident condition loading requirements and the generating capacity of the diesel generators.
Third, the diesel generators will provide excess emergency power generating capacity, which will allow some non-essential loads to be powered during accident conditions.
Finally, if desired, the new diesel generators could be utilized as a qualified alternate AC power source, in lieu of the existing combustion turbine, to address station blackout considerations.
12.0 specify the horizontal and vertical separation of Cable Tray G-04 from local control Panels A and B and 1
Conduit D01-2..
Response
The requested horizontal separation distances are provided in Attachment 3.
The requested vertical separation distances are provided in Attachment 4.
13.0 In a letter dated October 13, 1994, the NRC requested additional information regarding our proposed fire protection for Conduit D01-2.
This request states:
"You stated that Conduit D01-2 would be wrapped with the-E-50 series fire barrier material, manufactured by 3M Corporation, to provide a 1-hour rating to ensure that the conduit is protected from a fire in the fire area.
Please provide the fire endurance test reports, and any other supporting documentation used to qualify this configuration as a 1-hour rated fire barrier."
In preparation for our submittal of the August 5, 1994 exemption request, we determined that a short section of Conduit D01-2 was located in the 20-foot separation area between the FU and FR cable trays in the auxiliary.feedwater pump room.
This short section of conduit is the only portion of the 125 VDC red instrumentation channel that could potentially be affected by certain fire scenarios in the room.
We determined that we could provide additional flexibility in the 125 VDC distribution in this room simply by protecting this short section of_ conduit.
The additional
-i flexibility provided by protecting the D01-2. conduit is shown in the Instrumentation options Matrix in Attachment 5.
By letter dated September 9, 1994, we proposed to protect the conduit using a 1-hour, fire-rated E-50 series fire barrier assembly manufactured by 3M Corporation.
This 13 J
system is already installed on several conduit located in the auxiliary feedwater pump room.
The configuration j
and specific details about Conduit D01-2 are included in The location of D01-2 with respect to other cable trays in the room is shown on Attachments 3 and 4.
Conduit D01-2 is a 4-inch diameter conduit that enters through the east wall of the auxiliary feedwater pump l
room approximately four inches and then turns upward for i
l approximately twelve inches, exiting the room through the ceiling.
A detailed design of the fire barrier system for this conduit has not been completed; however, preliminary i
design has been completed with the assistance of.3M Corporation.
This design consists of a 1-hour, fire-l rated assembly using E-53 or E-54 fire barrier mat from l
3M Corporation.
The mat would be arranged to enclose the conduit into the corner of the wall and ceiling in the room using 3M-approved installation details 5500-C7-2 and 6100-E1.
Both details are provided in Attachment 9.
The proposed assembly will be installed, as per the installation details, by contractors trained in the use and application l
of these systems.
l l
I These 3M installation details were developed based on 3M fire tests that demonstrate the performance of these l
designs.
The fire test reports are included in the ten volume set of documentation, "3M Fire Protection Products Documentation For The Flexible Wrap System", which 3M made available to the industry in August 1993.
The fire test references for the proposed details are as follows:
l l
Installation Detail Associated Fire Test 3M Detail 5500-C7-2, 3M Fire Test #86-78
" Conduit Near Slab" in 3M Documentation Pkg Vol. X l
l 3M Detail 6100-E1, 3M Fire Test #86-18 and #86-19;
" Electrical Raceway Twin City Testing Lab #414186-331 Penetration Firestop" in 3M Documentation Pkg Vol. VII A copy of the cover page from the applicable fire tests and the associated cover of the volume from the 3M Documentation j
Package is provided in Attachment 9.
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RTRCRt1ENT 1.
i 3' METAL COVER (CENTERED OVER FIRESTOP)
(BOTH SIDES)
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1" CARBORUNDUM FIDERFRAX DAMMING OR APPROVED EQUAL 4
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i Refer to ANI Letters Dated 3/30/84, 5/10/83 & 9/17/82
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INSULATION CONSULTANT & MANAGEMENT SERVICE
- TYPICAL DETAIL DWG.-POINT BEACH
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FIRESTOP ELECTRICAL CABLE TRAr
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ATTACHMENT 3 ~ i HORIZONTAL SEPARATION DISTANCES (TOP VIEW) l e ,se Mj _ _ __.. x.2.. GG04
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ATTACHMENT 4 VERTICAL SEPARATION DISTANCES (SIDE VIEW) 26 fcot elevation ov. -,sm emumanumm--wo-mmmm-m - m .. i D01-2 E a ? r_ E E t i E d h m a e i !E E i E i 5 GG04 GG01 -- j i h. ........u w=.uw... f ^ '[ u s ( NO2 O m 5 40 F i I e d j m m n n t Ei s i
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l t I ATTACHMENT 5 l l APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL OPTIONS l I 1 I i l \\ l 1
Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Fire Area Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instrumentation Channel Options Fire 1.4reeteen L mie se be %hedene l Atenshat immerunnentattom lasertuments pmWd en t!adesneged Cable I rmyt'Condules /- ed wMk Selected laut. -.^ Oansel Centpliance alth Appendis R Ill.G.2 Separwies Ae il.bae nennel in Auu. Fepasp Ras retreene 8 t --
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South side et Roosa Uew t Du3 wtute Channel 11E.4%ou I4tet les FU Cable I reys (en merth side of reeme) FU Cable Irave swet /,7..in R 1110 2.b wah Adv 5 South of FR Cable Troy 1-. Bus tTE450A TroidLes cessam power cables to Dio? beine y charger for D03125 Vdc Imt. Bus 1983 appre=ed request for 20 ft. sepersrien IPT469 SG Press WR D03 also has en ehemate feed frown Diet ouisade the AFP Rra Fue Area wnh irservesung ' 'en in east. M drectica L ILT460B SG Lvt.WR 35677 Condelt (I hr. flee wrapped) between FU and FR cable trava IPT420A SCS Press WR auppews power er ILT427 Pra Lvt ITE.430D T.Itatles IS077 Caruhut owets Appendia R !!!G 2 e for I hr fue tN 32 Saisce Range trE430A Troid Les remed barner with desecuan and -- a fne aret tLT a600 SO Lvl WR IPT420A RCS Press WR OR (;,d a (104 iestow (hasiet i1E-4?ID I-Hat Les P W Cable Trave (en north side of roosa) fU and t
- Catde 1 rays sneet / mix R 111G 2 b mnh
.on Bus ITEJSI A T<old Lsg contam power cables to the Dl09 swing benery charger for D04123 Vde inst Bus July 5. '985 appnnd ewripiece re;uest for 20 it IPT479 SG Preis WR D04 also has an ahernate feed Bern D109 eutade the AFF Rm F' n Area separatum web irmaevenmg ' ' ' _ m east west u ILT4708 SG Lvt. WR ISO 79 Conduit (to be protected per Appendia R [1LC.2) ' deusaan betmen FU and FR cable greys. IPT420 RCS Prest WR supplies power to: and ITE4$tD T.Hosles D01-2 and 1S079 Ceness se be protected in accordance ITE451A TroidLeg with Appendix R ELG.2 to provide operstars with am LLT470B SG Lvl WR adstional atemmesve : __ ' channet as described in the Augum 5.1994 and September 9,1994 t WE emevesen request subenmalt doi Red Channel 1LT426 Prz Lvl FU Cable Trays (em north side of resen) Innenenentation Bus IN-31 Scuree Range enutam power cables to dw D09 sweig banery charger for D01 125 Yde inst. Bus Det.2 Ceeduit (to be protected per Appendiz R HLG.2) contains power eshies 6am Doi 123 Vdc las Flus se DI2 DC Dra. Pnt
4 Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Fire Area Appentlix R Safe Shutdown Instrumentation Channel Options Hre imenehm I'nds to be Shutdeme AveteWe :. _. ladrumesets provWed se tiedesmered Onble i rsw=Ceedeira Asserteced asHh Seteded laserunees (hennel 0 ". useth Appredes R I!!E2 hepersalen ( hserg,) A mmable i han,e to Aes. Fdymy Rom ( 'reerte musih unde of itnone tbut 2 lM4 ) eHow Lliarmeet 21 b451D I Il<W lrg f % t 'ehle I rnve (ae meeth nWe of reseen FL'and F W Cable Irave need Appembu R 643 0 2 h wrah hush ed FR CaMe Trev innrusswnsaeum lhse 2TF45i A 1 Cold Isg careem emner cahics to the Dl09 sweng benerv charger int D04123 Vdc Ina Das July S.1955 agyrowed enemgene recreed Fev 20 ft. 2PTA79 m f4eus WR im4 eine has an akessiste Ered fram D109 costzule the AFP Rm Fee Ares separeine werb mecew ung. * -eles e east. wee 21 T-4700 m t vt WR liin*9 residuit (1 hr. nee wropped) deudum himmeese f11 and FR cohle travs. 2PTJ2n RCs pre WR mapptwo poner te. ens 2TFA9 D T.Ifee Iet 2S019 Cassemit sneees Appenen R til G 2 c for i tr b 2TE418 A TCold teg cased herrwr enth &escteen and supteessenn m dire aree 21 T410B SG t vt WR DO) %1ue Diment 29 T.427 Pra ivt FI' CoMe Tesos (en eerth side of enese) Rus 2N-32 hurce Range cercam pmeer cahtes to Dt07 baners charger for DOI 12$ Vdc hut thee Im also has an aiseenste feed Frnen D109 autside the AFP Rm Fev Area er Doi Red Channet D012 Caeduit to be presorted in socordance =dh . _:,ma Ibs 2L FJ26 Peu L.vt FI' CoMe Trew (en morth sede et reme) Appembs R Ifl O 2 to provide operneers esth an ^ 2N.31 Scurce Range cantano pmuer enNem to the Do9 swmg bemer, charger far DOI 12$ Vde trut Bus odetennel alterneseve _ ctionnel as Det 2 Conduet (se he preceded per Appeedts it IllR2) drocyshed athe August $ 1994 and Sejtendwr 9,1994 coreaans power esNes from Iml 121 Vdc hust Ibn in D12 DC Dod Ptd WF egempownsegard witwoontale OR t was 2 004 ) enow Onesweel 21b4M64 I-His t eg tw ( ette Troys (en endh side of resent W and Fw t.aNe Treve eieet Apperuba R 115 O 2 b welps tusertsnesessam thes 2TF-450C 1 Cold 1sg ceasse pauser cables to ploe somg hane charger fie D04123 Vde het Rus Jint, S.1935 append enemiesen sequem far 20 R. D04 s!se has en afiesmose Fred from DI09 cuamde the AIT Rm Fue Ares eeperstwo wah meerwning evenhustihie= wi ese - wee 298?9 Conduk (I be. fire weeppen dwect=mIweween FU and FR csNe em and emppews power to. 21F490R T4fatIeg 29079 Conded sneets Agyendie R IIIO 2 c he Ile fire 21TA90C TColdIse resed herrier enh dreectum and suppressmen en fire eres Del Red Chemeiet 2PTJ63 $G Press WR FU Cable Treys (en merth side et neeent D01-2 Ceedme to be pecemeted in accordesce usih een aus 28 Ta6nA 3G t vi WR c weam pmner caMes to the D09 sweg basey charger Fnr D0t 125 Ver last Hus Appenes R IH G.2 es prewide aperusere enh an 2PTJ2nc RCS riens WR Dog 2 7.ed 2 3a ha W per Appendia R tH (L2) " aternabwe amarunicatstmo c4 armel as II.T426 Prs t.vt. cswieswo pmeer cables Frases nob I25 Te & hus Hus ta DE2 DC Due Pod denaeed a she Aeges 3.1994 and Ser'enthe' 9.1994 2N-il Saurce Range % F egem sespeed subenstal
i i I 4 l S i I l v i I P Auxihary Feed Water Pump Fire Area . Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instrumentation Channel Options i Pie, necessam te se he fiepose=== Aveashee :_- - _... Immierunneuse powdeed en e'
- ( ette I reyet 'eedusas Anmer$ meed wegh %etened laserunwet t.h
( ~. edit Apprenflu R lilE3 Feparesten nies,et.) 4.aahitst e inamers h Aes. Fess p ass ressert. Northof FU Caldr Trey imI %%sse thaswere iIEASoll t Sles leg P 96 4 aber T rave (ao sauch stee of reene) F k Cahae Irsy aseets Aggrenha R til O 2 h emin holy 3. Naretsede af Rorse - t'sut i leutrumentmewe ihm 1TE490A TCcidIca e ense pmmer canes to the DIO9 emmg honesy charger far D01823 Vde leut fhas $923 appewood eneinreine regiment for 20 4. orperatensi I PT-469 KG l'eena WR IM also has an alscemete feed fran D109 oulside the AFP Rm Fue Aree enh warrvesung _. ' '" un end - wem dwectice 11 T460H KG t d. WR IM877 Conduk (1 he. the avspped) hetween F1' and FR sehte travs. IPT420A RCS Prem WR suppteen gineer so-1 LT-427 Per 1.d iTE-dson T41.e leg I5077 Cesuhest suets Agyendia R III O 2 e Sw I ter fee I N-12 5.orce Range 91E 490A Tredd Isa rueed hamer =dh detectum and mappsensaase si fue area i t IPT-869 SU Press. WR ll.T a60s sGIxt WR l IPT420A RCE Pma WR I OR-tinst i Im1 Red diennel 81E431H I4Ineieg FP t meer Trays ten smash sede er euman) i P tsNe Trav andCessend tC205-8 arows Asyenden R ion Bus iTFASIC T<cidIsg ccesam pemes csNes to tx'? hamers charge fis Dnt 123 Vdc Inse this 111 G 2 h with Asly 5.1983 ergeoved e=enysean menest far 20 A arewesson adh isecrweisung comheestibles en end i IPTJt) RG Press. WR tief 2 Ceemeult(se he peseerted per Appeedts R IIIE2) . west duectsam between IV and FR cable tavs. It.T-d70A SG l.d WR centem pmeer cables fraan Det i 23 Vdc tout Rus b. DI 2 DC Due. f'id. ,i. IPT-420C RCE l' vees WR tC2en S Cessede (en e.ast nede of veses) ILT 426 lh t.d caNet for D08-2 FW to be preesced in eusch tN-31 Ke Range . ITTA9 8R T41.g t eg Appamiru p til G.2 to peneide.. weh en } ITE ditC Troed tes addniemal shievimbie. 1 channet as iPT4R3 SG Prena. WR demedied an the Auquee 5.1994 and Sagaender 9. 3994 i ILT470A SGI.vl WR %7 emenysansiempsem suhaumal I l 1 I t I l U 4 s 1 2 0 ~.,.,. ~...
4 Attashment 5 Auxihary Feed Water Pump Fire Area g Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instrumentation Channel Options Hee immeena Elem to be Shuedemum AveAmble ledweewmeettom lumeussente prettded on a 'ed - __, I( able Irevet omdens A
- a " with LMO Esps._.
-- Osmewt CoenpIhmee uth Appredes R llLEA2 5e 0-- r C
- s) 4,eBehle (%suwt to Aes FJpmp Rm
( 'eteeto 1%eth unde af Itanne L4pt 2 Otb4 n elbowdienswt 21t J$ID l-the leg f at Cable T reve tem enemh eede st ressa) t R. FK and F P t'aNe t rava nerce.^,,la R 111 G 2 h 74.wth cf FU C ahle Yrs, hierwnentatue the 2TFJii A TraldIra cantem Po*ee canes to Dtot honer 3 charger for D04 t 23 Vdr hut ths =th biv 5. l985 appresed eerenr== segoed inr 20 R s 2PTJ79 SG Prems WR Im4 ele hun en ehernese feed hain Dt09 estade the AFP Rm Iwe Area separahne esth Weerwuneng counhuutshles e east. wegg 21 TJ70R SGl.wl WR 2'i079 Caesente (I he. Hee swupped) duettenn twtween FU and FR cane ersvs. autt en rawer la h and 2PT 420 RCS Press WR 2TI.49tD T-Ilot ieg 25079 Comhed meests Appeeedes R In O 2 e for I hr Two 2TF 4'l A Troldieg re!ed horrier wdh desechase end suppneneinn a fue area 21 f.amit SG ? t4 Wh DO) Muse Channet 21 T-427 Pvt i vt FK rehte Trove (en seeth nWe of en.wi) husessmesenhem Bus 2N-32 Seewce Range cccram powee canes in the Dt09 somg hetiery charger far D03125 Vdc tmL films Doi she has an shennese feed Frane Dio? entside the AFP Rm Fwe Ares er Det Red Charewt 2LT 426 Pre I.vt FP Cah8e Teeve (en emeth alde of emene) DOS-2 Conduti to be presorted en arizedence with L Ihe 2 % 31 Samce Range casaem peert caNet to D07 bettery charger Few D01 123 Vde feet the Agyendes R IH O 2 to procede operatese eneh am Det 2 Ces dale (se he prosected pee Appendte R III.G.2) odetsnnel ahernatne waarsninnehan channel es cornews gemer sanes from D01 125 V& Ims ihm to Dt 2 DC Dest Pal esidwd a the August 5. I994 and Sepsemher 9, t994 %7 ewmre=m ee<peem sulenstrais OR m.2_u R Ilt U 2 h unth Usut 2 1304 i e*lme Onesmet 21EJ50ft I-Ilse tsg FR Cohte Troys tee seesh sede of ressa) t R ased F F Cahle Treve eines J rmi eien he en he ee feed hoe. Dio9 ouande the M P R:n Fue Ares orperasam =vik weavenmg. " e gwe far 20 L hutrusnesitetwo Ehen 2TT-450C Troldles contessa ec=er cohles to die Dt09 sweg homery diergen for D03123 Vdc but Das helv 3.1985 approved. ' " _ m end -west 2SieM Coendelt (I he. Ree =repyrd) direcesan betweea FU and FR cable trova. and supphes pawer an' 2TI450ft I-ItceIeg 2S079 Cesuksit sneses Appasuhm R HI O 2 e tar I hr fue 2TE450C Tre4dlet esied horner enth detectam and. _. m fwe aves D01-2 Casend to be yemencted en ecoordance wdh Dni Red Chassel 21'T-468 50 press WR FP Cable Treve (mei emeek sade of seen.) Appevuhu R 1110 2 to pmwede aperunnre esth en fees 2LT-4604 50 t wt WR cessaan poner caNem to Im? benery chartee in DOI 123 Vdc inst the addeennoi _"- endrusserewahan chsenel as 2PTJ20C RCS Press WR Del 2 Coudelt (to be posseceed pee Appeendes R Ill G2) desvihed a the Augee S. l994 and Itapeemher 9. t994 2LT-426 Pyr. I_=t crowave powee eshnes freon Do1 121 V& Ime the to DI2 DC Dest Pet. HT. esemptem vequee eslunsttals 2441 Lorce Ranec
,d 6 Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Fire Area Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instrumentation Channel Options Fis, i meme6== t'mes se he hedwee A=eIIeMe Instemeneenesten generumments prootded on 0 I'oMe t reso't'andefoe AW esteh helected interament ihosenet 0 with Appeedis B IILC.2 "',._._;_ t hesinette) AvelleMe thennet Gn Ae; Fdyiny Ran t rteerto Iog isitease af Ronen t %ue t imi Ehse t hannet IIt 4Miln i Itue ieg t k ( ahte iruve tem *=meh side of ressel D l( and f I
- t aNe Ienvs awet Appendse R lit to 2 h weh Herween EU en FR 1 rave hutnanirsdatenet than ITF 4504 Troldieg reseam pneer oldes in she Dt09 eums hencry charger Se D03123 Vde hut th Jistv 5,1921 app==ed escenplann e far 20 R 1 PT-4r.9 SG Prew WR IM1 also has an allenase feed frosw Din 9 cats.de the AF P R4e Fwe Area separahan weli unerwnwig cesnhe<eihles as end, see tt5460H SG1vl WR asedeem breween FU and i R t-aHe trevu ahevnetwelv, dihe Dice weeg Festav charpe is emed few the D04123 Vdc Inst. This to IPI-420A RCS Press WR s
11 T427 Pry I vi abuhinwn t but 2 Ihen. 99177 Cen&us merets Appen&u R HIO 2 e for I hr fwe IN-32 Lerce Range rased barner wsth detodenn and mappreussan a fue area. Ftf Cohte Troye(en the rh endeershe eemeist are avset Me casessa poner saNem to the D807 banery charites fur D01123 Vdc tout Dies l'ie77 Condale (I br. tiev wrapped) espelare pn==ce to t TE-eioD T 11<< t eg iTF490A TCc4d fra 6 f"T469 50 Prem WR tt.T 460n SGl.wt WR IPT.42nA RCS Preen WR OR twt D06 RedChannr4 i E t-49 t H 1 -Hat l es FP Cober T rave (an seach ande af rosan) tP Cane Iray end Cended 1C205-8 nesee Appesuks R Inensnaveneman this iTFASIC T<eldies cinemen p=wer esNes k> IM7 heuery charger for Del 123 Vdc bus. Ihse til G 2 h emb jedy 5,1989 app **=d e-. seepsee iFTJR1 SO Prem WR Det-2 Condelt fee he preserted per Appeedle R titR2) int 20 ft orpararwe essh weer=esung ensnhecteMes e end iLT4MA SGINI %R power canes fresa imt !25 Ydt twa lhes se Di2 DC Die. Pid - weg dwed nn heemeca FU and FM cable eravs tPTJ20C RC5 Preu WR RQe5 S Condale (en emoet olde et resum) iETJ 6 Prr 134 conhuns ceNea far-D01-2 Condust to be protected si aceeedesse enth IN-31 Scince Range 1TE451R 1-114 leg Appembu R 1110 2 to provide opermaars wish an ITF 45tC Ttoldies addaumet afterimenw.--- chamel as iPT4a1 SG Pres WR desceshed a the Augum 5,1994 and September 9.1994 ILTJ 70A SU I s4 WR WF enesnisinsivenpaed euturuumis l l l
..__m. .~m m_._.-_. mm - _... .__m.._.-..-... .-_m .~. -.-m._ m.. ._.. ~ 6. Auxifiary Feed Water Pump Fire Area Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instrumentation Channel Options Fire facessen Ituer to he seemedeere Avenshee :n _ ~ Bantrunnenes provided en tI t 'ehle TreveCendusEs Assertased etth Sclerted Innernmeet ( hunnel C --. seeth Appeans R III G.2 Separe lan r nemmet(=) Avenehee nosect in Ame,Idomir Run t reserte ise Menger c4 Nassa tinet 2 D04 i eHans t hennel 21 t -4%ieJ B -1 tot i eg PM i eher irave (em meeek side et emese) I W. & R. Fti and iIt Lahle irevs reset Appendet R netween FU se IR Treve -am ihm 2TYA*1 A Y<cid Ing senian cames cables to the DIM swwig hemer, charger for D0412$ Vdc but Bus 111 G 2 h weh Mw 3.1995 apreoved esemrisson eeques 2*f 479 SG press WR IM4 she has an alternwe feed from D109 eute the AFP Rma Fwe Aree far 20 A separesum with ener== rang evenhuntedes a ene 2LT-470H SG t.+t WR - west d.receum heewesse FU and I'm sable hevt 2PT 42n RCs tvens WR and ahevnehvely, ifthe Dic9 eming hensey charger is used for the D01123 Vdc but Bus to 25079 Ceuksit sirves Appendis R IIIO 2 e fee iIw fue i ehokkmetbut 4 then. rated herewr wdh drtedean and suppreseene m fire area l t FR Cahee Tesys(en the seash side of the resen) are avantable canteen smeer ceMes to lhe Dtot banery charges f.w im4123 V& buL Dus 2M0'9 Camdede (I br. Are wrapped) h a'IT ee power to' 21T49tD T. Hat 14g 2TE-451A Tretd tag 21T410n SG1vt WR 003 WhiteOmniel 2LT427 Prt tvt. Ft' Cohee Troye (en merth sede of eween) Bus 2N-32 Snence Range coedam pnwer cahles to Dt07 hastery charpne few D01123 Vee but Bus t21 ss abe appleed fresa the ehernete feed ham Diet outside the AF? Rsn Fire Arte er Det RaiCheunt Det-2 Cesena to be preteeted in accordance meh Phas 21 T-426 Prz. I.vt. FP Osheriseye tem samh am of remas) Appnid:s R It! O.2 se provier erereenre wish an 2N-31 Senece Range comtesi power cables to er D09 soms hanery charger for DOI t 23 Vdc Inst. Des adddweel ehernetree ' - chamel as Det 2 Conduet(to he peeserted per Appenden R I11.04 described a she Aegner 5.1994 and Sepsesuher 9.1994 cretains pn=er cahice shm Imi 129 Vdc las fium en DI2 Dr Due pnf HT evenipe,seip est ashnuasse OR tisnt 2 Doe ienaw Gennet 2iF.-4Sdit I-the tsg FW Cahte Troye(en meeth sede et resse) iW. FR sad FP Cahte Tran asses Appenem R 183 G 2 h 1- - this 2TF.-450C Trahiteg c mamui pnue, cohles to Dt09 s=mg heatery cherser for D04125 Vdr InsL Des =dh July 5.1985 approemd -, ee.peese ice 20 e 5m4 alue has an aheneste 6eed Ihme D109 ausside the AFP Ren fue Aree seperseem wah wiserocasig eenshuddees a ces - mee dwerts m heemeen Ft.' and FR co de hevt n and er if the Dl09 sung banery charger is used fur the D03123 Vdc him. Das to shuidown t End I them. 23079 eeneksie snests Appesubs R III O.2 e Ew I tr fire remed barner meth desecsaan and suppreesson in fire area Fit Cohte Trees (em the seash side ofIIw sween) are evadshie cositam power cables to the DIOR honery rherger far DD4125 Vdc bus. Ihm 19879 Caudust(I he. Aee wrapped) ti nieI9 es p**er to-2TT-490R T-Igne Isg 2TT-490C Troldina D0t-2 Condmil to be praiseted se accordance wnh D01 Red Channet It.T 426 prt Lvt. FP Cette Treve (en enesh sede of venue) Arteadi= R !!! O 2 to provide aperances with an i Rus IN-11 Soisse Range contani pneser cohles to the Dn9 sweg heneew charger fiw D01 125 V& Inst this addshneel. - chgemel as Det 2 Ceeduer (to be prosected pee Appewee R Brin 2) described se the Augwas 5.1994 and Sepseneher 9.1994 canesse remose enhies fenen Dn1 t 2s vac inn aus to Dt 1 DC Des pud uT esengews,eipice =denntnis l
9 g
- ATTACHMENT 6 INTERVENING COMBUSTIBLE CABLES i
l l l l
i ) Attachmsnt 6: Intervening Combustibio Cables l CABLE SIZE FUNCTION FROM TO 13213MH 12 POWER C47 1C157 1A201E 16 INSTRUMENT 1 A02-16 2A04-51 4 1A401D 12 POWER 2A04 CO2 1A401E 10 INSTRUMENT 1 A4-52 1 A06-63 5 1K0012E 12 POVVER 1A06 CO2 1K0013C 12 POWER 1A06 CO2 l 1K0023B 12 POWER 2A05 CO2 l 1K0101B 12 POVVER 1A06 C01 j 1K0123B 12 POWER CO2 1X14 CONNBOX ] 24212MH 12 POWER C48 1C167 4 24301E 12 POWER 2C-003 C-069 l 24302E 12 POWER 2C-003 C-069 l 2A101C 10 CONTROL 2 A01 -18 2A03-44 l 2A101D 12 CONTROL 2A01 -18 2A03-41 2A201D 12 CONTROL 2A02-34 2 A04-51 2A201E 10 CONTROL 2A02 34 2 A04-48 4 2A22C 12 POWER 2C-003 C-069 j 2A22D 12 POWER 2C-003 C-069 2A24A 500 MCM POWER 2A01-24 2Q13 2A24B 500 MCM POWER 2 A01 -24 2014 i 2A25A 350 MCM POWER 2A01 -25 2X11 2A28A 350 MCM POWER 2A02-28 2X12 5 2A29A 500 MCM POWER 2A02-29 2016 2A29B 500 MCM POWER 2A02-29 2017 2A301B 12 POWER 2A03 CO2 l 2A31C 12 POWER 2C-003 C-069 2A31D 12 POWER 2C-003 C-069 l 2A401C 12 POWER 2A04 CO2 2A44C 12 POVVER 2A03 CO2 2A44D 12 CONTROL 2 A01 -18 2A03-44 2A45A 1000 MCM POWEB 2A03-45 2X04-X l 2A45B 1000 MCM POWER 2A03-45 2XO4-X i 2A45C 1000 MCM POWER 2A03-45 2XO4-X j 2A45D 1000 MCM POWER 2A03-45 2XO4-X 2A45E 1000 MCM POWER 2A03-45 2X04-X 2A45F 1000 MCM POWER 2A03-45 2XO4-X j 2A45G 12 POWER 2A03 CO2 2A45H 10 POVVER 2A03 CO2 j 2A45L 12 CONTROL OC-223B 2A-03(45) ~ l 2A47A 1000 MCM POWER 2A04-47 2XO4-Y 2A47B 1000 MCM POWER 2A04-47 2X04-Y 2A47C 1000 MCM POWER 2A04-47 2XO4-Y 2A47D 1000 MCM POWER 2A04-47 2XO4-Y 2A47E 1000 MCM POWER 2A04-47 2XO4-Y 2A47F 1000 MCM POWER 2A04-47 2XO4-Y 2A47G 12 POVVER 2A04 CO2 2A47H 10 POWER 2A04 CO2 2A47L 12 CONTROL OC-223B 2 A-04(47) Page 1 4
.. : Intervening Combustibio Cabins CABLE SIZE FUNCTION FROM TO 2A48C 12 POWER 2A04 CO2 2A48D 12 CONTROL 2A02-34 2A04-48 2A70C 12 POWER 2A04 CO2 2K0012E 12 POVVER 2A05 CO2 2K0013C 12 POVVER 2A03 CO2 2K0013E 12 POWER 2A05 CO2 2K0021A 12 POVVER C65A CO2 2K0021B 12 POWER C35 CO2 2K0023A 12 POWER 1A06 CO2 j 2K0101A 12 POWER 2A05 C01 2K0113A 12 POWER 2A05 C01 2TR22A 16 POWER 2C-004 C-069 j 2TR22B 16 POWER 2C-004 C-069 2TR22C 16 POWER 2C-004 C-069 2TR22D 16 POWER 2C-004 C-069 2TR22E 16 POWER 2C-004 C-069 2TR22F 16 POWER 2C-004 C-069 2X401E 10 POWER 2A03 CO2 2X401F 10 POVVER 2A04 CO2 D1305A 4 POWER D13 1 A03-40 D1306A 4 POWER D13 2A03-41 D1307A 4 POWER D13 1 A04-50 D1308A 4 POWER D13 2A04-51 H32J 8 CONTROL OC-2238 2A-03(45) H32K 8 CONTROL OC-2238 2A-04(47) J21A 12 POWER C-001 FO-03922 K00148 12 POVVER 2A03 CO2 K0082A 12 CONTROL C01 TS3020 K0083C 12 CONTROL C01 PANEL K2A K0083D 12 CONTROL C01 PANEL K2B K0119A 12 POWER C01 Z31 K0122A 12 CONTROL C01 TB127 K01228 12 CONTROL C01 TB127 K50118 12 CONTROL 2C20 Z39 WE2K5005A 12 POWER D01 2C20 l ZB1A601C 12 POWER 1 A-06 C-002 ZB1A638 12 POWER 1 A-06(63) C-002 ZB1A63E 12 POWER 1 A-06(63) C-002 ZB1A64B 12 POWER 1 A-06(64) C-002 ZB1A64C 10 POWER 1 A-06(64) C-002 ZB1A65B 12 POWER C-001 1 A-06(65) ZB1A65C 10 POWER C-001 1 A-06(65) ZB1817BB 12 POWER 1 A-06 C-002 ZB1817BC 12 POWER 1 B-03 C-002 ZB1817BE 12 POWER 18-04 C-002 ZS1B18CB 12 POWER 18-04 C-002 ZB1823CB 12 POWER 1 B-04 C-002 ZB1NB134L 12 POWER 1A06 1C167 Page 2
1 i : Intervening COmbustibio Cables ~ j CABLE SIZE FUNCTION FROM TO ZC2A501A 12 POWER 2A-05 C-002 ) ZC2A728 12 POWER 2A05 CO2 5 ZC2A748 12 POWER C-001 2A-05 ZC2A74C 10 POWER C-001 2A-05 ZC2A758 12 POWER 2A-05 C-002 ZC2A75C 10 POWER 2A-05 C-002 ZC2A76B 12 POWER 2A-05 C-002 l ZC2A76C 12 POWER 2A-03 C-002 i ZC2B36AA 250 MCM POWER 2BS2-36A 2B336A-B958 ZC2B37AK 12 CONTROL 2N04 2B03 j ZC2837AL 12 CONTROL 2N04 2B03 ZC2B37BJ 250 MCM POWER 2B03 283378 1831 l ' ZC2B378K 12 CONTROL 2N04 2B03 1 ZC2837BL 12 CONTROL 2N04 2B03 ZC2B38AA 250 MCM POWER 2803 2P14A ZC2840BC 12 POWER 2A-05 C-002 I ZC2J148G 12 CONTROL 2B03-37 2842-06 ZC2J149G 12 POWER 2803-37 2B42-06 ZC2J150G 12 POWER 2803-37 2842-06 { ZC2NA134L 12 POWER 2A05 2C157 l ZE1391C 12 POWER 1B391 2C20 l ZE13910 12 POWER 18391 2C20 '{ ZE1391E 12 POWER 1A05 2C20 l ZE23212HE 12 POVVER 2A05 2C20 l ZE2391C 12 POWER 2B391 2C20 4 ZE2A73C 12 POWER 2A-05 C-002 l ZE2837CA 250 MCM POWER 2B03 B33 ZED 0101C 10 POWER D-01 2C-20 ZENA010A 12 POWER C-001 LS-3930A l ZENA0108 12 POWER C-001 LS-3930B j ZF1A66C 12 POWER 1 A-06(66) C-002 + ZF1A66E 12 POWER C-002 C-035 i ZFG0201E 12 POWER 1 A-06 C-002 l J 1 J l l 4 j e Page 3
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k ATTACHMENT 9 D01-2 CONDUIT INFORMATION
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Ceiling of $$1 Aux. Fd. WB PmP Rm mpi .c jisM El. 24 ft. mmm: i l'if,if.iii E - imm 4 in. D01-2 Conduit f$!! nm mi alli!5 cim si h 4: .E m A Cw% .am 4! v" ) .!y .g.;!:!!4
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.A E!/;il sa ai / 515k; ti 6.dirnilifYy 8 11 East Wall of .~=:r 'sijs:!" Hux. Fd. Pmp Rm
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ij !!!T/ near Col. D/11
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w-- y x\\ \\\\ \\xNN l 4 in. Type "LB" Electrical Pulling Elbow Figure 1.0 D01-2 Conduit Raceway in Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Room
+ a., D01-2 Raceway Information 61.02 Raceway (general) D01-2 02 Description SITE RACEWAY l1 Function POWER 14 From destination (s) D-01 l-15 To destination (s) D-12 33 Allowable percent fill 18 61 Type CONDUIT 62 Area (sgin)]Actfill]Dsgnfill 12.88 2.24 2.24 63 Cable (s) ZED 0106A l 66 Race (Ibs/ft)] Tot Act] Tot Desgn 9.73 13.61 13.61 67 Width (in)] Act fill]Dsgn fill 4.00 3.40 3.40 68 Percent fill actual] design 17.39 17.39 83 Number of Cables actual] design 4 4 84 Ampacity Cable Area actual] design (In**2) 2.8900 2.8900 l 85 Number of Conductors actual] design 4 4 I l l l l Cable ZED 01106A Description i i i 02 Description 4-1/C #250 MCM POWER - 04 Number of cable (s) 4 15 Function POWER 17 From destination D-01 18 To destination D-12 61.06 Cable (general) ZED 0106A 21 M<wimum load (amps) 216.00 72 Cable weight (Ib/ft) 3.88 73 Cable width (in) 3.40 75 Ampacity cable area (sgin) 2.8900 ) 84 Minimum ampacity Actual] Design 216.00 216.00 85 Ampacity Actual \\ Design].. 216.00 216.00. t
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.o .[6 - l ',' O .. a~. 1 . o:.o ;. Q'. . s..- /1 l T i J h I E OPTION B: Mat Flare E
- 1. Wrap as many layers of E-53A mat as possible completely aroud the conduit per 5500-C1.
2. Apply the remaining inner layer (s) of E-53A Mat so that the edges of the mat contacts the concrete. 5 3. Flare out the third (and final) layer of E-53A so that it extends a minimum of 2" onto the concrete. 4 Install concrete anchors, washers, and stainless steel banding at 8" I maximum spacing throughout the system and within 2" of all seams and terminations. An alternative to banding is stainless steel welded wire I mesh fully covering the E-53A Mat. 5. Fill any gaps between the mat and concrete with CP 25N/S Caulk. - 2" minimum b;, *. [; ' e.. . * *.f.. 'y (_ n 9- - 1 _l ~ Cross-sectional View NOTE: o collar or overlap is required on the last layer seam. This applies ONLY when the conduit is against the concrete. egut OATE R E V. CM. CONDUIT NEAR SLAB ~ m. M * ;.:'::"!,0.'"". :" t. ="F 1 6-19-87 5
- d/1/ 5-26-T2 5
ES K.A. Jensen R.G. Kora 4 1-HOUR SYSTEM M "M aternets 'M 5500-C7-2 Page 2 of 4
1'-
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.i I Concrete anchor spacing et 8 in. (2o3mm) moximum and within 2 in. (51mm) of 8 in. (2o3mm) edges at corners and seems. Mcximum. Fire Barrier CS-195 sneet plate cut to b fit tightly cround fire Borrier CS-195 coller, l i l Fire Borrier CS-195 collar cut to fit around wropped electrical recewey. Collor is secured I t m 6 with 2 steel bonds. I 1 \\ Concrete onchor with 1 1/4 in. (3omm) I minimum diameter washer. I COLLAR VAR!ATIONS PLATE VARIATIONS COMBINED cot.LAR AND PLATE \\ U / A i g ) r, sa ] I "^'* 3M Brand Fire Protection Produc's ! A mm,,, u,,..- I e i - >.== m =.e -w = we.. i. *==- 1 10-1-90 -;I
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Electrical Raceway } E-iooi 55co-Es-7 Penetrat. ion F.irestop m, w.,".lll, n = n, t,":, - d pu. r preeww i s i w sweev= DE E.A.A. ^J/[ N R.J.t.sch y)" E-50 Series mE / $d E n 1 0 l /R1OO F1 1 Hour System}}