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September 2, 1992 MP-92-958 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Reference:
Facility Operating License No. DPR-21 Docket No. 50-245 Licensee Event Report 92-001-01 Gentlemen:
This letter forwards update Licensee Event Report 92-001-01 required to be submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).
Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY L
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Stephen E. Jeace Vice President - h1illstone Station SES/SC:ame Attachment: LER 92-001-01 cc:
T. T. Martin, Region 1 Administrator P. D. Swetland, Senior Resident inspector, hlillstone Unit Nos.1. 2 and 3 J. W. Andt rsen, NRC Acting Project Nianager Millstone Unit No.1
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v AesTaAct put to 340c spac., t... ament.y sm.en sw.-saac. wooeun on.si ou On January 27,19t>2, at 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br />, with 8.he plant m cold shutdown-(136 degrees Fahrenheit, 0 psi) it was
- - discovered that opening a Stand-by Gas Treatment (SDGT) circuit breaker would defeat the isolation signal to two (2) of the;four (4) reactor buildmg ventilation isolation dampers thui makmg them inoperable with regard to providmg secondary containment isolation. Defeating the isolation signal to two of the four reactor buildtng
- ventilation isolauon dampers resulted in a violation of Technical Specihcations secondary containment requirements. The remaining two dampers were operable and would hate isolated the reactor buildmg in the
- - event of a condition requiring secondary containment nolation. The SBGT system procedures base been revised -
to provide guidance on removing one SBGT citemt from service. - No safety consequences resulted from this
. event.
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Dngiption of Evern On January 27,1992, at 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br />, with the plant m cold shutdown f136 degrees Fahrenheit. O pst) it was discovere that epening a Stand-by Gas Treatment (SBOT) circuit breaker would defeat the iso!ation d
signal to two m) of the four (4) reacts buildmg venulation isolauon dampers thus making them moperable with legard to providing secondary containment solanon. Defeatmg the nolanon signal to two of the four reactor buildu.; venulauon nolanon dampers resuhed in a violauon of Technical Specificanons secondary contamment regturements The remammg tuo dampers were operable and would have isolated the reactor buildmg in the esent of a condition reqmring secondar) contamment isolauon. The SBGT system procedures have been revned to proude gu dance on removmg one SBG circuit from serace. No safety consequences resuhed from tlus event.
II.
Cause of Etent The cause of this event was determined to be the inadequate design of the origmal isolation logic for the Reactor Bui! ding Ventilanon dampers for all SBGT >> stem configuration < (i.e. one SBGT breaker opened).
- lil, Analysic of Ermn The isoladon of the Reactor Building Ventilanon is required to prevent a radioacuve release durmg an accident or high radiation condnion. The Reactor Building Ventilation isolates on a Group 11 isolanon (2 ps drywell pressure and low reactor water level (d)) or Hi-radiation signal fsteam tunnel exhaust radiation 50mr/hr or greater, refuel floor radiation 100mr/hr or greater and reactor buildmg ventilation exhaust radiation 11mr/hr or greater).
During an engineering technical evaluation of the supporting svstems regmred to implement an Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) the followmg was discovered: (Reference Figures 1 and 2 attached)
- 1) The relay that proudes the isolation signal to the reactor building ventilation dampers also provides the SBGT iruuation signal This relay is energued to isolatelininate and receives power from the SBGT circuit breaker.
- 2) - The pilot solenoids to the air operated isolation dampers are normally energized and de-energize to isolate. These pilot solenoids valves receive power from Instrument AC and 125 VDC and do not fail closed when a SBGT breaker is opened These pilot solenoids vahes receive a close signal when the SBGT iniuation relay energizes. When the SBGT circuit breaker is opened, the power to the SBGT initiation relay is removed. This prevents the SBGT irunation relay from energizing and prondmg the isolation signal to 2 of the 4 Reactor Buildmg Ventilation Isolation dampers (one supply damper and one exhaust damper). These two dampers will remain open un:il the redundant supply and exhaust damper close, tnpping the Reactor Building Supply fans. The redundant supply and exhaust dampers would still receive an isolation signal and isolate the Reactor Building.
- 3) Defeating the tsolation signal to 2 of the 4 isolation dampers would reduce the reliabihti of the Reactor Building Ventilation isolation. However, during normal plant operation a SBGT circuit breaker is not opened except as required for mamtenance or surve:1!ance.
This event is being reported per 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (t) (B), " Any operation or condaion proh:bned by l
Technical Specifications" based on the following:
- 1) The opening of a SRGT circuit breaker defeats the isolation signal to 2 of the an dampers.
These two dampers will remam open and will not receive an isolation signal un..
redundant supply and exhaust damper close, tnppmg the Reactor Buildmg supply fans.
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- 2) Technical Speilication's defmition of Secondary Cont:unment requires " All automatic sentilation system isolation valves be operable or secured m the isolated position" IV.
Correctshm The short term correcuse action was to revise the SBGT Sptem operaung procedure (SP 64o.6) to provide gwdance on removing one train of SBOT from service when Secondary Contamment is required per Technical Specification Requirements. The procedure revision provides guidance for removine one train of SDGT for mamienance or suneillance of the fan and blier assembly or for ma'mtenance of the SBGT control logac. The procedure directs operators to pull the thermal ove.-loads in heu of opening the circuit breaker. This prevents the isolanon signal to 2 of the 4 dampers from being defeated. If the breaker is required to be opened, the operators will be required to isolate the normal reactor buildmg ventilation ar.d run the operable SBGT tram. Additionally. Caution labels hase been mstalled on the SBGT breakers referencing the operators to SP 646.6 prior to openmg a SBGT circun breaker.
i A design modificanon to the SBGT irniation and Reactor Buildmg Ventilauon isolatton logic was evaluated and it was determined that a technical specification change was a more appropnate corrective acuan. A teclimtal specification change will be processed to add the reactor buildmg ventilation dampers, which receive an isolanon signal from the out of service SBGT train (SBGT breaker open) to the hmiting conditior af operation (LCO) for a SBGT circuit inoperable, V.
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| 05000423/LER-1992-001, :on 920113,leaking Monitoring Connection Containment Isolation Valves Were Not Locked Closed.Caused by Program failure-procedure Deficiency & Administrative Error.Valves Were Locked Closed |
- on 920113,leaking Monitoring Connection Containment Isolation Valves Were Not Locked Closed.Caused by Program failure-procedure Deficiency & Administrative Error.Valves Were Locked Closed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1992-001-01, :on 920124,smoke Detectors Inadvertently Deleted from Semiannual Surveillance Procedure 2618C.Caused by Administrative Error.Reinforced Need to Verify Assumptions Valid Before Changes |
- on 920124,smoke Detectors Inadvertently Deleted from Semiannual Surveillance Procedure 2618C.Caused by Administrative Error.Reinforced Need to Verify Assumptions Valid Before Changes
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000245/LER-1992-001, :on 920127,discovered That Opening SBGT Circuit Breaker Would Defeat Isolation Signal to Reactor Bldg Ventilation Dampers.Caused by Inadequate Design.Sbgt Sys Operating Procedure Sp 646.6 Revised |
- on 920127,discovered That Opening SBGT Circuit Breaker Would Defeat Isolation Signal to Reactor Bldg Ventilation Dampers.Caused by Inadequate Design.Sbgt Sys Operating Procedure Sp 646.6 Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1992-002, :on 920124,identified Seismic Deficiencies in Foxboro SPEC 200 safety-related Instrument Cabinets.Caused by Insufficient Vendor Info.Spec 200 Racks Updated W/ Installation of Dummy Modules |
- on 920124,identified Seismic Deficiencies in Foxboro SPEC 200 safety-related Instrument Cabinets.Caused by Insufficient Vendor Info.Spec 200 Racks Updated W/ Installation of Dummy Modules
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000336/LER-1992-002-01, :on 920207,determined That Unit Was Not in Compliance W/Ts Surveillance 4.1.3.1.4a During Previous Startups.Caused by Inadequate Procedure (Sp 2620C).CEA Motion Inhibit Surveillance Sp 2620C Revised |
- on 920207,determined That Unit Was Not in Compliance W/Ts Surveillance 4.1.3.1.4a During Previous Startups.Caused by Inadequate Procedure (Sp 2620C).CEA Motion Inhibit Surveillance Sp 2620C Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1992-003-02, :on 920214,spent Fuel Pool Analysis Error Noted.Caused by Using Transport cross-sections as Approximation for Total cross-sections.Util Evaluating Spent Storage Rack Design Changes |
- on 920214,spent Fuel Pool Analysis Error Noted.Caused by Using Transport cross-sections as Approximation for Total cross-sections.Util Evaluating Spent Storage Rack Design Changes
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1992-003-01, :on 920207,inadvertent Encl Bldg Integrity Breach Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Work Planning.Encl Bldg Integrity Restored & Erosion/Corrosion Exam Procedure Changed |
- on 920207,inadvertent Encl Bldg Integrity Breach Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Work Planning.Encl Bldg Integrity Restored & Erosion/Corrosion Exam Procedure Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1992-003, Requests 10-day Extension to File Contentions Re Spent Fuel Pool Design Specs (Ref LER 92-003-00) at Plant.W/Certificate of Svc.Served on 920819 | Requests 10-day Extension to File Contentions Re Spent Fuel Pool Design Specs (Ref LER 92-003-00) at Plant.W/Certificate of Svc.Served on 920819 | | | 05000423/LER-1992-004-02, :on 920224,B Train CR Pressurization Bottles Were Found Isolated by Two Manual Valves.Probably Caused by Personnel Error Associated W/Improper self-verification. Commitment Opened to Discuss self-verification |
- on 920224,B Train CR Pressurization Bottles Were Found Isolated by Two Manual Valves.Probably Caused by Personnel Error Associated W/Improper self-verification. Commitment Opened to Discuss self-verification
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1992-004-01, :on 920211,facility 1 HPSI Train Header Isolation Valve 2-SI-656 Discovered Closed While in Mode 3. Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Subj Valve Immediately Opened & HPSI Sys Flow Path Restored |
- on 920211,facility 1 HPSI Train Header Isolation Valve 2-SI-656 Discovered Closed While in Mode 3. Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Subj Valve Immediately Opened & HPSI Sys Flow Path Restored
| | | 05000336/LER-1992-004, :on 920211,HPSI Train Header Isolation Valve 2-SI-656 Was Discovered to Be Closed.Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Valve 2-SI-656 Opened & HPSI Sys Flow Path Restored |
- on 920211,HPSI Train Header Isolation Valve 2-SI-656 Was Discovered to Be Closed.Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Valve 2-SI-656 Opened & HPSI Sys Flow Path Restored
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000423/LER-1992-005, Discusses Omission of RCS Depressurization Function from TS Requirements for Remote Shutdown Capability,Per LER 92-005 Submitted Via .Caused by Administrative Oversight.Ts Change Will Be Processed & Valves Tested | Discusses Omission of RCS Depressurization Function from TS Requirements for Remote Shutdown Capability,Per LER 92-005 Submitted Via .Caused by Administrative Oversight.Ts Change Will Be Processed & Valves Tested | | | 05000336/LER-1992-006-01, :on 920302,design Deficiency Discovered for Letdown Isolation Valves Possibly Causing Failure of 24-volt Dc Bus.Caused by Design Error During Initial Plant Layout. Valves Added to Local Leak Rate Test Program |
- on 920302,design Deficiency Discovered for Letdown Isolation Valves Possibly Causing Failure of 24-volt Dc Bus.Caused by Design Error During Initial Plant Layout. Valves Added to Local Leak Rate Test Program
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1992-006-02, :on 920306,discovered That Intermediate power- Range Power Above Permissibe (P6) Bistable Calibr Lower than TS Trip Setpoint.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Bistable Recalibrated to More Conservative Value |
- on 920306,discovered That Intermediate power- Range Power Above Permissibe (P6) Bistable Calibr Lower than TS Trip Setpoint.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Bistable Recalibrated to More Conservative Value
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1992-006, :on 920302,design Deficiency Discovered for Letdown Isolation Valves 2-CH-089 & 2-CH-516.Caused by Design Error in Initial Layout of Plant.Llrt Program Updated & TS Change Request Submitted |
- on 920302,design Deficiency Discovered for Letdown Isolation Valves 2-CH-089 & 2-CH-516.Caused by Design Error in Initial Layout of Plant.Llrt Program Updated & TS Change Request Submitted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000423/LER-1992-007-01, :on 920305,nonlicensed Operator Failed to Perform Firewatch Tour of 45 ft,6-inch Elevation of West Motor Control Ctr Area Prior to Surveillance Test.Caused by Miscommunication.Hourly Firewatch Reinstated |
- on 920305,nonlicensed Operator Failed to Perform Firewatch Tour of 45 ft,6-inch Elevation of West Motor Control Ctr Area Prior to Surveillance Test.Caused by Miscommunication.Hourly Firewatch Reinstated
| | | 05000336/LER-1992-007, :on 920219,concluded That Reactor Coolant Gross Activity Surveillances Completed Prior to 920103 Failed to Meet Tss.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Surveillance Sp 2831 Was Changed |
- on 920219,concluded That Reactor Coolant Gross Activity Surveillances Completed Prior to 920103 Failed to Meet Tss.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Surveillance Sp 2831 Was Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000423/LER-1992-008-01, :on 920317,plant Personnel Verified That Eight Valves Not Included in Svc Water Sys TS Valve Lineup.Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Change to Valve Lineup Procedure Written & Valves Verified in Correct Position |
- on 920317,plant Personnel Verified That Eight Valves Not Included in Svc Water Sys TS Valve Lineup.Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Change to Valve Lineup Procedure Written & Valves Verified in Correct Position
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1992-008-02, :on 920403,mounting & Bushings for Control Room Air Conditioning Compressors F-22 & A&B Determined to Be Nonseismic.Caused by Error in Original Seismic Analysis. Seismic Mounting Restraints Installed |
- on 920403,mounting & Bushings for Control Room Air Conditioning Compressors F-22 & A&B Determined to Be Nonseismic.Caused by Error in Original Seismic Analysis. Seismic Mounting Restraints Installed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000423/LER-1992-009-01, :on 920325,discovered That Required Channel Checks for full-range Containment Pressure Indication Deleted from Control Room Rounds.Caused by Personnel Error. Channel Checks Incorporated Into Logs |
- on 920325,discovered That Required Channel Checks for full-range Containment Pressure Indication Deleted from Control Room Rounds.Caused by Personnel Error. Channel Checks Incorporated Into Logs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1992-009, :on 920325,CR Operators Discovered That Required Channel Checks for full-range Containment Pressure Indication Not Deleted from CR Rounds.Caused by Personnel Error.Event Reviewed & Procedure Changed |
- on 920325,CR Operators Discovered That Required Channel Checks for full-range Containment Pressure Indication Not Deleted from CR Rounds.Caused by Personnel Error.Event Reviewed & Procedure Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1992-009-02, :on 920612,auxiliary Bldg Elevation Sprinkler Sys Isolated for Approx Eight H Due to Personnel Error.Hose Stations & Sprinkler Sys Restored to Operable State & Continuous Fire Watch Stationed |
- on 920612,auxiliary Bldg Elevation Sprinkler Sys Isolated for Approx Eight H Due to Personnel Error.Hose Stations & Sprinkler Sys Restored to Operable State & Continuous Fire Watch Stationed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000423/LER-1992-010-01, :on 920401,discovered That Surveillance Requirements Not Met Re Testing of Atmosphere Cleanup Filter Units.Caused by Failure to Identify Proper Surveillance Test Requirements.Procedures Revised |
- on 920401,discovered That Surveillance Requirements Not Met Re Testing of Atmosphere Cleanup Filter Units.Caused by Failure to Identify Proper Surveillance Test Requirements.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1992-010-02, :on 920530,discovered That Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Drifted.Cause Unknown.Setpoint Adjustments Made & Passed Retest |
- on 920530,discovered That Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Drifted.Cause Unknown.Setpoint Adjustments Made & Passed Retest
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1992-011, :on 920609,leakage Rate of Containment Hydrogen Purge Piping Isolation Valves May Have Exceeded Combined TS Leakage Limit.Caused by Personnel Error.Valves Disassembled & Inspected & Damaged Keys Replaced |
- on 920609,leakage Rate of Containment Hydrogen Purge Piping Isolation Valves May Have Exceeded Combined TS Leakage Limit.Caused by Personnel Error.Valves Disassembled & Inspected & Damaged Keys Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1992-011-01, :on 920405,reactor Manually Tripped Due to Loss of Operating Condensate Pumps,Causing Hotwell Level to Fluctuate.Caused by Design Deficiency.Traveling Water Screens A,B,C & F Replaced |
- on 920405,reactor Manually Tripped Due to Loss of Operating Condensate Pumps,Causing Hotwell Level to Fluctuate.Caused by Design Deficiency.Traveling Water Screens A,B,C & F Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000336/LER-1992-011-02, :on 920710,leakage Rate Test of Containment Hydrogen Purge Piping Isolation Valves Exceeded SR 3.6.1.2b.Caused by Failure of Key Connecting Air Operator to Valve Shaft.Damaged Keys Replaced |
- on 920710,leakage Rate Test of Containment Hydrogen Purge Piping Isolation Valves Exceeded SR 3.6.1.2b.Caused by Failure of Key Connecting Air Operator to Valve Shaft.Damaged Keys Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1992-012, :on 920407,inadvertent Feedwater Isolation Signal Generated Due to Reactor Trip Breaker Testing.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Procedure Changed to Require Performing Steps in Sequence |
- on 920407,inadvertent Feedwater Isolation Signal Generated Due to Reactor Trip Breaker Testing.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Procedure Changed to Require Performing Steps in Sequence
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000336/LER-1992-012-01, :on 920706,inadvertent ESAS Actuation Occurred Resulting in Partial Loss of Normal Power & Undervoltage Actuation of Facility Z1.Caused by Deenergizing ESAS Sensor Cabinet.Power Restored to Vital 4,160-volt Bus |
- on 920706,inadvertent ESAS Actuation Occurred Resulting in Partial Loss of Normal Power & Undervoltage Actuation of Facility Z1.Caused by Deenergizing ESAS Sensor Cabinet.Power Restored to Vital 4,160-volt Bus
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000423/LER-1992-013-01, :on 920411,determined That Temporary Sampling for Turbine Bldg Stack Monitor Improperly Connected.Caused by Inlet & Discharge Sample Lines Inadvertently Crossed. Sample Pump Procedures to Be Revised |
- on 920411,determined That Temporary Sampling for Turbine Bldg Stack Monitor Improperly Connected.Caused by Inlet & Discharge Sample Lines Inadvertently Crossed. Sample Pump Procedures to Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1992-013-02, :on 920713,pressurizer Safety Valve 2-RC-200 (S/N Bn 7128) Failed Lift Set Testing Due to Unknown Cause. Valve S/N Bn 7128 Being Refurbished,Retested & Set to 2485 Psig +/- 1% |
- on 920713,pressurizer Safety Valve 2-RC-200 (S/N Bn 7128) Failed Lift Set Testing Due to Unknown Cause. Valve S/N Bn 7128 Being Refurbished,Retested & Set to 2485 Psig +/- 1%
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1992-014-01, :on 920507,determined That Static Pressure Effect Not Accounted for in Setpoints of Veritrak Dp Transmitters.Caused by Incorrect Assumptions.Setpoints Methodology for Transmitters Will Be Reviewed |
- on 920507,determined That Static Pressure Effect Not Accounted for in Setpoints of Veritrak Dp Transmitters.Caused by Incorrect Assumptions.Setpoints Methodology for Transmitters Will Be Reviewed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000336/LER-1992-015, :on 920821,determined That SPEC 200 Cabinets May Not Be Qualified as Result of Missing Bumpers.Caused by Lack of Adequate Vendor Instruction to Install Seismic Bumpers.Equipment Insp & Bumpers Installed |
- on 920821,determined That SPEC 200 Cabinets May Not Be Qualified as Result of Missing Bumpers.Caused by Lack of Adequate Vendor Instruction to Install Seismic Bumpers.Equipment Insp & Bumpers Installed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000336/LER-1992-015-01, :on 920821,determined That SPEC 200 Cabinets Mfg by Foxboro Co May Not Be Seismically Qualified as Result of Missing Bumpers.Caused by Lack of Vendor Instruction.Seismic Bumpers Ordered |
- on 920821,determined That SPEC 200 Cabinets Mfg by Foxboro Co May Not Be Seismically Qualified as Result of Missing Bumpers.Caused by Lack of Vendor Instruction.Seismic Bumpers Ordered
| | | 05000423/LER-1992-015, :on 920523,discovered That Containment Leakage in Excess of Limits Due to Valve Leakage.Hinge & Packing Cleaned & Lubricated |
- on 920523,discovered That Containment Leakage in Excess of Limits Due to Valve Leakage.Hinge & Packing Cleaned & Lubricated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1992-016-01, :on 920704,both Trains of Auxiliary Bldg Filters Declared Inoperable After Discovering Access Door on Common Intake Plenum for Abfs Open.Caused by Improper Design.Door Has Been Locked Wired Shut |
- on 920704,both Trains of Auxiliary Bldg Filters Declared Inoperable After Discovering Access Door on Common Intake Plenum for Abfs Open.Caused by Improper Design.Door Has Been Locked Wired Shut
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1992-016, :on 920704,both Trains of Auxiliary Bldg Filters Declared Inoperable When Access Door on Common Intake Plenum for Subj Bldg Found Open.Caused by Impoper Design.Door Locked Wired Shut |
- on 920704,both Trains of Auxiliary Bldg Filters Declared Inoperable When Access Door on Common Intake Plenum for Subj Bldg Found Open.Caused by Impoper Design.Door Locked Wired Shut
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000423/LER-1992-017, :on 920717,determined That One Train of Pressurizer Steam Space Vent Path Was Inoperable & Action Statement Not Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Changes to TS Will Be Submitted to Clarify Actions |
- on 920717,determined That One Train of Pressurizer Steam Space Vent Path Was Inoperable & Action Statement Not Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Changes to TS Will Be Submitted to Clarify Actions
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1992-018-01, :on 920722,both RHR Trains Rendered Inoperable Due to Procedure Deficiency.Both Trains of RHR Restored to Operable Condition & Surveillance Procedures for Both Trains Revised |
- on 920722,both RHR Trains Rendered Inoperable Due to Procedure Deficiency.Both Trains of RHR Restored to Operable Condition & Surveillance Procedures for Both Trains Revised
| | | 05000423/LER-1992-019-01, :on 920818,determined That Trains a & B of Hydrogen Recombiner Sys Had Been Inoperable Between 920812 & 17 & Train a Positive Displacement Blower Motor Found W/ Lifted Lead Due to Personnel Error |
- on 920818,determined That Trains a & B of Hydrogen Recombiner Sys Had Been Inoperable Between 920812 & 17 & Train a Positive Displacement Blower Motor Found W/ Lifted Lead Due to Personnel Error
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1992-019, :on 901005,discovered Combined Leakage Rate Exceeded.Caused by Wear in Plug & Seat Area.Seat & Plug Replaced & Tested Satisfactorily |
- on 901005,discovered Combined Leakage Rate Exceeded.Caused by Wear in Plug & Seat Area.Seat & Plug Replaced & Tested Satisfactorily
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1992-020-01, :on 920824,Auxiliary Bldg Filter Sys Fans Tripped W/Vivs Set at 100%.Caused by Failure to Perform Adequate Technical & Safety Evaluation of Auxiliary Bldg Filter Sys.Event Will Be Reviewed W/Engineers |
- on 920824,Auxiliary Bldg Filter Sys Fans Tripped W/Vivs Set at 100%.Caused by Failure to Perform Adequate Technical & Safety Evaluation of Auxiliary Bldg Filter Sys.Event Will Be Reviewed W/Engineers
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1992-020-02, :on 921124,discovered That During 1992 Snubber Exams,Three Snubbers Not Included in List of safety-related Snubbers.Caused by Failure to Maintain Snubber Insp Lists Up to Date.Three Snubbers Added to List |
- on 921124,discovered That During 1992 Snubber Exams,Three Snubbers Not Included in List of safety-related Snubbers.Caused by Failure to Maintain Snubber Insp Lists Up to Date.Three Snubbers Added to List
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1992-021-01, :on 920831,discovered That Testing for Loop Stop Valve Not Adequate.Caused by Incomplete Review When Preparing Containment Electrical Penetration Protection Drawing.Backup Breakers for Valves Verified |
- on 920831,discovered That Testing for Loop Stop Valve Not Adequate.Caused by Incomplete Review When Preparing Containment Electrical Penetration Protection Drawing.Backup Breakers for Valves Verified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1992-022-01, :on 920929,determined That Train B of Supplemental Leak Collection & Release Sys Inoperable & Operability of Train a Could Not Be Verified.Caused by Incomplete Sys Design.Test Procedure Revised |
- on 920929,determined That Train B of Supplemental Leak Collection & Release Sys Inoperable & Operability of Train a Could Not Be Verified.Caused by Incomplete Sys Design.Test Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000423/LER-1992-024-01, :on 921015,ESF Bldg Normal Ventilation Radiation Monitor Declared Inoperable & Temporary Sample Rig Installed.On 921015 & 16,breaker Tripped Open.Caused by Inadequate Installation.Breaker Reset |
- on 921015,ESF Bldg Normal Ventilation Radiation Monitor Declared Inoperable & Temporary Sample Rig Installed.On 921015 & 16,breaker Tripped Open.Caused by Inadequate Installation.Breaker Reset
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1992-025, :on 921102,LCO 3.4.9.2.a Not Initiated for Pressurizer Heatup.Caused by Lack of Detailed Procedural Guidance & Licensed Operator Error.Procedure Change Re Insurge During Plant Heatup Implemented |
- on 921102,LCO 3.4.9.2.a Not Initiated for Pressurizer Heatup.Caused by Lack of Detailed Procedural Guidance & Licensed Operator Error.Procedure Change Re Insurge During Plant Heatup Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1992-026-01, :on 921103,CR Staff Determined That Performing Check Valve Testing Per Surveillance Procedure Would Align Train B of HPSI to Both Hot & Cold Leg Injection Path.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Mod Program Changed |
- on 921103,CR Staff Determined That Performing Check Valve Testing Per Surveillance Procedure Would Align Train B of HPSI to Both Hot & Cold Leg Injection Path.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Mod Program Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000245/LER-1992-027, :on 921029,determined That Certain Historical Conditions Involving Open/Unsealed Fire Barrier Not Reported to Nrc.Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of Requirements. Reporting Requirements Discussed at Meeting |
- on 921029,determined That Certain Historical Conditions Involving Open/Unsealed Fire Barrier Not Reported to Nrc.Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of Requirements. Reporting Requirements Discussed at Meeting
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000423/LER-1992-027, :on 921105,electrical Fault Protection Signal in Zone Between Generator & Switchyard Resulted in Reactor Trip,Turbine Trip & Generator Trip.Caused by Spurious Signal from Relays.Design Change to Be Pursued |
- on 921105,electrical Fault Protection Signal in Zone Between Generator & Switchyard Resulted in Reactor Trip,Turbine Trip & Generator Trip.Caused by Spurious Signal from Relays.Design Change to Be Pursued
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation |
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