ENS 49167
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
22:05 Jul 1, 2013 | |
| Title | High Pressure Core Spray Minimum Flow Valve Pressure Switch Setpoint Found Outside of Tolerance |
| Event Description | This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. During routine Instrument Maintenance Surveillance Testing (LIS-HP-205), the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) minimum flow valve pressure switch set point was found outside the Technical Specification allowable value. This could have prevented the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS), a single train safety system, from performing its design function. This is reportable as an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ENS notification.
The required actions of Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1 were entered on 7/01/13 at 1646 [CDT] when the system was made inoperable for surveillance testing. At 1705, maintenance personnel reported minimum flow valve pressure switch set point was found at 112.6 psig, which is outside of the TS Allowable Value of greater than or equal to 113.2 psig (0.6 psig below the Allowable Value). The minimum flow valve pressure switch set point has been calibrated and was left within Technical Specification allowable values, HPCS was declared OPERABLE at 1815 on 7/01/13." The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The event notification was reported by LaSalle Generating Station on 7/01/2013 at 2147 EDT. This update is being provided for the purposes of retracting that notification. On July 1, 2013, during surveillance testing, the Unit 2 High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) minimum flow valve pressure switch setpoint was found below the Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.5.1 allowable value. HPCS was declared inoperable, and TS Required Actions (RA) were entered on July 1, 2013, at 1646 hours0.0191 days <br />0.457 hours <br />0.00272 weeks <br />6.26303e-4 months <br /> [CDT]. Because HPCS is a single train system, an ENS report was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The minimum flow valve pressure switch setpoint was calibrated to within TS allowable values, and HPCS was declared operable on July 1, 2013, at 1815 hours0.021 days <br />0.504 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.906075e-4 months <br />. A post-event review determined that declaring HPCS inoperable was not required. The inoperability of the pressure switch would not have impacted the function of the HPCS minimum flow valve to automatically open as required to prevent overheating of the HPCS pump. The as-found setpoint was 0.6 psig below the TS allowable value, which would have resulted in the minimum flow valve opening slightly sooner. The inoperability would also not have prevented or delayed the automatic closing of the valve at the required system flow to assure that adequate ECCS flow is available. It should be noted that the LaSalle ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] LOCA [Loss Of Coolant Accident] analysis assumes that the HPCS minimum flow valve is open during an injection. TS 3.3.5.1 RA D.4 requires that the minimum flow valve pressure switch be restored to operable status within 7 days. If it cannot be restored within that time, RA G.1 requires that the supported system (HPCS) be declared inoperable, precluding extended operation with the minimum flow pressure switch inoperable. The pressure switch was re-calibrated to within TS allowable values within approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 29 minutes of being declared inoperable. Therefore, the HPCS system was operable with the minimum flow pressure switch 0.6 psig out of calibration for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 29 minutes. This event did not constitute a loss of safety function of the HPCS system, and the event was not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lara). |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Lasalle  Illinois (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.3 h-0.0125 days <br />-0.00179 weeks <br />-4.1094e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Jason Depriest 21:47 Jul 1, 2013 |
| NRC Officer: | John Shoemaker |
| Last Updated: | Aug 5, 2013 |
| 49167 - NRC Website
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Unit 2 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |