05000341/LER-1987-001, :on 870126,during Calibr Activities in RWCU Sys,Esf Isolation Actuation Received.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between Instrument Repairman & Shift Personnel.Personnel Counseled

:on 870126,during Calibr Activities in RWCU Sys,Esf Isolation Actuation Received.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between Instrument Repairman & Shift Personnel.Personnel Counseled

ML20211Q325
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	02/25/1987
From:	Bregni L, Lenart R DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-87-001, LER-87-1, NP870111, NUDOCS 8703030065
Download: ML20211Q325 (4)

LER-1987-001, on 870126,during Calibr Activities in RWCU Sys,Esf Isolation Actuation Received.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between Instrument Repairman & Shift Personnel.Personnel Counseled

Event date:
Report date:
3411987001R00 - NRC Website

text

.

.~

nC eem 354 U 5. NUCLEAR KEGULATORY COMMisslON f

APPROVED OM8 NO 31504104 i

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

'"P'a' 5

• 8"'

t F ACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUM0ER (2)

PAGE 63e 1

Fermi 2 o 15 I o Io I o i 31411 1 loFl013 Inadequate Communication Results in Automatic Isolation of RWCU During Calibration Activity EVENT DATE ISI LER NUM8ER 161 REPORT DATE 171 OTHER F ACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

St L

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTM DAY YEAR F ACILsTV NAMES DOCKET NUW8ER$S) n Nuwa N/A 0 15101010 1 l l 0l 1 2l6 8 7 8l7 0l0l1 d0 0l2 2l5 8l7 N/A o1 5l0 iotog i i THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR {. (Chere eae or more of the ferrowest (til OPE R ATING 1

20 402mi 20.Osi.i X

sonaH2H i 73 7mi 20.4061aH1Hd POWER 50 3sicH1) 50 73teH2Hv) 73.711cl Si?

Ql0 i

20 0 i.HiH,d s0 3.i.H2i

.0 73iaH2H..d OTHER <s,ec,,y,. A snct 20 4061aH1Had 60.73(aH2Hd 50.73iaH2HomHAD J66Al 20 406teH1Hiv) 60.73:aH2Had 50.73:a H2Husidf BI 20.406 te H1 Hv) 50.73 aH2Heid 50.731aH2Hal LICENSEE CONTACT FOR TMit LER (12)

NAME TELEPMONE NUMBER ARE A CODE Lewis P. Bregni, Compliance Engineer 313 5 i 8,6l-iSi3i l3 i i 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR E ACM COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN TMi$ REPORT 1131 l

C AEP

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT C A USE SY STE M COYPONENT T E TO PRDS O NPAD I

I I I l I i l

I I I I I 1 l

l 1 l l l 1 l

l I I I I 1 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 1941 MONTw CAV YEAR YES (If ves cowomte EJrPECTED SUB6tt5$10N CATEl NO l

l l

LESTR ACT fLom*t to 1400 soeces o e. spores **ere'y 9' free" s*9'e soece tweewentree reeso (198 I

At 0110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> on January 26, 1987 Fermi 2 was in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 (POWER OPERATION), operating at 925 psig, 530 degrees Fahrenheit, and 10 percent reactor power.

While performing calibration activities for a differential temperature switch in a leak detection circuit for the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) an automatic Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) isolation actuation was received.

The isolation occurred when an Instrument Repairman lif ted the thermocouple leads to the differential temperature switch.

This event was caused by a shared personnel error, and resulted from inadequate communication between an Instrument Repairman and shift personnel.

As corrective actions, Instrument Repairmen have been instructed to provide the details and consequences of their activities to operations prior to work initiation, and Instrument Foremen have been instructed to discuss work packages which could impact plant operations with the assigned repairman prior to work initiation.

Additionally, information has been provided to selected Operations personnel to encourage better communications.

This event was not contributed to by any failed components, i

structures, or systems.

eT 288M gi;8gga men r,w- ~

von ip

anc seen en -...nemuren, -

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION waoven ome no. ame.

==

• ===== m

=n a vaan G espe g

seg a6 p

Fermi 2 o p io lo lo l 3l4 l 1 8 17 0l 0l1 0l 0 0 12 0F 0 l3 mr -

e= =.wm At 0110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> on January 26, 1987 Fermi 2 was in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 (POWER OPERATION), operating at 925 psig, 530 degrees Fahrenheit, and 10 percent reactor power.

While performing calibration activities for a differential temperature switch (TDT) in a leak detection circuit for the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) an automatic Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) (JE) isolation actuation was received.

Prior to the event, Operations personnel had noted that the common differential temperature meter for the RWCU rooms was not reading at zere when no input signal was applied to it.

As a result, a request was issued to have the meter needle zero adjusted and an Instrument Repairman (non-licensed, contractor) was assigned to investigate and adjust the meter needle zero.

The work request document stated that the meter needle zero was reading incorrectly and needed to be adjusted.

However, since adjusting the needle zero can. affect the span of the meter calibration, the repairman interpreted his assignment to also include calibration of the dif ferential temperature switch.

The procedure used to calibrate the differential temperature switch requires that the thermocouple leads to the switch be determinated.

Lifting a lead to the temperature switch can cause an isolation of the outboard RWCU isolation valve if it results in the circuit output exceeding the switch setpoint.

~

After receiving his work assignment, the repairman reported to the main Control Room (NA) to obtain work authorization.

The Instrument Repairnan understood that the calibration activity he was going to perform would probably result in an RWCU isolation at this time.

Since the Nuclear Assistant Shift Supervisor (NASS) (licensed,

utility) believed that the repairman was only going to adjust the meter needle zero he did not ask for details concerning the work that was about to performed.

Conversely, since the repairman had interpreted his work assignment differently than the NASS, he believed that the NASS had taken the necessary actions to preempt an RWCU isolation, and did not indicate to the NASS the ef fect of his intended actions.

l At 0110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> an ESF isolation of the outboard RWCU isolation valve (G33-F004) was automatically initiated in response to the repairman lif ting the leads to the dif ferential temperature switch (G33-N602D).

Following the isolation, the NASS reported to the location where the repairman was working and the leads had been lifted to inform the repairman of the isolation actuation.

g co. see.

- __-.-.,--_-,,_,,,,_g

.,w,,.

anc men ca.mustaan me utarony-UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CENTINUATION maoveo om iso. sin-eio.

ames:woim

• aatstv==== m eacant

. ei v8AR jeeous sak 4:.

m 4

Fermi 2 o ls j o j o l o 13 l 4l 1 8l7 0l0l1 0l0 0l3 or 0 13 TEltf Mamme ausse 4 mendent aus aulmemW ABIC h WW(17)

At 0120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> the differential temperature switch leads were restored and the affected isolation valve was reopened.

This event was caused by a shared personnel error by the NASS and the Instrument Repairman and resulted from a lack of communication between the repairman and the NASS.

This event did not involve actions which were not in accordance with procedures, an error in a procedure, or an activity which is not described in a procedure.

This event was not contributed to by any unusual conditions of the workplace, or any components, structures, or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event, or that failed.

As corrective actions, Instrument Repairmen have been counseled to ensure that they provide the details and consequences of their activities to Operations prior to work initiation, and Instrument Foremen have been instructed to discuss work packages which could impact plant operations with repairmen prior to work initiation.

Additionally, information has been provided to selected Operations personnel to encourage better communications.

During this event, plant conditions requiring isolation of the RWCU system did not exist.

As a result, this event did not affect the safe operation of the plant or the safety of the public.

Had an RWCU isolation been required by plant conditions, system l

isolation capability was demonstrated to be available during the event by the proper operation of the RWCU isolation actuation j

logic and components.

A previous event involving maintenance activity for an RWCU room differential temperature switch was described in Licensee Event Repcrt 86-046.

l l

esec Pomes assa

Punt r

DI 10CFR50.73 rermi2 Edison HEEN m,,

operations February 25, 1987 NP870lll U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Reference:

Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 Facility Operating License No. NPF-43

Subject:

Transmittal of Licensee Event Recort 87-001-00

+

Please find enclosed LER No. 87-001-00, dated February 25, 1987, for a reportable event that occurred on January 26, 1987.

As indicated below, a copy of this LER is being sent to the Administrator Region III.

If you have any questions, please contact us.

S ince r ely, R.

S. Lenart f

Plant Manager

Enclosure:

NRC Forms 366, 366A cc:

J. R. Eckert J. G. Keppler W. G. Rogers J. J. Stefano 7

)hgjL '

Wayne County Emergency

!!anagement Division I

.e-.,-,

+ -,- -., - -,.,,, - - -,,,,, -

- ev

.-,,..--.-_-,.,--m