ML20149F663

Requests Comments & Concurrence by 831006 on Proposed Amends to 10CFR50.34,50.54 & App E Re Emergency Preparedness.Draft Commission Paper Encl

ML20149F663
Person / Time
Issue date:	09/16/1983
From:	Bernero R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
To:	Goller K, Jordan E, Mattson R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
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ML20149B718	List: ML20149F619 ML20149F626 ML20149F650 ML20149F663 ML20149F678 ML20149F687 ML20149F777 ML20149F792 ML20149F799 ML20149F812 ML20149F826 ML20149F830
References
FOIA-87-743 NUDOCS 8802170301
Download: ML20149F663 (69)

Text

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MEMORANDUM FOR: E. Jordan, IE X. Goller, RES R. Mattson, NRR D. Eisenhut, NRR W. Olmstead, ELD

> R. Cunningham, NMSS FROM: Robert M. Bernero, Director Accident Source Tenn Program Office Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

SUBJECT:

PROPOSED ADMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR PART 50. SECTIONS 50.34, 50.47, 50.54 AND APPENDIX E; EMERGENCY PRE-PAREDNESS Please review the subject rulemaking package and provide me with your comments and concurrence by October 6,1983.

1.

Title:

Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, Sections 50.34, IG, 50.54 and Appendix E and 10 CFR Part 70, "Plans for Coping with Emergencies at Production and Utilization Facilities"

2. Task Leader: Mike Jamgcchian, ASTP0, RES

3. Task No: HF 303-1

4. Coonizant Individuals: Bill Shields, ELD Shelly Schwartz, IE ,

5. Backaround: In August 1980, the NRC published revised emergenc'y pre-pareoness regulations. After 3 years of experience in implementing these regulations as well as additional insight gained through ex-tensive research in the part of reactor risk, it is felt that some refinenent in the regulations is in order.

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• Robert M. Bernero, Director ,.

8, Accident Source Tenn Program Office S Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research gA Enclos e: -

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Tom McKenna, IE l

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Dave Matthews, IE '

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For: The Commissioners C

From: William J. Dircks Executive Director of Operations

Subject:

Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, Sections 50.34, 50.47, 50.54, and Appendix E and 10 CFR Part 70; "Plans for Coping with Emergencies at Production and Utilization Facilities" purpose: To obtain Commission approval for publication of the subject proposed rule change in the Federal Register.

This paper covers a major policy question.

Catecory:

Background:

On August 19, 1980, the NRC published a r'evised emergency plan-ning regulation (45 FR 55402), which became effective on November 3, 1980.

The 1980 rule changes were considered an upgrade of NRC emergency planning regulations that provided clarification and expansion *

( in. areas perceived to be deficient as a result of the TMI accider.t.

The 1980 emergency preparedness regulations involved the following three major changes from past practices:

l l 1. To continue operations or to receive an operating license, the NRC requires that applicants / licensees submit their emergency plans, including State and local governmental emergency response plans, to NRC. The NRC then makes a finding as to whether the

Contact:

Michael T. Jamgochian, RES 4437890 09/16/83 CP 10 CFR 50 EMERGENCY PLANNIN L -

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.o Jhe Commissioners 2 state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emer-gency.

The NRC bases its finding on a review of the Federal Emer- .

gency Manageme'nt Agency (FEMA) findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented and on the NRC assessment as to whether the licensee's/ applicant's emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented. Specifically:

a. An operating license will not be issued unless a favor-able NRC overall finding can be made, and

b. After January 1,1981, an operating plant may be required to' shutdown if it is determined tha't there are such deficiencies that a favorable NRC finding cannot be made or is no longer warranted and the deficiencies are not corrected within 4 months of that determination.

2. Emergency planning considerations were extended to "Emer-gency Planning Zones," and .

3. Detailed emergency planning implementing procedures of both licensees and applicants for operating licenses must be submitted to the NRC Inspection and Enforcement regional offices for review.

In addition, the Cnmmission revised 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, "Emergency Plans for Production and Utilization Facilities," to clarify, expand, and upgrade the content of licensee emergency plans. ,

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The Commissioners 3 Discussion: The emergency preparedness regulations published on August 19, 1980 (45 FR 55402), were based on the significance of adequate emergency planning and preparedness in order to ensure the protection of the public health and safety. As the Commission reacted to ,the accident at Three Mile Island, it became clear that the protection provided by siting and engineered design features had to be bolstered, by the ability to take protective measures during the course of an accident. In 1980, the Commission concluded that in order to discharge effectively its statutory responsibilities, the Commis-sion must know that proper means and procedures will be in place to assess the course of an accident and its potential severity, that NRC and other appropriate authorities and the public will be notified promptly, and that adequate protective actions in response to actual or anticipated conditions can and will be taken.

After 3 years of experi.ence in implementing the regulation as' well as additional insight gained through extensive research in the portrayal of reactor risk since 1980, the staff believes that, while the conclusions reached in 1980 are still valid, some refine-ment of the regulations is in order. The pri.ncipal change proposed involves the application of a "graded response" capability within ,

l the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ based on the significant differences in risk as well as time and resources that are available for actions l to be taken within the various portions of the EPZ. The staff therefore proposes the following changes.

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1. The 10-mile plume exposure EPZ should be subdivided into two l zones. The first zone, to be known as the Prompt Action Zone (PAZ), should extend from the reactor out to about 2 miles (3 km). The second zone is the remainder of the plume exposure EPZ. Although the prompt notification system to I inform the public in the event of emergency should be retained throughout the entire EPZ, the staff believes that the types of protective actions to be planned, the timing of such actions, l

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']TheCommissioners 4 and the allocation of resources assigned to implement any plan will differ significantly between the Prompt Action Zone and the remaining area of the plume exposure emergency planning zone.

a. Within the Prompt Action Zone (PAZ), the actions that ,

should be planned to be taken include the prompt evacua-tion of the public from this area,'if recommended by the licensee upon declaration of a general emergency.

A characteristic of this zone is that in the event of a severe accident, persons in the path of the plume may be exposed to high doses of radiation unless protective actions are taken promptly. For core damage accidents, priority should therefore be given to initiate prompt evacuation, and such actions should be taken within a few hours. This zone is defined in'the proposed regula-tion as,."Generally, the Prompt. Action Zone (PAZ) for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area ofabout 2 miles (3 km) in radius and where generally all members of the public can and will be evacuated after the declara-tion of a general radiological emergency. The design ,

objective or goal is to have the capability to evacuate essentially all persons within this zone in approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The Commission realizes that the ability to evacuate this zone could be hampered by adverse weather conditions, road repairs, etc. The increased time required to evacuate this zone under these unusual adverse conditions will not be considered a Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) as it is anticipated that these conditions will be temporary in nature."

An evacuation guideline of about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for the population within a 2-mile radius was selected based on the estimated timing and duration of the release 09/16/83 CP 10 CFR 50 EMERGENCY PLANNIN

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The-Commissioners 5 of radioactivity for very severe accidents, as well as the general feasibility of achieving an evacuation within this time frame for most sites.

For the most severe accident sequences investigated in the Sandia sitting study (an SSTI), the time of-release is estimated to be 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. This is the time between the onset of the accident and the actual release of-radioactivity to the environment. The duration of the release is estimated at about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Although the Sandia study indicated that the warning time (that is, the time when the operators became aware of an impending release and the actual release) was 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, this is considered to be unduly pessi,mistic. In-plant instrumenta-tion has been improved to detect and follow the course of severe accidents, and when the emergency action levels (EAL's)'have been integrated into the emergency operating procedures (EOP's), plant operators definitely would have more warning time than the time of release (that is, 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />).

By evacuating individuals within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, people would be exposed to very little dose from ground shine and

- less than half of the plume dose from exposure to the cloud. From data in the Sandia study, it is estimated I that an individual at the plume centerline, originally located at a distance of 1 mile from the reactor, would not be expected to receive a dose in excess of about 100 rem, given the most severe accident sequence.

With evacuation goal of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> radiation dose would not be entirely avoided under all circumstances. How-ever, if evacuation can be accomplished within this time even close in individuals, under the most severe 09/16/83 CP 10 CFR 50 EMERGENCY PLANNIN

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o S The Commissioners 6 releases, are unlikely to suffer serious early health effects.

b. Within the remaining area of the plume exposure emer-  !

gency planning zone, the protective action that should be planned to be taken is immediate sheltering within r available residences or other buildings for a number of hours (typically, about four), followed either by a f resumption of normal activity or by relocation of those  ;

persons in areas that were exposed to the plume. A i

characteristic of this zone is that in the event of a severe accident release, persons in the path of the  ;

j plume may be exposed to radiation doses ranging from about 2 to 20 re's per hour without the taking of any protective action. Priority should be given to protec-tive actions intended to reduce radiation doses, and ,

such actions can be taken over time periods of up to-about half a day and still prove effective in mitigation. 7 Evacuation of this zone is not likely but it cannot be entirely precluded. In any event, evacuation of this  !

zone could be accomplished with significantly less pre , j planning than that required for the PAZ because of the l time frame afforded by the physical ?ealities of distance l from the plant and dispersion characteristics within f the plume.

l Rationale The principal reason for this change is the-increased recog- ,

nition that the risk to the public from reactor accidents is not constant or uniform throughout the entiro 10-mile EPZ. -

I The risk is much higher close-in to the reactor and decreases  ;

continuously with distance. A corollary to this principle  ;

is that risk does not become zero beyond 10 miles; consequently i i

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protective actions beyond 10 miles might be called for in $

severe accident sequences, although preplanning is not judged j

to be necessary because of the available time and because of the existence of the fundamental emergency capabilities that exist within the 10-mile EPZ that can be readily expanded.

Within the 10-mile EPZ, the risk varies significantly both in magnitude and in character. *ithin the first 2 miles, high doses of radioactivity are much more likely (in the event of a severe accident) than at greater distances. At a distance of about 1 mile from the reactor, risk studies indicate that, given the most severe accident release, an individual within the path of the plume faces a high prob-ability of very high doses of radioactivity unless prompt protective action is taken. At a distance of about 2 miles this prob 4bility is reduced by an order of magnitude to about 10%. Whole body dose rates within this region (the PAZ) may reach about 100 rem per hour to individuals exposed to the plume; hence the need for prompt evacuation in order to ,

minimize these excessive doses.

Since accidents of lesser severity can also occur, and indeed, are more likely, protective actions and emergency planning should not focus on severe accidents alone but should accom-modate a spectrum of accidents, as provided by the 1980 regula-tions. For this reason, evacuation of the PAZ should be '

recommended by the lidensee when plant parameters indicate or project core damage. Sheltering in available residential structures or other available buildings should be planned for lesser accidents. Sheltering to avoid the exposure from the passage of the radioactive plume can be effective for ,

lesser accidents.

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p Beyond about 2 miles, whole body dose rates are reduced sig-p{

nificantly and range from about 2 to 20 rem per hour without These lowered dose rates the taking of any protective action.

permit a greater time frame in which to take sitigative actions. {

. j Consequently, the need for taking of prompt actions beyond  ;

While evacuation of about 2 miles is significantly reduced, f

this zone is unlikely, it cannot be entirely ruled out for unusual accident sequences or particularly adverse meteorology.-

For most severe accidents, immediate sheltering of the Since population should be planned for beyond the PAZ.

doses are not likely to be significantly high beyond the PAZ, a monitoring program can then be undertaken to deter-mine, within a few hours, the locations of excessive levels of contamination, if any. Persons in these areas can then be rel,ocated, while the remainder of the population in this This protective action zone can resume normal activities.

strategy is preferred since, where high doses are projected, immersion in the plume is expected to contribute less to total dose to a person than the cuntinued exposure of that This has person to contaminated ground af,ter plume passage.

Avoidance, several implications for emergency preparedness.

of the path of the plume, shortly after it has passed, is nearly as important as the avoidance of immersion in the For those exposed to the plume or moving into plume itself.

contaminated areas, the length of thier stay, and the shield-ing factors prevailing for them are highly influential on their total dose.

Accidents chat stop short of severe core damage cannot give Virtually all of the rise to particularly large releases.

public bealth risk posed by nuclear reactors originates in Some core damage or melt-core damage or meltdown accidents.

down accidents may be well contained and mitigated, so that Some core melt they do not resuit in substantial releases.

accident s;:enarios may give rise to very large releases.

CP 10 CFR 50 EMERGENCY PLANNIN GCVMVK1D - - _ _ ___ _

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Those that do so within a few hours of the accident onset tend to be worse than those that take 10 or more hours to develop. Radioactive decay and other physical processes tend to reduce the severity of releases that take a long time to develop from onset to release. It is generally .

possible to identify the_ symptoms of an accident in progress ~

and to prognosticate the prospect of a release, although the magnitude or timing cannot be done with exactitude or with certainty. Reactor operators are much better trained to do tnis today than they were before the accident at Three Mile Island. .

In summary, the actions that result in a reduction of offsite doses for severe reactor accidents are prompt evacuation near I

the plant, shelter in the remainder of the EPZ and prompt relocation (2-5 hours) of the public from contaminated areas.

To implement these protective actions, the following require-ments are proposed:

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a. Predetermined instrument and plant status indicators in the control room for declaring a general emergency .

and recommending protective actions based on core and containment conditions (before a release).

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b. Control Room personnel who have both the authority and the knowledge to make the appropriate protective measura recommendations offsite.

c. Provis Lens offsite for 24-hour pron.pt protective action I decisionmaking for all control room recommendations to include evacuation of the area near the plant (PAZ).

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CP 10 CFR 50 EMERGENCY PLANNIN 09/16/83

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d. Public notification procedures (e.g. , information) that address prompt ev6)sition of the area near the plant (PAZ).

e. Provisions for prompt location of contaminated areas throughout the plume exposure pathway EPZ and possibly ,

beyond.

The staff believes that the gradation in risk within the 10-mile EPZ requires a gradation in response. This gradation should give appropriate priority to reducing excessive doses where these are likely to occur, should recognize the differing time frames available for action, and should also recognize that protective actions may be required to be taken beyond 10 miles, in unusual circumstances.

Additional changes that are being proposed in this rulemaking package are:

2. Eliminate the "Unusual Event" as an emergency class.

The staff recommends eliminating this emergency classification because these events do not affect the public health and safety.

3. Incorporate Appendix E into the body of Part 50. The proposed rule change complies with Federal Register policy that states substantive regulations should be contained in numbered parts of the regulations rather than appendices.

The content of Appendix E has stayed essentially the same, except for the changes noted herein, and has been placed appropriately throughout Part 50 (i.e., S$ 50.34, 50.47 and 50.54).

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4. The 4-month clock >- The wording in this proposed rule change relating to providing a 4-month time span for the correction ,

of deficiencies in emergency planning has been clarified to be consistent with the Commission's original (1980) intent.

The preposed rule' change specifically states that deficiencies '

in the State and local governmental emergency planning and ,

preparedness, which are g within the control of the licensee, maybeghen4 months'forcorrection. This 4-month time period does not include the time period that FEMA may take to find that the deficiency has been corrected, particularly if such finding depends on conducting another exercise.

Similarly, emergency planning and preparedness deficiencies that are within the license's control will be handled as a normal enforcement action.

5. Specification of emergency planning requirements for research

- and test reactors and critical facilities - The staff is proposing to add a new section 50.48 to its regulations that i

would outline specific planning standards that research.ano i

test reactors and critical facilities must meet to obtain an

! operating license or to continue operation. The rationale '

for the change is that the potential radiological hazards to j

the public associated with the operation of research or test reactors and critical facilities licensed under 10 CFR Part 50 involve considerations different than those associated with nuclear power reactors.

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Research 4nd test reactors and critical facilities are low power facilities that are used for the fundamental study of t

material properties and nuclear processes and the production of radioisotopes for medical and industrial applications.

I Safety analyses for research and test reactors are based on i

the concept of a postulated Design Basis Event (DBE), an j

CP 10 CFR 50 EMERGENCY PLANNIN 09/16/83

O O 12 The' Commissioners event for which the risk to the public health and safety is greater than that from any event that can be mechanistically postulated. The rationale for using the DBE for research and test reactors is to assess the potential effects to the public health and, safety and is based on the deteruination that the offsite doses from the DBE be within the require-Consequently, if the ments of 10 CFR Parts 20 and 100.

requirements are met for a DBE condition, the capability of the facility to withstand normal and abnormal operational transients and a broad spectrum of postulated credible acci-dents without undue risk to the public would also be defined within the DBE.

The NRC staff has defined the DBE for research reactors as the event that will result in the total loss of water (reactor coolant) in the reactor pool or tank. A loss of coolant acci-

• dent for research and test reactors is where the reactor pool or tank could be drained through a break of an experimental beam port, crack of a primary coolant line, or other means, thus removing toe liquid coolant medium from the reactor.

The postulated radioactive releases from credible accidents associated with the operation of research reactors will not result in offsite radiological doses to the general public

' exceeding the EPA Protective Action Guides.

In light of the credible accidents postulated for research and test reactors and critical facilities resulting in core degradation, the staff considers that research and test reactors and critical facilities with an authorized power level of 2 MW (th).or less should establish general industrial emergency plans. These plans need not be submitted to the j

NRC for approval but must be maintained onsite, i

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The staff also considers that research and test reactors with an authorized power level greater than 2 MW (th) should establish and maintain radiological emergency plans  !

that meet the planning standards and elements in 5 50.48.

These emergency plans must be submitted to NRC for review and approval. ,

In addition, the staff considers it beneficial to discuss the following issues relative to the experience it has gained over the last 3 years with the implementation of the 1980 Emergency Preparedness regulations;

a. Funding Staff experience has been that provision of the necessary resources necessary to ensure that State and local juris-

• dictions can establish and maintain an adequate state ,

of emergency preparedness may pose a problem.

In the 1980 regulatory discussion, the Commission stated that it would be in the best interest of the licensee to provide the necessary funding to local jurisdictions.

In a few instances, In most instances, this has been done.

however, State and local governmental bodies, particularly those outside of the tax base or service area of the licenses, have felt that the burden of planning, training of personnel. and participation in exercises is beyond the capacity of their limited resources. This has caused doubts as to the adequacy of their portion of the overall emergency response capability.

The staff suggests that the Commission repeat its 1980 statement urging the licensee to assure adequate funding of local jurisdictions needing such support. The staff also suggests that the Commission share with the public CP 10 CFR 50 EMERGENCY PLANNIN, 09/16/83 ,

's 14 The Commissioners i the results of its informal poll of four licensees and  ;

state and local governments that indicates the usual level of funding that has been found necessary for i 1

developing an adequate state of preparedness around various- facilities during the last 3 years. In general, l it has been the NRC and FEMA's experience that the .

expenditure of approximately one dollar for each resident within the EPZ, appropriately divided among jurisdictions,  ;

has proven adequate, in most cases, for the first year's ,

initial efforts at planning, training, equipment. purchase, ,

and exercise participation. An annual sum of about fifty cents per person within the~EPZ has proven adequate,

< in most cases, for maintaining the emergency preparedness l 4

program. ,

While obviously not mandatory or rigid, these' levels of ,

funding are provided only as a basis for first attempts  ;

to estimate the level of resources that might usually be 1

needed by most State and local governmental entities within typical EPZs.  ;

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b. FEMA /NRC Relationship i

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.' The NRC and FEMA staffs have revised the original Memo-1 i randum of Understanding (MOU) to provide specificity to l

the findings and determinations that must be made by .

both agencies. In essence, FEMA will make a finding l and determination as to whether the emergency plans  !

I adequately meet the planning standards in $ 50.47, and I NRC will make a finding and determination as to whether f l

appropriate protection measures can and will be taken for the protection of the health and safety of the public.

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c. Severe Accident Source Term Work '

Although an intens'.ve research effort is underway to reassess the magnitude and timing of accidental radio ' l activity releases ("source team"), this effort is ,

presently incomplete. It is important to note that the

• staff emphasizes the changes proposed herein are based solely on the existing source terms and are written with -

out any prejudgment of the outcome of the ongoing research program. ,

d. Objective of the NRC Emergency Preparedness Regulations Various governmental authorities, consultants, and members of the public have argued that an emergency plan cannot be developed that would eliminate publ.ic health risk from all of the possible reactor accidents. 'he T NRC , ,

agrees that emergency preparedness can reduce but not eliminate public health risk associated with reactor accidents. It is not the intent of the NRC's emergency {

i preparedness regulations - nor is it theoretically pos- l sible at any reactor site - to develop a plan that would

, ensure that no one would receive a dose in excess of l the EPA protective action guidelines (PAGs) for any release, regardless of timing or severity. ,

i The NRC has noted that problems in interpreting the symptoms of an accident in a nuclear power plant, diagnosing the symptoms, developing a prognosis of the l

future course of events, communicating this information ,

I from plant personnel to appropriate officials in the offsite environs, the officials' decision to implement j appropriate protective actions for the population in (

1 surrounding areas, and communication of this information l l

CP 10 CFR 50 EMERGENCY PLANNIN  :

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to the public can be delayed or confused if these steps are not anticipated and planned in advance. The NRC therefore requires both the owner / operators of nuclear reactors _and offsite authorities to anticipate and to

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plan what is reasonable and prudent to do in the.very remote event of-a reactor accident with the potential .

to threaten public health and safety. .The objective of the planning process is to pave the way for expeditious action tailored to the circumstances, t .

The NRC would not license a plant if the radiological risk posed by possible accidents were not very small -

Nevet-even in the absence of emergency preparedness.

theless, the NRC has chosen to require emergency prepared-ness as another level of "defente-in-depth," the principle that a variety of independent and . diverse levels of protection should be afforded the public from the hazard of radiation exposure. The NRC believes that reasonable l

efforts to anticipate and plan for public protective actions in the vicinity of a' commercial nuclear plant can substantially reduce, though not eliminate, the ,

already small offsite radiological risk, and is, there-1 fore, a prudent if not essential requirement.

I The development of these proposed regulations has been coordinated l

FEMA concurs with the proposed rule change.

with the FEMA staff.

It is FEMA's intent that its regulations (44 CFR Part 350) be i consistent with the NRC regulations.

i I The staff anticipates that there would be no additional costs Cost Estimate:

for NRC, States, local governments, or licensees if the proposed

' rule changes are approved as a final regulation.

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Tha Commissioners  !

Recommendation: That the Commission:

1. Approve: . Publication of the proposed rule change in the  ;

l Federal Register for public comment (Enclosure 1).

2. Note: , .

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a. That anpropriate Congressional committees will be nstified of the proposed rule (draft Congressional j letter is Enclosure 2).

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b. That the ACR5 is being informed of the proposed rule. f,

c. That, pursuant to 5 51.51(d)(3) of the Comission's

g. regulations, an environmental assessment will be prepared j in connection with the subject proposed amendment.

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d. That the Federal Reaister notice contains a statement that the NRC certifies that the proposed ruie will not, ,

f if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a i

substantial number of small entities, pursuant to the .  ;

Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, S 605(b).

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e. This proposed rule contains no additional information, collection requirements and therefore is not subject to I the requirements of the Paperwork Requirement Act of ,

f 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et. . seq.).

f.

That the Office of Administration will distribute copies I L of the Federal Reaister notice to affected applicants, licensees, State governments, and interested persons. l

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g. That a public announcement will be issued.

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h. That a Regulatory Analysis has been prepared (Enclosure 3). f~

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The staff's conclusions, set forth in Enclosure 4, provide 8

the analysis called for by the Periodic and Systematic k

Review of the Regulations. k That the Chief Counsel for Advacacy of the Small Business J. f Administration will bi informed of the certification  !

and the reasons for it as required by the Regulatory .

Flexibility Act.

William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

Enclosures:

1. Federal Register Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

2. Draft Congressional Letter

3. Regulatory Analysis

4. TMI Action Plan Review .

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W 4UCLC'AR REGULAT0!1Y COMMISSIdN .:

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10 CFR PART 50 EMERGENCY'PLAHiiING KdD PREPAREDNESS FOR PROCOCTION M l"

AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES

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Nuclear Regulatory Comission.

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ACTION: Proposed rule. t.2?

ST.

The Commission is proposing to amend its emergency preparedness W

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SUMMARY

p regulations to reflect experience gained since 1980 an'd to tetter organi ..

,y the requirements for clarity. Recent research studies on reactor risk and g

the pructical amergency planning experience have led to a refined portr 5 The proposed.'eules would require a of rea: tor risks and consequences.

gr'aduated emergency response capability'to reflect a more realistic prog f;

'for dealing with radiological emergencies at nuclear power plants'.

.

• Comments .

DATES:

The comment peM od expires '

receivcd.after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, '

l but assurance of r.onsideration cannot be given except as to comments rece(ved onxor before this date.

1 I Deterested persom are invited to submit written comments and ADDRESSES:

suggestions on the proposed rule changt and/or the supporting Regulato Analysis to the 5%cretary of,the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulato

! Docketing and Service Branch.

'sion,' Washington, 0)C.[?.0555, Attentlon:

Copies of the Regulatory Arialysis and the comments received by the i

sionmaybeexi.minedintheCommission'sPublIcDocumentRoomat1717H '

l NW. ', Washington,'D.C. _

x s

1  %.,

4-

• 1asert date 60 (ays a'*ter publicat19n in Federal Register,

- . s t

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Enclosure 1

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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Michael T.'Jamgochian, Accident Source Term Program Office, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, .

Washington, D.C. 20555, Telephone: (301)443-7936.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On August 19, 1980, the NRC published rev emergency preparedness regulations, which became effective on November L.

The regulations required nuclear power reactor licensees to submit upgraded emergency plans by January 2, 1981; to submith' 1980 (45 FR 55402). ',

N(

implementing procedures by March 1,1981; and to implement the plans by m g April 1, 1981. 5S In 1

a The 1980 rule changes were considered an upgrade of NRC emergency (i

planning regulations to provide clarification and expansion in areas h

perceived to be deficient as a result of the TMI experiences.

The 1980 emergency preparedness regulations involved the following three major changes from past practices:

the NRC [

g

1. To continue operations oi to receive an operating license '

reouires that applicants /licenscas submit their emergency plans, including The NRC State and local governmental emergency response plans, to NRC.

then makes a finding as to whether the state of onsite and offsite emer-

gency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that appropriate proter, j 1

tive measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. '

The NRC bases its finding on a review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) findings and determinations as to whether Sta and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented and on the NRC assessment as to whether the licensee's/ applicant's emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented.

Specifically:

a. An operating license will not be issued unless a favorable NRC overall finding can be made, and i

2 Enclosure 1

d (7590-01) lW . .

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^*D .

b.

After January 1,1981, an operating plant may be required to 13 shut down if it is determined that there are such deficien . ,

favorable NRC finding cannot be made or is no longer i warranted$$ and

'i deficiencies are not corrected within 4 months of that dete 2.

Emergency planning considerations were extended to "Emergency S Planning Zones," and j 3.

Detailed emergency planning implementing procedures h of both ,.

3 licensees and applicants for operating licenses must be submitted

• t NRC Inspection and Enforcement regional office for review.

In addition, the Commission revised 10 CFR Part l50,ify, Appendix fi$ E,

@C "Emergency Plans for Production and Utilization Facilities," to c ar :pj, expand, and upgrade the content of licensee emergency plans.

19, 1980 lM The emergency preparedness regulations published on August l i @

(45 FR 55402), were based on the significance oflthadequate and {- e and preparedness in order to ensure the protection of the public he ..

safety.

As the Commission reacted to the accident at design Three Mile Isl

. became clear that the protection provided by si' ting and engineered ,

features had to be bolstered by the ability to take protective measur In 1980, the Commission concluded that during the course of an accident. i the s.

in order to discharge effectively its statutory responsibilit es, [

Commission must know that proper means and ity,procedures that NRC will!;b to assess th'e course of an accident and its potential sever tly, and other appropriate authorities and the public will be ii notified td prom ~

- and that adequate protective actions in response to actual or ant c conditions can and will be taken.

After 3 years of experience in implementing the regulation l as additional insight gained through extensive research in hilethe theportraya l of reactor risk since 1980, the Commission has determined ula- that, w conclusions reached in 1980 are still valid, some refinement of th The principal change that is proposed involves l the tions is in order.

appli-ation of a "graded response" capability within ll as thetime10-mile exposure EPZ based on the significant differences in risk as i uswe and resourcesThethat are available Commission for actions therefore proposes the following tochang be portions of the EPZ.

Enclosure 1 3

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(7590-01] ,

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1.

The 10-mile plume exposure EPZ should be sub-divided into two I L zones.

The first zone, to be known as the Prompt Action Zone (PAZ), .

b t 2 miles (3 km). The second

' should extend from the reactor out to a ou Although the prompt zone is the remainder of the plume exposure EPZ. hould notification system to inform the public in the event of emergency that s be retained throughout the entire EPZ, the Commission f such actions,has determined ,

the types of protective actions to be planned, the timing o ill differ and the allocation of resources assigned to implement any plan f w ..

significantly between the Prompt Action Zone and the remaining area o h the plume exposure emergency planning zone. ik c.

a.

Within the Prompt Action Zone (PAZ), the actions that should be lic from this k planned to be taken include the prompt evacuation of the pub n%

area, if recommended by the Eicensee upon declaration of a general h w

eme gency. A characteristic of this zone is that in thei hevent doses of a severe .g accident, persons in the path of the plume may be exposed Therefore,to h g l of radiation unless protective actions are caken promptly. f for core damage accidents, priority should be giver) toThis initiate prompt .

evacuation, and such actions.should be taken within a few hours. O zone is defined in the proposed regulation as, "Generally, fthe Prompt ~

I.

Action Zone (PAZ) for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area o ,

about 2 miles (3 km) in radius and where generally alll members of the public can and will be evacuated after the declaration of a Genera  :

The design objective or goal is to have tae ,

radiological emergency. l capability to evacuate essentially all persons within this zone in approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

The Commission realizes that the ability to evacuate this zone could The increased time be hampered by adverse weather and road repairs. ditions required to evacuate this zone under these unusual adverse CO) as itcon is will not be considered a Limiting Condition of Operation (L anticipated that these conditions will be temporary in nature.

An evacuation guideline of about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for the population within a 2-mile radius was selected based on the estimated timing and durat ll as the the release of radioactivity for very severe accidents, as we for general feasibility of acheiving an evacuation within this time frame most sites.

4 ,

Enclosure 1 L_-___. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

[7590-01] s.3 vf a

g For the most seve're accident sequences investigated in the Sandia sitting study (an SSTI), the time of. release is estimated to be 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

k

~

This is the time between the onset of the accident and the actual rec of radioactivity to the environment. The duration of the release is Although the Sandia study indicated that the estimated at about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. -

warning time (that is, the time when the operators became aware of an inpending release and the actual release) was 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, this is con-sidered to be unduly pessimitic. In plant instrumentation has been g improved to detect and follow the course of severe accidents, and when 9 the emergency action levels (EAL's) have been integrated into the emer- f.2 in gency operating procedures (EOP's), plant operators definitely would have h more warning time than the time of release (that is, 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />).

a[

By evacuating individuals within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, people be exposed to very  !)

y little dose from ground shine and less than half of the plume dose from From data in the Sandia study, it is est.imated f-exposure to the cloud.

that an individual at the plume centerline, originally located Lt a distance of 1 mile from the reactor, would not be expected to receive a dose in excess of about 100 rem, given the most severe accident sequence. .

With evacuation goal of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> radiation dose would not be entirely -

However, if evacuation can be accom-avoided under all circumstances. .

plished within th'is time even close in individuals, under the most severe releases, are unlikely to suffer serious early health effects, b.

Within the remaining area of the plume exposure emergency plan-ning zone, the protective action that should be planned to be taken is immediate sheltering within available residences or other buildings for a number of hours (typically, about four), followed either by a resumption l

of normal activity or by relocation for those persons in areas that were exposed to the plume. A characteristic of this zone is that in the event of a severe accident release, persons in the path of the plume may be t

exposed to radiation doses ranging from about 2 to 20 rem per hour with-Priority should be given to out the taking of any protective action.

I protective actions intended to reduce radiatiots doses, and such action l

can be taken over time periods of up to about half a day and still prove

' effective in mitigation. Evacuation of this zone is not likely although l

1

, - 5 Enclosure 1

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1

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• [7590-01]

-g it cannot be entirely precluded. However, in any event, evacuation of [

ud this zone could be accomplished with significantly less pre planning than that required for the PAZ because of the time frame envisioned above. d Rationale f The principal reason for this change is the increased recognition that the risk to the public from reactor accidents is not constant or uniform throughout the entire 10-mile EPZ. The risk is much higher $

close-in to the reactor and decreases continuously with distance.

A corollary to this principle is that risk does not become zero beyond h 10-mile; consequently protective actions beyond 10-mile might be called f for in severe accident sequences, although preplanning is not judged to f be necessary because of the available time and because of the fundamental ,

emergency capabilities that exist within the 10-mile EPZ that can be readily expanded. .

Within the 10-mile EPZ, the risk varies significantly both in magnitude as well as character. Within the first 2 miles, high doses of

' radioactivity are much more likely in the event of the most unlikely but the most severe accident releases than at greater distances. At a distance of about 1-mile from the reactor, risk studies indicate that, given the most unlikely but the most severe accident release, an indi-vidual within the path of the plume faces a high probability of very high doses of radioactivity unless prompt protective action is taken. 'At a distance of about 2 miles this probability is reduced by an order of magnitude to about 30%. Whole body dose rates within this region (the PAZ) may reach about a 100 rem per hour to individuals exposed to the plume; hence the need for prompt evac,uation in order to minimize these excessive doses.

Since accidents of lesser severity can also occur, and indeed, are more likely, protective actions and emergency planning should not focus on severe accidents alone but should accommodate a spectrum of accidents, as was accomplished by the 1980 regulations. For this reason, evacuation of the PAZ will be recommended by the licensee only when plant parameters indicate core damage; sheltering in available residential structures or 6 Enclosure 1

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[7590-01]

~

other available buildings may be planned for lesser accidents. Sheltering to avoid the exposure from the passage of the radioactive plume can be

' effective for lesser accidents as well as less socially disruptive than e an evacuation. ,

Beyond about 2 miles, whole body dose rates are reduced signif-ica'ntly and range from about 2 to 20 rem per hour without the taking of any protective action.

These lowered dose rates permit a greater time frame in which to take mitigative actions. Consequently, the need for

,j taking of prompt actions beyond about 2 miles is significantly reduced .

While evacuation of this zone is unlikely, it cannot be entirely ruled out for unusual accident sequences or particularly adverse meteorology.

For most severe accidents, immediate sheltering of the population should be planned for beyond the PAZ.

Since doses are not likely to'be signif-icantly high beyond the PA'Z, a monitoring program can then be undertaken to determine, within a few hours, the locations of excessive levels of contamination, if any.

Persons in these areas can then be relocated, while the remainder of the population in this zone can resume normal activities.

This protective actjon strategy is preferred since, where high doses'are projected, immersion in the plume is expected to con-tribute less to total dose to a person than the continued exposure of that person to contaminated ground after plume passage.

This has seve.ral implications for emergency preparedness.

Avoidance of the path of the plume, shortly after it has passed, is nearly as important as the avoid-ance of immersion in the plume _itself.

! For those exposed to the plume or l

moving into contaminated areas, the length of their stay, and the shield-ing factors prevailing for them are highly influential on their total dose.

I Accidents that stop short of severe core damage cannot give rise to particularly large releases.

Virtually all of the public health risk posed by nuclear reactors originates in core damage or meltdown accidents.

Some core damage or meltdown accidents may be well contained and mitig so that they do not result in substantial releases. Some core melt-accident scenarios may give rise to very large releases. Those that do so within a few hours of the accident onset tend to be worse thar tho that take 10 or more hours to develop. Radioactive decay and other 7 '

l Enclosure 1

[7590-01] @

n

!h physical processes t'end to reduce the severity of releases that take a ,

long time to develop from onset to release. It is generally possible to h identify the symptoms of an accident in progress and to prognosticate the N-prospect of a release, although the magnitude or timing cannot be done $r with exactitude or with certainty. Reactor operators are much better trained 'to do this'today than they were before the accident at Three Mile &

Island.

[

In summary, the actions that result in a reduction of offsite doses for severe reactor accidents are prompt evacuation near the plant, shelter [

Y in the remainder of the EPZ and prompt relocation (2-5 hours) of the public  ;

from contaminated areas. To implement these protective actions the follow-f

)

ing requirements are proposed: n a .' Predetermined instrument and plant status indicators in the control room for declaring a general emergency and recommending protective actions based on core and containment conditions (before a release).

b. Control Room personnel who have both~the authority'and the knowledge to make the appropriate protective measures recom-mendations offsite.

c. Provisions offsite for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prompt protective action ,

I decisionmaking for all control room recommendation to include

- evacuation of the area near the plant.

l d. Public notification procedures, information, etc. that address promot evacuation of the area near the plant (PAZ).

i e. Provisions for prompt location of contaminated areas throughout I the plume exposure pathway EPZ and possibly beyond.

l The Commission considers that the gradation in risk within the l

10 mile EPZ requires a gradation in response. This gradation should give l

appropriate priority to reducing excessive doses where these are likely 8 Enclosure 1 I

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[7590-01]. . . . . .k

[;

i; to occur, should recognize the differing time frames available for action, h and should also recognize that protective.' actions may be required to be f taken beyond ten mil.es, in unusual circumstances. .f Additional changes that are being proposed in this rulemaking package -h are: h

2. Eliminate the "Unusual Event" as an emergency class. The Commis-sion has decided to eliminate this emergency classification because these f[

events do not affect the public health and safety.

3. Incorporate Appendix E in the text of Part 50. The proposed rule caange complies with Federal Register policy that states substantive f regulations should be contained in numbered Parts of the regulations {

rather than appendices. The content of Appendix E has stayed essentially }

the same, except for the changes noted herein, and has been placed appro-priately throughout Part 50 (i.e., SS 50.34, 50.47 and 50.54). _h

4. The 4-month clock - The wording in this proposed interchange relating to providing a 4 months time span for the correction of defi-ciencies in emergency planning has been clarified in order to be con-sistent with the Commission's original (1980) intent. The proposed rule change specifically states that deficiencies in the State and local governmental emergency planning and preparedness, which are not within the control of the licensee, may be given 4 months for correction. This 4-month time period does not include the time period that FEMA may take to find that the deficiency has been corrected particularly if such ,

finding dependu on the conduct of another exercise. Similarly, emergency planning and preparedness deficiencies that are within the licensee's control will te handled as a normal enforcement action. ,

5. Specification of emergency planning requirements for research and test reactors and critical facilities - The Commission is proposing to add a new section 50.48 to it's regulations that would outline specific planning standards that research and test reactors and critical facil-ities must meet to obtain an operating license and/or to continue opera-tion. The rationale for the change is that the potential radiological hazards to the public associated with the operation of research or test reactors and critical facilities licensed under 10 CFR Part 50 involve considerations different than those associated with nuclear power reactors. ,

9 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

e Research and test reactors and critical facilities are low power facilities that are used for the fundamental study of material properties

. and nuclear processes and the production of radioisotopes-for medical and industrial applications.

Safety analyses for research and test reactors are based on the concept of a postulated Design Basis Event (DBE), an event for which the risk to the public health and safety is greater'than that from any event that can be mechanistically postulated. The rationale for using the OBE '

for research and test reactors is to assess the potential effects to the public health and safety and is based on the determination that the offsite doses from the.DBE be within the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20, and "Standards for Protection Against Radiation" and Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria." Consequently, if the requirements are met for a DBE condition, the capability of the facility to withstand normal and abnormal operational transients and a broad spectrum of postulated credible accidents without undue risk to the public would also be defined within the DBE.

The NRC has defined the.DBE for research reactors as the event that will result' in the total loss of water (reactor coolant) in the reactor pool or tank. A loss of coolant accident for research and test reactors is where the reactor pool or tank could be drained through a brsak of an experimental beam port, crack of a primary coolant line, or other means, thus removing the liquid coolant medium from the reactor. ,

The postulated radioactive releases from credible accidents asso-ciated with the operation of research reactors will not result in offsite l

radiological doses to the general public exceeding the EPA Protective l Action Guides.

l In light of the credible accidents postulated for research and test reactors and critical facilities resulting in core degradation, the Commission has determined that research and test reactors and critical facilities with an authorized power level of 2 MW (th) or less must establish general industrial emergency plans. These plans need not be submitted to the NRC for approval but must-be maintained onsite.

The Commission has also determined that research and test reactors with an authorized power level greater than 2 MW(th) must establish and 10 Enclosure 1

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.., .. . m .. , . . . .

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maintain radiological emergency plans that meet the planning standards and elements in S 50.48. These emergency. plans must be submitted to NRC for review and approval.

-In addition, the Commission considers it beneficial to discuss the following issues relative to the experience it has gained over the last 3 years with the implementation of the 1980 Emergency Preparedness ,

regulations;

a. Funding Commission experience has been that the necessary resources to ensure that State and local jurisdictions can establish and maintain an adequate state of emergency preparedness mission may pose a problem. In the 1980 regulat'ory discussion, the Commission stated that it would be in the best interest of the licensee to provide the necessary funding to local jurisdictions. In most instances this has been done. In a very few instances, however, State and local governmental bodies, particularly those outside of the tax base or service area of the licensee have felt that the burden of planning, training of personnel and participation in exerci'ses is beyond the capacity of their limited resources. This has ,

caused doubts as to the adequacy of their portion of the overall emer-gency response capability.

The Commission therefore wishes to repeat their 1980 stater.4ent of urging the licensee to assure adequate funding of local jurisdiction's needing such support. Al-so the Commission and FEMA have informally polled four licensees and State and local governments in order to obtain an estimate as to the overall cost for implementing the 1980 emergency preparedness regulations. This inform-t;on is being shared with the public in the hopes that it will provide some guidance for future applicants and State and loc _al governments. It is in no way meant to restrict, restrain, or limit larger or smaller amounts of resources that may be necessary to establish and maintain an adequate state of emergency preparedness. In general, it has been the learned that the expenditure of approximately one dollar for each resident within the EPZ, appro-priately divided between jurisdictions, has proven adequate, in most 11 Enclosure 1

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cases, for the first years initial efforts at planning, training, equip-ment purchase and exercise participation. An annual sum of about fifty cents per person within the EPZ has, proven adequate in most cases for maintaining the program. -

While obviously not mandatory or rigid, these levels of funding are provided only as a basis for first attempts to estimate the level of  ;

resources-that might usually be needed by most State and local govern- _

mental entities within typical EPZs. .

b. FEMA /NRC relationship A revised FEMA /NRC Memorandum of Understanding has been developed and is provided for information.*

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN NRC AND FEMA RELATING TO RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPARE 0 NESS I. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE This Memorandum of Understanding establishes a framework.of coopera-tion between the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and~the,U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in radiolog1 cal emergency response planning matters, so that their mutual efforts will be directed toward ,

more effective plans and related preparedness measures at and in the l

vicinity of nuclear reactors, fuel cycle facilities which are subject to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and certain other fuel cycle and materials j licensees which have potential for significant accident offsite and l radiological releases. The memorandum is responsive to the President's

! decision of December 7, 1979, that FEMA will take the lead in offsite l

l Planning and response, his planning and response, his request that NRC

~

f assist FEMA in carrying out this role, and the NRC's continuing statutory responsibility for the radiological health and safety of the public.

( "The revised MOU is typed in comparative texter to assist your review.

l 12 Enclosure 1 l

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[A-separate-memorandem-has-been negotiated-to-cover-NRE/ FEMA-eeepera-tion-and-responsibiiities-in respense-to-an-actuai-emergency-incieding pubiic-information-activities:--in-addition--an-agreement-was-aise reached-between-the-NRE-and-FEMA-en-September-li--19797-that-chairmanship of-the-Federai-interagency-Eentrei-Seerdinating-Eemmittee-(new-the Federai-Radielegicai-Preparedness-Seerdinating-Eemmittee-shoeid-be transferred-from-NRE-to-FEMA:--This-agreement-was-transmitted-to-ether Federai-agencies-by-a-jeint-ietter-frem-the-Ehairman-of-the-NRE-and-the Sirector-of-FEMA:--The-NRE-and-FEMA-sise-agreed-in principie-en September-li--1979;-to-the-idea-of-joint participatien-in-the-review; -

assessment-and-cencerrent-with-regard-to-State-and-iecai-emergency response pians;]

On January 14, 1980, the two agencies entered into a "Memorandum of Understanding Between NRC and FEMA to Accomplish a Prompt Improvement in Radiological Emergency Preparedness" that was responsive to the President's December 7, 1979, statement. A revised and uodated Memorandum of Under standing (MOU) became effective November 1, 1980. This MOU is a further revision to reflect the evolving relationshio between NRC and FEMA and the

'excerience gaine'd in carrying out the provisions of the January and November, 19'80 MOU's. This MOV supersedes these two earlier versions of the MOU.

The ceneral orincioles, agreed to in the previous MOU's and reaffirmed in this MOU, are as follows: FEMA coordinates all Federal planning and takes the lead for-deveioping-a program-and in assessing State and local radio-logicalemergencyresponseplansinandpreparedness,and-formakesfindings and determinations as to the adequacy and capability of implementing State and local plans, and to makes those findings and determinations available to NRC. The NRC reviews those FEMA findings and determinations for the purpose of making determinations on the overall state of emergency prepared-ness for issuance of licenses or shut-down-of-eperating-reacters for taking l enforcement actions. That arrangement makes FEMA staff responsible for evaluating the adequacy of State and local plans and for assuring that the plans are capable of implementation on a continuing basis, and therefore substantially avoids duplicative efforts by NRC staff. This-memorandem ef-enderstanding-buiids-epen-the-reistionship-that-has-been-deveieping between-the-two-agencies-and sepersedes-the-daneary-14--1980--memorandem.

13 Enclosure 1 l

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4

[7590-01] N.$

fa A seoarate MOU,"dated October 22, 1980, deals with NRC/ FEMA coopera- b

,t tion and responsibilities in response to an actual or ootential radio- k k

g loaical emergency. Operational Response Procedures have been develooed f

that implement the provisions of the Incident Response MOU. These docu-ments are intended to be consistent with the Federal Radiolooical Emeraency -g Response Plan which' will describe the relationships, roles and responsi_-

bilities of Federal agencies for respondino to accidents involvina peace-time nuclear emeroencies. .

II. AUTHORTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES h 1;

?

FEMA - Executive Order 12148 charges the Director, FEMA with estab-i lishing policy for and coordinating all civil emergency planning and assistance functions for Executive agencies (Section 2-101). It also  :

provides that "The Director shall represent the President in working with State and local governments and private sector to stimulate vigorous participation.in civil emergency preparedness ~, mitigation, response, an recovery progi ams." .(Section 2-104).

[ 0 n- B e c emb e r-Y T - 1999-- the- P re si de nt--i n- re s p o n s e- to- t he- re c omme n d

, tiens-of-the-Kemeny-6emmission-en-the-accident-at-Three-Miie-isiand-directed-that-FEMA-assume-iesd-responsibility-fer-ait-effsite-nuetear, emergency pianning-and-respenser] .

Specifically, the FEMA responsibilities with respect to emergency ,

preparedness as they relate to NRC are: '

1. To take the lead in offsite emergency planning and review and assess State and local emergency plans and oreparedness for adequacy.

I [2;--To-review-State-and-4ecai-emergency-pians-in-these-States af f ected- by- ep erati ng- resete rs- f rep ert- s u bmi tted- te- the- P re si de nt-i n i dune-1986 -):

l S;---To-cempietei-as-seen-as pessibie--the-review-of-State-and-ioesi emergency pians-in-these-States-affected-by piants-scheduied-for-operation in-the-near-future ]

2. To make findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and espabie-of-impiementation can be imple-mented (e.g., adequacy and maintenance of procedures, training, resources, l 14 Enclosure 1

[

1

-N e myrvw-m- v v c- y

_ , , . - - - ----a -___._____.-_m

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[7590-01]

staffing levels and qu ifications and equipment adequacy). [Notwithstanding the precedures-which-may-be-set-forth-in-44-EFR-350-for-requesting-and reaching-a-FEMA-administrative approvai of-State-and-fecai pians--Findings and-determinations-en-tha-current-states of emergency preparedness around particeiar-sites-may] will be referred to as interim findings and will be requested by the NRC through the NRC/ FEMA Steering Committee and provided ,

by FEMA for use as needed in the NRC licensing process. [These-findings and-determinatiens-may-be-based-epen-currently avaiiabie-to-FEMA-er -

furnished-to-FEMA-by-the-NRE-] An interim finding provided under this arrangement will be an extension of FEMA's orocedures for review and acoroval of State and local radiological emergency olans and preoared-ness set forth in 44 CFR 350. It will be based on either currently available olan reviews, or on available plan reviews and joint exercise results related to specific nuclear power plant site.

An interim finding based on currently available olan reviews will include an assessment as to whether or not existing offsite olans are adeouate when measured against the standards and criteria of NUREG-0654/

FEMA-REP-1; and cending a demonstration through an exercise, whether

~

there is reasonable assurance that the plans can be imp'lemented.

An interim finding based on currently available plan reviews and joint exercise results will include an assessment as to (1) whethers State and local emeronecy plans are adeouate and caoable of being imolemented.

and (2) whether the exercise (s) dem'onstrated that the offsite orecared- .

ness orovides reasonable assurance that aoprooriate orotective measures can be taken to orotect the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power olant site in the event of a ratiolooical emergency.

In the event State and local olans have not been submitted to FEMA for review or there has been insufficient time to comolete the review; FEMA will provide a status recort of offsite emergency orecaredness in lieu of an interim finding on olans and/or preoaredness;

3. To assume responsibility for radiological emergency preparedness training of State and local officials.

4. To develop and issue an updated series of interagency assignments

~

which wecid delineate respective agency capabilities and responsibilities and define procedures fo coordination and direction for emergency planning 15 Enclosure 1

a. .

[7590-01]

and response. (Current assianments are in 44 CFR 351, March 11, 1982.

) [41 FR 107581).

NRC - The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, requires that the NRC grant licenses only if the health and safety of the public is adequately protected. While the Atomic Energy Act does not specifically require emergency plans and related preparedness measures, the NRC had -

requireds consideration of overall emergency preparedness as a part of the licensing process. 10 CFR 50.33, 50.34, 50.47, and Appendix E to .

10 CFR Part 50 include requirements for the licensee emergency plans.

i n- a- F e derai-R e gi s te r- Ne ti ce- dated- D e c emb e r- 24;-1995-- e nti ti e d. u R adi e--

iegicai-incident-Emergency-Response-Pianning:--Fixed-Faciiities-and-Trans-portation .fu 40-FR-59494-);-the-Federai-Preparedness-Agency--a predecessor ef-FEMA--eatiined-responsibiiities-of-varieas-Federai-agencies-in provid-ing-assistance-to-State-and-iecei governments-in-their-radie4egicai emer-gency-response pianning:--Beth-FEMA-and-NRE-recognice-that-these responsibilities-have-been-reevaiested-and-this-wiii-be-reflected-in th e- rei s s e a nc e-o f- th a t- F e ce rai- Re gi s t e r- N e ti c e Specifically, the NRC responsibilities for emergency preparedness are:

1. To assess licensee emergency plans for adequacy.

2. To verify that licensee emergency plans are adequately imple-mented (e.g., adequacy and maintenance of procedures, training,' resources, staff levels and qualifications and equipment adequacy).

3. To review the FEMA findings and determinations on the adequacy ,

and capability of implementation of State and local plans.

4. To make decisions with regard to the overall state of emergency preparedness (i.e., integration of emergency preparedness onsite as determined by the NRC and offsite as determined by FEMA and reviewed by NRC) and issuance of operating licenses or for taking enforcement actions shutdown-of-operating-reacters:

III. AREAS OF COOPERATION A. NRC Licensino Reviews FEMA will provide support for NRC reactor, fuel facility and material licensing reviews, as-requested- with regard to the assessment of the adequacy of State and local radiological emergency rerponse plans. For 16 Enc 1'osure 1

a [7590-01]

accidentai-radielegieni-reieases This will include timely submittal of an evaluation suitable for inclusion in NRC safety evaluation reports.

Substantially prior to the time that a FEMA evaluation is required with regard to fuel facility and of material license review, NRC will identify those fuel and material licensees with potential for significant accidental offsite radiological releases and for those NRC will submit to FEMA the -

emergency plans as they are completed. _

FEMA routine suppor twill include providing ev essments findings and determinations (interim and final) on State (y 1 local plans and orecared-ness related to reactor Construction Permit and Operating License reviews and [ continuing-essessments-of-State-and-iocal pians-dering-the-facility 44fetime] operating reactors. To support its findings and determinations, FEMA will make expert witnesses available before the Commission, the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, NRC hearing boards and admin-istrative law judges, and court actions, and during any related discovery l

proceedings. FEMA will not be asked to provide witnesses to succort status recorts. -

FEMA will appear in NRC licensing preceedings as part of the presenta-tion of the NRC staff. However, FEMA counsel will normally present FEMA witnesses.and be permitted at the discretion of the NRC licensing board I

to cross examine the witnesses of parties, other than NRC witnesses 4 on matters involvino FEMA findings, policies or coerations. FEMA is not considered a carty to NRC proceedings and. therefore, is not subject to formal discovery reouirements placed uoon Darties to NRC oroceedinos.

Consistent with available resources, however, FEMA will resoond informally

~

l to discovery reouests by parties. Soecific assionment of orofessional resoonsibilities between NRC and FEMA counsel will orimarily be the resoonsibility of the attorneys assioned, to a particular case. In

! situations where questions of professional resoonsibility cannot be resolved by the attorneys assigned, resolution of any differences will

. be made by the General Counsel of FEMA and the Executive Legal Director of the NRC or their designees. FEMA will be placed on the service list for all litioation in which it is exoected to participate.

l l

17 Enclosure 1 l

1 '

, ,. [7590-01]

Nothing in this document shall be construed in any way to diminish

, NRC's responsibility for protecting the radiological health and safety of the public.

B. FEMA Review of State and Local Plans 2

NRC will assist in the development and review of State and local plans through its membership on the Regional Assistance Committees. FEMA will .

chair the Regional Assistance Committees. Consistent with NRC's statutory responsibility, NRC will recognize FEMA as the interface with State and local governments for interpreting radiological emergency preparedness criteria as it affects those governments and for reporting the results of any evaluation of State and local governments' emergency preparedness to those governments.

Where questions arise concerning the interpretation of the criteria, such questions will continue to be referred.to FEMA Headquarters, and .

when appropriate to the NRC/ FEMA Steering Committee to assure uniform interpretation.

C. Emeroency Preparedness Guidance s

NRC has lead responsibility for the development of emergency prepared- ,

ness guidance for licensees. FEMA has lead responsibility for the develo,p-ment of emergency preparedness guidance for State and local agencies. NRC and FEMA recognize the need for an integrated, coordinated aooroach to radiolooical emergency preparedness by NRC licensees and State and local governments. NRC and FEMA will each, therefore, provide opportunity for the other agency to review and comment ,on emergency preparedness guidance (including interpretations of agreed joint cuidance) prior to adoption as formal agency guidance.

D. Sucoort for Automated Information Retrieval System FEMA and NRC will each provide the other with continued access to those automatic data processing support systems which contain emergency preparedness data developed and/or utilized. during-the-transit 4en peried.

. 18 Enclosure 1 1

.g,- I ,. . u .%

. - [7590-01]

At NRC this includes Automated Information Retrieval System (AIReS) support to the extent that.it does not affect duplication or records retention. At FEMA this includes technical support to the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Management Information System. This agreement is not intended to include the automated information retrieval support for the national level emergency response facilities. .

E. Onceine-NRE Research and Development Procrams l 1

NRC and FEMA research and development programs that are related to State and local emergency planning and preparedness will be coordinated.

F. Public Information Procrams FEMA will take the lead in developing public information programs.

NRC will assist FEMA by reviewing for-accuracy- educational materials concerning radiation and its hazards and information regarding appropriate actions to be take'n by the general public in the event of an accident involving radioactive materials.

• Public information activities have been wiii-be addressed in the incident response MOU dealing with response to actual emergency informa-tion programs. NRC will assist FEMA by reviewing for-securacy- educational materials concerning radiation and its hazards and information regarding ,

appropriate acti'ons to be taken by the general public in the event of an accident involving radioactive materials.

Public information activities have been wiii-be addressed in the incident resoonse MOU deaiing-with-response-to-actuai-emergencies and in the ooerational resoonse orocedures developed between NRC and FEMA.

IV. HEAR-TERM-600 PERATIVE-MEASWRES NRC/ FEMA STEERING COMMITTEE In order to achieve a prompt improvement in the state of emergency i preparedness at and around nuclear power facilities, and because of the need for an integrated assessment of the degree of preparedness, FEMA and NRC recognize the need for an especially close working relationship.

l 4

19 Enclosure 1 1

~

3-

)

-. . ,,4 - ' . ... .a s...

. . [7590-01]

s The NRC/ FEMA. Steering Committee on Emergency Preparedness'will be the focal point for coordination of emergency preparedness and response activities between the two agencies. The Steering Committee will consist' of an equal number of members to represent each agency with one vote per agency. Where the Steering Committee cannot agree on the resolution of an issue, the issue will be referred to NRC and FEMA management. The .

NRC members will have lead responsibility for licensee preparedness and the FEMA members will have lead responsibility for State and local ,

preparedness. The Steering Committee will coordinate the preparedness evaluation activities and develop upgraded acceptance criteria for ,

licensee, State, and local emergency preparedness. NRC and FEMA will then consider and adopt criteria, as appropriate, in their respective jurisdictions. (See Attachment 1).

V. WORKING ARRANGEMENTS A. The normal point of contact for implementation of the points in this Memorandum will be the NRC/ FEMA Steering' Committee.

B. The Steering Committee will establish the day-to-day procedures for assuring that the arrangements of this Memorandum are carried out. ~

6^/D N 0C P10 L(.

% M N

.- d

c. Severe Accident Source Term Work ,

Although an intensive research effort is underway to reassess the magnitude and timing of accidental radioactivity releases ("source term"), this effort is presently incomplete. It is important to note that the NRC wishes to emphasize the changes proposed herein are based I

solely on the existing source terms and are written without any prejudg-ment of the outcome of the ongoing research program.

d. Objective of the NRC Emergency Preoaredness Reculations Various governmental authorities consultants and member of the public have argued that an emergency plan cannot be developed that would eliminate the public health risk from all of the possible reactor accidents.

The NRC agrees: emergency preparedness can reduce but not eliminate public health risk associated with reactor accidents. It is not the intent 20 Enclosure 1

^

, I7590-01]

of the NRC's emergency preparedness regulations - nor is it theoretically possible at any reactor site - to develop a plan that would assure that no one receives a . dose in excess of the EPA protective action guidelines

'(PAGs) for any release, regardless of timing or severity.

The NRC has noted that problems in interpreting the symptoms of an accident in a nuclear power plant, diagnosing the symptoms, developing .

a prognosis of the future course of events, communicating this information from plant personnel to appropriate officials in the offsite environs, the officials' decision to implement appropriate protectiva actions for the population in surrounding areas, and communication of '.his.information to the public can be delayed or confused if these steps are not anticipated and planned in advance. The NRC therefore requires both the owner / operators of nuclear reactors and offsite authorities anticipate and plan what is is reasonable and prudent to do in the very remote event of a reactor accident with the potential to threaten public health and safety. The objective of the planning process is to pave the way for the expeditious action appropriate to the circumstances.

The NRC would not license a plant if the radio' logical risk posed by possible accidents were not very small - even in the' absence of emergency ,

preparedness. Nevertheless the NRC has chosen to require emergency preparedness as another level of "defense-in-depth," the principle that a variety of independent and diverse levels of' protection should be afforded the public from the hazard of radiation exposure. The NRC believes that reasonable efforts to anticipate and pian for public protective actions in the vicinity of a commercial nuclear plant can substantially reduce, though not eliminate, the already small offsite radiological risk, and is, therefore, a prudent if not essential requirement.

[ e. Overemchasis of Evacuation of Comolete EPZ l The Commission has concluded that regulatory changes are necessary to correct several widely held misconceptions especially those relating to an overemphasis on evacuation. It is clear that prompt evacuation of the area near the plant is warranted for the case of severe accidents. However, the following misconceptions often distort appropriate emergency planning efforts:

. 21 Enclosure 1 l

,, (75901 01]

~ .

1. Risk to the, population surrounding a nuclear power reactor from a severe release is essentially uniform at all points within the 10-mile EPZ.

2. Risk to the population abruptly ceases at a distance of 10 miles from the reactor.

3. The "EPZ" .is syno'nymous with "evacuation zone." ,

4. The only responsible emergency response action of choice is evacuation. g These misperceptions of the real risks involved .l~ '. 5: severe accident occur have led to misjudgments in emergency preparedness planning.

In some cases, attempts were made to spread the finite resources of surrLJnding jurisdictions too thinly over the' entire EPZ. These emergency preparedness efforts failed to concentrate those finite resources on these populations most at risk, i.e. , those closest to the reactor.

The objective of these proposed regulatory changes is to concentrate the available emergency response resources within an EPZ plume exposure pathway on the population within the zone closest to the reactor (PAZ) where the risk is highest during a severe release. Persons located outside of this zone (s 2 miles) would generally not be subject to exposure of excessive doses of radioactivity, particularly if prompt sheltering was accomplished. Protecting or removing those people within the PAZ very promptly and sheltering those people outside of this zone would allow maximal dose saving for those most at risk. These efforts would also allow an orderly protection of those people at lesser risk over a much longer time frame than distance,and natural dispersion affords. Shelter-ing, followed by relocation of only those people actually at risk would, in any case, be much less socially disruptive and much safer than precipitous evacuation of the entire EPZ.

= = =

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.

S 605(b), the NRC certifies that this rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The proposed rule concerns the content and extent of emergency 22 Enclosure 1

o [7590-01]

plans for nuclear power plants. The electric utility companies owning

-and operating these nuclear power plants are dominant in their service areas and do not fall within the definition of a smill business founc in Section -3 of the Small Business Act,15 U.S.C. S 632, or within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in 13 CFR Part 121. Although part of the burden for emergency preparedness falls on State and local governments, the proposed rule would possibly lessen this burden by focusing the offsite emergency response resources and capabilities on , ,

the higher risk areas around nuclear power reactor facilities. Thus,

'the proposed rule would impose no significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, as defined in the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980.

LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 50 Part 50 - Antitrust, Classified information, Fire prevention, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty,

. Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting requirements.

REGULATORY ANALYSIS ,

The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis for this regulation.

The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the rule as considered ,

by the Commission. A copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspection and copy, for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301)443-7890.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT This proposed rule contains no additional information collection requirements and therefore is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Requirements Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et. seq.).

23 Enclosure 1

, [7590-01]

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and section 553 of Title 5 of "

the United States Code, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 70 are contemplated.

PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES b

1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 348, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); sees. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846), unless otherwise noted.

Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L.95-601, se . 10, 92 Stat.

2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50-81 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec. 186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2273), SS 50.10(a), (b), and (c), 50.44, 50.46, 50.48, 50.54, and 50.80(a) l are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b));

l SS 50.10(b) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat 949, ,

l as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and SS 50.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, and 50.78 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)). -

= = = *

• 2.a Paragraph (10)of Section 50.34a is revised as follows:

$ 50.34 Content of application; technical information.

(10) A-discussion-of-the-appiiennt's preliminary pians-for-ceping*

with-emergencies---Appendix-E--sets-forth-items-which-shafi-be-incieded in-these plans, a * * * *

• This regulation has been typed in comparative text to assist review.

24 Enclosure 1

L 1

, [7590-01]

• • (10) The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report shall contain sufficient information to ensure the compatibility of proposed emergency plans for onsite areas, t,he Prompt Action Zone (PAZ)1 and the Emergency Plannino Zones (EPZs)2, with facility design features, site layout, and site location with respect to such considerations as access routes, surrounding population distributions, land use, and local jurisdictional boundaries for the EPIs' ,

in the case of nuclear power reactors; as well as the means by which the standards of 9 50.47(b) will be met. ,

As a minimum, the following items shall be described:

A. Onsite and offsite organization for coping with emergencies and the means for notification, in the event of an emergency, of persons  !

assigned to the emergency organizations.

B. Contacts and arrangements made and documented with local, State, and Federal governmental agencies with responsibility for coping with emergencies, including identification of the principal agencies.

""Paragrapns 10 A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H are copied verbatim from Appendix E except where noted by comparative text.

1 Generally, the Pro ~ mot Action Zone (PAZ) for nuclear power reactors

! shall consist of an area of about 2 miles (3 km) in radius and where generally all members of the public can and will be evacuated after, the declaration of a General radioloaical emergency. The desian objec-tive or coal is to have the capability to evacuate essentially all persons within this zone in approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The Commission realizes that the ability to evacuate this zone could be hampered by ,

adverse weather conditions, road repairs etc. The increased time '

required to evacuate this zone under these unusual adverse conditions will not be considered a Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) as it l is anticioated that these conditions will be temporary in nature.

2 I Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the inges-tion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) In radius. The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to the ,

local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) are discussed in NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants," December 1978.

25 Enclosure 1 l _ _ _ . _ - _l_ -.

.~

.,s i e. <

7

. .a

. . [7590-01]

(c)(1) Failure to meet the applicable elements and standards set forth'in paragraph (b) of this section may result in the Commission declining to issue.an operating license; however, the applicant will have an opportunity to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Commission that deficiencies in the plans are not significant for the plant in question, that adequate interim compensating actions have been or will be taken .

promptly, or that there are other compelling reasons to permit plant operation.

(2) Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shail consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a

. particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by l such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an autnorized power level less than 250 MW thermal.

The plans for the ingestion pathway shall focus on such actions as are-appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway.

(3) Generally, the Prompt Action Zone (pAZ) for nuclear power, reactors shall consist of an area of about 2 miles (3 km) in radius and where generally all members of the public can and will be evacuated after the declaration of a General radiological emergency. The desion -

objective or coal is to have the capability to evacuate essentially all persons within this zone in approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The Commission realizes that the ability to evacuate this zone could be hampered by l adverse weather conditions, road repairs, etc. The increased time required to evacuate this zone under these unusual adverse conditions l will not be considered a Limitino Condition of Operation (LCO) as it is anticioated that these conditions will be temporary in nature.

(.

l (d) Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of I

this section no NRC or FEMA review, findings, or determinations concern-1 ing the state of offsite emergency preparedness or the adequacy of and I

capability to implement State and local offsite emergency plans are required prior to issuance of an operating license authorizing only fuel 41 Enclosure 1 l '

t

a . . .. . . - - . .

. - - [7590-01]

. o loading and/or low power operations (up to 5% of the rated power).

Insofar as emergency planning and preparedness requirements are concerned, a license authorizing fuel loading and/or low power operation may be issued after a finding is made by the NRC that' the state of onsite emer-gency preparedness provides. reasonable assurance that adequate protective

< measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.  ;

The NRC will base this finding on its assessment of the applicant's ' -

emergency plans against the pertinent standards and elements in para- .-

graph (b) of this section. and-Appendix-E-of-this part.

n n n n n

4. S 50.48 is added for Research and Test reactors and Critical e facilities.

S 50.48 Emergency Planning Recuirements For Research and Test reactors and Critical facilities. -

(a)(1) No operatinq_ license for a research or test reactor or critical farility will be issued unless a finding is made by the NRC that the Stat 3 of onsite emeroency pr,eparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiologic'al emergency.

(2) The NRC will Osse its findings on the assessment as to whether the licensee /aoplicant's egergency plans are adeouate and caoable of being imolemented.

(b) The-emergency plans for research or test reactors or critical facilities designed and authorized to coerate at 2 MW(th) or less must establish general industrial emergency olans. These plans need not be submitted to the ![RC for aceroval but must be maintained onsite.

(c) Thy emergency plans for research or test reactors or crit! cal facilities designed and authorized to coerate at greater than f MW (th) must meet the following and elements.

(1) Jntroduction. The plan shall briefly introduce the type of reactor, the__ reactor's ourpose, where it is located, and the purposes of the emergency plan.

. 42 Enclosure 1  ;

,' [7590-01]

(2) Definitions. Terms unioue to the reactor facility or that have a soecial meaning when used in the plan shall be defined in the plan.

(3) Organization and Responsibilities. The olan shall describe the emergency organization that.would be activated to cope with radio-logical emergencies. This includes the onsite emergency organization .

and any augmentation from offsite grouos.

(4) Emergency Classification System. The emergency olan shall ,

describe several classes of emergency situations covering the spectrum of emeroency conditions that involve the alerting or activating of progressively larger segments of the emergency organization. To provide for imoroved communications between the licensee, Federal, State and local agencies and organizations, the most severe accidents are standard-ized in three classes of emergency conditions which group the accidents according to the severity of offsite radiological consecuences. Each emergency olan shall include only those standard classes acoropriate for dealine with accident consecuengps determined to be credible for the soecific facility. Most resewach reactors have potential emergency situations which may occur (e.g. ujersonnel injury with contamination, fire, etc.) that have less s9vt. offsite consecuences than the least

. Severe standard class. Preoaredness for these onsite emergencies should be accomolished by identifying them and including in the olan those ele-ments of this standard commensurate with the costulated emergency situa-tions. Each class of emergenc/ shall be associated with Darticul,ar emergency action levels and with carticular immediate actions to orovide appreoriate graded response. In order of increasing severity, the three standard emergency classes are Alert, Site Area Emeroency and General Emeroencv.

(5) Emergency Action Levels. The energency plan ,shall establish emergency action levels which would identify those conditions which might initiate or signal a radiological emergency.

. (6) Emergency Planning Zoner. As part of emergency planning, the reactor owner /coerator shall identify an emergency olanning zone and establish Dre-determined protective actions and measures for the emer-gency planning zone (EPZ). The size of the EPZ shall be such that the 43 Enclosure 1 ,

a.

4.w pg .

7 7 y 7., y- y m w < .

n- ,

-e ,

n. m_ $.-  :: .- c-- n - -->' . -

.';,n;h ? *, .A s 'W i

[7b90-01)

," a xw -s . ,

w j .

, _ ,,  ;-w : # ,'

y o -

dose to' individ,ua,15 beyong;, hic EPZ is not projected to exce'ed the Protect.ive Action tiui_d.n,s_(PSGs) of'1 Rem whole'"body of 5 Rem thyroid.

s (7) f,m)thnc/ (esponse g Emeroency response measures shall be

,{ den,tified for e{c,,6je[gejng[ These respp'nse me'asures should be related to the emergency clost and action loveh that specify what-measures arf.[f.6'beiirdletaienteb. As a minimum, ema g ,c2 response .,

ceasdru snail' be describe ( /ar activation of the Emeroency orcaniza-tion. Asse.ssment Actions, C g 'e_c h e actions, and Protes,t_ive Actions.

(8) Emeroency Facilities and Equipment. The emerg.tncy plan shall briefly dercHbe the emergencefacilities, types of ecuinment' and their location. '

(9) Recovery. Thi emergency plan _shell 4escribe the criteria for ristorin'a the reac, toy faciliyy to a Efe status incluoino ceentry into the reactor building er poit"ions of the facility'that_m,ay bcVe been

,svacuated becausc?of the ace,igent. '[

(10) Maintaining Emera_engy Preparedness. The 2 (meroencv Plan shall describetheel,(cefitsnecessA;yformaintainingan'accepyblestateof r emercen,cy preparedness. A dgcription shall be orovided of how the

. effectiveness of the emercency plan will be maintaigid'; includina trainina c revicY a'nd update of the emergency plan arid associated imple-  !

menting pcocedures,.cnd maintenance and inventorv offagu,,ip, ment and ,

.s.u_pplies that would be used iItemertencies. '

= f, , = ,

n- a

s .....

i c ~

5. . Paragraphs (qh (r)

. 2 ..

his), (t), and (u),are revisad to read

[~

. as follows; s s

i sei, h 5 50 f;; . Conditior.s ef licenses.

l

.(q) . A licensea authorized tp po'sess s and/or operate a nuclear l power resctor shall follow and maintain in eMeet Amer 3ency plans which ineettheelementsandstandardsinS50.47(b).bfthispart, and-the requirements-in-Apper,e:ix-E-to-this part. '

f. A licensee authorized to possess and/or operate a research reactor j oi a fuel facility shali follow and maintain in effect emergency plans m

g I .

44 Enclosure 1 l <

- M .

, [7590-01]

which meet the elements in 10 CFR Part 50 S 50.48. The nuclear power reactor licensee may make changes to these plans without Commission approval only if such changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the elements and stand-ards of 6 50.47(b) of this part and-the-requirements-of-Appendix-E-of this part Tne research reactor licensee and/or the fuel facility licensee ,

with an authorized power level greater than 1 W thermal may make changes.

to these plans without Commission approval only if such changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue, to meet the requirements'ef-Appendix-E-ef elements of 10 CFR 50 9 50.48.

Proposed changes that decrease the effectiveness of the approved emergency plans shall not be implemented without application to and approval by the Commission. The licensee shall furnish one copy of each proposed change for approval to the Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office specified in Appendix 0 of Part 20 of this chapter and two copies to the Document Control Desk, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. If a change is made without approval, the licensee shall furnish one copy to the Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office specified in' Appendix D of Part 20 of this chapter and two copies.to the Document Control Desk, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 within 30 days after the change is made. ,

(r) Research or test reactors and critical facilities authorized to operate at power levels of 2 W (th) or less have potential emergency situations that can occur within the operations boundary (onsite) that will not r.esult in an impact on the public health and safety offsite.

Therefore, a licensee authorized to possess and/or o,.terate a research or test reactor or critical facility with an authorized power level of 2 W(th) or less need not submit radiologMal emergency plans to the NRC for approval. These licensees shall follow and maintain in effect general industrial emergency plans. Each licensee who is authorized to possess and/or operate a research or test reactor facility with an authorized power level greater than 2 W thermal under a licensee of the type specified in S 50.21(c), shall submit emergency plans complying 45 Enclosure 1

., [7590-01]

with the elements contained in;10 CFR Part 50, Appendix-E S 50.47 *o the Director of the Offica of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for appr. al.

by-September-7-1982 --Esch-44 ensee-who-is-authorized-to pessess andier-eperate-a-research-or-test-reacter-facility-with-an-authorized power levei-iess-than-2-MW-thermai; under-a-44 cense-of-the-type-specified-in S-50 Eitc37-shafi-submit-emeYgency pians-complying-with-19-EFR-Part-50; ,

A p p e ndi x- ET- to- the- Bi re c to r- of- t he- O f fi c e- H a ci e a r- Re acte r- R egei sti o n- f o r approvai-by-November-ST-1982.

(s)(1) Each licensee whJ is authorized to possess and/or operated a nuclear power reactor shall submit to NRC within 60 days of the effective date of this amendment the radiological emergency response plans of State and local governmental entities in the United States that are wholly or partially within a plume exposure pathway EPZ, as well as the plans of State governments wholly or partially within an ingestion pathway EPZ.1,2 Ten (10) copies of the above plans shall be forwarded to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation with 3 copies to the Director of the appro-priate NRC regional office. Generally, the Promet Action Zone (PAZ) for nuclear oower reactors shall consist of an area of about 2 miles (3 bn) ,

in radius and where generally all members of the oublic can and wil? be evacuated after the declaration of a General radiological emergency.

The desion objective or goal is to.have the cacability to evacuate essen tially all oersons within this zone in acoroximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The Commis sion realizes that the ability to evacuate this zone could be hamoered by adverse weather conditions, road repairs etc. The increased tin,e recuired to evacuate this zone under these unusual adverse conditions will not be considered a Limiting Condition of Oceration (LCO) as it is anticioated

~

that these conditions will be temocrary in nature. Generally, the pl'me exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area l

about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The exact size and

' Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) are discussed in NUREG-0396; EPA 520/1-78-016 "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light

! Water Nuclear Power Plants," December 1978.

l If the State and local emergency response plans have been previously provided to the NRC for inclusion in the facility docket, the applicant need only provide the appropriate reference to meet this requirement.

l 46 Enclosure 1

, ,, [7590-01]

l configuration of the EPIs for a particular nuclear power reactor shall i be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristjes, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled.

nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less ,

than 250 MW thermal. The plans for the ingestion pathway EPZ shall focus on such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway. ,

(2)(1) For operating power reactors, the licensee, State, and local emergency response plans shall be implemented. by-Aprii-it-1981. ,

(ii) If [after-Apri4-it-1981;) the NRC finds [that] significant deficiencies 3 in emercency olanning, and if correction of such defi-ciencies is not within the licensee's control,5 then the NRC shall inform the licenseo that such deficiencies have been identified, that they must be corrected within four morths, and that if they are not corrected within four months,4 [the-state-ef-emergency preparedness-dees-not provide-reasonabie-assurance-that-adequate protective-measures-can and wi44-be-taken-in-the avent-of-a-radiciegicai-emergency-fincieding

. fi ndi ng s- b as e d- e n- re qui re'ments- o f- App e n di x- ET - S e cti o n-i V: 9: 33 - an d- the deficiencies-fincinding-deficiencies-based-en-requirements-of-Appendix-E; S e c ti e n- f V; 9: 33 - are- n e t- co rre ct e d-wi thi n- f e er- mo nt h s - o f- th a t- fi ndi n gT ]

the Commission will determine whether the reactor shall be shut down until such deficiencies are remedied.8 [er-whether-ether-enforcement .

"Significant deficiency - In olanning, a failure of an emergency plan to meet one or more of the planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b). A finding of a sionificant deficiency in planning will be based uoon a review of FEMA findings and determinations as to whether state and local emergency plans are adeouate, and on the NRC's assessement of the adecuacy of the licensee's emergency plan. In implementation, a failure of a licensee to follow an emergency plan or a finding by FEMA as a result of an exer-cise that a olan is not capable of being implemented.

• 1f the licensee, State, and local emergency resoonse olans have previously been found to comofy with the recuirements of the Emergency Preoaredness regulations that were published on August 19, 1980 (45 F5 55402) the licensee need only orovide aoprooriate reference to meet this requirement.

5Witnin licensee's control - Capable of correction without cocoeration by federal, state, or local agencies.

6This 4 month time period does not include the time period that FEMA may take to find that the deficiency has been corrected oarticularly if such finding is deoendenl ucon the conduct of.another exercise.

47 Enclosure 1

e -

- [7590-01]

action-is-appropriate;] In determing whether a shutdown is aoorooriate, the Commission shall take into account, among other factors, whether'the licensee can demonstrate to the Commission's satisfaction that the defi-ciencies in the plan are not significant for the plant in question, or that -

adeouate interim compensating actions have been or will be taken promotly, or that there are other compelling reasons for continued ooeration. .

(ii) If after-Aeril-1--1981, the NRC finds significant deficiencies _

in emeroency olannino, the correction of which are within the licensee's ,

control, or deficiencies in implementation of an emergency plan, the NRC may take whatever enforcement action it deems approoriate to ensure t' hat the deficiencies are corrected.

(iii) Notwithstanding any other provision of this regulation, if at anytime the Commission finds that the state nf emergency preoaredness does not orovide reasonable assurance that oromot evacuation of the public can and will be taken within the Promot Action Zone (PAZ) after the declaration of a General radiological emergency and that adecuate orotective measures (shelterino with eventual relocation in the sector that has been exposed to the plume) can and will be taken in event of a radiological emeroency (including findings based a on requirements of 10 CFR 50.47) the NRC may take whatever enforce-ment action it deems appreoriate, includino immediate shutdown of the facility. (in-determining-whether-a-shutdewn-et-ether enforcement-action is appropriateT-the-Eemmission-shali-take-inte-accounti-ameng-ether-facters; whether-the-iieensee-can-demonstrate-to-the-Eemmission's-satisf action-that the-deficiencies-in-the pian are-net-significant-for-the piant-in questient er-that-adequate-interim-compensating-setions-have-been-er wiii-be-taken promptiy; er-that-there-are-ether-cempeiiing-ressens-for-continued-eperation:]

[( 33 - T h e- N RE-wi 44 - b as e-i ts - fi ndi ng- e n- a- re vi ew- e f- t he-F EMA- fi ndi ng s - a n d 1

determinations-as-to-wnether-State and-iecai emergency pians-are adequate and capabie-ef-being-impiemented;-and-on-the-NRE-assessment-as-to-whether the-ficensee's-emergency pians-are adequate and-capabie-of-being-implemented;] '

Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting the authority of the Commission to take action under any other regulation or authority of the Commission. [er-at-sny-time-ether-than-that-specified-in-this paragraph ]

r 48 Enclosure 1

"3, ..

.. -[7590-01]

(t) A nuclear power reactor licensee shall provide for the development, revision, implementation, and maintenance of its emergency preparedness program. To this end, the licensee shall provide for a review of its.emer-gency preparedness program at least every 12 months by persons who have no direct responsibility for implementation of the emergency preparedness program. The review shall include an evaluation for adequacy of interfaces .

with State and local governments and of licensee drills, exercises, capa-bilities, and procedures. The results of the review, along with recommen- ,

I dations for improvements, shall be documented, reported to the licensee's corporate and plant management, and retained for a period of five years.

The part of the review involving the evaluation for adequacy of interface with State and local governments shall be available to the appropriate

{

State and local governments.

(u) Within 60 days after the effective date .of this amendment, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall submit to the NRC plans for coping with emergencies that meet standards in S 50.47(b). If the licensee.

State, and-local emeroency response plans have previously been found to comply with the requirements of the Emeraency Preparedness reaulations that were published on August 19, 1980 (45 FR 55402) the licensee need only orovide accropriate reference to meet-this recuirement.

• a a a =

6. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E has been deleted. ,

APPENDIX E--EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS FOR PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES

• a a a a PART 70-00MESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

7. Section 70.32 is amended by adding paragraph (i) to read as follows:

e 49 Enclosure 1

c; '~, . ,

, [ < >t [7590-01]

-$ 70.32 Conditions of. licenses.

A A 2 A 2 *

(i) Licensees required to submit emergency plans in accordance with

.$ 70.22(i) shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans approved by the Commission. The licensee may make changes to the approved plans without Commission approval only if such' changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans as changed, continue to _ meet requirements-of-Appendix-E--Section-fV the aoolicable elements and stan-

,jf dards in 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.47. The licensee shall furnish the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the appropriate NRC Regional Office specified in Appendix D Part 20 of this Chapter, each change within six months after the changes is made. Proposed changes .

that decrease the effectiveness of the approved emergency plans shall not be implemented

, without prior applicant to and prior approval by the Commission.

= = n a n (Sec. 161b., i., and o., Pub. L.83-703, 68 Stat. 948 (42 U.S.C. 2201);

Sec. 201, as amended Pub. L.93-438, 88 Stat. 1242, Pub. L. 94-79, 89

Stat. 413 (42 U.S.C. 5341))

Dated at Washington, D.C. this lith day of August 1980.

• For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

l Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission.

I (FR Doc. 80-25247 Filed 8-18-80; 8:45 am) 8ILLING CODE 7590-01-M i

50 Enclosure 1

, ,, (7590-01]

C. Protective measures to be taken within the site boundary, the Prompt Action Zone (PAZ), and within each EPZ to protect health and safety in the event of an accident; procedures by which these measures are to be carried out (e.g. , iri the case of prompt evacuation within the PAZ or in case of sheltering with selective relocation ,who authorizes the evacuation, how' the public is to be notified and instructed, how the sheltering and ,

evacuation is to be carried out); and the expected response of offsite agencies in the event of an emergency.

D. Features of the facility to be provided for onsite emergency first aid and decontaminaticn and for emergency transportation of onsite individuals to offsite treatment facilities.

E. Provisions to be made for emergency treatment at offsite facil-ities of individuals injured as a result of licensed activities.

F. Provisions for a training program for employees of the licensee, including those who are assigned specific authority and responsibility in the event of an emergency, and for other persons who are not employees of the licensee but whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiological emergency.

G. A preliminary analysis that projects the time and means to be employed in the notification of State and local governments and the public in the event of an emergency. A nuclear power plant applicant shal,1 perform a preliminary analysis of the time required to evacuate various-secters and-distances and the oublic in the PAZ, noting major impediments to the evacuation or taking of protective actions.

H. A preliminary analysis reflecting the need to include facilities, systems, and methods for identifying the degree of seriousness and poten-tial scope of radiological consequences of emergency situations within and outside the site boundary, including capabilities for dose projection  ;

using real-time meteorological information and for dispatch of radiological monitoring teams within the EPZs; and a preliminary analysis reflecting the role of the onsite technical support center and of the near-site emer-gency operations facility in assessing information, recommending protective action, and disseminating information to the public.

= = =

26 Enclosure 1

a ., -

[7590-01]

s. .

2. b Paragraph (6)(v) of Section 50.34(b) is revised as follows:

5 50.34 Content of applications; technical information.

(V) Pians-for-coping-with-emergencies--which-sheii-ineinde-the items-specified-in-Appendix-E.

• (V) The Final Safety Analysis Report shall contain the plans for ,

coping with emergencies. The plans shall be an expression of the'overall concept of operation; they shall describe the essential elements of advance ,

planning that have been considered and the provisions that have been made to cope with emergency situations. The plans shall incorporate information about the emergency response roles of supporting organizations and offsite agencies. That information shall be sufficient to provide assurance of coordination among the supporting groups and with the licensee.

The plans submitted must meet the standards and include a description of the elements set out in S 50.47 for the Prompt Action Zone (PAZ)1 and the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs)2 to an extent sufficient to demonstrate that the plans provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can,and will be taken in the event of an emergency.

~

!

• Paragraphs (V) and (V)(1) are taken verbatum from Appendix E except l where noted by comparative text. ' '

l 1 Generally, the Prompt Action Zone (PAZ) for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area of about 2 miles (3 km) in radius and where generally all memoers of the public can and will be evacuated after-the declaration i

of a general radiological emeraency. The desion objective or coal is to I have the capability to evacuate essentially all persons within this zone in accroximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The Commission realizes that the ability to

, evacuate this zone could be hampered by such conoitions adverse weather and road repairs. The increased time required to evacuate this zone under these unusual adverse conditions will not ce considered a Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) as it is anticipated that these conditions will be temporary in nature.

2 Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) are discussed in NUREG-0396; EPA 520/1-78-016, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local l

Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," December 1978. ,

i l

27 Enclosure 1

,- [7590-01]

(V)(1) No less than 180 days prior to the scheduled issuance of an operating license for a nuclear power reactor or a license to possess nuclear material one copy of the applicant's detailed implementing proce-dures for its emergency plan shall be submitted to the Administrator of the appropriate NRC Reginal Office, specified in Appendix 0 of Part 20 of this chapter and two copies are to be sent to the Document Control Desk, U.S. ..

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Licensees who are _

authorized to operate a nuclear power facility shall submit one copy of any .

changes to the emergency plan or procedures to the Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office, specified in' Appendix 0, 10 CFR Part 20, and two copies to the Document Control Desk within 30 days of such changes.

=

• a a a

3. S 50.47 is revised to read as follows:

S 50.47 Emergency plans.

(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, no operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by NRC that there is reasonable assurance that promot evacuation of the oublic can and will be taken within the Promot Action Zone (PAZ)1 after the declaration of a general radiological emeroency and that adequate protective measures (sheltering with eventual reloca-tion in the sector that has been exoosed to the olume) can and will be ,

taken in the event of a radiological emergency for the remaining area of the.EPZ.

(2) The NRC will base its finding on (a) a review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) findings and determinations as to 1 Generally, the Promot Action Zone (PAZ) for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area of about 2 miles (3 km) in radius and where generally all members of the public can and will be evacuated after the declaration of a General radiological emergency. The design obiective or ooal is to have the capability to evacuate essentially all persons within this zone in acoroximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The Commistion realizes that the ability to evacuate this zone could be hamoered by adverse weather conditions, road repairs, etc. The increased time required to evacuate tnis zone under these unusual adverse conditions will not be considered a Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) as it is anticioated that these conditions will be temocrary in nature.

28 Enclosure 1

[7590-01]

whether State and. local emergency plans are-adequate adeouately meet the olannina standards set forth in this part.and whether there is reasonable assurance that the emergency' plans can be implemented and on (b) the NRC assessment as to whether the applicant's onsite emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented. A FEMA finding will primarily be based on a review of the ,

plans. Any other information already available to FEMA may be considered in assessing whether there is reasonable assurance that the plans can be implemented. In any NRC licensing proceeding, a FEMA finding will constitute a rebuttable presumption on questions of adequacy and imple-mentation capability. Emergency preparedness exercises (required by para-graph-fb3(143-of this section) and Appendix-ET-Sectien-F-ef-this-Part are part of the operational inspection process and are not required for any initial licensing decision.

(b) The onsite and, except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, offsite emergency response plans for nuclear power reactors must meet the following standards2 , likewise the applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e., organiza-tion for coping with radiation emergencies, assessment action, activation of emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency preparedness, and recovery, in-additient The emergency response plans submitted by an applicant for a l nuclear power reactor operating license shall contain information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards described in-5-56-47-fb3 and the plans will be evaluated against those standards. The nuclear power l

reactor operating license applicant shall also provide an analysis of l the tima required to evacuate- promotly evacuate the oublic within the l

l 3These standards are addressed by specific criteria in NUREG-0654; FEMA-REP-1 entitled "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radio-i logical Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in support of Nuclear Power Plants--for interim-Wse-and-Eemment',' dannary November 1980.

i 29 Enclosure 1

, [7590-01]

PAZ and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ3 for transient and permanent populations.

(1) ORGANIZATION (i) PLANNING STANDARDS *

(A) Primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility licensee and by State and local organizations within the Prompt Action Zone and the Emergency Planning Zones have been assigned, the emer-gency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations have been specifically established, and each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis.

(B) On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, adequate , staffing to provide initial facility accident response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.

3 Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the .

ingestion pathway EPZ sha11 ' consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to the local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) are discussed in NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants," December 1978.

• All of the planning standards have been taken verbatim from the existing planning standards in 50.47 except where noted in comparative text.

30 Enclosure 1

,- [7590-01]

duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency organization and the means for notification of such individuals in the event of an emergency. Specifically, the following shall be included:

(ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN **

The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall be described, including definition of authorities, responsibilities, and ,

(A) A description of the normal plant operating organization.

(8) A description of the onsite emergency response organization with a detailed discussion of:

1. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of the individual (s) who will take charge during an emergency;

2. Plant staff emergency assignments;

3. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties en of an onsite emergency coordinator who shall be in charge pf the exchange of information with offsite authorities responsible for coordinating and implementing offsite emergency measures.

(C) A description, by position and function to be performed, of the licensee's headquarters personnel who will be sent to the plant site to augment the onsite emergency organization.

(0) Identification, by position and function to be performed, of persons within the licensee organization who will be responsible for ,

making protective action decisions offsite-dese projections, and a l

description of how taese decisions projections will be made and the results transmitted to State and local authorities, NRC, and other appropriate governmental entities.

(E) Identification, by position and function to be performed, of l other employees of the licensee with special qualifications for coping with emergency conditions that may arise. Other persons with special qualifications, such as consultants, who are not employees of the l

, ""All of the Elements of Licensee Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim l from Appendix E except where noted in comparative text.

31 Enclosure 1 l -

^

[7590-01) l licensee and who may be called upon for assistance for emergencies shall also be identified. The special qualifications of these persons shall be described.

(F) A description of the local offsite services to be provided in support of the licensee's emergency organization.

(G) Identification of, and assistance expected from, appropriate ..

State,_ local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies. ,

(H) Identification of the State and/or 1,ocal officials responsible for planning for, ordering, and controlling appropriate protective actions; including evacuations when necessary within the PAZ.

(2) ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT ACTIONS (i) PLANNING STANDARDS (A) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use.

(B) A range of protective actions have been developed for the Promet Action Zone and the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency, workers and the public. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and,

- in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.

(ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN (A) The means to be used for determining the magnitude of and for ,

continually assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission and other Federal agencies, and

~

the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside 32 Enclosure 1

y , ,

a .. o.. . r . . . ~ - .. - -

[7590-01]

the' site boundary.to protect' health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. These emergency action levels shall be discussed and' agreed on by the applicant and State and local governmental authorities and approved by NRC. They shall also be reviewed with the State and local governmental authorities on an annual basis. '

(3) EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM AND ACTIVATION OF ORGANIZATIONS (1) PLANNING STANDARDS (A) A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.

(ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN (A) The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that involve ,the aierting or activating or progressively larger segments of the total emergency organization shall be described. The communication steps to be taken to alert or activate emergency personnel under each class of emer-gency shal.1 be described. Emergency action levels (based not only on onsite and offsite radiation monitoring information but also on readings .

from a number of sensors that indicate a potential emergency, such as the pressure in containment an the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System) for notification of offsite agencies shall be described. The ,

existence, but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be noted for such agencies. The emergency classes defined shall include:

ft)-notification-of-unusuai-events (1) alert, (2) site area emergency, and (3) general emergency. These-eiasses-are-further-discussed-in-NWRES-0654-FEMA-REP .

33 Enclosure 1

(4 .

,' (7590-01]

(4). NOTIFICATION METHODS AND PROCEDURES AND f PUBLIC EDUCATION (i) PLANNING STANDARDS l (A) Procedures have been established for notification, by the .

licensee, of State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency personnel by all organizations; the content of initial and followup messages to resp;,nse organizations and the public has been established; and means to provide early notification and clear instruc-tion to the populace with the promot action zone and the clume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established.

(B) Information is made available to the public on a periodic basis on how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g., listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), the principal points of contact with the news media for dissemination of information during an emergency (including the physical location or locations) are established in advance, and proce-dures for coordinated dissemination of information to the public are established.

(ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN (A) Administrative and physical means for notifying local, State, and Federal officials and agencies and agreements reached with these officials and agencies for the prompt notification of the public and for public evacuation or other protective measures, should they become necessary, shall be described. This description shall include identifi-cation of the appropriate officials, by title and agency, of the State and local government agencies within the EPZs.2 This shall include each steo in the notification and decision making process to demonstrate this caoability during all shifts.

(b) Provisions shall be described for yearly dissemination to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency planning 34 Enclosure 1

4 . ,

[7590-01]

t information, such.as the metho'ds and times required for public notification and the protective actions planned if an accident occurs, general informa-tion as to the nature and effects of radiation, and a listing of local broadcast. stations that will be used for dissemination of information during an emergency, signs-er-ether Measures shall also be used to disseminate to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ appropriate information that would be helpful if an accident occurs.

Attention shall be focused on informino the transient and permanent public .

within two (2) miles (3 km) to 3 miles (5 km) of the nuclear oower reactor a's to the need for prorrot evacuation if a general emeroency is declared.

(C) A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible State and local g'overnmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emer-gency. The licensee shall demonstrate that the State / local officials have the capability to make a public notification decision promptly on being informed by the licensee of an emergency condition. By-February-i--1982 Each nuclear power reactor licensee shall demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ focusino ,

attention on the PAZ. The-fear-month peried-in-10-6FR-50-54(s3(23-for-the correctien-of-emergency pian-deficiencies-shaii-not-appiy-te-the-initisi instaiistien-of-this-notifiestien-system-that-is-required-by-Feb--l--1982.

The 4-month period will apply to correction of deficiencies identified ~

during the initial installation and testing of the prompt public notifica- ,

tion systems as well as those deficiencies discovered thereafter. The design objective of the prompt public notification system shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of l this notification capability will range from immediate notification of the l public (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent action within the PEZ to the more likely events where there is substantial time available for the State and local governmental officials to make a judgment whether or not to activate the public notification system. Where there is a decision to l activate the notification system, the State and local officials will deter-mine whether to activate the entire notification system simultaneously or 35 Enclosure 1 1

[7590-01]

in a graduated or. staged manner. The responsibility for activating such .

a-public notification system shall remain.with the appropriate governmental authorities.

(5) EMERGENCY RESPONSE SUPPORT AND RESOURCES (1) PLANNING STANDARDS

,. (A) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local _

staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility have '

been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified. '

(B) Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the  ;

einergency response are provided and maintained. .

(C) Means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency,  ;

i are established for emergency workers. The means for controlling radio-  ;

logical exposures shall include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA' j Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides. ~

(0) Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated  !

injured individuals. l l  ;

L l (ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN ,

I i

i Adequate provisions shall be made and described for emergency i facilities and equipment, including:  !

l (A) Equipment at the site for personnel monitoring-i (B) Equipment for determining the magnitude of and for continuously ,

assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the

' l l environment; (C). Facilities and supplies at the site for decontamination of i

onsite individuals; (0) Facilities and medical suoplies at the site for appropriate  !

j emergency first aid treatment; l

36 Enclosure 1 i

[7590-01)

O (E) Arrangements for the services of physicians and.other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies on-site; -

(F) Arrangements for transportation of contaminated injured individuals from the site to specifically identified treatment facilities outside the site boundary; (G) Arrangements for treatment of individuals injured in support ,

of licensed activities on the site of treatment facilities outside the site boundary; (H) A licensee onsite technical support center and a licensee near-site emergency operations facility from which effective direction ,

can be given and effective control can be exercised during an emergency.

(6) EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS (i) PLANNING STANDARD (A) Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.

(ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN (A) At least one onsite and one offsite communic 6tions system; each system shall have a backup power source. ,

All communication plans shall have arrangements for emergencies, including. titles and alternates for those in charge at both ends of the communication links and the primary and backup means of communication.

Where consistent with the function of the governmental agency, these arrangements will include:

1. Provision for communications with contiguous State / local governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such communications shall be tested monthly.

2. Provision for communications with Federal emergency response organizations. Such communications systems shall be tested annually.

3. Provision for communications among the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite technical support center, and the near-site l

i 37 Enclosure 1

, [7590-01]

o -

emergency operations facility; and among the nuclear facility, the principal State and local emergency operations center, and the field .

assessment teams. Such communications systems shall be tested annually.

4. Provisions for communications by the licensee with NRC Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center from the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite technical support ,

~

center, and the near-site emergency operations facility. Such communica-tions shall be tested monthly.

(7) TRAINING (i) PLANNING STANDARD (A) Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major

, portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be). conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or dril.ls are (will be) corrected.

(B) Radiological emergency response training is provided to those

~

who may be calle'd on to assist in an emergency. .

(C) Responsibilities for plan development and review and for 4

distribution of emergency plans are established, and planners are ,

properly trained.

(ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN (A) The program to provide for (1) the training of employees and exercising, by periodic drills, of radiation emergency plans to ensure that employees of the licensee can perform their specific emergency response duties and (2).the participation in the training and drills by 1

other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiation emergency shall be describe,d. This shall include a description of specialized initial training and periodic retraining programs to be provided to each of the following categories of emergency personnelt i

i 38 Enclosure 1

,, - -,-,--n-

4

- [7590-01]

.- l

. ..v ,

1. Directors and/or coordinators of the plant emergency organization; , ,

2. Personnel responsible for protective action decisionmakina; i

3. Personnel responsible for accident assessment, including control roch shift personnel; 4.. Radiological monitoring teams; ,

5. Fire control teams (fire brigades); -

6. Repair and damage control teams;

, 7. First aid and rescue teams;

8. Medical support personnel;

9. Licensee's headquarters support personnel;

10. Security personnel. ,

(B) In addition, a radiological orientation iraining program shall be made available to local services personnel, e.g., local Civil Defense, >

1 local law enforcement personnel, local news media persons.

, (C) The plan shall describe provisions for the conduct of emergency f preparedness exercises. Exercises shall test the adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and methods, test emergency equipment I

i and communication networks, test the public notification system, and ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar with thei,r

• duties. Each licensee shall wxercise at least annually the emergency plan for each site at which it,has one or more power reactors licensed i for operation. Both full-scale and small-scale exercises sna11 be con-ducted and shall include participation by appropriate State and local 1 government agencies as follows:

1. A full-scale exercise which tests as much of the licensee, State, and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable with manda-

! tory public participation shall be conducted;

a. For each site at which one or more power reactors are i located and licensed for operation, at least once every five years and at a frequency which will enable each State and local goveanment within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to participate in at least one full-scale i exercise per year and which will enable each State within the ingestion l pathway to participate in at least one full-scale exercise every three ,

years.

j 39 Enclost.re 1 P

- - - - - - -r- -- - --r-

{7590-01] -

e .*

O

b. For each site at which a power reactor is located for which the first operating license for that site.is issued after July 13, 1982, within one year before issuance of the first operating lic'ense for full power, and prior to operation above 5% of rated power of the first reactor, which will enable each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and each State within the ingestion pathway I

EPZ to participate.

2. The plan shall also describe provisions for involving Federal j emergency response agencies in a full-scale emergency preparedness ~1 exercise for each site at which one or more power reactors are located and licensed for operation at least once every 5 years;

3. A small-scale exercise which tests the adequacy of communica-tion links, establishes that response agencies understand the emergency action levels, and tests at least one other component (e.g., medical or offsite monitoring) of the offsite emergency response plan for licensee, State, and local emergency plans for jurisdictions within the plume exposure pathway EPZ shall be conducted at each site at which one or moie

~

power reactors are located and licensed for operation each year a full-scale exercise is not conducted which involves the State (s within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.

(D) All training, including exercises, shall provide for formal critiques in order to identify weak areas that need corrections. Any ,

weaknesses that are identified shall be corrected.

(8) RECOVERY AND REENTRY (i) PLANNING STANDARD (A) General plans for recovery and reentry are developed.

ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN Criteria to be used to determine when, fo11cwing an accident, reentry of the facility would be appropriate or when operation could be resumed shall be described.

a 40 Enclosure 1

%b he OCT 2 j J983 E)OPROUM FOR: William J. Dirck.s Eancutive Director for T)perations THRU: Robert B. Minogue. Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research FRON: Robert M. Befnero. Director Accident Source Tem Program Office Office of helear Regulatory Research ',

StBJECT: DEVEl.0 PENT AND STATUS OF DRAFT PROPOSED RLLE ON EERGEMCY PLARMING . .

l The purpose of this memo is to' provide you with a clear accounting of the background, denlopmental history and status of the draft rule en energeocy planning dich is currectly re:elying much attention (see memo R. Bernero to E. Jordan, et al., dated September 16.. '.1983). .. ..

b Een the Accident Source Tem Program Office (ASTPO) was formed in February t:- 19a3 within RES, the policy Development and haplementation tiroup of ASTP0 began to reexamine emergency planning la the' light of recent experience in applying the rule as well as extainsive 'recent risk studies (primarily the SaMia report NUREG/CR-2239), tha't ~were unavailable at the time the present rule was promulgated. It must be anphasized that his reassessment made use entirely of existing source teras;' essentially 'the same as those of VASH-1400 dich had been used to develop the present rule.' # a' result of this reassess-

) ment it became clear that our present rule does ' ant contribute to a clear public understand 1og of the nature of reactor acciuent risk, nor of the role that amergency planning should plaiy in regard to his. ' The lac 1 of clear public moderstanding rests upon two,,erro,neous ass,umptions, namely: ,

1. that the risk to a maeer af the publie is constast throughout the entire 10-elle plume exposure virtuallyzerobeyond,and; , ' , emerp,',,,'plann'ing

,',,( ,(',,' ,

zone (EPZ) and is

2. that the only efficacious protective action is ismediate evacuation

, of the entire EPZ.  ;' [ ,,[ ,, ;' ';' '

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E- Working relationships with the other federal agencies involved in emergency =i k

B planning, EPA and FEM, were also established. EPA and TDM representatives were briefed on the results of recent risk studies and experience and they ]

L agreed in principle that a refinement of the rule to correct its misper- A L ceptions appeared to be warranted. EPA has agreed to cooperate in the -

( revision of MUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016 when new source tens information I becomes available and if such changes 'are'then warrantaf, TDM will parti- t cipate on a task force to revist WUREG-D654 FDM-REP-1, Rev. I whether or jn not source tern changes occur. -

.m By late spring of 1983, a tentative decision had been made by MRC management  ?

to defer any revisions to the emergency planning rules until the results of the source term research had been completed aM had been subjected to a -

thorough peer review process. However, the Qiairman, in a memo to you dated

June 8,1983, indicated his interest in exploring the possibilities of revisions b to our emergency planning regulations. In your reply of July 1,1983, you -

indicated that the staff was examining a possible revision of MRC regulations -

utilizing a graduated response capability based upon experience to date together with a refined portrayal o'f reactor consequences and likelihood using V g existing reactor accident source tarus. , ;, f ,

f, -

b A conceptual approach to revising the regulation was then developed within .

ASTPO, and you, as well as a number'of' senior staff,'were briefed on this approach at a meeting en September'6,1983. The viewgraphs from this pre-sentation are attached. There das '9eneral agreement 'that the conceptual approach itself us sound, although 'there were elements for Which a fully

b. developed technical basis bad not yet beeriMsestadi'and'that were recognized 3_

i to be nighly controversial. I believe 'there was also a recognition that the proposal was not a relaxation of our present regulations since it does not  :

propose to reduce our present EPZi'but a;dds the requirement for' prompt actions

~

a within the first few mi)es of a Teactor[, ', ,

f- This approach was then developed into the format of a pmposed rule by my _

e staff, ircorporating several other 'redonneMed ' changes, aM ms transmitted

[5 by me in a mese dated Septsaber 16,'1983 for ' division level review. As you are aware, it is this package intended 'for an ' internal staff review at the 1

Bivision level that has received~.s.o mch c.'ur.r.ent..a.ttention.

The package at the stage of a divisional review is intended to be a "straman rule." 1.e., a proposed appmach developed'to draw close critical attention of other technical experts and division management'to'the principal issues. It '

in no any represents a final positidn. 'It'is ' expected that senior staff and mana.sament representing affected gmupfdithis WRC di11' subject the draft corcepts and reconnendations to whaus,tive pee'r, review.

1 William J. Dircks l This open and critical peer review is necessary to ventilate the many issues l Involved and to solicit the full range of staff views. This is particularly '

true when a proposed rule change contains positions that are considered highly controversial. As I have said to you hfore on this subject, I feel that  !

it would be extremely unfortunate if such an internal peer review prxess within the staff resulted in a premature ' freezing" of certain elements that were intended to evolve within the nonmal, deliberati,ve processes.

• 0rigital 5142#@,*

Robert M. Bernero, Director Accident Source Tersi Progras Office Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

Attachment:

As Stated Distribution:

RES Central File CIRC .

CHRON ASTP0 Subject ASTP0 Reading Soffer Reading

,g Grill Reading t:o Bernero Reading Ross Minogue l

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ISSUES AND APPROACHES FOR REVISING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REGULATIONS WITHOUT NEW SOURCE TERflS

e o EMERGENCY ZONES .

o SENSITIVITY TO SOURCE TERM CHANGES o FEMA FINDINGS -

o 4-MONTH ENFORCEMENT 1 .

o APPENDIX E ABSORPTION l

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EMERGENCY ZONFS .

, , CHANGES f PLANNING: CLARIFY EPZ IS PLANNING ZONE J NOTIFICAIIDH: RETAIN CAPABILITY FOR PROMPT PUBLIC NOTIFICATION IlfROUGHOUT 10-MILE EPZ RESPONSE: o INCORPORATE 0-2 MILE PROMPT ACTION ZONE ACTION LINKED TO DECLARATION OF GENERAL EMERGENCY A CAPABILITY EXISTS TO EVACUATE PUBLIC PROMPILY o REMAINDER OF EPZ .

ACTION LINKED TO EVALUATION OF CONDITIONS A CAPABILITY EXISTS TO SHELTER PUBLIC OR EVACUATE (RELOCATE) DEPENDING ON NEED RATIONALE o PROVIDES BEST ABILITY TO DEAL WI.TH REAL ACCIDENTS o SIMPLIFIES DECISION AND RECOMMENDATION PROCESS o BUILDS ON THE 1980 BASIS ALREADY IMPLEMENTED .

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SFNSITIVITY OF FATAL AND INJURY DISTANCES TO REIFASE MAGNITUDE ASSUMPTIONS: NEW YORK CITY METEOROLOGY, 3412 MW(t) PWR, AND NO EMERGENCY RESPONSE.

~

SOURCE: NUREG/CR-2239, NOV. 1982 ~s ea x y \-

FATAL DISTANCE (MI) INJURY DISTANCE (MI)'

.' ACCIDENT REIFASE* MEM 901 93 1 MEM 9DX 93X ,

~

SST1 3.9 8.0 12 11 20 135 {; ,

2.5 5.0 10 7.0 12 20 2 ,\

_ 1/2 SST1 ,

ci jj 1/10 SST1 0.9 2.0 2.2 2.8 5.0 10 1/20 SSTI 0.5 1.2 2.0 1.9 3.5 7.0

-0 <1 1.0 0.9 2.0 4.0 ,

1/100 SST1 t'

' RELEASE FRACTIONS REDUCED FOR ALL IS0 TOPES EXCEPT N0BLE GASES

~ .QV .

' ~

. FEMA FINDINGS .

i CHANGES o SOME MODEST RULE CHANGE (E.G., FEMA FINDS... ADEQUATE TO 50.47 PLANNING STANDARDS) o CONCENTRATE ON FEMA FINDINGS, SEQUENCE AND CONTENT, THROUGH MOU REVISION INTERIM FINDING ON PLANNING W/0 EXERCISE SECOND FINDING ON IMPLEMENTATION AFTER EXERCISE CLARIFICATION OF TERMIN0 LOGY RATIONALE o CLEAR UNDERSTANDING AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES o TIMELY INTERACTION WITH NRC ACTIONS o NO FULLY DISPOSITIVE FEMA FINDING W/0 LEGISLATION

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4-MONTH ENFORCEMENT .

CHANGE o DEFICIENCIES WITHIN LICENSEE CONTROL--NORMAL ENFORCEMENT POLICY DEFICIENCIES OUTSIDE LICENSEE CONTROL--4-MONTH ENFORCEMENT POLICY o

RATIONALE o CLARIFY 1980 COMMISSION INTENT ~

o EXPERIENCE SHOWS 4-MONTH. CLOCK.lS NEEDED

. e. c- ,

- APPENDIX E ABSORPTION ,

POSSIBLE CHANGE o TRANSFER APPROPRIATE SECTIONS OF APPENDIX E TO 50.34, 50.47, 50.54 RATIONALE 7

o ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES (FEDERAL REGISTER) TO ELIMINATE APPENDICES o POSSIBLE APPEARANCE OF MAJOR CHANGE

• i o POSSIBLE CONFUSION o METHOD FOR CLEAR PRESENTATION AVAILABLE

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