ML20149F678
| ML20149F678 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/13/1984 |
| From: | Bernero R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| To: | Jennifer Davis, Harold Denton, Deyoung R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149B718 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-743 NUDOCS 8802170311 | |
| Download: ML20149F678 (181) | |
Text
,~, . ,- ..>,3 , , ~~ - , c , ,
'n Sg. W "h t y UNITED STATES
. . f$g /*. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMis':lON if [lX j* WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
'Q M:r: g +- ,... ,/
y' April 13,1984
$.g c .
$bf MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Davis, Director, NMSS ji; R. DeYoung, Director, IE
.h.R H. Denton, Director, NRR y.:j . G. Cunningham, Director, ELD J J. Felton, Director, DRR
'J J. Fouchard, Director, OPA
". Regional Administrators
.i. P f,; FROM: Robert M. Bernero, Director
,' Accident Source Tenn Program Office G ,, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
'V
SUBJECT:
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR PART S0, SECTIONS 50.34,
. 50.47, 50.54 AND APPENDIX E - AS WELL AS 10 CFR PART 70;
Please review the subject rulemaking package and provide me with your comments and concurrence by C.O.B. April 30, 1984. This package is also ,
being sent to the Regional Administrators for infonnation and possible comment.
<:- l.
Title:
Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, Sections 50.34, 50.47, 50.54 and Appendix E-As Well As 10 CFR Dart 70,
, "Plans for Coping with Emergencies at Production and
- Utilization Facilities."
. 2. Task Leader: Mike Jamgochian, ASTP0, RES P. .
M r:
- 3. Task No.: HF-303-1 m 4. Ccanizant Individuals: Bill Shields, ELD l .- D. Matthews, IE
.. 5. Backaround: On September 16, 1983 this rulemaking package was
, forwarded for Division review. All comments that
( .1 . were received have been resolved, therefore, the
!- package is presented for Office review and concurrence.
2.-
- r
, (
ls
(., .
. *-. ' [] _ ,
b,x 8802170311 880204 l: PDR FDIA SHOLLYB7-743 PDR -
" N ,
- ./ .
"$ b!.b
. K.
- I
?* 9s You may wish to focus your review' on the following j,.1] major conceptual proposed modifications to the gjj regulations:
fh. 1. Graded response strategy - Upon declatation
%t of a general emergency, persons within a two
- ,Y mile radius will be evacuated, (a goal of h
9;.
two hours is specified), immediately followed by the evacuation of the downwind sectors out to 9 ... about five miles. If the accident gets worse N 'l. (see figure 1 on page 9 R of the Commission Paper the evacuation is expanded to the downwind sectors
?J.Y out to 10 miles with an alert to expand beyond 10
- g. ,
miles.
7**
t.T 2. Demonstration of the graded response strategy Q ', thru exercises.
'; 3. Elimination of the unusual event emergency
-/ classification.
P
'. 4. Incorporation of Appendix E into the Body of Part 50.
l~..
- 5. Clarification of the 4 month time period for l/ correction of emergency preparedness de-D, ficiencies.
- 6. Considerat' ion of seismic hazards.
1... . '.
g::
~
f "O Robert M. Bernero, Director l:* . Accident Source Term Program Office l
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research t-
Enclosure:
Proposed Rulemaking Package p.
f.
c, c A'f,'
(. ~
l '. '. t j I ,1 O
s , . , - - _
DRAFT C
~ MJangochian:psb
.. 4/9/84
$.{i
+,
G.
'Q For: The Commissioners a
's 0; From: William J. Dircks
.h Executive Director of Operations 1: .
p Sub.fect: Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, Sections 50.34,
', 50.47, 50.54, and Appendix E and 10 CFR Part 70; "Plans
.h -
for Coping with Emergencies at Production and Utilization N( Facilities" f;
/;,
Purpose:
To obtain Commission approval for publication of the
[.
s.
subject proposed rule change in the Federal Register.
Categor,y: This paper covers a major policy question.
Background:
. On August 19, 1980, the NRC published a revised emergency planning regulation (45 FR S5402), which became effective on November 3, 1980.
The 1980 rule changes were an upgrade of NRC emergency planning regulations
," that provided clarification and expansion in areas perceived to be deficient ,
1 .; .
after an assessment of the TMI accident.
The 1980 emergency preparedness regulations involved the following three major changes from past practices:
- ?
f.? ' 1. To continue operation or to receive an operating license, the NRC requires f'
I;; that applicants / licensees submit their emergency plans, including State and local governmental emergency response plans, to NRC. The NRC then
!'" makes a finding as to whether the state of onsite and offsit'e emergency
., preparedness provides reasonable assurance that appropriate protective
'N measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
t:
- t. .
P. . '
7l.
Contact:
(: Michael T. Jamgechian, RES 443-7659 l .
! s J
n
. - .. . . .~~
^ i' '
2 The Commissioners 2
?,!;;
p L* T .
- ,.9 -
The NRC bases its finding on a review of the Federal Emergency Management r.';*
- Agency (FEMA) findings and determinations as.to whether State and local
- 9, emergt:ncy plans are adequate and on the NRC assessment as to whether the f) licensee's/ applicant's emergency plans are adequate and capable of being
.y)
^ implemented. Specifically:
9.:
O j[{
- a. An operating license will not be issued unless a favorable NRC y overall finding can be made, and 4.,
'{ b. After January 1,1981, an operating plant may be required to shutdown
!.:.:', if it is determined that there are such deficiencies that a favorable
. NRC finding cannot be made or is no longer warranted and the deficien-
! , cies are not corrected within 4 months of that determination.
3
- 2. Emergency planning considerations were extended to "Emergency Planning
. Zones (EPZ)," of about 10 miles in radius and 8
p- 3. Detailed emergency planning implementing procedures of both licensees. and applicants for operating licenses must be submitted to the NRC Inspection
'. and Enforcement regional offices for review.
l.
if L' In addition, the Commission revised 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, "Emergency L.' ,
Plans for Production and Utilization Facilities," to clarify, expand, and upgrade the content of licensee emergency plans.
L.'
(' , Discussion:
?.-
I. The emergency preparedness regulitions published on August 19, 1980 (45 FR 55402), were based on the significance of adequate emergency planning and
[.[," preparedness in order to ensure the protection of the public health and safety.
As the Commission reacted to the accident at Three Mile Island, it became y clear that the protection provided by siting and engineered design features
[.. ., had to be bolstered by the ability to take protective measures during the
[ ,,, course of an accident. In 1980, the Commission concluded that in order to I**
1
_ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ . _ - - _ .__ _ - - -- -_ U
~ "
% ^v
~ n.)
.a- . u: .. c. 7 ; . .. .
. .~ .
j The Commissioners 3 NO M
gr.
i.n discharge effectively its statutory responsibilities, the Commission must know g that proper means and procedures will be in place to assess the course of an ifj accident and its potential severity, that NRC and other appropriate authorities h and the public will be notified promptly, and that adequate protective actions in response to actual or anticipated accident conditions can and will be
$)n v;
p f,J.
taken.
3:/ After 4 years of experience in implementing the regulations as well as additional 3., insight gained through extensive research in the understanding of reactor risk 2[
, since 1980, the staff believes that the basic conclusions reached in 1980
- 3. - still provide a sound basis for emergency planning. In fact, the NRC has t..
[,; concluded that generally the overall thrust of the guidance in the original e
planning document developed by the EPA /NRC Task Force (NUREG-0396, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," December 1978) remains valid.
[, The staff is deeply involved with NRC's resetrch contractors and others, in a reevaluation of severe accident releases on source terms. The recommendations made to the Commission here are based on the staff's conclusion that later,
} with an accepted technical basis for different source terms, the Commission
,- would apply the same rationale and principles associated with graded response but possibly with refinements in distances and ranges.
However, the experience and insight gained since 1980 prompts the staff to recommend the following areas in the regulation for clarification, expansion,
- .[ and revision
l.;
,s
- 1. Improved understanding of the differences in individual risk within the 10-mile emergency planning zone, which would be best implemented by a graded emergency response approach.
i.,
- 2. Specification of the capabilities necessary within the 10-mile EPZ to p .,. , implement protective actions in a graduated manner.
l r, -
r I
l' l
.~J
" ~
~ ' ~ ~
x .. . .' . ' . e. . . Ri ' -
r' ~
.:. 3
<1
.h ft'
.A
- A The Commissioners 4 1 51 el-f/i N 3. Demonstration of these emergency response capabilities through exercises.
M3 g
- 4. Elimination of the "Unusual Event" as an emergency classification.
Q'
- g. -
% 5. Incorporation of the requirements of Appendix E into the body of Part 50.
!A
.:l
- 6. Clarification of the use of the 4-month time period for the correction of h
W emergency planning deficiencies.
- 7. Consideration of seismic hazards in determini.ng evacuation time estimates.
(l.J. Proposed Rule Changes:
s . r.
il.
- 1. Emphasize a Graded Response Capability
~'
The staff's improved understanding of reactor risk. considers the extensive
',. research done since the Reactor Safety Study in 1975, but does not use or
. depend on research currently underway that may revise accident source terms (and risk).
- The principal clarification in the proposed changes involves explaining more j specifically the concept of a "graded response" capability within the 10-mile
,. plume exposure pathway EPZ established by the 1980 emergency preparedness regulation. A graded response in emergency planning derives from the signi-ficant differences in risk that individuals in different locations of the plume exposure pathway EPZ face from nuclear power plant accidents. The
., staff notes that this concept of graded response is not new to the emergency preparedness arena. In fact, the Commission, in the 1980 rulemaking (see 45 2c FR 55407, August 19,1980), stated that:
f.
"Some comments received on the proposed rule advocated the use of g. a staged notification system with quick notification required only h'" . near the plant. The Commission believes that the capability for
.t quick notification within the entire plume exposure emergency 4 planning zone should be provided but recognizes that some planners 2 may wish to have the option of selectively actuating part of the
?. .
-- n -e, , - , , , .
- c. L .>. . . . ,. _ . 'c ,:. .. w : '
t,d U, The Commissioners 5 3% .
- Y-system during an actual response. Planners should carefully LII consider the impact of the added decisions that offsite authorities 1-9 would need to make and the desirability of establishing an official p.; communication link to all residents in the plume exposure emergency e planning zone when determining whether to plan for a staged notifi-(g cation capability."
'e M Nonetheless, implementation experience with the 1980 rule has shown that this
(( "staged" or "graded" concept may have been overlooked and emphasis has been
[.' ,
placed on the capability of prompt evacuation throughout the entire plume d' exposure pathway EPZ (about 10 miles in radius). This emphasis has included fj exercises to demonstrate this capability and resources committed to implement f this capability throughout the entire EPZ by all State and local governments.
h b' ..
Consequently, the licensee faced a shutdown of its plant or the applicant faced not receiving its license to operate.
. The staff believes the enclosed proposed regulation is necessary to make absolutely clear that although the planning for protective actions throughout
. the enti.re 103 mile EPZ is needed, emergency planners should recognize that the
~
risks to the population within tha't zone are not uniform. Therefore,' the l'. capability to implement these plans, i.e., the commitment of resources and the p' extent of exere.ises, should reflect this gradation of risk within the EPZ. The h graded response approach also includes consideration of the time available for h,7 the taking of protective actions.
) A reassessment of the technical bases underlying the 10-mile plume exposure
% emergency planning zone (EPZ) and the proter.tive actions to be taken within
( this zone has been performed." The reassessment has been based on extensive
[ additional risk studies that were not available at the time the NRC emergency
/ ,c planning rt.gulations were promulgated in 1980.
y: -
).
P"*l The reassessment has taken as its starting point the Commission's basic guidance
} on emergency planning, namely; that serious accidents can happen and that a range of them should be planned for. However, the reassessment has also tried 9i h,
f, *A detailed technical analysis and the rationale of the graded response approach
'*; to emergency planning is provided as Enclosure 5.
I i j
, .i .s u +.n .
...u
"~
'. . a, ' '
- e -
~ / s . c. :
[ . . . .
w
?.'}; -
- .: . The Commissioners 6 D,
n.
7.g:
ev to keep in aind recent Commission guidance (1984 Policy and Planning Guidance, g'Y
@,t NUREG-0885, Issue 3), that "Emergency planning should be based on realistic
[x.,, assumptions regarding severe accidents."
{n;.+ -
7,1j The reassessment has made use of analyses that have considered a full spectrum of potential accidents, up to and including very severe releases resulting
.[ from a core-melt and a breach of containment directly to the atmosphere. The l',] '
release characteristics used to describe the range of accidents considered A. have made use of the "Siting Source Term" (SST) terminology (e.g., SST-1, f.]. SST-2, etc.) described in NUREG-0773 and the Sandia siting study (NUREG/
Ei.
2.1. ,
' CR-2239), and accident sequence descriptions taken from the six reactor plants c; > Probabilistic Risk Assessments of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) and the Reactor Safety Study Methodology Application Program (NUREG/CR-1659).
Y. . .
Ql, Although an intensive research effort is underway to reassess the magnitude and timing of accidental radioactivity releases ("source terms"), this effort is presently incomplete. It must be emphasized that the enclosed rule change l[' is based solely upon existing source terms.
A major objective of this assessment was to determine a protective action strategy capable of dealing with a spectrum of accidents that would satisfy the following objectives:
p:.
,- The overall objectiye can be broken down for two types of General Emergenciesj d.ll generai Emergencies are not core melts, the overall
% f W .4
. objective is to deal with both categories.' The high probability events includes y.
three categories, 1) those which threaten to severely damage the core but are
-(.' arrested short of it, 2) those which severely damage the core but are arrested
[ ,' . short of large scale fuel melt, and 3) core melt accidents where successful
(.. operation of the containment systems greatly mitigaghgconsequences. The g low probability events are the core melt (where the containment U; does fail.
- /, '
f.; 1. For most core melts the emergency planning should provide reasonable y assurance that early fatalities and early injuries will be avoided and
- . that long-term heal'th effects will be reduced, if not avoided.
E
. . .. W . ... l ,
w, i:'g; The Commissioners 8 G*
m.
ra I;2 f;,. A distance of about 2 miles has significance for the following reasons:
r.:;
'ih
'$ o For many core-melt accidents (those without a direct release to the
.ll atmosphere), projected doses would not exceed the Protective Action Guide N' (PAG) levels beyond this distance;
)ff Q -
.;, o For most core-melt accidents (those without early failure of containment),
M projected doses would be unlikely to result in early injuries beyond this
[j. distance;
'h l{ oh Afromptevacuationofthepopulationw A w.vY ceu. Mf a.ccNI.5, ithin 2 milesj followed by evacuation A in the downwind sectors out to about 5 miles and immediate sheltering
.' j- within the remaining area of the 10 mile EPZ would provide a large reduction
, ,} in risk to the highest risk group and would also provide additional time to assess the developing situation further to decide on and implement required protective actions, as necessary, beyond this distance, s
. A time frame of about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> has signifitance for the following reasons:
o For many core-melt accidents, response times well in excess of this value
, :.I would be available before projected doses are expected to exceed the
.;. Protective Action Guide (PAG) levels.
- o. .
o For most core-melt accidents, an evacuation within this time would be
'. unlikely to result in doses capable of producing early injuries.
For the worst core-melt accidents, war.ing times (prior to releases) of
, o
- , 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or more are predicted for about 80% to 90% of severe accident j sequences.
.s e,
f' ,
Since about 1% to 2% of all core-melt accidents are currently estimated to
'O result 'in severe releases that would also be fast-developing (warning times less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), an evacuation time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for individuals within the
,l first two miles can provide a high, but not absolute, degree of assurance that
.. w .w. w life-threatening doses would not be received in the event '# aAcore melt.u u &+,
g .
, 4. c .. . '-
.~~
- 1. v s. . -
i..
Y f-V. . The Commissioners 9 m:
7t
.p U
tj Based on'the above results of the risk studies, a two-step protective action
[i; W
strategy is proposed as follows:
e., s 6
1,7. In the event of a reactor condition where a molten or degraded cord condition
- ~j, is projected, or where adequate core cooling is in doubt:
{,fy' 1. A prompt evacuation (to be accomplished within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) of everyone g within 2 miles should be recommended,followed by an evacuation in
- f. * ,
downwind sectors out to about 5 miles; everyone within the remainder of l;.1, the 10-mile EPZ should seek available shelter and remain indoors until
.. further notice.
7 f 2. Accident assessment should continue, with monitoring of both plant and f field conditions, and further actions, including evacuation or reloca-tion, taken as necessary.
This strategy was evaluated by examining the' individual consequences (as l measured in whole body and thyroid doses) resulting from a spectrum of core-melt events. For most core melt releases, a prompt evacuation out 4o
,; 2 miles followed by an evacuation of persons in the downwind sectors out to
'. about 5 miles within about 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of ground exposure results in no early b fatalities and very low risk of early injuries or long-term health effects.
( For the most severe releases (SST-1), a prompt evacuation out to 2 miles,
-[I followed shortly (within about 1 aditional hour) by an evacuation out to 5 miles in the downwind sectors only, with sheltering elsewhere and relocation within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of ground exposure for persons beyond 5 miles, would avoid
'[ '
- ; ',. t early fatalities and provide a low risk of early injuries see or lonS f)erm Ficut health l ,. effects. It is concluded that the proposed strat(egyA1s effective and flexible I/- enough to accommodate a complete spectrum of core melt events. It is effective
,j because: (a) those at greatest risk are given the most immediate attention I,$ and (b) emergency response resources can be used most effectively by concen-h y,
trating responses in a graded or phased manner.
\'
o, s
. 'x*;:;[?*: ND:j' . '( . . . ,.
.~ i '*- ~'< *'
. , . . ';,J. ,: *;. Mi':[.R}.;}.'Q*i[M-l{4.[': .y General Emergency -
- 1. Evacuation of 2 miles radius in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> .
- 2. Followed by evacuation of downwind sectors out to Sad o
- 3. Shelter remainder of EPZ .
1
(
Release No Release Large Fission Product I Substantially Degr&ded Underway inventory in containment or inoperative dosc (more than gap) reduction systems and.
Immentent Containment ,
Failure
- abov b low Cont m u 6 No es PAG s Pis '
Assessment y Evacuate Alert to Contiou s Alert to expand Continue k Alert to expand downwind expand assessment .
evacuation but assessment evacuation but continue evacuation icontinue sheltering ,
f* 10 sectors miles *but continue ~ ~ - ' - - sheltering shelte ng If both yes This in conjunction Evacuation downwind sectors to 10 miles -
(
with any other event, evaceate downwind i, alert to expand evacuation 3 sectors to 10 miles beyond 10 miles but i.
continue sheltering ,
n .
(t D
t :
h e
N-
- _ 3. c_ . ' .; .
. . . . c. ' . ' ' w, ' -
1 F
.:. The Commissioners 10 Mi
?).N
?j In summary, the actions that result in a reduction of offsite radiation doses for severe reactor accidents are prompt evacuation near the plant (about
'ij 2 miles in radius) followed by an evacuation in the downwind sectors out to
- fl.1
,ti, about 5 miles with sheltering in the remainder of the EPZ (out to about 10 miles).
To implement these protective actions, the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ
'" should be subdivided into two emergency response areas. The first area, to be L., known as the Inner Action Area (IAA), would extend from the reactor out to (1) about 2 miles (3.2 km) in radius. The second area would be the remainder of
{}i$ the plume exposure pathway EPZ (approximately 2-10 miles in radius). The
( prompt notification system to inform the public in the event of emergency z".; should be retained throughout the entire 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. ,
$ However, because of the significant differences in risk, the staff believes
.[ that the types of protective actions to be planned, the timing of such actions, and the allocation of resources assigned to implement any plan will differ significantly between the Inner Action Area and the remaining area of the
, plume exposure pathway EPZ. Specifically; the following requirements are
. proposed:
/.
- a. Inner Action Area: Within the Inner Action Area (IAA), the actions thac f should be planned to be taken include the prompt evacuation of the public from this area, upon declaration of a General Emergency. In the event of 7
, a severe accident, persons in this area may be exposed to high doses of radiation unless protective actions are taken promptly. Therefore, for
- 'c core damage accidents, priority should be given to initiate prompt evacu-ation, and complete this action within a few hours. This area is defined j in the proposed regulation as:
f, "The Inner Action Area (IAA) within the 10-mile plume exposure
?r , pathway EPZ for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an 9: area of about 2 miles (3.2 km) in radius and from which
- ,- generally all members of the public can be promptly evacuated f.' after the declaration of a General Emergency. The design l
.gj objective or goal is to have the capability to evacuate p,- essentially all persons within this area in approximately L;;' 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The evacuation of the IAA should be promptly
!L. followed by the evacuation of persons in the downwind sectors b,' out to about 5 miles. The Commission realizes that the H.
y
c - -
.- .s u. . v . ; w .,
.:. - . .. . .. w -
4.. . ..
e Ef.-
/ The Commissioners 11 iC
'.2,,
ipg ability to evacuate it.e p g could be hampered by such -
%;J conditions as adverse weather and road repairs. However, the J.'X increased time required to evacuate this area under these 3;; unusual adverse conditions will not affect the continued Ac operation of the power plant since it is anticipated that these conditions will be temporary in nature."
- l.7
/ b. Remainder of the 10-Mile EPZ: Within the remaining area of the plume O exposure pathway EPZ, the protective actions that should be planned for is, immediate sheltering within available residences or other buildings (k
};
, while evacuation of persons out to about 5 miles in the downwind sectors is being conducted. Depending upon the accident sequence a resumption of Pd .
normal activities may follow or an expanded evacuation of those persons
{} , beyond 5 miles in the downwind sectors may be warrented. Evacuation c,' .:: beyond 5 miles is not likely, but it cannot be entirely precluded. In
,.. any event, evacuation of areas beyond 5 miles could be accomplished with significantly less preplanning than that required for the IAA because of f the time frame afforded by the distance from the plant and the dispersion
/, characteristics within the plume.
- 2. Implement Protective Actions To ddequately implement the appropriate protective actions within the two areas i discussed above, the following requirements are proposed:
- a. Predetermined instrument and plant status indicators should exist in the
"- control room for declaring a General Emergency and recommending protective
)
actions based on core and containment conditions (before a release).
5:
. b. Plant personnel are needed who have both the authority and the knowledge l); to make the appropriate protective measure recommendations offsite.
?
2
/, . c. Provisions offsite for 24-hour prompt protective action decisionmaking in
)[ response to all control room recommendations to include evacuation of the E.I area near the plant (IAA) and in downwind sectars out to about 5 miles.
3 .
o t
7;. *t .T " .
'~
... u - . .. . .m.. -
. . .e .
L.,
Yp.
0 ?i
?;.3 The Commissioners 12 M
.?
9',q: d. Public notification procedures (e.g., information) should address prompt E evacuation of the area near the plant (IAA), as well as possible evacuation rf ti. of downwind sectors out to about 5 miles.
?2 4.':
j'*; e. Provisions are needed to promptly locate contaminated areas throughout
[ 4:
the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ and possibly beyond.
M t.. -
The following additional changes are. proposed to the emergency planning regula-
- y . tions:
M..'
h';i 3. Demonstrate Capabilities Through Exercises
?,>*.
j.
The staff considers emergency planning exercises necessary to demonstrate the f capability of the licensee and State and local authorities for the taking of
.' protective actions to protect the health and safety of the public during a
. radiological emergency. To demonstrate this capability, successful exercises
[ are required at 2 year intervals. These exercises must dcnonstrate the
. following:
- a. The capability to alert the population within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ within 15 minutes of the declaration of a Site Area or General
- *;, . Emergency.
N v..
- b. The capability to promptly reach decisions to declare an Alert, Site, or M General Emergency classification exists, based on predetermined Emergency
.- Action Levels (EALs).
f:q The capability to evacuate the 2-mile Inner Action Area (IAA) of the c.
l:j plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> upon declaration of a (i
s~:.,
General Emergency.
6.;
i .: .,
- d. The capability to evacuate appropriate downwind sectors of the EPZ to a Y5 distance of about $ miles in a timely manner (in approximately 3 to 5
[* ,) hours) based on an exercise scenario that includes a representative
(. .
lee*
t
- l. '
(; / . ; F a. . . ,. ~ ~ ~ * , . . . .. ~..' ..~.: ~'V ~- w. ' ~
P (g. The Commissioners 13 v.N:
I.@
1.
f,$.. sample of population groups, including any urban centers or special h population groups such as hospitals, prisons, and schools. .
% j
.2-
- e. The capability to reach decisions to shelter other popul'ation groups y); within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to minimize population doses.
,.T, se'l f. The capability to reach decisions relative to the direction of the plume, to determine potentially contaminated areas within the plume exposure
- n. ,' ' . pathway EPZs, and decide if relocation of population groups or other
~..-> protective actions are warranted to minimize radiation doses.
A;.
);.
Q'; g. The capability to reach decisions to downgrade or end the declaration of
- i an emergency and to allow the evacuated population to return with a o,.
', minimum of disruption.
4 4 l;; The staff feels that if the above capabilities are satisfactorily exercised on 7., a biannual basis, using appropriately altered sectors over the years,' reasonable x assurance would exist that the resources used for the evacuation of the 2-mile
- c. area and the 5-mile sector (s) could then be expanded, or if necessary used for the taking of appropriate protective measures in any portion of the EPZs to protect the health and safety of the public during an actual emergency.
Y.
4 Eliminate the "Unusual Event" as an Emergency Class.
[
l: The staff recommends eliminating this emergency classification. This is being
- proposed because these events do not affect the public. health and safety, ,
l.3 since they are usually handled and resolved by plant personnel and do not :
[ warrant activation of the emergency preparedness organizations.
hN L.* 5. Incorporate Appendix E into the Body of part 50. -
u, , ,. .
The proposed rule change complies with Federal Register policy, which requires
[-l '
?:.: that substantive regulations should be contained in numbered parts of the b'f. regulations rather than appendices. The content of Appendix E has stayed P.. ;
t..
\'
l-l .
- a. . .
,_,e ,.
The Commisstoners 14 b ].
essentially the same, except for the changes noted herein, and has been placed
@g appropriately throughout Part 50 (i.e. , SS 50.34, 50.47, and 50.54).
k p,' These changes are mainly organizational in nature and involve using a few of y[4 ?. the guidance criteria from NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 ("Criteria for Preparation N.- and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in
[.j Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Rev. 1, November 1980) to amplify some of j the Planning Standards in the regulation. These organizational changes are
'.{ intended to better differentiate the emergency planning requirements applicable
/ to State and local governments and licensees and to make a distinction between
['
planning, preparedness, and implementation. In doing this, two Planning Standards were added to eliminate existing ambiguities: Planning Standard 4, "Emergency Action Levels," and Planning Standard 14, "Downgrading Emergency 2'
Classi fications. " No substantive changes other than those for clarity and emphasis are intended.
- 6. Clarify the 4-month Time Period for Correction of Deficiencies
." The wording in this proposed rule change relating to providing a 4-month time
. span for the correction of deficiencies in emergency planning has been clari-fied to reflect experience gained since 1980. The proposed rule change specifi-
[(
'.- cally states that deficiencies in the State and local governmental emergency planning and preparedness, which are not within the control of the licensee, y may be given 4 months for correction. This 4-month time period does not
, include the time period that FEMA may take to find that the deficiency has s' ,.
. been corrected, particularly if such finding depends on conducting another
. l.. exercise. Emergency planning and preparedness deficiencies that are within
/ the license's control will be handled as a normal NRC enforcement action, 3.i i.e., a 4-month grace period may not be provided.
'4;
- 7. Consideration of Seismic' Hazards
{ The staff has considered the need for and extent of consideration of the potentially complicating effects of earthquakes in the context of emergency
') '
t
c . -
.. . 2 - . ..c t.u - .r . .
N'. .
f The Commissioners 15 id .. t j'- preparedness. As a result of this analysis, the staff finds that for most
- h. earthquakes (including some earthquakes more severe than the SSE) the power h ,
plant would not be expected to pose an immediate offsite radiological hazard.
For earthquakes that would cause plant damage leading to immediate offsite
- {.
$.J radiological hazards but for which there would be relatively minor offsite
-? damage, emergency response capabilities around nuclear power plants would not
((.) be seriously affected. For earthquakes that would cause more severe offsite 7.j] damage, such as disabling a siren alerting system, the earthquake itself acts ej as an alerting system. For those risk-dominant earthquakes, which cause very L?.j severe damage to both the plant and the offsite area, emergency response would
{'d. have marginal benefit because it would be impaired by offsite damage. The
- / expenditure of additional resources to cope with seismically caused offsite damage is of doubtful value considering the modest benefit in overall risk reduction that could be obtained. Nonetheless, the staff feels that it would 3 be prudent for licensees to consider the potential effects of earthquakes, i
k such as road blockages and damaged bridges, when evaluating evacuation time
- i estimates. The enclosed proposed rule change has been modified accordingly.
t r,; Discussion of Issues:
In addition, the staff considers it beneficial to discuss the following issues T relative to the experience it has gained over the last 4 years with the imple-
}.? mentation of the 1980 emergency preparedness regulations:
Ai
- 1. Severe Accident Source Term Work l '- Although an intensive research effort is underway to reassess the magnitude O' and timing of act.idental radioactivity releases ("source term"), this effort
[ is presently incomplete. The changes proposed herein are based solely on the
['l, existing source terms and are written without any prejudgment of the outcome of the ongoing research program, nonetheless, the staff anticipates that the
';. rational and principles assoicated with the graded response concept will remain valid with possible refinements in distances and ranges after the source term research program.
e
- ^ - t
, ,- -- a- - - - . - - .-c -- -- - - . - - , -
p*~ . . : . ..: ' t: .. t ? ..
' ~
~-
l I!:;
}l; The Commissioners 16 i
?
".3? 2. Objective of the NRC Emergency Preparedness Regulations s
?g.
tj Various governmental authorities, consultants, and members of the public have
$j argued that an emergency plan cannot be developed that would eliminate public E;f ' health risk from all of the possible reactor accidents. The NRC agrees that n
$j emergency preparedness cannot total.ly eliminate the public health risk associ-
..] ated with potential nuclear plant accidents. However, since complete elimina-Q ..
tion of all risk is not even theoretically possible, it is not the intent of
@ the NRC's emergency preparedness regulations to ensure that no one in the C public would receive a dose in excess of the EPA protective action guidelines
- s,
.it. (PAGs) for any accidental release, regardless of timing or severity. Based
[, on experience, the NRC has noted that there are many uncertainties associated i
,f with' potential accidents and that emergency planning cannot account for every 1, . eventuality. Therefore, we must emphasize that emergency preparedness is not y
. ;; a panacea for eliminating all risk to the public.
,e i The objective of the NRC emergency preparedness regulations is to reduce the d risk to the public health and safety by planning in advance how to respond to
[. nuclear power plant accidents.
The NRC would not license a plant if the radiological risk posed by possible
.[ accidents were not very small - even in the absence of emergency preparedness.
H Nevertheless, the NRC has chosen to require emergency preparedness as another f level of "defense in-depth," the principle that a variety of independent and diverse levels of protection should be afforded the public from the hazard of
{c radiation exposure. The NRC believes that reasonable efforts to anticipate h.. and plan for public protective actions in the vicinity of a commercial nuclear
[,' plant can substantially reduce, though not eliminate, the already small offsite
?,: radiological risk, and is, therefore, a prudent if not essential requirement.
M: 3. Other Alternatives Considered M
- f
- , In the staff's deliberations relating to this proposed rulemaking, other h alternatives were considered for improving emergency preparedness around 4.,.
E' a ,
p,'2 . x ..m s.C 'r '
E
(:
s u
~ ~7.: The Commissioners . 17 il
. .b
,q.
- .;
- ; nuclear power plants. These alternatives focused on (1) methods for providing sg
.q inducements"to State and local governments to upgrade emergency preparedness, y (2) requiring licensees to provide funding directly to State and local govern-
@ ments, and (3) providing guidance on the range of costs that' experience has
- shown to be reasonable and effective in establishing an adequate state of y preparedness. All of these alternatives were considered inappropriate for the D.-l regulatory role of the NRC.
e
,1-f/ FEMA Coordination
% ~
kj.{ The development of these proposed regulations has been coordinated with the
- d
,' FEMA staff. FEMA concurs with the proposed rule change. It is FEMA's intent
.f^ . that its regulations (44 CFR Part 350) be consistent with the NRC regulations.
D. .
c Cost Estimate:
S:
The staff anticipates that there would be additional incremental costs for
[.< ,,
States, and local governments,.and' licensees if the proposed rule changes are '
- .l. approved as a final regulation because of the need to revise and submit emer-12 'gency plans. However, it is anticipated that there would be a savings of
,., approximately $150,000 per plant every two years because of the reduced extent y :'
of emergency preparedness exercises.
l..: Recommendation: That the Commission:
e ~
- l. :l Q
T
- 1. Aporove: Publication of the proposed rule change in the Federal Register for public comment (Enclosure 1),
y; 1: a;,- 2. Note:
s.1 l.o g a. That appropriate Congressional committees will be notified of the proposed N ,r.
rule (draft Congressional letter is Enclosure 2).
.~;.
V:
N.
1 l ,
1
? .
.. . a...
L:. 2 .
.' .D. ' -
- 5. .
IN The Commissioners 18 hk
.w h h b. That the ACRS is being informed of the proposed rule.
s, .$ -
- Tp; c. That, pursuant to S 51.51(d)(3) of the Commission's regulations, an v environmental assessment will be prepared in connection with the subject j
@t v:3
%. proposed amendment.
Q.i -
rc 7:u d. That the Federal Register notice contains a statement.that the NRC certifies 4 that the proposed rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant I.i economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, pursuant to j,( the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, S 605(b).
. .y This proposed rule contains no additional information collection require-Q f.1; .
e.
ments and therefore is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Requirement Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et. seq.).
<.' f. That the Office of Administration will distribute copies of the
~
Federal Register notice to affected. applicants, licensees, State governments, and interested persons.
w+; t'.f g. That a public announcement will be issued.
G l h. That a Regulatory Analysis has been prepared (Enclosure 3).
e
'1' i. That the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration
~
will be informed of the certification and the reasons for it as required
'a by the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
- 2
- William J. Dircks
!. " Executive Director for Operations
.P
?
Enclosures:
9 1. Federal Register Notice
,(. ; of Proposed Rulemaking
- 2. Oraft Congressional Letter
'. ' 'i 3. Regulatory Analysis
- ' ^
- 4. Technical Rational, NUREG
(" '- ,
4,
~
. ..r. ':.
,,.' ~
[ .~. '
( [7550-01]
jdl.
?. t. -Q M NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7
0
,j 10 CFR PART 50
.l.5 t.i.f g EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS FOR PRODUCTION Dk AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES
- 3 N.
p f4 AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
J.P.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
r.: 7 7:
SUMMARY
- The Commission is proposing to amend its emergency preparedness y,5 regulations to reflect experience gained since 1980 and to better organize the
- ,, ; requirements for clarity. Recent research studies on reactor risk and the
- practical emergency planning experience have led to a refined understanding of
. reactor risks and ways to improve emergency preparedness. The proposed rules
. would require a graduated emergency response cap 5bility to reflect! a more
- realistic program for dealing /ith radiological emergencies at nuclear power p
7, plants.
- .t .
s
.j DATES: The comment period expires .
- Comments received
- after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance e.
l' of consideration cannot be given except as to comments received on or before p .. .
ii this date.
~ !. ',
.' ADDRESSES: Interested persons are invited to submit written comments and sugges-tions on the proposed rule change and/or the supporting Regulatory Analysis to
.:4 the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
.u a
- .(
- 0.C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch. Copies of the Regulatory y Analysis and the comments received by the commission may be examined in the G Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street NW. , Washington, D.C.
Q...
Q:
- Insert date 60 days after publication in Federal Register.
, 04/11/84 1 Enclosure 1 4
. U T =...a ,
'5 2 . .
L$ [7590-01]
a m
Q
% FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
[ Michael T. Jamogochian, Accident Source Team Program Office, Q Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, M U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
$.j Washingto6, D.C. 20555, Telephone (301)443-7659.
u.:
g'-
7.g SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On August 19, 1980, the NRC published revised
'Is emergency preparedness regulations, which became effective on November 3, W.! 1980 (45 FR 55402). The regulations required nuclear power reactor licensees y,7 y..
to submit upgraded emergency plans by January 2, 1981; to submit implementing procedures by March 1, 1981; and to implement the plans by April 1, 1981.
{..
. g. The 1980 rule changes were considered an upgrade of NRC emergency plan-9, ning regulations to provide clarification and expansion in areas perceived to
[^ be deficient as a result of the TMI experiences.
','j The 1980 emergency preparedness regulations involved the following three
- major changes from past practices
- 1. To continue operations or to receive an operating license, the NRC
~. l requires that applicants / licensees submft their emergency plans, including
,: St' ate and local governmehtal emergency response plans, to NRC. The NRC then
,j makes a firiding as to whether the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides' reasonable assurance that appropriate protective j measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
c:' The NRC bases its finding on a review of the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are. adequate and capable of being implemented and on the NRC
,. assessment as to whether the licensee's/ applicant's emergency plans are
- t. . adequate and capable of being implemented. Specifically:
ll a. An operating licensee will not be issued unless a favorable NRC
- ., overall finding can be made, and
1 . b. After January 1,1981, an operating plant may be required to shut
- -i down if it is determined that there are such deficiencies that a favorable NRC
[ll finding cannot be made or is no longer warranted and the deficiencies are not 1 corrected within 4 months of that determination.
's 2. Emergency planning considerations were extended to "Emergency
~.
.I Planning Zones (EPZs)," and i
04/11/84 2 Enclosure 1 s
,. s1 ,
D [7590-01]
a.:
$ 3. Detailed emergency planning implementing procedures of both licensees d'@ and applicants for operating licenses must be submitted to the NRC Inspection
$[f and Enforcement regional office for review.
M In addition, the Commission revised 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, "Emergency Q,j Plans for Production and Utilization Facilities," to clarify, expand, and
$ upgrade the content of licensee emergency plans.
}j The emergency preparedness regulations published on August 19, 1980 h (45 FR 55402), were based on the significance of adequate emergency planning and preparedness in order to ensure the protection of the public health and g.y 2' - safety. As the Commission reacted to the accident at Three Mile Island, it
$. became clear that the protection provided by siting and engineered design W ., features had to be bolstered by the ability to take protective measures during lf; P
y the course of an accident. In 1980, the Commission concluded that in order to I.'U, discharge effectively its statutory responsibilities, the Commission must know that proper means and procedures will be in place to assess the course of an f{ accident and its potential severity, that NRC and other appropriate authorities
[.7 '
and the public will be notified promptly, and that adequate protective actions b in response to actual or anticipated accident conditions can and wili be
, .ta ken. *
.3 After 4 years of experience in implementing the regulations as we'll as l' additional insight gained through extensive research in the understanding of L reactor risk since 1980, the Commission believes that the basic conclusions p reached in 1980 still provide a sound basis for emergency planning. In fact, 4 the NRC has concluded that generally the overall thrust of the guidance in the
~~
original planning document developed by the EPA /NRC Task Force (NUREG-0396, i "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological r
.._ Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,"
'.1 December 1978) remains valid.
[ The Commission is deeply involved with NRC's research contractors and
'f; '
others, in a reevaluation of severe accident releases or source terms. The
/. proposed amendments noted herein are based on the Commissions' conclusion that later with an accepted technical basis for different source terms, the Commission 1 would apply the same rationale and principles associated with graded response
\?; but possibly with refinements in distances and ranges.
1 5 l 1
'. 04/11/84 3 Enclosure 1
*T
_ _ _ _ _t___ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.- >f , ;_,-- ., , z . . 7 ,, ; , ,
[7590-01] al. $ However, the experience and insight gained since 1980 prompts the Commis-C.hf g sion to propose changing the following areas in the regulation for clarifi-f,' cation, expansion and revision: $li 1. Improved understanding of the differences in individual risk within 9 y the 10-'aile emergency planning zore, which would be best implemented by a j m *. graded emergency response approach. h 2. Specification of the capabilities necessary within the 10-mile EPZ A
;<f. . to implement protective actions in a graduated manner, d.' 3. Demonstration of these emergency response capabilities through exercises.
[ ' ('
- 4. Elimination of the "Unusual Event" as an emergency classification.
$/. 5. Incorporation of the requirements of Appendix E into the body of f.. Part 50. I 6. Clarification of the use of the 4-month time period for the correction of emergency planning deficiencies. {.}
- 7. Consideration of seismic hazards in determining evacuation time estimates.
Procosed Rule Changes:
;. 1. Emphasize a Graded Resoonse Capability. The Commission's improved
'I understanding of reactor risk considers the extensive research done since the
( ,", Reactor Safety Study in 1975, but'does not use or depend on research currently J., underway that may revise accident source terms (and risk). The principal [, clarification in the proposed changes involves explaining more specifically % the concept of a "graded response" capability within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ established by the 1980 emergency preparedness regulation. A
- m. graded response in emergency planning derives from on the significant differences
.;; in risk that individuals in different locations of the plurne exposure pathway M EPZ face from nuclear power plant accidents. The Commission notes that this p
concept of graded response is not new to the emergency preparedness arena. In 1 fact, the Commission, in the 1980 rulemaking (see 45 FR 55407, August 19, ?- 1980), stated that: ]j I'.. P. "Some comments received on the proposed rule advocated the L .. use of a staged notification system with quick notification K' required only near the plant. The Commission believes that , 04/11/84 4 Enclosure 1
h 7,. . . , , u . J ".W '
. f. s . . :
'3. i . , .
L { .[7590-01]
.(
b,)) , the capability for quick notification within the entire plume
%" exposure emergency planning zone should be provided but
., recognizes that some planners ny wish to have the optien of c selectively actuating part of the system during an actual 3 response.. Planners should carefully consider the impact c'
.: the added decisions that offsite authorities would need to
.i. make and the desirability of estabitshing an official communi-W cation link to all residents in the plume exposure emergency
' planning zone when determining whether to plan for a staged v notification capability."
$ Nonetheless, implementation experience with the 1980 rule has shown that
?[, this "staged" or "graded" concept may have been overlooked and emphasis has I,
.e<
been placed on the capability of prompt evacuation throughout the entire plume (. ;, exposure pathway EPZ (about 10 miles in radius). This emphasis has included
.c .
f.f exercises to demonstrate this ccpability and resources comitted to implement [ this capability throtghout the entire EPZ by all State and local governments.
$ The Commission believes this proposed regulation is necessary to make absolutely clear that although the planning for protective actions throughout the entire 10 mile EPZ is needed, emergency planners should recognize that the
,f risks to the population within that zone are not uniform. Therefore, the L, capability to implement these' plans, i.e., the commitment of resources and the j' extent of exercises, should re?ltet this gradation of risk within the EPZ.
?< The graded respunse approach also includes consideration of the time.available
(' , for the taking of protective actions.
.'. :, A reassessment,of the technical bases underlying the 10-mile plume exposure
> emergency planning zone (EPZ) and the protective actions to be taken within this zone has been performed. The reassessment has been based on extensive additional risk stu'ies d that were not available at the time the NRC emergency
, planning regulations were promulgated in 1980.*
~; The reassessment has taken as its starting point the Commission's basic O guidance on emergency planning, namely; that serious accidents can happen and that a range of them should be planned for. However, the reassessment has
,a A detailed technical analysis and rationale of the graded response approach to emergency planring is provided in NUREG .
'4 04/11/84 5 E.nclosure 1
* , , na,r. , , . , , . , , - - - -
e ,
7,7; ; .g. ;. % m . y , .&:y:. u w; , L fh
~
[7590-01]. 1
!.4 .
f$. also tried to keep in mind recent Commission guidance-(1984 Policy and
- ,),7 Planning Guidance, NUREG-0885, Issue 3), that "Emergency planning should be
.a pj basedonrealisticassumptionsregardingsevereaccidenti."
$ .The reassessment has made use of analyses that have considered a full
,[ spectrum of. potential accidents, up to and including very severe rele:ses 9 resulting from a core-melt and a breach of containment directly to the atmos-jf phere. The release characteristics used to describe the range of accidents j c.,;j considered have made use of the "Siting Source Term" (SST) terminology (e.g.,
N SST-1, SST-2, etc.) described in NURIG-0773 and the Sandia siting study
. (NUREG/CR-2239), and accident s quence descriptions taken from the six reactor f plants Probabilistic Risk Assessments of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) and the Reactor Safety Study Methodology Application Program (NUREG/CR-1659).
Q, jf Although an intensive research effort is underway to reassess the magnitude gf and timing of accidental radioactivity releases ("source terms"), this effort e: is presently incomplete. It must be emphasized that the enclosed rule change .'... is based solely upon existing source terms. A major objective of this assessment was to determine a protective action h strategy capable of dealing with a spectrum of accidents that would satisfy cj the following objectives: h The overall objective can be' bri., ken down 4d.two types of General Emergencies, hN*% n.ll General Emergencies are not core melts, the f overall objective i:, to deal with both categorie.s. The high probability J.; events includes three categories, 1) those which threaten to severely damage
, J. the core but are arrested short of it, 2) those which severely damage the core i but are arrested short of large scale fuel itelt, and 3) core melt accidents
'e
{ ;. where successful operation of the containment systems greatly mitigates the consequences. The low probability events are the others, the core melts where ' [( X.- the containtint does fail. .
.H
- .i;
{,. ,
- 1. For most core melts the emergency planning should provide reasonable "p ,
assurance that early fatalities and early injuries will be avoided and that j long-term health effects will be reduced, if not avoided. 'C . 2. For severe core melt releases (where the containment fails promptly 7; or where few mitigating systems are operable) emergency planning should I:f,3 provide reasonable assurance that early fatalities will be avoided and that IO early injuries ad long term health effects will be reduced. 04/11/84 6 Enclosure 1 a .
.s , --s- , , . . - . - . - . . - - , . -
c- . . = - - . ,
c .4 V - [7590-01)
? :'
(?y The risk studies focused on the individual distribution of risk with
;I) distance, both within the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ, as well as beyond it.
Individual risk is highest close to the reactor and declines rapidly at first, g./ and then more slowly with increasing distance. At a distance of 2 miles, the f.'l average radiation dose from a given release is about 20 percent of its value j '.] at. one half mile. This behavior is the result primarily of increased atmospheric
,p; dilution or dispersion with distance, which is inherent in nature and reduces $; the atmospheric concentration, and hence the dose, of any released radioactivity.
Q', - While the individual dose from a given release ic lower by about a factor of I s.. 50 at a distance of 10 miles versus that at a distance of one-half mile (the Of, nearest boundary of the typical exclusion areas), the effect becomes magnified Id for those health effects where a threshold dose is required before an effect
~.U. is observed.
kI Hence, for the most severe release without protective actions, the individual d risk of early fatality is reouced by about a Letor of one hundred at a distance of 10 miles versus its initial value at one-half mile. Because the risk q decreases continuously with distance, howevar, it also does not become zero at 10 miles. The risk studies confirm that while the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ is appropriate for planning purposes, special attentior, or priority should be given to preplanned actions to reduce tne risk within about
,7, the first 2 miles, while retaining the capability to take additional protective ,-~ actions, as necessary, within the remainder of the EPZ. It should also be ,,', made clear that protective actions could be required at distances beyond f;. 10 miles, in very unusual circumstances.
s , ~ Accident timing considerations were also examined. Based on these studies, 7 it can be concluded that a distance of about 2 miles ard a time-frame of about
,j 2 hours has significance for taking of prompt actions for all core-melt events.
A distance of about 2 miles has significance for the following reasons:
- h. o For many core-melt accidents (those without a direct release to the y atmosphere), projected doses w;uld not exceed the Protective Action Guide y (PAG) levels beyond this distance; Ih m
o For most core-melt accidents (those without early failure of containment), (- i i:. projected doses would be unlikely to result in early injuries beyond this b distance; 04/11/84 7 Enclosure 1 s , b m. _ _ . . . _
w > j , mc c 3
.; , , t, ,
,y ,. ,
[7590-01] (;k $n, &. W d wu - M c (c A44 o Afromptevacuationofthepopulationwithin2milesfollowedbyevacuation
} j in the downwind sectors out to about 5 miles and immediate sheltering 24 '
L'S. within the remaining area of the 10 mile EPZ would provide a large reduction 5,h in risk to the highest risk group and would also provide additional time
',7 to assess the developing situation further to decide on and implement
[,*j required protective actions, as necessary, beyond this distance.
- m::
- .. A time frame of about 2 hours has significance for the following reasons:
*}.
Y; o For many core-melt accidents, response times well in excess of this value ftj 3; would be available before projected doses are expected to exceed the ([, Protective Action Guide (PAG) levels,
- 9. 1 ce,g o For most core-melt accidents, an evacuation within this time would be
$- unlikely to result in doses capable of producing early injuries. (' ' o For the worst core-melt accidents, warning times (prior to releases) of ], 2 hours or more are predicted for about 80% to 90% of severe accident sequencas. )
~
Since about 1% to 2% of all core-melt tecidents are currently estimated to result in severe releases that would also be fast-developing (warning times
; less than 2 hours), an evacuation time of 2 hours for individuals within the 1.2 c
first two miles can provide a high, but not absolute, degree of assurance that life-threatening doses would not be received in the eventaofcna cor;e-meltAct Ab.
.u.
j Based on the above results of the risk studies, a two-step protective
; action strategy is proposed as follows:
In the event of.a reactor condition where a molten or degraded core
$ condition is projected, or where adequate core cooling is in doubt:
1: 2
. 1. A promet evacuation (to be accomolished within 2 hours) of everyone within 2 miles should ce recommended j followe. by an evacuatica in the downwind rj sectors out to about.' miles; everyone within the remainder of the 10-mile EPZ 'O should seek available sheltei and remain indoors until further notice.
l? q . 04/11/84 8 Enclosure 1
;,t. . _.- ,
[7590-01] R! W*
- 2. Accident assessment should continue, with monitoring of both plant Q'
f?. n .,. and field conditions, and further actions, includ'ng evacuation or relocation, y taken as necessary. h ilt This strategy was evaluated by examining the individual consequences (as measured in whole body and thyroid doses) resulting from a spectrum of core-melt nv i'3 events. For most core-melt releases, a prompt evacuation out 2 miles followed
.a y by an evacuation of persons in the downwind sectors out to about 5 miles ':il," within about 4 hours of ground exposure results in no early fatalities and Q very low risk of early injuries or long-term health effects. For the most
[c,d severe releases (SST-1), a prompt evacuation out to 2 milas, followed shortly y.( (within about 1 additional hour) by an evacuation out to 5 miles in the downwind 7.' sectors only, with sheltering elsewhere and relocation within 4 hours of h> ground exposure for persons beyond 5 miles, would avoid early fatalities and 4, provide a low risk of early injuries or long-term health effects. It is (
- concluded that the proposed strategy is effective and flexible enough to
( accommodate a complete spectrum of core melt events. It is effective because: ". (a) those at greatest risk are given the most immediate attention and [ (b) emergency response resources can be used most effectively by concentrating
-4 responses in a graded or phased manner.
In summary, the actions that result in a reduction of offsite radiation doses for severe reactor accidents are prompt evacuation near the plant (about
.. 2 miles in radius) followed by an evacuation in the downwind sectors out to '~
about 5 miles with sheltering in the remainder of the EPZ (out to about 10 miles). l: . To implement these protective actions, the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ u.' ,, l should be subdivided into two emergency response areas. The first area, to be 72 known as the Inner Action Area (IAA), would extend from the reactor out to f about 2 miles (3.2 km) in radius. The second area would be the remainder of the plume exposure pathway EPZ (approximately 2-10 miles in radius). The
- p. prompt notification system to inform the public in the event of emergency i'f should be retained throughout the entire 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ.
b However, because of the significant differences in risk, the Commission believes
,h that the types of protective actions to be planned, the timing of such actions, and the allocation of resources assigned to implement any plan will differ
{. p significantly between the two areas: the Inner Action Area and the remaining i area of the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Specifically, the following requirements are proposed:
*?
04/11M4 9 Enclosure 1
7 m .; . ,
~
y 7 .
. [7590-01)
..M
,h a. Inner Action Area: Within the Inner Action Area' (IAA), the actions (f. that should be planned to be taken include the prompt evacuation of the public from this area, upon declaration of a General Emergency. In the event of a
{?] severe accident, persons in this area may'be exposed to high doses of radiation Q unless protective actions are taken promptly. Therefore, for core damage
!- accidents, priority should be given to initiate prompt evacuation, and complete
[ this action within a few hours. This area is defined in the proposed regula-fl[N n'c
.f]
u tion as:
"The Inner Action Area (IAA) within the 10 mile plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an .J. area of about 2 miles (3.2 km) in radius and from which j generally all members of the public can be promptly evacuated p- after the declaration of a General Emergency. The design KJ objective or goal is to.have the capability to evacuate ,; essentially all persons within this zone in approximately ,/- 2 hours. The evacuation of the IAA should be promptly ,,., followed by the evacuation of persons in the downwind sectors out to about 5 miles. The Commission realizes that the c ability to evacuate the T A 6 could be hampered by such
- conditions as adverse weather and road repairs. However, the increased time required to evacuate this area under these
. unusual adverse conditions will not affect the continued operation of the power plant since it is anticipated that these conditions will be temporary in nature."
L N' b. Remainder of the 10 mile EPZ: Within the remaining area of the plume l' p exposure pathway EPZ, the protective a.: tion that should be planned for is, immediate sheltering within available residences or other buildings while 1 evacuation of persons out to about 5 miles in the downwind sectors is being n-F. ., conducted. Depending upon the accident sequence, a resumption of normal [ .',' activities may follow or an expanded evacuation of those persons beyond 5 miles in the downwind sectors may be warrented. Evacuation beyond 5 miles is not
'a likely, but it cannot be entirely precluded. In any event, evacuation of
[l', areas beyond 5 miles could be accomplished with significantly less pre planning l6 than that required for the IAA because of the time frame afforded by the )( distance from the plant and the dispersion characteristics within the plume.
- i. ; 2. Implement Protective Actions: To adquately implement the appropriate
[q protective actions within the two areas discussed above, the following requirements are proposed: [ L-p. l 04/11/84 10 Enclosure 1 1
p^x , z... .
~
[7590-01] c
. n:
fvP ha.j a. Predetermined instrument and plant status indicators should exist in g, the control room for declaring a general emergency and recommending protective
,.d actions based on core and containment conditions (before a release).
.] b. Plant parsonnel are needed who have both the authority and the knowledge to make the appropriate protective measure recommendations offsite.
$ c. Provisions offsite for 24-hour prompt protective action decision-
$j making in response to all control room recommendations to include evacuation 1 of the area near the plant (IAA) and in downwind sectors out to about 5 miles.
f[U
,: t is
- d. Public notification procedures (e.g., information) should address prompt evacuation of the area near the plant (IAA) as well as possible evacuation g[';'. of downwind sectors out to about 5 miles.
3sf e. Provisions are needed to promptly locate contaminated areas throughout f.;, the 10 mile plume exposure pathway EPZ and possibly beyond. The following additional changes are proposed in this rulemaking package: (.; 3. Demonstrate Capabilities Through Exercises The Commission considers that emergency planning exercises necessary to
>' demonstrate the capability of the licensee, and State and local authorities, .g for the taking of protective actions to prote.ct the health and saf ety of the , pubile during a radiological emergency. In order to make this demonstration, ,f successful exercises are required at 2 year intervals. These exercises must dersnstrate the following:
- a. The capability to alert the population within the 10 mile plume
{ exposure pathway EPZ within 15 minutes of the declaration of a Site Area or General Emerge.mcy. a
- b. The capability to promptly reach decisions to declare an Alert, Site, or General emergency classification exists, based on predetermined Emergency
> Action Levels (EALs).
i
- c. The capability to evacuate the 2-mile Inner Action Area (IAA) of the
[' , plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 2 hours upon declaration of a General i M.. Emergency.
- d. The capability to evacuate appropriate downwind sectors of the EPZ to f.: .
i' a distance of about 5 miles in a timely manner (in approximately 3 to 5 hours) (. .:
- 7. .lj based on an exercise scenario that includes a representative sample of popula-k,' tion groups including any urban centers or special population groups such as hospitals, prisons, schools, etc.
i. l 04/11/84 11 Enclosure 1
* , ,, ; , . s c,,
~
., ,, y ,
, [7590-01]
4 Hj- ' g e. The capability to reach decisions to shelter other population groups b within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to minimize population doses, y f. The capability to reach decisions relative to the direction of the d) plume, determine potentially contaminated areas within the plume exposure (*) pathway EPZs, and accide if relocation of population groups or other protec-Yy tive actions are warranted to minimize radiation doses.
- g. The capability to reach decisions to downgrade or end the declaration f of an emergency and to allow the evacuated population to return with a minimum y((.f of disruption.
[ The Commission considers that if the above capabilities are satisfactorily % exercised on a biannual basis, using appropriately altered sectors over the C/ years, there would exist reasonalia assurance that the resources used for the
- p. . .
.) evacuation of the 2 mile zone the 5-mile sector could then be expanded, or if j.
necessary used for the taking of appropriate protective measures in any portion 'c.' of the EPZs in order to protect the health and safety of the public during a j, real emergency.
. 4. Eliminate the "Unusual Event" as an Emergency Class h; The Commission proposes eliminating this emergency classification. This is being proposed because these events do not affect the public health and
' safety since they are usually han.11ed an.d resolved by plant personnel and do not warrant activation of the emergency preparedness organizations.
; 5. Incorporate Aopendix E into the Body of Part 50
- e. The proposed rule change complies with Federal Register policy, which l requires that substantive regulations should be contained in numbered parts of
]. the regulations rather than appendices. The content of Appendix E has stayed i essentially the same, except for the changes noted herein, and has been placed
^
^ appropriately throughout Part 50 (i.ec, SS 50.34, 50.47, and 50.54). < These changes are mainly organizational in nature and involve using a few ~., of the guidance criteria from NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 ("Criteria for Preparation [ and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in ' Y Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Rev. 1, November 1980) to amplify the Planning standards in the regulation. These organizational changes are intended to
}}
better differentiate the emergency planning requirements applicable to State (.) and local governments and licensees and to make a distinction between planning, preparedness, and implementation. In doing this, two Alanning Standards were
,g added to eliminate axisting ambiguities: Planning Standard 4, "Emergency 04/11/84 12 Enclosure 1
n_>.;- ..a .: : . . . . , . . : 1 [7590-01] [.y.i Action Levels," and Planning Standard 14, "Downgrading Emergency Classifications." No substantive changes other than those for clarity and emphasis are intended. f: 6. The 4-month Time Period for Correction of Deficiencies {I The wording in this proposed rule change relating to providing a 4-month time span for the correction of deficiencies in emergency planning has been i}y clarified to reflect experience gained since 1980. The proposed rule change f! specifically states that deficiencies in the State and local governmental ye emergency planning and preparednes.s, which are not within the control of the 1lj licensee, may be e,iven 4 months for correction. This 4-month time period does 4, not include the tine period that FEMA may take to find that the deficiency has 7 been corrected, particularly if such findin0 depends on conducting another "cd exercise. Emergency planning and preparedness deficiencies that are within
,;,, the license's control will be handled as a normal NRC enforcement action, ^
i.e., a 4-month race period may not be provided. L', . 7. Consideration of Seismic Hazards l:; The Commission has considered the need for and extent of consideration of the potentially complicating effects of earthquakes in the context of emergency preparedness. As a result of this analysis, the Commission finds that for
~
D-
,?.
most earthquakes (including some earthquakes more severe than the SSE) the power plant would not be expected to pose-an immediate effsite radiological hazard. For earthquakes that would cause plant damage leading to immediate offsite radiological hazards but for which there would be relatively minor
- . offsite damage, emergency response capabilities around nuclear power plants
}'- would not be seriously affected. For earthquakes that would cause more severe offsite damage, such as, disabling a siren alerting system, the earthquake
, itself acts as an alerting system. For those risk dominant earthquakes which h
- f. ,' cause very severe damage to both the plant and the offsite area, emergency
[ .. reponse would have marginal benefit because of its impairment by offsite damage. l '.". . t~ The expenditure of additional resources to cope with seismically caused ;
- l ., offsite damage is of doubtful value considering the modest benefit in overall risk reduction that could be obtained. Nonetheless, the Commission finds that E it would be prudent for licensees to consider the potential effects of earth-s
- y. quakes, such as road blockages and damaged bridges, etc., when evaluating Li evacuation time estimates. The enclosed proposed rule change has been modified
[. accordingly. t-04/11/84 13 Enclosure 1 ( 9 ---
,; , 3,7 v , . p ,; ;, .
~
Le! 7; [7590-01] G uU Discussion of. Issues: ng. P.y $O In addition, the Commission considers it beneficial to discuss the following - issues relative to the experience gained over the last 4 years with the imple-
'2
. mentation of the 1980 emergency preparedness regulations:
6 '
- 1. Severe Accident Source Term Work -
iS Although an intensive'research effort is underway to reassess the magnitude
} and timing of accidental radioactivity releases ("source ters"), this effort ;
.]/ is presently incomplete. The changes proposed herein are based solely on the .
existing source terms and are written without any prejudgment of the outcome Q(.'d of the ongoing research program, nonetheless, the staff anticipates that the g,' . rational and principles associated with the graded response concept will : remain valid with possible refinements in distances and ranges after the ! O.. , source term research program. ' '), 2. Objective of the NRC Emeroency Preparedness Regulations. [ Various governmental authorities, consultants, and members of the public [ have argued that an emergency plan cannot be developed that would eliminate public health risk from all of the possible reactor accidents. The NRC agrees , i that emergen,cy preparedness cannot totally eliminate the public risk associated , T[, ei.. with potential nuclear plant accidents. However, since it is not even theo-
. retically possible, it is not the intent of the NRC's emergency preparedness ;
regulations to ensure that no one in the public would receive a dose in excess l'
; cf the EPA pratective action guidelines (PAGs) for any accidental release,
. regardless of timing or severity. Based on experience, the NRC has noted that
. there are many uncertainties associated with potential accidents and that
(., emergency planning cannot account for every eventuality. Therefore, the Commission must emphasize that emergency preparedness is not a panacea for eliminating ;
;2 all risk to the public. .R .t.
The objective of the NRC emergency preparedness regulations is to reduce $ t 9 the risk to the public health and safety by planning in advance how to respond /,' to nuclear power plant accidents. ; The NRC would not license a plant if the radiological risk posed by l
.f possible accidents were not very small - even in the absence of :mergency jj preparedness. Nevertheless, the NRC has chosen to require emergency prepared-
$ ness as another level of "defense-in-depth," the principle that a variety of f
^
. independent and diverse levels of protection should be afforded the public !
L > i t 04/11/84 14 Enclosure 1 a
- -. -- ax- ;>.- - '
[7590-01) 9. E from the hazard of radiation exposure. The NRC believes that reasonable f,h II! efforts to anticipate and plan for public protective actions in the vicinity N. of a commercial nuclear plant can substantially reduce, though not eliminate, hj N the already small offsite radiological risk, and is, therefore, a prudent if [S not essential requirement, r
. .a . ~: !.-
J. Other Alternatives Considered [t; p In the Commission's ' deliberations relating to this proposed rulemaking,
@ other alternatives were considered in improving emergency preparedness around li nuclear power plants. These alternatives focused on (1) methods for providing
, inducements to State and local governments to upgrade emergency preparedness;
. (2) requiring licensees to provide funding directly to State and local govern-
.. (
ments, and (3) providing guidance on the range of costs that experience has shown to be reasonable and effective in establish'ing an adequate state of preparedness. All of these alternatives were considered inappropriate in the regulatory role of the NRC.
. FEMA Coordination
. The development o'f these proposed regulations has been coordinated with the FEMA staff. FEMA concurs with the proposed rule change. It is FEMA's
- - intent that its regulations (44 CFR Part 350) be consistent with the NRC
., regulations.
L lt T: ' 4 04/11/84 15 Enclosure 1
,y w - n:. . y ; ,,,, . . .
1 [ '[7590-01)- i 1 REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION ("ddj : In accordance with the Regulatorv Flexibility Act of 1980, S U.S.C. '
$ 605(b), the NRC certifies that this rule will not, if promulgated, have a
';. significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entites. The j[;{$ ,
proposed rule concerns the content and extent of emergency plans for nuclear (y power plants. The electric utility companies owning and operating these M nuclear power p1 ants are dominant in their service areas and do not fall h within the definition of a small business found in Section 3 of the Small fjh Business Act, 15 U.S.C. I 632, or within the Small Business Size Standards pf,.,' -set forth in 13 CFR Part 121. Although part of the burden for emergency f, ,- preparedness falls on State end local governments, the proposed rule would 7 possibly lessen this burden by focusing the offsite emergency response f.; resources and capabilities on the higher risk areas around nuclear power ?.] reactor facilities. Thus, the proposed rule would impose no significant '/; economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, as defined in ~, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980. LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 50 n' . . Part 50 - Antitrust, Classified information, Fire prevention, Intergovern-a mental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Radiation protec-tion, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting requirements. [
. <{
12
- 3 REGULATORY ANALYSIS
[. The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis for this regulation.
,;/ The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the rule as considered by the O Commission. A copy of the regulatory analysis is available fc inspection and
,- copy, for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, M DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Richard P. Grill, 9,), Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
- ', . Washington, DC 20555 Telephone (301)443-7685.
, N 4
04/11/84 16 Enclosure 1
y . :a - : ,;
~
(. [7590-01) e/
.x hJ PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT i'd <5 . This propossd rule contains no additional information collection requirements . -
o yjg and therefore is not subject to the requirements of the Pape mork Requirements 3)'s. Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 35C1 et. seq.). jl Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorgani-zation Act of 1974, as amended, and section 553 of Title 5 of the United
- G n
;.j States Code, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments (h to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 70 are contemplated.
i.v.
@ PART 50 - 00MESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION E
AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES e ':.' fl 1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows: U AUTHORITY: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 948, (* 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 State. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat.
.c 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846), unless otherwise y noted.
Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat 939 i (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68' Stat.
- h. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec. 186, 63 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236).
'e For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 State. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273),
SS 50.10(a), (b), and (c), 50.44, 50.46, 50.48, 50.54, and 50.80(a) are issued
^
under sec. 161b, 60 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); $$ 50.10(b) and i ,- (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat 949, as amended (42 U.S.C.
;z 2201(i)); and $$ 50.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, and 50.78 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).
- 1. r.
"' .
- a a *
- L.
b n y. b;, U 04/11/84 17 Enclosure 1
n, ._. 2ms. ,. . . (7590-01] E! 2.a Paragraph (10) of Section 50.34a is revised as follows:* h Content of application; technical information. ( 5 50.34 (10) A-disenssion-of-the-applicant's preiiminary plans-for-coping
- with-
- 1 emergencies---Appendix-E-sets-ferth-items-which-shali-be-ineinded-in these 9,- pians-f:-
,f n
- n n n C:
':E **(10) The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report shall contain sufficient j.; information to ensure the compatibility of proposed emergency plans for onsite areas, the Inner Action Area (IAA)1 and the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs)2, (ia. '
3.' : with facility design features, site layout, and site location with respect to
'O '
such consid'erations as access routes, surrounding population distributions, la.td use, and local jurisdictional boundaries for the EPZs in the case of nuclear as well as the means by which the planning standards and elements
<. power reactors;)ill of 6 50.47(+) w be met i '
- This regulation has been typed in comparative text to assist review.
. ** Paragraphs 10 A, B, C, 0, E, F, G, and H are copied verbatim from Appendix E except where noted by comparative text.
1 The Inner Action Area (IAA) within the 10-mile plume exoosure oathway EPZ for
- r. nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area of about 2 miles (3.2 km) in f,~' radius and from whicn generally all members of the public can be promptly evacuated after the declaration of a General Emergency. The design objective or goal is to have the capability to evacuate essentially all persons within this area in approximately 2 hours. The evacuation of the IAA should be promptly followed by the evacuation of oersons in the downwind sectors out
, , ,about 5 miles. The Commission realizes that the ability to evacuate the I;M could be hampered by such conditions as adverse weather and road a, repairs. However, the increased time required to evacuate this area under f, these unusual adverse conditions will not affect the continued operation g as it is anticipated that these conditions will be temporary in nature, 2 Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power reactors shall i consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway D EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The exact
- g size and configuration of the EPZ's surrounding a particular nuclear power
., ; reactor shall be determined in relation to the local emergency response needs n ,'. and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, a topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.
R Emergency Planning Zone (EPZs) are discussed in NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological W~- Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants," December 1978. 04/11/84 18 Enclosure 1
.;.. . ~.
7 . , e [7590-01) y
$,}.$ As a minimum, the following items shall be described:
D h A. Onsite and offsite organization for coping with emergencies and the
/; means for notification, in the event of an emergency, of persons assigned tg j the emergency organizations. ' M.
r, s, B. Contacts and arrangements made and documented with local, State, and 9l. Federal governmental agencies with responsibility for coping with emergencies, f,I including identification of the principal agencies. y C. Protective measures to be taken within the site boundary, the Inner
' .I Action Area (IAA), and within each EPZ to protect health and safety in the event of an accident; procedures by which these measures are to be carried out y'[,
y (e.g. , in the case of prompt evacuation within the IAA or in case of shelterina
$ with selective relocation who authorizes the evacuation, how the public is to be notified and instructed, how the sheltering and evacuation is to be carried p, out); and the expected response of offsite agencies in the event of an emergency.
{ 0. Features of the facility to be provided for onsite emergency first y aid and decontamination and for emergency transportation of onsite individuals to .offsit- treatment facilities. h *, E. Prosisions to be made for emergency treatment at offsite facilities . c{ of individuals injured as a result of licensed activities. F. Provisions for a training program for employees of the licensee, [ ,, including those who are assigned specific authority and responsibility in the 7 event of an emergency, and for other persons who are not employees of the - o licensee but whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiological j, "- emergency. p.., ! G. A preliminary analysis that projects the time and means to be employed in the notification of State and local governments and the public in the event of an emergency. A nuclear power plant applicant shall perform a preliminary analysis of the time required to evacuate variens-sectors-and
.,- distances-and the public j the IAA, approoriate downwind sectors out to
[ .', about 5 miles as well as the takinc of other protective actions throughout [{ the EPZ, noting identifyinc major impediments to the evacuation or taking of l /?.' e protective actions. The evacuation time estimates shall include the ootential I,' effects of seismic hazards. [.' . r j 04/11/84 19 Enclosure 1
-: : m. _ , x E. JL ' '
.l P'
[7590-01] ,
' 'i .
't 1
- .j fp H. A preliminary analysis reflecting the need to include facilities, wi
$ systems, and methods for identifying the degree of seriousness and potential ;
h scope of radiological consequences of emergency situations within and outside (h, the site boundary, including capabilities for dose projection using real-time meteorological information and for dispatch of radiological monitoring teams 9, within the EPZs; and a preliminary analysis reflecting the role of the onsite i
' l}~'
technical support center and of the near-site emergency operations facility in
* 'y assessing information, recommending protective action, and disseminating information to the public.
i, , -
,7- .l -
n - n n n n n 7 .',; { 2.b Paragraph (6)(v) of Section 50.34(b) is revised as follows:
]~;._
S 9 50.34 Content of applications; technical information.
~
- p '
(v) Pi a ns- f o r- c epi ng-wi th- emerge nci es --whi c h- s h ai i-i nei nde- th e-i tems O' specified-in-Appendix-E. ' I ~. *(v)'The Final Safety. Analysis Report shall contain the plans for coping f.'. with emergencies. The plar2 shall be an expression of the overall concept of
- operation; they shall describe the essential elements of advance planning that , ,, have been considered and the provisions that have been made to cope with ; emergency situations. The plans shall incorporate information about the 7, emergency response roles of supporting organizations and offsite agencies.
,", That information shall be sufficient to provide assurance of coordination among the supporting grot.os and with the licensee. 6 *
'i, r..
!o P, (, a, lil l @s.,
- Paragraphs (v) and (v)(i) are taken verbatim from Appendix E except where is noted by comparaive text.
- l 04/11/84 20 Enclosure 1 i l
r
g)- o. .. _ _ , , 1 , (7590-01)
..~- '
b 8!) The plans submitted must meet the plannina standards and include a description h.
- q. of the elements set out in i 50.47 for tha Inner Action Zone (IAA)1 and the H: Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs)2 to an extent sufficient to demonstrate that 8,.
.'y. the plans provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can and'will y '
be taken in the event of an emergency. (V)(i) No less than 180 days prior to the scheduled issuance of an %] % , operating license for a nuclear power reactor or a license to possess nuclear material one copy of the applicant's detailed implementing procedures for its )..$ y .. emergency plan shall be submitted to the Administrator of the appropriate NRC K' Regional Office, specified in Appendix 0 of Part 20 of this chapter and two . copies are to be sent to the Document Control Desk, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
. Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Licensees who are authorized to operate a
[.. ..
's nuclear power facility shall submit one copy of any changes to the emergency v '- plan or procedures to the Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office,
,,+ y specified in Appendix 0, 10 CFR Part 20, and two copies to the Document Control , Desk within 30 days of such changes. n n n n n g. 1 The Inner Action Area (IAA) within the 10 mile plume exposure oathway EPZ for
*J nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area of about 2 miles (3.2 Km) in i
radius and from wnich generally all members of the public can be ', .c promptly evacuated af ter the declaration of a General Emergency. The design ". objective or goal is to have the capability to evacuate essentially all persons
-l - within this area in approximately 2 hours. The evacuation of the IAA should
.? be promptly followed by the evacuation of persons in the downwind sectors out f, * . about 5 miles. The Commission realizes that_the ability to evacuate the 244
... could be hampered by such conditions as adverse weather and road repairs.
?, However, the increased time required to evacuate this area under tnese unusual
'.- adverse conditions will not affect the continued operation as it is anticipated
'7, that these conditions will be temporary in nature.
2 Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) are discussed in NUREG-0396; EPA 520/1-78-016, Q'i, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological M Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,"
- i. December 1978.
g.,.'. t, - 1 04/11/84 21 Enclosure 1
f, (7590-01] b g H 3. $ 50.47 is revised to read as follows: 7[,.
- i. ,1 Q $ 50.47 Emergency plans. !
03 (a)(1) Excer,as provided in paragraph (d)(c) of this section, no operating ti
;,3 -license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by J. NRC that there is reasonable assurance that prompt evacuation of the public can p be taken within the Inner Action Area (IAA)1 after the declaration of a ff) General Emeraency and that adequate protective measures (evacuation or sheltering in the sector's that have been exposed to the plume) can and will be taken p, .i in the event of a radiological emergency for the remaining area of the plume exposure pathway EPZ.2
{.' (2) The NRC will base its finding on (a) a review of the Federal Emergency
/ Management Agency (FEMA) findings and determinations as to whether State and
['J local emergency plans are-edequate adequately meet the olannina standards set
? forth in this part and whether there is reasonable assurance that the emergency 7, plans can be implemented and on (b) the NRC assessment as to whether the
, applicant's onsite emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable
, assurance that they can be implemented. A FEMA finding will primarily be *
(' based on a review of the plans. Any other information already available to , FEMA may be considered in assessing whether there is reasonable assurance that P 1 The Inner Action Area (IAA) within the 10-mile olume exoosure oathway [J. ' EPZ for nuclear power reactors snall consist of an area of about 2 miles (3.2 km) in radius and from wnicn generally all members of the public -S can be promptly evacuated after the declaration of a General Emergency. The desion objective or goal is to have the capability to evacuate essentially all !' persons within this area in aporoximately 2 nours. The evacuation of the 1 IAA should be promptly followed by the evacuation of persons in the downwind sectors out to about 5 miles. The Commission realizes that the ability to b[ . evacuate the T H could be hampered by sucn conditions as adverse weather and road repairs. However, the increased time required to evacuate this area under. ( *:. [ these unusual adverse conditions will not affect the continued operation as J; it is anticipated that these conditions will be temporary in nature. i( 2 Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power reactors i shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the inges- ' 'Q tion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in
,:1 radius. The exact size and configuration of the EPZ surrounding a particular e;' nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to the local emergency .
/(, respMse needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as
- l' demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional y boundaries. Emergency Planning Zone (EPZs) are discussed in NUREG-0396, l EPA 520/1-78-016 "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local l' . Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light-Water
'g Nuclear Power Plants," December 1978. t 04/11/84 22 Enclosure 1
?
l:
. q.v 7 -
+
[ [7590-01] I e g
- r. 9
?R 'the plans can be implemented. In any NkC licensing proceeding, a FEMA finding h will-constitute a rebuttable presumption on questions of adequacy and implemen-2d , tation capability. Emergency preparedness exercises, required by peregraph-(b)(i43'-of-this-section)-end-Appendfx-E--Section-F-of- this Part, are part of the operational inspection process and are not required for any initial licensing 5g, i (,% decision and will b5 conducted on a' biennial basis after a plant is licensed to operate. I h (c)(b)(1) Failure to meet the applicable elements and plannina standards set g forth in paragraph (b3(d,) of this section may result in the Commission declining P to issue an operating license; however, the applicant will have an opportunity h N to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Commission that deficiencies in the plans are not significant for the plant in question, that adequate interim p: .
- ! - coopensating actions have been or will be taken promptly, or that there are j ,' other compelling reasons to permit plant operation. ;
{ (2) Ger.erally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants V. ' shall co 31st of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pai.hway UZ. shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. ~ The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear
. power reactor shall be detiermined in relation to local emergency response ,
~
needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography,
.. topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.
# The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled
~
[ nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less thn U 250 MW thermal. The plans for the ingestion pathway shall focus on such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestio'n pathway. { (3) The Inner Action Area (IAA) within the 10 mile plume exposure pathway (i., , }. ' EPZ for nuclear power itactors shall consist of an area of about 2 miles (3.2 km) i V in radius and from which aenerally all members of the public cA4 be promptly t evacuated after the declaration of a General Emeraency. The desian objective or I h.h.. 3 goal is to have the capabiliy to evacuate essentially all persons within this area
@ in approximately 2 hours. The evacuatior of the IAA should be promptly followed y by the evacuation of persons in the downwind m. tors out to about 5 miles. The 'i.7 Commission realizes that the ability to evacuate the. I A A ould be hampered by -
M 'such conditions as adverse weather and road repairs. However, the increased time i 7 a, J N : i 04/11/84 23 Enclosure 1 l j
- _ _ . , _ , , , , . . . , . . - . . - , , , . - _ - - ,- ,_,m-, _. -
m <; ~ U [7590-01] % required to evacuate this area under these unusual adverse conditions will not h,) affect the continued operation of ti. ' power plant as it is anticipated that these W conditions will be temporary in nature.
~it i.'.i.
[$ (c)(d) Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b)(d) of
,ij.. this section, no NRC or FEMA review, findings, or determinations concerning the state of offsite emergency preparedness or the adequacy of and capability to jh implement State and local offsite emergency plans are required prior *.o issuance of an operating license authori:ing only fuel loading and/or low power operations f;.
(up to 5% of the rated power). Insofar as emregency planning and preparedness
>y requirements are concerned, a license authorizing fuel loading and/or low power l,% ,
operation may be issued after a finding is made by the NRC that the state of f.; onsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate
' 'f' protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological ![ emergency. The NRC will base this finding on its assessment of the applicant's 'i . emergency plans against the pertinent plannino standards and elements in ] paragraph (b)(d) of this section and Appendix E of this part. ".. (d)(b3',The onsite and, except as provided in paragraph 46) of this section,
< offsite emergency response plans for nuclear power reactors must meet the following planning standards and elements set out below. The Operating-ticense- . applicant's- emergency plans snall contain, but not necessarily be limited to, V. information needed to demonstrate compliance with the planning standards and elements set forth below, i.e., organization for coping with radiation emergencies, assessment action, activation of emergency organization, notificaton procedures,
, emergency facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency preparedness,
- and recovery. in-additien--the-emergency-respense plans seemitted-by-an-sppiicant
'2 fer-a-neciear power-reseter-eperating-iicense-shaii-contain-infermatien-needed k'. to-demonstrate-eemplicance-'nith-the-standards-described--in-9-50-47-(b)
/,'. and-the plans-w4H-be-eveinated-against-these-standards- The nuclear power E. reactor operating license applicant shall also. provide an analysis of the time
)
3.' - required to evacuate promptly evacuate the public withi' the IAA, to evacuate r
; ~. "All of the planning standards have been taken verbatim from the existing planning standards in 50.47 except for standards 4 and 14 and where noted in comparative text.
04/11/84 24 Enclosure 1
, c . :. m . -- ... _
t .,. , (7590-01] g"I', , appropriate downwind sectors out to about 5 miles, and for taking other protective-- ! 5.y . actions for various sectors and distances within the' plume exposure pathway EPZ , t y2 for transient and permanent populations. This evacuation time estimate shall ! W include the potential effects of seismic hazards. v* kh- .:
~
t.t C' ,'
- d i:.
- i. .
f.;s e l
*=
n-
- i
.c i '
e2*
~.
1. l (;l.. . ; g W. : s > (*.. '
.s r
04/11/84 25 Enclosure 1 ,
c' '
.l.. . ..
N [7590-01] i.2: 5.
}'. (1) ORGANIZATIONAL INTERFACES ?.h ?y .
(i) PLANNING STANDARDS 3 4 j['I The organizational interfaces Primary-responsibilites for emergency response [h have been established between (1)-by-the nuclear facility power plant licensee,
- .9 and-by-(2) State and local organizations within the Emergency Planning Zones, have-been assigned--the-emergency-responsibilities-of-the-variees and (3)
~.] ,. .; supporting organizations. have-been-specificaliy-established--and each principal
(.2 response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on Q. a continuous basis.
.p (ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN * -
(A) c:--Esch pian-shaii-iiiestrate-these-interrelatienships-in A block diagram shall be provided which illustrates these interfaces. - (B) 3:--Esch plan-shaii-inciede written A description shall be orovided of how arrangements and agreements referring-to-the-i:encept-of-eperations will be maintained which specify the emergency response efforts developed between
'the licensee, Federal, State, and local government agencies and other support organizations having an emergency response role within the Emergency Planning Zones.
.L
'*u
. 3Two new planning standards have been added to 6 50.47(b3(d) in order to clarify
? ambiguities in these areas. These are proposed Planning Standaros (4),
*. "Emergency Action Levels," and (14), "Downgrading Emergency Classifications."
l' .
- Elements A and B of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim from NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear
- f. Pnwer Plants," November 1980, except where noted by comparative text.
04/11/84 26 Enclosure 1
O [7590-01] n 7,i . (2) LICENSEE ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION NM
- .~ a
?;4 (i) PLANNING STANDARD hJ.' w '(
, On-shift-facility- The licensee onsite oraanization and responsibilities for .?( emergency response personnef are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to Q provide initial feefifty accident response in key functional areas is main-
].] tained at all times, timely augmentation of response capabilities is available, .,j , and the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support y,7 and response activities are specified. l% h, (ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN
- i~s The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall be described, j' including definition of authorities, responsibilities, and duties of individuals
. assigned to the licensee's emergency organization and the means for notification of such individuals in the event of an emergency. Specifically, the following
,'^ shall'be included: . (A) A description of the normal plant operating organization, a ". , (B) A description of the onsite emergency response organization with a
- l. '
detailed discus. tion of:
- 1. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of the individuals who will take charge during an emerge 1cy;
- 2. Plant staff emergency assignments;
.- 3. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties en of an onsite emergency '[
coordinator who shall be in charge of the exchange of information with offsite M.; authorities responsible for coordinating and implementing offsite emergency h ^' measures. i4 h"
- Elements A, 8, C, D, E, F, G, and H of the Licensee's Emergency Plan
/, ' have been taken verbatim from Appendix E, except where noted by comparative text. 04/11/84 27 Enclosure 1
..r, , m y ,
.4
[7590-01] h (C) A description, by position and function to be performed, of the $ licensee's headquarters personnel who will be sent to the plant site to h.,$ augment the onsite emergency organization, en $0
,7; (D) Identification, by position and function to be performed, of persons k;; within the licensee organization who will be responsible for classifying f/h and determining the magnitude of the accident and for making protective action $$ decision recommendations offsite-dose projections, and a description of how y..
T' these recommendations projections will be made and the results transmitted to g ! .Q, State and local authorities, NRC, and other appropriate governmental entities. pg y b;j (E) Identification, by position and function to be performed, of other y[ employees of the licensee with special qualifications for coping with emergency Id conditicas that may arise. Other persons with special qualifications, such as
- consultants, who are not employees of the licensee and who may be called upon j for assistance for emergencies shall also be identified. The special qualifi-9 cations of these persons shall be described.
l -
.. (F) 'A description of the local,offsite services to be provided in support of the licensee's emergency organization.
. (G) Identification of, and assistance expected from, appropriate State,
); local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies.
.c
- f. (H) Identification of the State and/or local officials responsible for
'I planning for, ordering, and controlling appropriate protective actions, ', including evacuations when necessary within the Inner Action Area (IAA) of the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ.
7 G ; bg 9
,A l ~:.
b l 04/11/84 28 Enclosure 1
g.-
, . _ s 4
[7590-01]
"j M s; (3) EMERGENCY RESPONSE SUPPORT AND RESOURCES Vy:. ,
,.} .
E' (i) PLANNING STANDARDS W
).?
s,*] Arrangements have been made for requesting and effectively using assistance I, resources have-been-made, arrangements h, ave been made for te-accommodateing p;$.' State and local staff at the licensee's near site Emergency Operations Facility gp have-been-made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned C response have been identified.
?i . .g -.. (ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN
- 1 (p (A) 1: The Federal government maintains.indepth capability to assist y
- licensees, States, and local governments through the Federal Radiological
; Assessment Plan (formerly Radiological Assistance Plan (RAP) and Interagency
... Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP)] as described in "Planning Guidance for the Preoaration of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan," April 1983, FEMA. Each-State end-iieensee-shafi-make provisions-fer-inceperating A the-Federai-response-capability-inte-its-operation pian. The plan shall, as
," a minimum, include-ing the following:
- 1. a: The identification, specifie persens-by title, of the Individual
% authorized to request Federal assistance. ;-see-Arird -A7 2:a:
l 2.b The identification of specific Federal resources expected-available p- for response to nuclear power olant accidents. T-ineinding-expected-times-of 4 . l ?. arrivai-st-specific-neciear-facility-sites;-and P 3.c: The identification of specific State and local resources available $ to support the Federal response. erg:T-air-fieids;-command postsi-telephene iines;-radio-frequenciesi-and-telecemmenication-centers F9 (B) -S --Esch organization The emergency plan shall identify radiological E. ", . laboratories and describe their general capabilities and expected availability to provide radiological monitoring and analytical services which-ean that could (.'.[ (, be used in an emergency. yl.
- v.
- Elements A & B of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim from i NUREG-06S4/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of R' Radiological Rsponse Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,"
L. November 1980, except where noted by comparative text. l -
, 04/11/84 29 Enclosure 1
;;n .
. .n . , ,
m ' [7590-01] i_ (4) EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS h (i.) PLANNING STANDARD q i:- i,$ Emergency Action Levels (EALs) have been established for use as thresholds to
.s .
- i. determine emeraency classes and to initiate appropriate emeraency response e.*
Q actions. The EALs are based on specific instrument readinas or observations
., of other plant parameters that~ determine the emergency class and the information y to be supplied to offsite authorities, includina recommended protective actions
{- for members of the general public offsite.
' 'l u;.
[,i .:. (ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN
- el (A) Emergency action levels (based not only on onsite and offsite 3
- s. .
radiation monitoring information but also on readings from a number of sensors
;, that indicate a potential emergency, such as the pressure in containment and the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System) for notification of offsite
. agencies shall be described, l,?* '. .
(B) The emergency action levels shall be based on in plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. { .', (C) These emergency action levels shall be discussed and agreed on by l ;' the applicant and State and local governmental authorities within the clume i .' , exposure pathway EPZ and approved by NRC. They shall also be reviewed with L.: the State and local governmental authorities on an annual basis. s;:: y g, Y.
- Elements A, 8, and C of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatirrt Y[' from Appendix E, except where noted by comparative text.
o l-04/11/84 30 Enclosure 1 L
E , { [7590-01] f V di: (5) EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM Mi hs (i) PLANNING STANDARD M. .m A standard emergency classification ard-actien-levei-scheme--the-bases--of-3 which-incinde-facility-system-and-effluent parameters--is-in-ase-by-the-
, 5,( naciear-facility-ficensee--and- system has been established that covers the soectrum of emergency situations for nuclear power plant accidents and which guld result in alerting and activating progressively larger segments of the that emergency organization. This system shall group ootential nuclear power
[ plant accidents into three emergency classes 4 according to the severity of g, poter.tial offsite radiological consequences. In order of increasing severity, the li three emergency classes are: (1) Alert, (2) Site Area Emergency, and (3) General
..' Emergency. Each of these emergency classes are associated with particular immedi-ate actions that provide an appropriate graded emergency response from licensee,-
Federal, State and local emergency succort organizations. State and local emer-gency plans call for reliance on information provided by the nuclear power plant
~
l' licensee for determination of minimum initial offsite response measures. e (ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN
*(A) The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the alerting ,' .- or activating progressively larger segments of the total emergency organizations
..,. shall be described. 7
. (B) Each emergency class is associated with specific emergency action levels ,'.. that determine the class, b' s l l.
D:
* *t s / ,.
5[ 47hese emergency classes were discussed Apoendix E.
'7
- Element A of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim from 1:e Appendix E, except where noted by comparative text.
- 7. ~
-(,
l 04/11/84 31 Enclosure 1 I
. . . .n . r... .
(7590-01] L ,s. ji.',.j (C) Each emeraency class is associated with particular predetermined actions jy . for notification of offsite authorities, activation of emergency oraanizations, p and for General Emergencies, recommendation of immediate offsite protective actions, including immediate evacuation (.within 2 hours) of the Inner Action V) .
' i. ' Area (IAA) upon declaration of a General Emeraency, followed by evacuation of ?> appropriate dowruind sectors out to about 5 miles.
4 n 5 9 u, c.. . _v l.. L c. (." L. 1-f'. .
- lV L-L . ,
- r
- l.
- 1' i
I' f s -
't
( .- - j
.t iei
>^ k$ t< E. i. ~i k T. i.
.t.
t. 04/11/84 32 Enclosure 1 i
v_ ,, x . (7590-01] H jy (6) NOTIFICATION METHODS AND PROCEDURES n.'
%.h c; (i) PLANNING STANDARD A
M
$- Procedures have been established for the licensee to notify notification; a
Y by-the-ficensee-of State and local response organizations of the emergency gj class and any recommended protective actions and for notification of emergency 4 personnel by all response organizations. The content of initial and followup is messages'to response organizations and the public has been established. The means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within h.:: the 10-mile plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone has been established.
,b.
( c.. , (ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN
*(A) Administrative and physical means shall be descrited for notifying
[ local, State, and Federal officials and agencies. and Agreements reached with
- these officials and agencies for the prompt notification of the public and-for public-evacuatien-er-ether protective-measures;-shecid-they-beceme-necessary;
'~'
including instructions for takina prote'etive actions shall be described. This . uescription shall inciude identification of the appropriate officials, by title
'~
and agency, of the State and local government agencies within the EPZs. This shall include each steo in the notification and decisionmakina process to demonstrate that this capability exists on a continuous basis. p
;. *(B) The communication steps to be taken to alert or activate emergency
~*
personnel under each class of emergency shall be described. The existence, but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be noted. fer-such , .. agencies-a:. t.n (*, *(C) A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible State
;:e and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency.
(; The' licensee shall demonstrate that the State / local officials have the
$- capability to make a public notification decision prcmptly on being informed ] by the licensee of an emergency condition. By-February-1T-198E Each nuclear 'a b- -
- Elements A, B, and C of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim
- from Appendix E, except where noted by comparative text, i
04/11/84 33 Enclosure 1
, [7590-01)
{3 - id power reactor licensee shall demonstrate that administ'rative and physical
,kj means have been established for altering and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ focusing attention on
}{ ,
gy the capability to immediately evacuate'the Inner Action Area (IAA) upon yf declaration of a General Emergency, followed by evacuation of appro;,ricate
,y downwind sectors out to about 5 miles. The-fear-month peried-in-16-EFR-58:54(s)(2) - @ fer-the-correction-of-emergency pian-deficiencies-shali-net-apply-to-the-initial h instaiistion-ef-this-netification-systee-that-is-required-by-Feb -i--1982:
kh The 4-month period will apply to correction of deficiencies identified during h the initial installation and testing of the prompt public notification systems y;] as well as those deficiencies discovered thereafter. The design objective of
- q. .
the prompt public notification system shall be to have the capability to Y; essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume h, exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this notification capability will range from immediate notification of public (within 15 minutes
'r of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situation exist's requiring urgent action) within the Inner Action Area (IAA) to the more likely events where there is substantial time available for the State and
~
', local governmerital officials to make a judgment whether or not to activate the
- public notification system. Where there is a decision to activate the
.* notification system, the State and local officials will determine whether to activate the entire notification system simultaneously or in a graduated or staged manner. The responsibility for activating such a public notification b, system shall remain with the appropriate governmental authorities.
**(0) The licensee in conjuction with State and local organizations shall l'. establish the contents of the initial emergency messages to be sent from the
, .' 3 plant. These measures shall contain information about the class of emergency, p< whether a release is taking place or is imminent, potentially affected population R and areas, and whether protective measures may be necessary.
; ** Element 0 of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim from ,: NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Precaredness in Succort of Nuclear Power Plants," Novemoer 1980, exceot wnere noted by comoarative text.
h..., . f 04/11/84 34 Enclosure 1 l
.m
. W _.. . .5 s.. . . .
m o [7590-01]
%i (E) Written messaaes intended for public dissemination shall be consistent
, 'h with the licensee's esercency classification system and recommended orotective
. ~
.IA actions. These messaaes shall include instructions for protective actions to
.be taken by people within the potentially affected areas and shall be included as 3'$ .t j:p part of the emeraency plan.
C:; ! s, {k% 3: i 1.0
. >s I
'Q: ' '
.c 2.* 6 0.
7, ', e
. .. * . t f
i ". ' 1 i
.3
. i a ,
J L. t,' ^ 'i l
.s l **.
g,
- 1
.o l;
7,
- i. .
l 04/11/84 35 Enclosure 1 !--. u_ . . _ _ , _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . .- _ _ _
v: . :,.;m.; - 2. .. u . . w. . N ' (7590-011 LU W .; [ .(7) EMERGENCY COMUNICATIONS.
,$I k (i) PLANNING ST/NDARD
[q-f.; yy- Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations
,Q ad to emergency personnel and the public. ,
v.y . ! '*. I h. v , .i %- (ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN *
- Q g (A) At least one onsite and one offsite communications system; each system
{j shall have a backup power source. - e n.,
. (B) All communication plans shall have arrangements for emergencies, h including titles and alternates for those in charge at both ends of the
,{, communication links and the primary and backup means of communication. (C) Where consistent with the function of the governmental agency, these arrangements will include: Lg y, , (1) Provision for communications with contiguous State / local governments
.; within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such communications shall be tested monthly, f,' (2) Provision for communications with Federal emergency response organi-3 zations. Such communications systems shall be tested annually.
}( (3) Provision.for communications among the nuclear power reactor control
', room, the onsite technical support center, and the near-site emergency operations facility; and among the nuclear facility, the principal State and local emergency
'h operations centers, and the field assessment teams. Such communications
- I systems shall be tested annually.
., (4) Provisions for communications by the licensee with NRC Headquarters kl and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operatiens Center from the nuclear h power reactor control room, the onsite Technical Support Center, and the Tj near-site Emergency Operations Facility. Such communications shall be tested 3
?. monthly. 'c. $.4 -
- Elements A, B, and C of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim from a Appendix E, except where noted by comparative text.
Enclosure 1 04/11/84 36
~
' ~. m (7590-01)
.. ; (8) PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION
' Z-p q (i) PLANNING STANDARD .
,i. f .
.d. Emergency Planning information is made av,ailable to the public on a ceriodic
["' basis on how they will be notified and what their initial protective actions N.;. should be in an emergency. (e:g:--listening-to-a-iecai-broadcast-station-and
$,y remaining-indeers)t- The principal points of contact and locations are established for with the news ' media for-dissemination-of to obtain informa-j,- tion during an emergency. (incinding-the physicai-leestion-er-iecations3-are $.' established-in-advancei-and Procedures are established for coordinated D dissemination of information to the public are-established:
I.
,9
.~
..t.- l- (ii) ELEMENTS OF THE LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN t
*(A) Provisions shall be described for yearly dissemination to the public
(. within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ of g), basic emergency planning 3 information such as the methods and times required for public notification and the protective actions planned if an accident occurs, (2) plans for the promot evacuation of the Inner Action Area (IAA) upon declaration of a General -
+-
Emergency. (3) general information as to the nature and effects of radiation,
,, and L4J a listing of local broadcast stations that will be used for dissemina-
!,' l tion of information during an emergency. signs-er-ether f0 '
*(8) Measures shall also be used to disseminate to any transient popula-
', tion within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ appropriate infonnation that would be helpful if an accident occurs. (fF-(C) Attention shall be focused on infoming the transient and oermanent population within two (2) miles (3.2 km) of tha nuclear power reactor as to the
' J. need for prompt evacuation if a general emergency is declared.
ll; p.z d V
- Elements A and B of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim from
.. . Appendix E, except where noted by comarative text.
.c
. 04/11/84 37 Enclosure 1 l
t [7590-01]
~t ,
'3'
**(D) Sa---Esch principai-erganization-shail-designate-the points-of-contact
!.;j ,
and physical-iocations-for-use-by The emergency plan shall specify the locations j (,' where information will be made available to the news media and the public during
,[j an'energency.
J:) .- .
$).-
f!,I ill ce 5(2/ 4
- f 6'
1 4 4
)
0 -.
/-
(?.
..s
.,t..
+q ""Element 0 of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim from .- NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of
,. Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980, except where noted by comparative text.
.s 04/11/84 38 Enclosure 1
, y
, [7590-01]
(9) EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT R-f E. yJ (i) PLANNING STANDARD
.t,*
I4:' Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response i c .: m 4 are provided and maintained. I 9'; FM d' (ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE S EMERGENCY PLAN ; Adequate provisions shall be made and described for emergency facilities and
@ equipment, including:
g,s M *(A) A licensee onsite Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support
' , *p Center (OSC), and a licensee near-site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) from which effective direction can be given and ei'fective control can be exercised during an emergency.
**(B) Laboratory and analytical facilities, fixed or mobile, for the receipt l and analysis of all samplina and monitorina data.
*(C) Equipment at the site for personnel monitoring; O$
(
.
- Elements A, C, and D of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken 4..
verbatim from Appendix E, except where noted by comparative text. c.3 ** Element 8 of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim from r.' ' NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, "Crite-ia for Preparation and Evaluation of Radio-
^;' logical Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear
,Y . Power Plants," November 1980, except where noted by comparative text. I',
- l. .
04/11/84 39 Enclosure 1 i L
{
- 1. v .C -
(7590-01] (7.0) ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT $ (i) PLANNING STANDARD (ll m
*g Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assassing and monitoring actual f-s.c , or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in C, use. The methods, systems, and equipment used to continually monitor and h:;. .
assess actual radiation releases durina an accident are specified.
- J h (ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN The means 'to be used for determining the magnitude of and for continually t.; assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials shall be described, 7
- p including Emergency Action Levels that are to be used as criteria for deter-
.j" mining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission and other Federal agencies, and the Emergency Action Levels that
~
are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures would
;*' should be warranted censidered within and outside the site boundary to protect
$., health and safety. r
.."'. (A)' Equipment for determining the magnitude of and for continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment. <
(B) Procedures and equipment for estimating the magnitude of releases frcm unmonitored pathways during an accident, i.e., as would be based on
,' ., inventories of radionuclides in plant systems or, for postulated severe acci-J'- dents, on preestimated source terms for postulated severe accident sequences.
m c .; 5-
,.J c' '
.. *This element of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim from
- Appendix E, except where noted by comparative text.
;N '.' 04/11/84 40 Enclosure 1 I
[7590-01] (11) PROTECTIVE ACTIONS 0.! Ej (1) PLANNING STANDARD . n f A range of protective actions have-has been developed for use ia areas M;g within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ for emargency workers and the
) public. Guidelines developed for the choice of protective actions during an v . "E. emergency a consistent with Federal guidance. are-developed-and-in place-f( and Protective actions are developed for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ i).'. that are appropriate to the locale. have-been-deveieped-
. ',t hk (ii) ELEMENTS OF THE LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN f: Adequate provisions have been made for initiating protective actions to protect
',] health and safety within the site boundaries, and for recommending the taking of protective actions offsite. including:
(A) The methods and time frames to notify all oeople onsite of a radiolgical
;j emergency.
*(B) Evacuation of nonessential onsite personnel in the event of a Site Area or General Emergency.
.l .
r, ,
*(C) The capability to account for all individuals onsite upon the declaration
- l. of a Site Area or General Emergency.
. *(0) A description of the mechanism for recommending protective actions to state and local authorities.
y
*(E) A description of the methods and capabilities for implementing .j protective actions within appropriate areas of the 10-mile plume exposure a pathway EPZ.
- Elements 8, C, 0, and E of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken
,. verbatim from NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evalua- .: tion of Radiological Eraergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980, except where noted by comparative text.
ll- . 04/11/84 41 Enclosure 1
[7590-01] L . $$ (12) RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE CCNTROL
,G/, (i) PLANNING STANDARD e f,.s 1
g The h means for controlling radiological exposures, in-an-emergency are established i, , for emergency workers, the-seens-for-centrolling-radfeiegicai-exposures-sheit-
& includi_ng n exposure guidelines that are consistent with the EPA Emergency 5
Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides.s
,)S v :*.
y;," (ii) ELEMENTS OF THE LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN
~;
!ss
[, Adequate provisions shall be made for controlling radiation exposure and
. : contamination of emergency workers and individuals onsite, including: - .i *(A) A descriu+.fon of an onsite radiation protection program that would be implemented during emergencies. .~
(B) A description of facilities and equipment necessary to assess radiation. ~k doses to individuals -
**(C) A description of facilities and supplies at the site necessary for decontamination of ensite- contaminated individuals.
. '9 y'
sEPA 520/1-75/001, "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions L.y for Nuclear Incidents," Revised June 1980, Environmental Protection Agency, j Washington, DC. L ., .
- Element A of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim from Z' NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of
- Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear s'} , ' .' Power Plants," November 1980, except where noted by comparative text.
.l' ** Element C of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim from
,- Appendix E, except where noted by comparative text.
w 04/11/84 42 Enclosure 1
.c .
[7590-01) 2 (13) MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR RADIATION INJURIES '? . f - (i) PLANNING STANDARDS Fu . f,.f; Arrangements are established for medical services for-contaminated ?.$ y injured-individuais and support for people with injuries involving radiation.
, (ii) ELEMENTS OF THE LICENSEE'S ENERGENCY PLAN
[.y Adequate provisions shall be made for providino medical support, includina: t y. j *(A) Facilities and medical supplies at the site for appropriate emergency ?, first aid treatment; A *(B) Arrangements for the services of physicians and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies onsite;
*(C) Arrangements for transportation of contaminated, injured individuals from the site to specifically identified treatment facilities'outside the site boundary;
, *(0) Arrangements for treatment of individuals injured in support of
, ;, - licensed activities on the site at treatme . facilities outside the site
. boundary, d.
r k
.T l,
t ,- . b. ! :\ .
).g C9 if
- Elements A, B, C, and 0 of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken
.;: verbatim from Appendix E, except where noted by comparative text. ;.c 04/11/84 43 Enclosure 1 e
, . ; w . .. .. . .
[ , (7590-01] m y ~ (14)- D0WNGRADING EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS-y,ij g9 > y f,4 , l (i) PLANNING STANDARD kh w (,.e ?, Provisions are established for downgrading the eneraency classification. E0 declarina the eneroency ended, and informina all emeraency orcanizations and M-5, the public. Q'.i
- e. ^
7: (ii) ELEMENTS OF THE LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY-PLAN
.i. *
(J' Adegaate provisions have been'made for downgradina the emeraency, including:
- g. :
pl *(A) The identification by title of the individual (s) who have the responsi-t'2 bility and authority to (a) relax the emeraency classification and associated f;j protective measures, (b) declare the emeraency ended, and (c)'to inform the appropriate individuals and organizations.
- (B) A description of the basis for reaching the decision to downgrade the
.. y emeraency classification, includina coordination amona emeroency response ? organizations. (C) A description of the procedures for communicating these decisions to
- h. the appropriate emeraency orcanizations and to the media and the public.
/: *
?; . (D) A description of the procedures to be used by the various emeraency oraanizations in adjustina their response tu the declaration of the new (b status.
- (a l<
- l
['i . M
- Element A of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim from
$- NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for P dparation and Evaluation of 7 '7 Radiolocical Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear
. Power Plants," November 1980, except where noted by comparative text.
E 04/11/84 44 Enclosure 1 4
x,
, . (7590-01]
L 4 (15) RECOVERY AND REENTRY
':(
w lg.$ (i) PLANNING STANDARD J General plans fer-recovery-and-reentry are developed for the oroanizational i structure and procedures to be used in recoverino from the effects of a nuclear W" power plant accident. Procedures are developed for reenterino evacuated areas
,y and areas suspected of containina hich levels of radiation or radioactive contamination.
O..'s t
- f. . (ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN 5'h .
[l};. Criteria to be used to determine when, following an accident, reentry of the Q; facility would be appropriate or when operation could be resumed 'shall be M' described, includina:*
. **(A) A description of the recovery organization.
. **(8) A description of the plan for maintaining technical personnel with
.: . the responsibili"y and authority to develop, evaluate, and direct recovery and ,
f; reentry operations.
?. (C) Provisions for the development of criteria and procedures for reentry 'g. into evacuated areas and areas containina high levels of radiation or radio-3 active contamination.
it.
- f. -
zy "This element of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim (s from Appendix E, except where noted by comparative text. 3**
** Elements A and 8 of the Licensee's Eme gency Plan have been taken verbatim from NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation
- 4 of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980, except where noted by comparative text.
i.. L,~* 04/11/84 45 Enclosure 1
r. [7590-01] . r/ l_a $ (16) EXERCISES AND ORILLS N f.) (i) PLANNING STANDARD
.f,) Periodic exercises are (wiii-be) conducted to evaluate major portions of
@ emergency response capabilities. Periodic drills are (wili-be) conducted to develop and maintain key emergency response skills. and Provisions 3[f ! exist to correct deficiencies that are identified as a result of exercises ji. and drilTs. are-(wili-be)-corrected-0: f,: j' (ii) ELEMENTS OF THE LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN h't 2. rs
,. *(A) The plan shall describe provisions for the conduct of emergency
- preparedness exercises as follows: Exercises shall test the adequacy of N timing and content of implementing procedures and methods, test emergency equipment and communication networks, test the public notification system,
", and ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar with their '., dutie,s.8 - ., 1. A full-participation exercise 7 which tests as much of the licens'ee, State, and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation shall be conducted for each site at which a power reactor
~: is located for which the first operating license for that site is issued after
,( July 13, 1982. This exercise shall be conducted within 1 year before issuance
- Element A of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim from Appendix E, except where noted by comparative text.
3 6 Use of site-specific simulators or computers is acceptable for any exercise. 7ufull participation" when used in conjunction with emergency preparedness
- 7. exercises for a particular site means appropriate offsite local and State
. authorities and licensee personnel physically and actively take part in r*: testing their integrated capability to adequately assess and respond to an
'..- accident at a commercial nuclear power plant. "Full participation" includes testing the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel and other r; resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond ,o the accident scenario. 04/11/84 46 Enclosure 1
- +
[7590-01] <q .3 $ of the first operating license for full power and prior to operation above 5% $,s of rated power of the first reactor, and shall include participation by each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and each ^ Sta'te within the ingestion pathway EPZ. @.; ' 2. Each licensee at each site shall annually exercise its emergency y' pl an.- - , '(i, 3. Each licensee at each site shall exercise with offsite authorities }l: such that the State and local government emergency plans for each operating f,9 reactor site are exercised biennially, with full participation by local if, governments, and full or partial participations by States, within the plume 5., exposure pathway EPZ. The biennial exercise frequency requirement with
.,, offsite authorities shall be measured from the date of the last exercise
.; conducted at that site prior to (insert effective date of this rule.) The U. . < - level of State participation shall be as follows: 2- [ (a) A State shall at least partially participate in each offsite exercise at each site.
. (b) A State shall fully participate in at least one offsite exercise
,. every-2 years. . (c) At'least once every 7 years, all States within the plume exposure ', ~ pathway EPZ,for a given site must fully participate in an offsite [ exercise for that site. This exercise must also involve full participation by local governments within the plume exposure pathway h EPZ. (d) Each State within any ingestion exposure pathway EPZ shall exercise its plans and preparedness related to ingestion exposure pathway measures at least once every 5 years. f (e) Licensees shall enable State and local governments to participate in
~
. annual exercises when requested by such State and local governments.
- 4. Full participation exercises shall demonstrate the followina:
- a. The capability to alert the population within the plume exposure
,] ,
pathway EPZ within 15 minutes of a Site Area or General Emeraency. Q j' s"Partial participation" when used in conjunction with emergency preparedness m exercises for a particular site means appropriate offsite authorities shall S actively take part in the exercise sufficient to (1) test direction and control
, functions; i.e. , (a) protective action decision making related to emergency ,; action levels, and (b) communication capabilities among affected State and g local authorities and the licensee.
04/11/84 47 Enclosure 1
(7590-01) Lii
- b. The capability to promptly declare an Alert, Site Area or General
[f V
+..
Emeraency based upon predetermined Emergency Action Levels (EAls).
,, c. The capability to evacuate the 2 mile Inner Action Area (IAA) of the p$ plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 2 hours upon declaration of Stu a General Emeraency.
- n.
Q. d. The capability to evacuate appropriate downwind sectors of the EPZ to a distance of 5 miles in a timely manner (in approximately 1 to s hours) s based on an exercise scenario that includes a representative sample of 4 population aroups including any urban centers or special population y groups such as hospitals, prisons, schools, etc. 31 e. The capability to reach decisions to shelter other population aroups ['[ within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. M f. The capability to determine the direction of the plume and therefore
. determine potentially contaminated areas within the plume exposure i;l
- pathway EPZ and to determine if relocation of population aroups or
., other protective actions would be warranted.
. g. The capability to reach decisions to downgrade or end the rie:laration of an emergency and to allow evacuated population to return with a m'nimum of disruption.
The Commission considers that if the above capabilities are satis-
- factorily exercised on a biannual basis, usino aporopriately altered 3
sectors over the years, there would exist reasonable assurance that the resources used for the evacuation of the 2 mile zone and any 5 mile sectors could then be expanded, and if necessary used for the taking of appropriate protective measures in any cortion of the EPZs in order to protect the health and safety of the public during a real emergency. e. l' l - 5. Remedial exercises will be required if the emergency plan is not satis- ' , '. factorily implemented during the biennial exercise, such that the NRC does not e, , have reasonable assurancri that adequate protective measures can and will be taken
.' in the event of a radiological emergency. The extent of State and local partici-pation in remedial exercises should be sufficient to show whether appropriate
)[ corrective measures have been taken regarding the elements of the plan not properly implemented in the previous exercise. ? 04/11/84 48 Enclosure 1 i L
(7590-01]
!'E
{;d. 6. All training, including exercises, shall provide for (formel] critiques
-'f. in order to identify weak or deficient areas that need correction. Any weak-n- @ nesses or deficiencies that are identified shall be corrected.
p.1, . f s: - w: N. '. E T;' n' k,
,p
'?,
~
I.; . 1, C. 4
'9-
, .( .
)
,p 9 I ,j a . i. 1.. L' 04/11/84 49 Enclosure 1
[7595-01] jo
}Ly (17) RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING W
Z (i) PLANNING STANDARD i 5,i) Radiological emergency response training is provided to those individuals who
.f.}
may be ceiied-on-to-essist-in-en-emergency, part of an emergency res,onse f.; to a nuclear power plant accident, m N.e. t'ii) ELEMENTS OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN" V.. c..
.y (A) The program to provide for (1) the training of employees and aer- !], cising, by periodic drills, of radiation 6mergency plans to ensure that >[.; employees of the licensee ere-familiar-with can perform their specific emergency ,j response duties and (2) the participation in the training and drills by other '(.
persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiation emergency shall be described. This shall include a description of specialized initial
'. training and periodic retraining programs to be provided to each of the following categories of emergency personnel: .
i
- 1. Directors and/or coordinators of the plant emergency organization;
- 2. Personnel responsible for protective a'ction decisionmaking;
. 3. Personnel responsible for accident assessment, including control
, room shift personnel;
. 4. Radiological inonitoring teams; I' 5. Fire control teams (fire bridgades);
l 6. Repair and damage control teams;
. 7. First aid and rescue teams; 5 8. Medical support personnel;
- 9. Licensee's headquarters support personnel;
' t, 10. Security personnel. M 11. personnel responsible for transmission of emergency information and instruction. I' t
- Elements A and B of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim
, from Appendix E, except where noted by comparative text.
04/11/84 50 Enclosure 1 i
n (7590-01]
- r. '.. ~-
g35{ , (B) In addition, a radiological orientation training program shall be ,;[ made available to local services personnel, e.g., local Civil Defense / Emergency /;f Services, local law enfortement personnel, and local news media persons. ,h4 kA * (is. %1 ?W .7.r.
.c a
i. ,.; c
- t g. '
04/11/84 51 Enclosure 1
, [7590-01]
l$ e g (18) DEVEL,0PMENT ANO f4AINTENANCE OF EMERGENCY PLANS d
; ?, (i) PLANNING STANDARD v..' .g i[;.
- {c .
Responsibilities-for pien-development The responsibility and authority have (, j ,, been assigned to develop,-and- review, update, and for distributeien of ensr-Y. gency plans. are-estabiished- and- Emergency planners are properly trained h) and provisions exist for coordination of the total planning effort.
. {. I
* *i (ii) ELEMENTS OF THE LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN (f
h' Provisions to be employed to ensure that the emergency plan, its implementing
- .f, procedures, and emergency equipment and supplies are maintainea up to date
$' shall be described, including:
' .!.t i ** (A) The identification by title g the individual with the overall
, , authority and responsibility for radiological emergency response planning.
** (8) The desianation of an Emergency Planning Coordinator (or equivalent) with responsibility for the development and updating of emergency plans and J coordination of these plans with other emergency response organizations.
n a a n r, 3 4. Paragraphs (q), (r), (s), (t), and (u) of 5 50.54 are revised to
., read as follows:
3
- L
,7 v l- *This element of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim from , j Appendix E, except where noted by comparative text.
1 ** Elements A and B of the Licensee's Emergency Plan have been taken verbatim
.- f rom iiUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation '* oTTadiological $ir.'Jegency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of I ', Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980, except where noted oy_ comparative text.
04/11/84 52 Enclosure 1
(7590-01] l:{ 5 9 50.54 Conditions of licenses. M'!! m. s o '
'c. (q) A licensee authorized to possess and/or operate a nuclear power j reactor shall follow and maintain igffect emergency plans which meet the ,U elements and standards in 9 50.47(d) of this part. end-the-requirements-in .j -Appendix-E-to-this part: . .y A licensae authorized to possess and/or operate a research reactor or a f; fuel facility shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which ~.
generallymeetghfrequirements-in-Appendix-E-of-thispart;elementsin10CFR p.. part 50 6 50.47d.1 The nuclear power reactor licensee may make changes to these plans without Comission approval only if such changes do not decrease
.f the effectiveness of the plans and he plans, as changed, continue to meet the .l , elements and standards of 9 50.47QPof this part and-the-reqnfrements-of-ef .;; Appendix-E-ef-this part: The research reactor licensee and/or the fuel facility '(.
licensee may make changes to these plans without Commission approval only if such changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as
'. changed, continue to general meet the requirements-of-Appendix-E-ef-this part elements of 10 CFR 50 ; 50.4 d.1 Proposed. changes that decrease the effective-ness of the approved emergency plans shal.1 not be implemented without applica-tion to and approval by the Commission. The licensee shall furnish one copy of each proposed change for approval to the Administrator of the appropriate NRC
., Regional Office specified in Appendix 0 of Part 20 of this chapter and two copies to the Document Control Desk, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
. Washington, DC 20555. If a change is made without approval, the licensee J shall furnish one copy to the Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional
,T ' Office specified in Appendix 0 of Part 20 of this chapter and two copies
. to the Document Control Desk, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
.- DC 20555 within 30 days after the change is made.
~; M e
.- 1For research reactors, guidance relating to these elements is containN in
, Regulatory Guide 2.6, "Emergency plans for Research and Test Reactors."
04/11/84 53 Enclosure 1
[7590-01) p', . (r) Each licensee who is authorized to possess and/or operate a research
, ',' or test reactor facility with-an-authorized power-levei greater-than-or-equal b to-2-W-thermal; under a licensee of the type specified in $ 50.21(c), shall S submitgergencyplanscenerallycomplyingwith10CFRPart50, Appendix-E
.! 5 50.47.f to the Director of the Office Nuclear Reactor Regulation for approval '
h- by-September-77 -4902 - Each-44censee-who-is-authorized-te pessess-and/or-operate [4 a research-or-test-reseter-facility-with-an-authorized power-levei-iess-than F, 2-W- the rmai t - u nde r- a-ii c e n s e - o f- th e- typ e- s p e ci fi 1t d-i n 50: 21( c3 ;- s h al i- s u bmi t
,, emergency plans-cemplying-with-10-6FR-Part-507-9-50:47-to-the-Birector-of-the c.' O f fi c e- o f- Nu cl e a r- R e a c te r- R e g ui ati e n- fo r- s p p ro v ai - by- Nev emb e r- S t - 1982:
[, (s)(1) Each licensee who is authorized to possess and/or operated a nuclear power reactor shall submit to NRC within 60 days of the effective date
.? - of this amendment the radiological emergency response plans of State and local f, ,' governmental entities in the United States that are wholly or partially within a plume exposure pathway EPZ, as well as the plans of State governments wholly or partially within an ingestion pathway EPZ3,4 Ten (10) copies of the above plans shall be forwarded to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation with 3 copies to the Director of the appropriate NRC office. Generally, the Inner Action Area (IAA) for nuclear oower reactors shall consist of an area of about 2 miles (3.2 km) in radius and where cenerally all members of the public can be evacuated after the declaration of a General Emergency. The ,[ desicn objective or coal is to have the capability to evacuate essentially all persons within this zone in approximately 2 hours. The evacuation of the IAA
[ should be promptly followed by the evacuation of cersons in the downwind sectors
/ out about 5 miles. The Commission realizes that the ability to evacuate tbd c _L A4 could be hampered by such conditions as adverse weather and road repairs.
The increased time required to evacuate this zone under these unusual adve se conditions will not affect the continued operation of the power clant as it is anticipated that these conditions will be temocrary in nature. Generally, the 7 3 Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) are discussed in NUREG-0396; EPA 520/1-78-016, "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,"
/ December 1978.
'If the State and local emergency response plans have been previously provided to the NRC for inclusion in the facility docket, the applicant need only provide the appropriate reference to meet this requirement.
04/11/84 54 Enclosure 1
f7590-01] h plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area E] . about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of
- l', an area.about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The exact size and configuration of e
y the EPZs for a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation
/ *. to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such I,'E conditions as demngraphy, topography, land characteristics, access routes, juris-dictional boundaries. The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized
[ power level less than 250 MW thermal. The plans for the ingestion pathway EPZ ". } ihall focus on such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion s pathway. [" (2)(i) For operating power reactors, the licensee, State, and local lq emergency response plans shall be implemented, by-Aprii-it-1981r (ii) If [after-Aprii-li-19817] the NRC finds (that] significant deficienciess in emergency planning, and if correction of such deficiencies is not within the licensee's control,7 then the NRC shall inform the licensee that such deficiencies have been identified, that they must be corrected within four months, and that if they are not corrected within four months,s (the-state-of-emergency preparedness-dees-not provide reasenable-assurance-that-adequate pretective-measures-esn-and-wiii-be taken-in-the-event-of-a-rsdielegical-emergency-fincinding-findings-based en-requirements-ef-Appendix E;-Section-fV:B 33-and-the-deficiencies
.,- (ineinding-deficiencies-based-en-requirements-of-Appendix-E;-Section fV:B 33-are-net-eerrected-within-fent-menths-of-that-finding;] the sSignificant deficiency - A finding of a significant deficiency in planning will De based on a review of FEMA findings and deter'ninations as to wntther Stata and local emergency plans meet the planning standaras and elements in 50.47b, and on the NRC's assessment of the aden acy of tne licensee's emergency
- plan. In implementation, a failure of a licensee to follow an emergency plan or a finding by FEMA as a result of an exercise that a plan is not capable of d' being implemented.
. sIf the licensee, State, and local emergency response olans have previously been found to comoly with the requirements of the Emergency Preparedness I regulations that were published on August 19, 1980 (45 FR 55402) the licensee
. need only provide appropriate reference to meet this requirement, 7Within licensee's control - Capable of correction without cooperation by Feceral, State, or local agencies.
04/11/84 55 Enclosure 1
[7590-01] h., 9 - Commission will determine whether the reactor shall be shut down until euch m deficiencies are remedied.a [,7.whether-ether-enforcement-ection-is-sppropriate-] ! {[h In determining whether a shutdown is appropriate, the Commission shall take into i.q: account, among other factors, whether,the licensee can demonstrate to the
~.; f Commission's satisfaction that the deficiencies in the plan are not significant #- for the plant in question, or that adequate interim compensating actions have 1,: been or will be taken promptly, or that there are other compelling reasons ji for continued operation.
{J', (ii) I Q fter-Apr44-1;-19817 the NRC finds significant deficiencies y, in emercej ylpino, the correction of which are within the licensee's
]
control, o d efi tencies t in implementation of an emergency plan, the NRC may take w>jjalc,e enforcement action it deems aporopriate to ensure that the
,( ' deficiencie. a.it. corrected.
.. (iii) Notwithstanding any other provision of this regulation, if at any
, time the Commission finds that the state of emergency oreparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that prompt evacuation of the public can be taken
; within the Inner Action Area (IAA) after the declaration of a General Emercency or that other adequate protective measures (evacuation or sheltering in the sectors that have been exposed to the plume) can and will be taken in event of a radioloai-cal emergency (includino findings based on requirements ofiFR 50.47) the NRC
, may take whatever enforcement action it deems appropriate, including immediate shutdown of the facility.
, , [ i n- d e t e rmi ni ng- whe t h e r- a- s h u t down- e r- e t h e r- e n f o rc eme n t- s e ti e n-i s - e p p re p ri a t e i - the-Eemmissien-shali-take-inte-acceenti-smeng-ether-fsetersi-whether-the-iicensee can-demonstrate-to-the-Eemmissien's-satisfsetien-that-zhe-deficiencies-in-the-pian-are-net-significant-fer-the piant-in questioni-er-that-adequate-interim-c upensating-setiens-have-been-er-wiii-be-taken premptiyi-er-that-there-ste-o the n ce mp e lli ng- re s s e n s - f e r- c e nti n ue d- e p e r ati e n ] i i
. t l':
sThis 4-month time period does not include the time period needed by FEMA to find that the deficiency has been corrected particularly if such finding is cependent on the conduct of another exercise. l
- l. l l
l 04/11/84 56 Enclosure 1 i t [
, e - - - -
[7590-01] ('] [(33--fhe-NRE-wiii-base-its-finding-en-a-review-of-the-FEMA-findings-and
' ? . '-
determinations-as-to-whether-State-and-iocai-emergency pians-are--adequate-
"-, ' ' . snd-espabie-of-being-impiemented--and-en-the-NRE-assessment as-to-whether jl the-ficensee's-emergency plans are-adequate-and-capable-of-being-impiemented-]
g.j. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting the authority of the
/,' Commission to take action under any other regulation or authority of the f;.} Commission. [or-at-any-time-ether-than-that-specified-in-this- paragraph-]
'- (t) A nuclear power reactor licensee shall provide.for the development,
.(' revision, implementation, and maintenan'ce of its emergency preparedness program.
.f .i To this end, the licensee shall provide for a review of its emergency preparedness f* program at least every 12 months by persons who have no direct ru ponsibility
', for implementation of the emergency preparedness program. The review shall include an evaluation for adequacy of interfaces with State and local governments s c- and of licensee drills, exercises, capabilities, and procedures. The results of i the review, along with recommendations for improvements, shall be documented, reported to the licensee's corporate and plant management, and retained for a period of five years. The part of the review involving the evaluation for
. adequacy of interface with State and local governements shall be available to
.. the appropriate State and local governments.
(u) Within 60 days after the effective date of this amendment, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall submit to the NRC plans for go ing with emergencies that meet planning standards and elements in 9 50.47(4), If the licensee, State, and 1,0c,al emergency response olans have previously been found to comply with the ' .. ats of the Emergency Preparedness regulations that J. [ were published or. Ai y 29, 1980 (45 FR 55402), the licensee need only provide appropriate reference to meet this requirement.
; x x n a n
- 1. ' APPENDIX E -- EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS FOR
\ ! + PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES
- 1. .
- h. >
- k. ,
L: 1l 1;. 04/11/84 57 Enclosure 1 l
[7590-01] l
- j. 5. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E has been delbted.
S.,., f:.; i.. : ! 74. PART 70-00MESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL (e it. f.
- 6. Section 70.32 is amended by modifying paragraph (i) to read as
{.}:ll
. follows:
2 e. f 9 70.32 Conditions of licenses. L .O . * * * *
- w.
'i :
(i) Licensees required to submi,t emergency plans in accordance with
. 9 70.22(i) shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans approved ty
}[U. the Commission. The licensee may make changes to the' approved plans without Commission approval only if such changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans as changed, continue to meet requirements-of
~
Appendix-E--Sectien-IV the applicable planning standards and elements in 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.47. The licensee shall furnish the Director of Nuclear Material and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, i, DC 20555, with a copy to the appropriate NRC Regional Office specified in Appendix 0, Part 20 of this Chapter, each change within six months after the L changes is made. Proposed changes that decrease the effectiveness of the approved emergency plans shall not be implemented without prior application to and prior approval by the Commission. p l< l~ l
- 7. Section 72.19 is amended to read as follows:
l: 9 72.19 Emergency plan. An application to store spent fuel in an ISFSI shall include plans for coping [. with emergencies. These plans shall contain the applicable planning standards
- ,, } and elements that are listed in Section-fV..uSentent-of-Emergency-Plans.u.ef.
- i. Appendix-E-to-Part-50 10 CFR Part 50.47d of this chapter.
J: t . a . 04/11/84 58 Enclosure 1
[7590-01]
- f, 8. Section 72.33f is amended to read as follows
.. 1 k/:. 6 72.33 License Conditions
- p
~
(f) A licensee shall follow and maintain in effect an emergency plan that is
., approved by the Commission. The licensee may make changes to the approved plan bl; without Commission approval only if such changes do not cacrease the effective-a ness of the plan, and if the plan, as changed, continues to contain the applicable l ir l .s planning standards and elements of Section-fV-of-Appendix-E-of-6FR-Part-58 l
- - 10 CFR Part 50.47d. Within six months after any such change is made, the i
,'. licensee shall submit a report containing a description of any changes made
. in the plan to the appropriate NRC regional office specified in Appendix 0 to 1 7, Part 20 of this chapter with a copy to the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safequards. Proposed changes that decrease the effectiveness of the 5- approved emergency plan shall not be implemented unless the licensee has received prior approval of such changes from the Commission.
(Sec. 161b., i., and o., Pub. L. 83-703, 68 Stat. 948 (42 U.S.C. 2201); Sec. 201, as amended, Pub..L. 93-438, 88 Stat'. 1242, Pub. L. 94-79, 89 r Stat. 413 (42 U.S.C. 5341))
,. Dated at Washington, D.C. this For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
r Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission.
'(/ (FR Doc. 80-25247 Filed 8-18-80; 8:45 am)
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M a eg, 04/11/84 59 Enclosure 1
y
. i t e
o
? .
[AlC Lo s on G 2
,a fa ] e. /2 c) \/ / D C D h,8 ~..,- ~.
I ,'
*e
/
e t 4 d 1
.~
l .- 1. l l !*4 l I: 1.: - l. l: 1 1' l l C M(b
DRAFT 8 RGrill:psb 3/19/84 System 6 - ASTP0 1 {, \b
~' Regulatory Analysis'
- h. .
# 10 CFR Part 50, Sections 50.34, 50.47, 50.54 and Appendix d and 10 CFR Part.70; 6
"Plans for Coping with Emergencies at Production and Utilization Facilities."
h.' ; 23
- 1. Statement of the Problem 7
'% In 1980 the Commission published a revised emergency planning regulation It became effective on November 3,1980. These regulatory
- ] (45 FR 55402).
changes were considered an upgrade of the existing regulations and were implemented as a result of the TMI experience. Since that time the staff has vigorously pursued implementation of these new regulations on an accelerated schedule with licensees. During this period, the staff (1) observed problems in interpretation and enforcement by the staffs of bo'th the NRC and other Federal and State agencies, and (2)' attempted 4 to correlate the results of ongoing research with the practical realities of [ effectively protecting the public through emergency response planning. The results of these staff observations revealed the following problem areas: ,' a. The establishment of an Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) in the 1980 regu-lations, with its requirement of prompt public notification, led to several widely held misconceptions. These misconceptions are that:
;j i
- Note: This proposed rulemaking does not result in impacts sufficient to require an exhaustive analysis as discussed in the Regulatory Analysis Guide-
' lines as issued on December 13, 1982. However, because of the sensitivity of emergency planning, this concise analysis has been prepared to summarize the alternatives, impacts, and decision logic considered by the staff.
as8"
;- m % - .
,t
- l. The risk to the p;pulation surrounding a nuclear power plant
>A , j. from a severe release is essentially uniform at all points
[ within the entire 10-mile EPZ. -
,0 $2, 2. The risk to the population abruptly ceases at a distance of 10
<1 miles. s.2 , EA 3. The EPZ is synonymous with "evacuation zone."
, 4 P.
- 4. The only responsible emergency response action of choice
,c is evacuation.
- 5. The objective of emergency planning is to completely eliminate public health risk from all possible reactor accidents.
The misconceptions noted above led to: (a) emergency plans that spread the finite resources of surrounding jurisdictions too thinly; (b) plans that did not concentrate resources on those persons most at risk, i.e., those closest to the plant; and (c) in some cases, extended evacuation planning to much greater ataas than were warranted.,
~ ^
- b. The "Unusual Event" emergency classification and its requirement that State and local jurisdictions and the NRC be notified became burdensome to those notified. Originally many offsite State and local authorities
.' i: ,
wanted to be informed promptly of minor happenings at nearby nuclear power plants in order to be prepared for media questioning. It is now
. V recognized by The Comission ;1-tic; that incidents in the "Unusual Event"
i
.- \
l
'j category are generally quickly resolved by onsite plant personnel and do a.:
not affect the public health and safety. Many local and State authoritie,s
$'s . /, now feel that these events are too numerous and minor to justify their 1: 8 immediate attention.
Et ). . . ,
- c. Federal Register policy states that substantive regulatory provisions V:
must be contained in numbered parts of the regulations and not in appendices. b 64 The present part 50.Dr_asetits many substantive provisions c.
'[ in Appendix E.
- d. The intent of the regulation was to allow a maximun 120 days for correction of deficiencies that were ,not, o under the control of the licensee. Those deficiencies that the licensee had control over were intended to be handled as'nont.al NRC enforcement actions.
o
- e. The present regulations do not cor, sider the potentially complicating
, f effects of earthquakes in the context of emergency preparedness.
- f. The current regulaticn does not require exercises that demonstrate that J the concept of gradation of risk within the 10-mile EPZ will be accommodated.
, 'a 2. Objectives
~
The objectives of these proposed rules are to reemphasize the efficiency of u- the principles of graded and phased energency response by: L
, a. Retaining the current 10-mile (16 km)jlume p4posure athway Emergency
- Planning Zone (EPZ). The requirement for a prompt public notification system will be retained within this zone.
l
i l
- b. Dividing the/lumefxposure fathway EPZ into two distinct areas based cn f, risk potential . These areas are:
(d'. ^
- 1. An Inner Action Area (IAA) of approximately 2 miles (3.2 km) radius around 7-f
$h each nuclear power reactor from which generally all members of the public
- 7. can and will be evacuated within about 2 hours after the declaration cf a 3' General Radiological Emergency. The design objective or goal is to have F..
.TJ !
th.e capability to evacuate essent,ially all persons c within this zone in 9 ~ ,; w-approximately 2 hours. Tne .sW4 realizes that the ability to evacuate this
-? zone could be hampered by such conditions as adverse weather and road repairs.
The increased time required to evacuate this zone under these unusual adverse conditions, will not affect the continued operation of the power plant since it is anticipated that these conditions will be temporary in nature,
,' 2. The remainder of thejiumejxposure[athway EPZ that extends from about . 2 miles (3.2 km) to about 10 miles (16 km) from the nuclear power plant.
J Protective actions within this zone will be based upon the nature and timing of each accident. The concepts recommended are prompt sheltering
. 'and notification of recommended protective measures such as prompt evacua-tion of those downwind sectors threatened by an actual or impending release
/ projected to produce radiation doses in excess of protec'tive action guide-
~
lines. Relocation of other population groups would be recomended after field measurements indicate that significant dose reduction from residual
. contamination could be achieved.
4 C w:
/.! A characteristic of this zone is that in the event of a severe accident c.; ,f; release, current release estimates (source terms) indicate that persons in the path of the plume may be exposed to radiation doses in. excess of /.. 'W- protective action guidelines without the taking of shelter. Priority .e
( should be given to protective actions intended to reduce radiation doses, v. and such actions can be taken over time periods of up to about half a day
- b. and still prove effective in mitigation of dose. Evacuation of this zone J '.
is not likely, but it cannot be entirely precluded. In any event,
;i - evacuation of this zone could be accomplished with significantly less TAA preplanning than that required for the AAA because of the time frame afforded by the physical realities of distance from the plant and the dispersion characteristics within the plume. -
In summary, the gradation in risk within th.e 10-mile EPZ requires a gradation in response; this gradation will give appropriate priority
.. . to reducing high doses where these are more likely to occur, will recognize the differing time frames available for action, will accommodate the fac't that there are limited resources in the early hours of an l' emergency, and will also recognize that protective actions may be required to be taken beyond 10 miles, in unusual circumstances.
u. The joint objectives of a. and b. above are to establish an emergency planning L,- [ rationale that appropriately matches emergency response to the degree of risk throughout various portions of the EPZ. A very important fact is that risk to ? the public from nuclear power plant accidents is not constant or uniform through-l l 1 4
J' - 4.j out the entire 10-mile EPZ. The risk is highest closest to the plant, falling '.'.' off rapidly within about the first 2 miles, and gradually decreasing at greater -
,l .
distances, as can be seen by Figure 1. This figure illustrates that over 80% N'., of the dose (roughly equivalent to risk) is within the first 2 miles of the [ ' plant, hence, the prompt evacuation of this area would give priority to those persons most at risk. The proposed rules would concentrate the limited emergency 0 response resources within those areas where risk is highest during a severe 4, , ~'
. accident. They would pennit an effective emergency response throughout the
,' entire EPZ by utilizing these resources in a phased manner, i.e. , very prompt
. protection of those at higher risk followed by concentration of these resources
, for those shown to be at continued risk. The objectives also ensure that doses will be minimized by subsequent protective action for others within the 10-mile BPZ who are threatened by exposure to radiation from in accident and that social disruption for those not at risk will be kept to a minimum. The further objective of these provisions and the discussion in the proposed rule is to clarify the concept that emergency preparedness can reduce but not eliminate public health risks from nuclear power plant accidents. Is is stressed that complete elimination of risk is not a realistic criteria for judging the ade-quacy of emergency planning. The NRC will only license a plant if the radiological a risk is very small--even in the absence of emergency preparedness. Emergency preparedness, therefore, constitutes a prudent requiremont meant to mitigate but not eliminate all risk.
.-/ c. To eliminate the "Unusual Event" as an emergency class. .I ~ ~.L -
"1-
- d. To incorporate Appendix E into appropriate sections of the regulation.
.: e. To clarify the "four-month clock" aspect of the regulations to show that q ' .,,, it is to be used only as a time frame for correcting emergency planning
[ deficiencies not under licensee control and that the 120-day time period ',- does not include FEMA evaluation time. This aspect of the regulations makes clear that the time required for evaluation by FEMA of proposed remedies to deficiencies would not be included in the 120 days. This evaluation often requires considerable time, particularly if an exercise is required. It will also be emphasized that deficiencies that are under licensee control will be handled as nomal enforcement actions.
- f. To require consideration by licensees of the potential of earthquakes when evaluating evacuation time estimates as a prudent measure, dile recognizing that the expenditure of additional resources to cope with seismically 1
caused offsite damage is of doubtful value considering the modest benefit in overall risk that could be obtained.
- g. To require successful exercises at 2-year intervals that will demonstrate:
t i gA The capability to alert the population within the plume exposure l' pathway EPZ within 15 minutes of an emergency. 1 [. y X. The capability to promptly reach decisions to declare an Alert, Site i or General emergency classification exists based upon predetemined Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
~
,; i.i e::.
f,' g; The capability to evacuate the 2-mile Inner Action Area (IAA) of the (I! plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 2 hours upon declaration of W
-a General Emergency.
k.fl j f. The capability to evacuate appropriate downwind sectors of the EPZ to a distanc9 of 5 miles in a timely manner (in approximately 4 to I' 6 hours) based on an exercise scenario that includes a~ representative
.< sample of population groups including any urban centers or special 7 population groups such as hospitals, prisons, schools, etc.
'" ,,, .. .b
*A. The bility to re decisions to erdother population groups
~. -
. within the plu expo re o + ay EPZ in order minimi 2(dation doses.
, { #. The capability to reach decisions relative to the direction of the plume and therefore detemine potentially contaminated areas within the plume exposure pathway EPZs and to detemine if relocation of population groups or other protective actions are warranted in order to minimize radiation doses.
- 3. Al ternatives L The alternatives considered for each of the objectives in section 2 of the
.] analysis were as follows:
p 3.1 Establishment of a IAA of a different radius. From examining the results of parametric analyses of severe accident consequences, a number of different combinations of distances and times
. , ..v
~. .g. , for emergency preparedness response were considered. The maximum benefit (',';; for reducing high doses was obtained by promptly evacuating the j population within about 2 miles of the reactor during the most severe (;: accidents postulated.
,j/. Generally, the benefits obtained by increasing the
(, prompt evacuation distance from the plant fell off beyond this distance. Any cost savings obtained by reducing the area of the IAA appears minimal. [", 3.2 Retention of an EPZ of about 10 miles.
,.. The alternatives of elimination or expansion of the EPZ were considered.
;, ~.
, Elimination of tne 10-mile EPZ was not considered a viable alternative.
For some core melt accidents, there wuld still be the necessity of protective actiers beyond 2 miles. The time available to accomplish emergency actions from 2 to 10 miles is greater than the time available close to the reactor owever, populations could still need to be evacuated from some sectors of the EPZ or sheltered from passing plumes and to be moved from areas of residual contamination af ter plume passage. ~' The staff still feels that a planning zone about 10 miles provides a necessary base to ensure that an adequate number of jurisdictions are included in the planning and communication net to provide adequate public protection. At the same time, the staff feels that a planning base of about this size would give adequate assurance that ad-hoc actions could be effectively taken at distances beyond the EPZ, should that become necessary. The staff sees no advantage for a larger EPZ.
, - +
r t ,
, , 3, ,
cr; 10 O '.
?.: 3.3 Elimination of the "Unusual Event" emergency classification.
Ys
;! The alternative of retaining this category of incidents as an emergency b"
classification is not considered reasonable or necessary. h 3.4 Clarification of the four-month clock. No alternatives to clarification of the intent of this regulatory prov'ision were considered. (/, 3.5 Elimination of Appendix E. ,. Alternatives to the incorporation of Appendix E into the body of the regula4) A tion were considered, but Staff legal advice was that Federal Register policy precludes regulating by appendix. 3.6 Addition of Seismic Guidance. Alternatives of adding no guidance on the effect of seismic events on
. emergency preparedness and adding nuch more detailed guidance were considered. A staff analysis found that:
- a. For most earthouakes (including some earthquakes more severe than the SSE) the power plant would not be expected to pose an immediate offsite radiological hazard.
- b. For earthquakes which would cause plant damage leading to imediate offsite radiological hazards but for which there would be relatively
,- minor offsite damage, emergency response capabilities around nuclear power plants would not be seriously affected.
r - 11
- c. For earthquakes which cause more severe offsite damage, such as, 1
;. for example, disabling a siren al'erting system, the earthquake itself acts as' an alerting system.
- .3 db t' d. For those risk-dominant earthouakes which cause very seve.2 damage r .'
to both the plant and the offsite area, emergency response would have l. marginal benefit because of its impainnent by offsite damage.
', In summary, the expenditure of additional resources to cope with seismically , caused offsite damage is of doubtful value considering the modest benefit in overall risk reduction which could be obtained. Nonetheless, it was concluded that is would be prudent for licensees to consider the potential effects of earthquakes, such as road blockages, damaged bridges, etc. ,
when evaluating evacuation time estimates. 3.7 The alternatives of either enlarging or contracting the areas to be exercised were considered. Recognizing the concepts of gradation of risk within the EPZ, it was concluded that exercises should concentrate on (a) demonstration i- of the capability to promptly evacuate the population most at risk, i.e. , within the 2 mile IAA within 2 hours; (b) the capability to evacuate appro-l priate downwind sectors of the EPZ to 5 miles in a timely manner; and (c) to take other appropriate protective measures to reduce population dose. [ 4. Consecuences 4.1 Benefits. The specific benefits of these proposed regulatory changes would be (a) clarifying the intent of the 1980 regulations, (b) efficiently y
\
., 1
~
1 2 ': s -12 7 l/ using the societal resources devoted to emergency preparedness by y L;. first concentrating response on those most at risk and second, concentrating, in a phased manner, on those at lesser risk to ensure
]
Q greater confidence that public health and safety will be protected,
' , 1, and (c) efficiently and nondisruptively using resources by' requiring
< relocation of only those persons shown to be at continued risk. The
, collective benefit of these proposed changes is to ensure greater confi-dence that the public health an:: safety will be protected in the case of a severe reactor accident.
p ;- The proposed regulations accomplish these benefits by ensuring that those members of the public who might be subjected to high doses during a highly unlikely but severe accident would be expeditiously removed f. rom the Inner Action Area. The proposed regulations further ensure that the remainder of the population within the EPZ (a) would take imediate protective actions, including sheltering, to reduce dose and (b) would be evacuated or relocated only when that was shown to be necessary. The collective benefit of the proposed rule mentioned above would increase confidence that public health and safety could be protected in the event of
~
i l ,. a severe accident in two ways. First, this clarification of fundamental emergency planning philosophy stresses that priority considerations should be given to those persons most at risk. Those persons very near the reactor could be exposed to very high radiation dose rates. The principles of health l ! physics, public health, and common sense dictate that these high risk persons l l
m: , 5
'q j.f-v._*' ;.- be protected promptly and effectively. A second important, but not as criti-
[.(. cal, principle is that doses should be reduced at much as is practicable for all others who are exposed to radiation from an accident.
~
9:, J.,0 The proposed rule would implement these principles by ensuring that the available emergency response resources are concentrated in the IAA so that
.}lj individuals within that area would be removed promptly as soon as plant j operators declared a General Emergency.
t Simple arithmetic illustrates how a graded response approach functions when it is applied to the area and population of sample EPZs. For example, a 10-mile EPZ contains 314 square miles of land. Persons at highest risk of exposure to high doses are within a circle of about 2 miles from the reactor (see Figure 1).' This inner zone of highest concern (IAA) has an area of o 12.5 square miles , i.e. , 3.9 percent of the total EPZ'. By concentrating available resources on this relatively small zone, the emergency planners 4 - would be able to establish procedures for the first phase of the response to ensure that the planning goal of evacuation within about 2 hours could be metf etp wu M a \ y 4 6 .a g 44 W uA Ag k ,
. The second phase of response would be used'when additional protective actions (beyond initial sheltering) would be necessary for particular segments of
*. the remainder of the EPZ. The resources utilized for the initial evacuation
,1 of the IAA could then be directed to the next area of priority.
9 In practical terms, evacuation requires actual movement of people from one
- n. location to another. For example, the Palisades plant, which represents about a median population density site in the U.S., had 333 persons living
5 *
~;;;
.w.
.[
':s within 2 miles in 1980. This represents about 1 percent of the population
. of the Palisades EPZ. Prompt emergency response and evacuation of 1 percent e ..}
- ^
- v. , .
of the EPZ population could certainly be accomplished more rapidly even d$ under the most adverse conditions, thus increasing safety for those most at risk. 7,r ~ The same principle also applies for those sites having much higher popula-
, tion densities. For example, the three most populous EPZs surround the Indian Point, Limerick, and Zion plants. Inner Action Areas (IAAs) for
- , these plants would have had about 15,000, 6,000 and 13,000 residents, respectively, in 1980. This represents 6.3%, 3.8% and 4.9%, respectively, of the EPZ populations for those plants. Emergency planners can approach the task of,quickly evacuating this relatively small proportion of the popu-lation who are at highest risk with nuch greater confidence than planning the evacuation of the entire 10-mile EPZ population. The persons living in this area can also have nuch greater confidence that their health and safety can be assured.
Another aspect of phased response concerns dose reduction for the rest of the EPZ. Currently, some emergency plans include plans for evacuation of
. the entire EPZ. This obviously would not be required during almost any reasonable accident scenario. The wind can be expected to distribute radio-activity only in certain discrete areas of the EPZ. Those persons in these areas would take shelter, evacuate o, take other protective actions designed to reduce radiation dose. If there m 1 no residual contaminaton, there
, s .
.. i
'.t -
would be no further relocation of populations required. If contamination were detected, relocation would be undertaken for those persons who could receive significant additional dose. 3 (th Asst.me, for our sample plants, that a seve accident occurred that
.E M '.w.g
- cgw'WI Q tv.61.E v(tivity tG C;nt0.minet0 3 adj! cent I Ah MW tw % kd.k%H M 5d iT.0Cjh F diO10 77 E degram
- e. AL.A A A AA w d Lukec6 L f, mN, w g.o % .A d e T Jnwnwi nd car +*: Out tv 10 mile 5 so diat-ret 0 Cation-4f- all na"enns within
- thO t Or02 "35 "Muir;d.' Al 0 ;;;;;; that +he faA were evacuatad. The total number of persons who would be required to move would be about
'., l S4* \ f,Go D 13 @b 7,000 for Palisades,0,00^ for Indian Point, 34,,000 for Limerick, and
.. m ,6ec 71 J 50,000 for Zion. This represents 44-M of the total residents of the EPZ
*9 f . :L T.2-for Palisades. -M-95 for Indian Point, . for Limerick, and M,M for Zion. Again, emergency planners can approach the task of swiftly moving this comparatively small number of people with much more confidence of success than moving the entire 10-mile EPZ population, and the population of these areas can have greater confidence that their health and safety will be assured.
r In practical tenns, this policy of establishing to phase and concentrated emergency response gives much greater c'onfidence that protective actions are practical and will efficiently and,quickly protect the public health
- - and safety. ,
Other benefits include clarificationInf, the intent of the 4-month clock and i.,- elimination of Appendix E. ~
.h
*Unifom population distribution assumed. ,
%'2 ,
l l n'
- N
. s.n '. ..
=,n
'i2
- 4.2 Costs. -
': There are expected to be costs associated with the pro d regulatory
- d. b-. ~(c.4 4 4 c.t =-- - eat 4 a h.
f I .tbose
. d . . Ab.
I'.? changes ^cthc.{ i.he-% nM invch;d igfamiliaMzation emergency planning a w u. ... .. , personnel with the reemphasized concepts and those involved in phasing in of the energency plans for operating reactors. These minor costs should be '.- overshadowed by reduction of costs previously associated with "routine evacuation planning" out to 10 miles J - A tv Y.J s M a
, (c= L a % u- firpce m c + 4 ) .: w d % 1 L e k t m. m .AG3
- 5. Decision Rationale i "" " q% h 4 W c, m , ,
Careful consideration of the experience gained in implementation of the 1980 regulation as well as research results led the staff to conclude that the public health and safety and regulatory clarity would both be served by restructuring emergency planning as proposed in these regulations.
- 6. Implementation -
No implementation problems are anticipated. Use of the new concepts would be
. . 4 phased into the regular planning and emergency planning exercise cycle for operating power reactors and into the PSAR and FSAR schedules for applicants, as appropriate.
m 4 A 4
' ~
2 y;. b A F,,,,I t . ~
,? .
-*f o
.~
~.
r;n I ;; l.' . TECHNICAL BASES FOR A GRADED RESPONSE IN EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS
- by Leonard Soffer James A. Martin, Jr.
Richard P. Grill 0 I a S e e i O I stNcLOSURE 4
~
..c.. , . . ,- .
- 3. t .
- Table of Contents
.',, Sumary and Conclusions o;
. 1.0 Introduction t .;. _,
f,M..- 2.0 Accident Source Terms 3.0 Individual Risk Profile Within the 10 Mile Plume Exposure f:* , EPZ and Beyond I.- 3.1 Dose Variation vs. Distance
.- 3.2 Individual Health Effects Risk Variation vs. Distance
. 3.3 Accident Timing Considerations vs. Distance 4.0 Selection and Evaluation of Protective Action Strategies 9
9 9 4 e I f
! o
~
l *: 4 l~ l { l
- l. _
, 4 y ,
~j Summary and Conclusions U.?
E. A re-assessment of the technical bases underlying the 10 mile plume exposure R emergency planning zone (EPZ) and the protective actions to be taken within
, . .; this zone has been perfonned. The re-assessment has been based upon extensive
- p. .
b additional risk studies that were not available at the time the NRC emergency G]; planning regulations were promulgated in 1980. (SeeNUREG-0773,NUREG/CR-1659, V NUREG/CR-2239, NUREG/CR-2326 and NUREG/CR-2925). /,
*4 a The re-assessment has taken as its starting point the Commission's basic
. guidance on emergency planning, namely; that serious accidents can happen and that a range of them should be planned for. However, the re-assessment has also tried to keep in mind recent Commission guidance (1984 Policy and Planning Guidance, NUREG-0885, Issue 3), that "Emergency planning should be based on realistic assumptions regarding severe accidents."
The re-assessment has made use of analyses which have considered a full spectrum of potential accidents, up to and including a range of core-melt events. Anong these were very severe releases resulting from a core-melt and a breach of ( containment directly to the atmosphere. The release characteristics used to describe the range of accidents considered have made use of the "Siting Source Term" (SST) tenninology (SST1, SST2, etc.) described in NUREG-0773 and the Sandia siting study (NUREG/CR-2239). Although an intensive research effort is underway to re-assess the magnitude and timing of accidental radioactivity releases ("source terms"), this effort is presently incomplete. It must be P- 3 emphasized that this re-assessment is based solely upon existing source terms. l 4 I I l l
. < . v.
i. f.lO. ;-s fl. If the research effort leads to a technically defensible reduction of accident . I source terms, as many believe it will, it will make the at:alyses herein more (%,i..'
. pessimistic or conservative than warranted.
- 7. , -
fj') A major objective of this assessment was to detennine a protective action strategy 1 capable of dealing with a spectrum of accidents that would satisfy tne following
.l objectives:
G
.; a) For low-consequence core-melt accidents:
Avoid non-stochastic health effects (such as radiation injury and early fatality) and reduce stochastic health effects (such as latent cancer fatality). b) For high-consequence core-melt ~ accidents: Avoid mortality from non-stochastic health effects within the EPZ and reduce stochastic health effects within and outside the EPZ. i The risk studies focused upon the individual distribution of risk with distance, both within the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ, as well as beyond it. Individual risk is highest close to the reactor and declines rapidly at first, and then more slowly with increasing distance. At a distance of two miles, the average radiation dose from a given release is about 20 percent of its value
, at one-half mile. This behavior is the result primarily of increased atmospheric dilution or dispersion with distance which is inherent in nature and which ^
reduces the atmospheric concentration, and hence the dose, of any released radioactivity. While the individual dose from a given release is lower by about a factor of 50 at a distance of ten miles vs. that at a distance of one-half mile (the nearest boundary of the typical exclusion areas), the effect becomes magnified for those health effects where a threshold dose is required before an effect is observed. et .vWr= -- T+-T e'Tr:'=#' ="p"-'-T
,i..
Hence, for the most severe release without protective actions, the individual
- 1. risk of early fatality is reduced by about a factor of more than one hundred q at a distance of ten miles vs. its initial level at one-half mile. Because the p; risk decreases continuously with distance, however, it also does 'not become q9 '
zero at distances beyond ten miles. The risk studies performed confirm that r, while the 10 mile plume exposure EPZ is appropriate for planning purposes, primary attention or priority should be given to pre-planned actions to reduce the risk within about the first two miles, while retaining the capability to take additional protective actions, as necessary, within the remainder of the [. EPZ. It should also be made clear that protective actions could be required at distances beyond ten miles, in unusual circumstances. Accident timing considerations were also examined. Based upon these studies, it can be concluded that a distance of about 2 miles and a time frame of about 2 hours has significance for taking of prompt actions for all core-melt events. A distance of about 2 miles has s'gnificance for the following reasons: o For many core-melt accidents (those without a direct release to the atmosphere), projected doses would not exceed the Protective Action Guide (PAG) levels beyond this distance; o For most core-melt accidents (those without early failure of containment), projected doses would be unlikely to result in early injuries beyond this distance; 4
- ~
o
.b J.I int s.- o Early evacuation of the population within this distance and ' ;, , immediate sheltering beyond would provide a large reduction in risk to the highest risk group and would also provide additional (i.' .
time to assess the developing situation further to decide upon and
-w !.Q U implement required protective actions, as necessary, beyond this ," distance.
It should be specifically noted that a distanca of two miles is not sufficient t
'. to avoid life-threatening doses for the most severe core-melt accidents (those involving prompt failure of containment) and that actions beyond this distance would be necessary.
A time frame of about 2 hours has significance for the following reasons: o For many core-melt accidents, response times well in excess of this value would be available before projected doses are expected to exceed the Protective Action Guide (PAG) levels. o For most core-melt accidents, an evacuation within this time would avoid doses capable of producing early injuries to the population within the 2 mile radius. l
- l. o For the worst core-melt accidents, warning times (prior to re-l leases) of 2 hours or more are predicted for most (about 80% to 90%) severe accident sequences.
1- ., \ Since about 1% to 2% of all core-melt accidents (or 10% to 20% of the most
.i severe sequences) are estimated to result in severe releases that will also be A fast-developing (warning times less than 2 hours), an evacuation time of "j
2 hours for individuals within the first two miles can provide a high, but not absolute, degree of assurance that life-threatening doses would not be p . received in the event of a core-melt. Based upon the above results of the risk studies, a two-step protective action strategy is proposed as follows:
- f. In the event of a reactor condition where a molten or degraded core condition is projected, or where adequate core cooling is in doubt (the conditions for deciaration of General Emergency) ,
- 1. An early evacua' tion (to be accomplished within two hours) of everyone within two miles should be recommended; everyone within the remainder of the 10 mile EPZ should seek available shelter and remain indoors until further notice.
- 2. Accident ' assessment should continue, with monitoring of both plant and field conditions, and further actions including evacuation and/or relocation, taken as necessa'ry.
,' This strategy was evaluated by examining the individual consequences (as measured in whole body and thyroid doses) resulting from it for a spectrum of core-melt events. For most core-melt releases, an early evacuation out to 2 miles and sheltering beyond with relocation within 4 hours of ground exposure nisults in no early fatalities and very low risk of early injuries
- - , , -n -
,. . . . v .,b .
or long tenn health effects. For the most severe releases, an early evacuation (j< out to 2 miles, followed shortly (within about 1 hour) by evacuation out to p y-f. . - 5 miles in the downwind sectors only, with sheltering elsewhere and relocation
/.1
- .,1 within 4 hours of ground exposure, would avoid early fatalities and provide a f..;
low risk of early injuries or long-team health effects. It is concluded that t{ ~' the proposed strategy is effective and flexible enough to accommodate a complete h,., , spectrum of core-melt events. It is effective because a) those at greatest risk 4 are given the most immediate attention and b) emergency response resources can
- be used most effectively by concentrating response in a graded, or phased manner, It is recommended that this strategy be incorporated into appropriate regulatory
~
c ri teri a. . t a f-f e ae l' e 1-
, - - , - - - - - - - , - - - - - , - _ m _, ,. , , _. __ _. . . _ - , ,
s.. .- O l'[ , S& l.0 T4aW
$ * ^,1 b!.i *%y
[,.. La+r r s'
. .q .
e x" hY h 4 E 9 0 4 I s 9 l. i l 't l-I: 1.. 1 [- o s
.- .c
~$ybNbA 3.0 Risk Profile Within the 10-M11e Plume Exposure EPZ and Beyond
.. k
.! MMdM
} ," This chapter will discuss. the magnitude and variation of g risk that exists with.in the 10-m11e plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), as well as t>:-...
f.'I[. beyond it. Section 3.1 discusses the variation of dose as a function of
.: ~. t ?.
distance. This is followed by Sections 3.2 and 3.3 'which discuss the varia-
$.l tion of health effects and time-dose-distance relationshipc, respectively.
[i, , , Section 3.4 concludes the chapter. . ?. .
~.
0 0 9 4 e
$e
_I
~ ~- , , , , .
~
I 3.1 Dose Variation with Distance
.. 4 The variation of dose with' distance, given a severe accidental release. * ,,' has been a zed and reported in NUREG/CR-2239. This reference dis-played the mean whole body dose vs. distance to an individual, given
{. 1: 0 an SST1, SST2 and SST3 release, an% a log-log plot. These have been . ;p Qv
- d. replotted on a linear scale, and are shown here as Figures 3.1-1 to A ,. 3.1-3, respectively. Although the absolute doses from these three g, different release categories differ by about a factor of one thousand, h theydisplaythesamegen[eralvariationwithdistatce. From an initial value at a distance of 0.5 mile (taken as the typical exclusion boundary distance), the individual dose drops off sharply with distance at V
first, with the slope gradually and co(ntinuously decreasing. At a distance of two miles, for example, the dose is about 20% of the value at0.5 mile,whileatadistanceoftenmiles,themeanwholebodyis about 2% of its initial value. Although the dose varies continuously with distance it is important to recognize that most of the decrease t*luen e in dose over the 10 mile M exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ) occurs very close-in the reactor, with about 80% of the decrease
- occuring within the first two miles.
It is also important to recognize that the dose levels are still significant
,' in absolute ternts at distances of 10 miles and beyond, even though there has been a large decrease with distance. For example, at a distance .'. of 10 miles the whole body doses for an SST2 and SSTI release are about i
pi l
.57 -
1 g . f, equal to, and in excess of, respectively, the proposed PAG 1evels. Indeed, 8.
,. for an SST1 release, the whole body dose is in excess of the upper PAG
/; levels out to about 40 miles. The significance of these doses and their
~
,'. variation in regard to hhh effects, are examined in the next section, e.~.
*n k
. 5
- S 4
g e 4 6
'I*
4 4 1 b l
f.;
- S I ,
.?-
r.- Wt l 3.2 Variation of Health Effects with Di tance 3.2.1 General The adverse health effects arising from exposure to radiation .which have been considered in this study are early fatality, early injury (such as nausea or loss of appetite) and delayed fatality due to latent cancer incidence. The
-A.
modeling of the health effects is the same as that in the CRAC code, and is a
. A refinement of the health effects model used in the Reactor Safety Study. The reader is referred to these (SetMU9>E6-C3+0 sources for an in)-depth discussion of the health effects modeling.
9 /
'8 e
. i o
.. . + -
+
.n . ' . 3.2.2 Early Fatality The individual ris distancekf early fatalit[, given an SST1 and SST2 release,isshowninFigure3.2-1and3.2-2,respectiDQy. These-k '
data were taken from NUREG/CR-2239 and replotted on a lin k cale. u .
' r, The risk of early fatality from an SST3 release is zero for all distances,
- l. ' -
since the doses are not sufficient to produce this effect. Figure 3.2-1 l'.
- display 3the risk for four differing protective actions, and it is clear
- f. ' '
that the risk of early fatality is strongly dependent both uoan distance b,k as well as the protective action. ts.xen. Even where no protective action et w e is taken and an individual is presumed to remain exposed to the p&eme 2 (5(Nw ed.ho.* be- dog plus 24 hours o ground sinsee contamination) Iheriskdecreasesbymeme W% oc h a factor of over the 10 mile EPZ, with most of the risk decreasing in the first few miles. Where protective actions are taken, the decrease in a' cute fatality risk with distance becomes even more pronounced. Figure - -l
- 3.2-1 also provides valuable insight on the degree of urgency with which protective actions need be taken at various distances. To assure an individual the same degree of risk of early fatality, regardless of his or her location within the EP2, would require that protective actions be For example, to assure implemented more swiftly at shorter distances.
an individual risk of early fatality of no greater than 5 x 10~3 , given an 5571 release, an[ individual at a distance of 1 mile from the reactor
' needs to be evacuated with a delay time of 1 hour, whereas individuals at distancesof 2.5 miles and 4 miles can delay evacuation for 3 hours and 5 hours, respectively, with the same degree of risk, h
9
, , . . . . .. -o ,:
1
+: ':0 .
g{ Figure 3.2-2 shows the risk of early fatality vs. distance for an SST2 9 5' Clearly, the risk is much lower for an SST2 release and becomes release. [f.!
- 8 very small beyond about 1 mile. .v ?.
It is also important to recognize that the risk of eary fatality can
/3.. ^s extend beyond 10 miles, in unusual circumstances. Table 3.2-1, taken e'
from the Sandia siting study, shows that, for no emergency response, ,
. about 10% of the time an SST1 release would result in early fatalities C
beyond 8 miles, and about 1% of the time an SST1 release would result in [ , .' eary fatalities beyond 12 miles.
~...
I e e 4 4 4 2 1e f r'
3.2.3 Early In.iury ly. .' t Early injuries, obseriable by synptoms such as nausea and loss of appetite. consnence at whole body dosr., of about 50 to 75 rem, and can generally be i 2;; ij': expected at doses of about 100 rem or above. The individual risk of early (- injury as a function of distance, given an $5T1 rtlease, is shown in Figure j;q. 3.2 3, also taken from NUREG/CR-2239. Although the risk varies both with [ distance and protective action taken, the variation is not as large as shown a ~' earlier for early fatality. For example, for the case of no evacuation, the reduction in individual risk in going frz 0.5 miles to 10 miles is about a factor of 2 within the first 2 miles. Where protective action is taken, the V variation in risk is greater. As in the case of early fatality, at distances less than 2 miles, the only protective action strategy that is highly effective in reducing the risk of early injury is the "best" evacuation, with a delay of 1 hour and an affective radial speed of 10 mph. The individual risk of early injury, given an SST2 release is shown in Figure 3.2-4, taken from NUREG/CR-2239, and re-plotted on a linear scale. Even without protective action, the risk variation with distance is seen to be very large and occurs primarily within about the first 2 miles, since it decreases from a value of about 10-2 at a distance of 1 mile, given an SST2 release, to a value of 10'3 at 2 miles, and to about a value of 10 at 2.5 miles. I e t 9
a -. . . . s.( 3.2.4 tatent Cancer-Fatality
- s'
!;., The individual risk of latent cancer fatality as a function of distance is
,R ' ' -j shown in Figure 3.2-5. Curves are shown for individual SST1, SST2 and SST3 ll. releases and for an average core-melt release (labeled "SST1, 2, 3"). From c', the above figure it can be seen that the SST1 release dominates the risk of j latent cancer fatality although by only about one order of magnitude greater ,,' than that for SST2. r;
,' The reduction in risk in going from 0.5 miles to 10 miles is about a factor J '.
of 20, given an SST1 release. Fran 0.5 to 2 miles the risk reduction is about a factor of two. The curves given in Figure 3.2-5 are only for the c( case of "Summary" evacuation, and consequently the effect of different pro-tective action strategies is not clear. Unlike the risk of early fatality or early injury, there is no sharp dropoff in risk of latent cancer beyond some distance, but the risk drops off monotonically and snoothly with distance. From these curves it is clear that although energency response planning can reduce individual risk, population cancer risk is not readily amenable to a large reduction by virtue of energency response planning, since latent cancer fatality risk extends out to large distances. s
5 e b "% 9
-.p.+m.. ***e-ye= = * * * = .=*e** * **
.. u .
g
--.t.___. r 8 e -
t 3'
.'$? '
n y"
';=', =
_b
.n j m ..
g' .] --
- M LR.,,. .i.
8 2 qi C :
$s -
b ...= 51
"= .:
,=
.: y -
m n h 5
=
. c =i -=
lA ~ p -: : a e ..: ; = T -'
'@ D s
^*
']
, L . : -
o _
~2m ^ . _
4 g __
~ .- _
7- - a- W_" - t
=
Q Oc i
.- =
k _^_ - L.; 3 E1 : I g :. y' 'sr c' 1 e, .. =
. .q, to.
20 y .. m t
=
h D -
'J '_
*3 u 7 --
CL .- _
.3
.e.
6 , -
~
, gg h - :
. e ~
9 0 "'
- s w .-
. .T e MM
'* ~-
ge - men - f
% M m
e 2 - -=
]
! N N
- H5g I
.2 9 0 Q A C O E., 3 % N 0 1 i
- - . _ - - - . . . . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ . , . _ _ , , , . . _ , _ _ _ _ _,m_ _ _ _ _ ________,.. ,__
' - % E
--h',
4 , r. , , +4 ,
,,6
, g
- -- 5vw < # = , ,,* - ,,,,w I* b- S 6 < J,4* ,4,.- '% , JI ,. k_ .
,.-.- g.
S 1 l .' t . ! e /4
." h . <l .',k
- A< ~
i
*..' . - l I',{ . 4 j
' . ;p
.'y. s .
tit, 5 g ~; . p, l i n,t
*es O
l 9' %
'g
. , m , :
- - a
,I[* {
.' '. (
s ?
. p e 4 n. <,. 3 ,.
l W
. 2, }: a -. k (1 :
U <. l~ g ,. t !!
. . 11 4 I.
% g ,:
s;e - r
. as *l6 45 en [
k - as . o y 4 j
- a. It
' s zi.
e :
>f e yj
=$ t
.. tl ,
- 8 :
f i
- 2. . d! t
.se. e g e' >4 ' ' .i'.
e g i i 4
- - - - Ci n %
w.nz .a. coa n ot. umm i t,
,~ . !
l
)
. r
.--r,--.-_..~.,,-.,,..- __. _ . . . - _ _ . , . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , , _ _ _ _ _ ;
, $ 'f^
$ g 4 .5 4 4 4 0
0
, . q.
- --, : N
**L
- I 0
9 0 0 0 ' M l s s. . f, G.3 5 - . _4g
. j
> f f'.
' 'l Y
i>O
,,.0..s -"
g- -
,, 4 _ ..__
- . m==
s
- s. l. , @ >_ _
l' f m M c Q
~
';s v .
r _-- y- _
, h .m -
s =
, C 4 2 -- . "'
, egar r, g
. 2 v-
- h. tj '
2 _ ,
- = -
- y. ,
(- - N
- b. _ -
% ,. -s -
li t' e 1 f 1; G .'= = - s. g,. :- . si (F ag O, ' aa w
.so' '_-
A_"' - (, g - n .
- '.l ...
J ' -[ -' "
* ^_
$4 y 85
=s _bj .
U E -
! N
(_. =. L= g -
. .. g~ T _--- -
q _- ' lX: l'
. W f "
l.'
- j g m
$ w MM "M
~
ll 6 I
- e.
- . a -
4 E- 4; J d d C Q3[ $$QQ b0 550$ 1
g I' 0 e
- - - -. - . , s
-i
,d
- l J. A f
.g e. . t g e e., is I g l .:)
d -. - k cn g Q 9 s *s' % ~ a
, g*4 e *, 's _ . ,
f-"" g, ( *, ?
.s g- :
=
- r. _.
.g 3 ls
,m
,O... m :- - - = ^
a
- en -- -- ~
'i : M
~ m K -
T
- h~ =
. L.
.. =
L'~ A :- .-
- z. .
f, T
= .z ^'
LL1 2 =
- w _ = 5 b, "U b ' _
, :4 lJ a-- .
- .?
N
^
r ". '_-
-" j
- ct
,,' 5 ? ' -
'd(., ~- L (1)
_ . .. 1 T , 3 E N LAfM F M M M h ' L d . 1 .
.. '2 .
V n = = - 2 ,t
,l ;
1:I C 2 - s . T ,'.
'g
. q ._ m _;g ;- .- . :
=$
(r- - . :..
. = . .=
1 = u.- = 1
'o .
b,
, u __ , -
f e, .e = : ,1 a s'
"a .
ug p
'"r =
='
m R h-)
. 13 " ,.-
L .' Q ,
.?.,e. Q; .' .
6 R , , x-a e . +' =
-. - M M
M f A M
-g "M --
M M V g
._M _ . - _
,-M _ m- ,- ,,-
- f
'M Q '
A,3 - - _ k A M w iv.1.v.a m va .ao ys,y
t*
- i . ~ .1 - _ .c..' s p,
=iJ
= *p;*~ ----*a -a - - , -t- : _ . W2 ;' . ;~- ; . N u .. . j Ih25,b 4
, , -g i e+ . ,~
s.i F. * *
.: . I s:T. .
n
.' ,. *g.
i %. a 4
.,l g ta On J'~ 1.%
C O e, b d 1
%e g'i - - s, .e o ... . m tu A"
bn
, M
. . - h~
... 40 W
+ u: -
2 al '
, p",. m1
,=
8 q~ 4 = - kL , q )S lV b _m g.a T- IE- ' R f _
-,M O L j a 4
- q. 1 _
7 - L 4 ag . -; b, ,; 5g -, - sa 4; , I _- m r *
}
- $ W , , , -
g li .
-s
- nw e i
i
~
I h : as 23 c.. p >: V emo
. . 1
. L U
d' 4 - 4
- g. e.
m im . -- . . l e 2
=
2
=
r
~. :o
& & C O
- O Au1Y tva A7m .do ySt }}
. . , ,q '.. : . y :,_ ,
y y .. :, ;.;. ;5:; .5;g ;,..
._ gg: _ _
Geble S,g-$-
.. Ab-SENSITIVITY OF FATAL AND_IEJURY DISTANCES _IO_ RELEASE _MAGMLTiiDE j ASSUMPTIONS: NEW YORK CITY METEOROLOGY, 3'112 MW(t) PWR, AND NO EMERGENCY RESPONSE SOURCE: NUREG/CR-2239, NOV. 1982 FATAL DISTANCE (MI) INJURY DISTANCE (MI)'
ACCIDENT REIFASE* MEAR 901 99% MEAN 901 991 - SST1 3.9 8.0 ' 12 11 20 35 2.5 5.0 10 7.0 12 20 _ 1/2 SST1 , 1/10 SST1 0.9 2.0 2.2 2.8 5.0 10 1/20 SST1 0.5 1,2 2.0 1.9 3.5 7.0 , 1/100 SST1 -0 41 1.0 0.9 2.0 - 11 . 0 f
- RELEASE FRACTIONS REDUCED FOR ALL IS0 TOPES EXCEPT N0BLE GASES .. ,
. g.
4
~
s .- L . .w s D
. . ;; . : ' *H J. 5_N -l
" .*!_ ; : L -_ ..;__- 4 -
J
, . . . . .!W ~ - ~
." -i
's d*- ." J
- 1
.; r. .; 2;.,
- .e . .
r m. p : pv -.
- I . -t 3...,. .
=6 $ "
, y- :
. n.
g' g 5 h--1 ! II * : w 5 4 ', , D,,. e . $' = ( *$ e* u : 1 _
~
. b e.
l m m w i 3 _: t + = +f M ;
- !{ .
m
- :)
e . r - . . g
. . m - -
'j 6 ,
% t.
,m,ss .u .u- -
= - .
-. rc = 0 - -
. d 2 -
- .- = :
h a. 1 2 ' kC ^ m ^_-
=
L. p .-- b = 3 p _u _ .. u m m M m ' ' M L _ . . . ., -
--m 1 **
N _ L L . T 7
- 1 _. . _
A 4 A
- g =. -
. : - =
A, 5 Q -- ti : - , i i : Y. $a as V. , m c : I "_- ' y wi 1 = i ^- _. / _- a 4
- " _ - r y , .- .- ;
).
- 0:' ' ; _ c r f .e i ..
b.a _, =. -
- ;= _
og ' .' m"1 2~ " s _" .:. M
- 3': _
_m
.~
' Y Ci , , . -
t2 M F V - - -
. 8
.m .
.W-M
_""M _"~
-:-: c<
= .: =
,"~- l-
-M A
- g.' "",,-
s-- -" s y 2,-- --2 - -
-- *%e M .- M M M-E M- m M" M ETI g Y LM
% w w w q v e o e . . .
A;t!O S M.C ATDY5 dC .
> $ l h,
i .
* * ::- * -..l s
,y l __
,4 3
'., h $ ...E.
Q~:. u.. I
'F;'
. -{
E.* ',.$ t M {N d. e
', . 4
.5 . .g,
;,e %
.. .s.
Q (d c2, .
**?. ,
- 'i < 11 s , ___-
9 rr g N M
^ 3h m
~
', o e .
- t~ w 61 -
~?
g
^-
N at, ... 4
"- D :
H 2 ,
- 2 '
- j h a j y - -
)\fy I; a
4 l i
. d ,
4 n - lL! k L' .'
= -
, . . g, : I o l-j:. _2 2 aH l' S es ; r d l- ~l = . . .
;l
-o \
.... j$ @ _
T s3 . (-
- . ) -
~. 4 = -
!! ' ;M ut 3 _=
7 i . 22 0
=
. W "m
~ :
4 i.. Q " l*. *d - 6- b. _/ lN : t I l :, . _- l... ~
- l. g -
',., m ime l'
, ,- N
(. l
^^ '
a : - -- -
=
= = .- = =, =
= - - - . Oi d o' d o' C %
N OZN.L" A '1 8 W S 8 0 $0
~.- -
1
. l-
,_"v...-: n .- . Q,.:. r .;. .~.,;.,5. ;. .W.z
.a ,
. . . - . :';g;' :, .: .... .
(. r',
^
O .
... ) . .
r;g 3.5-*~ ( NYC WEATHER,
SUMMARY
EVACUATION a 10-s y i m = D SSTl X 10-R~ m - o SST2 M ,i
% A SST3 M - ? ~
b -i \ : + SsT1,2,3 - - B 10 i E o E- 10-f 1_ M = p - O 10-si f5 u N 7..
< 10~61:
o _ E-
- 2 -
m F-10-r1: . a : - - m 10-ae :i, o _E x : m -e
,,v, p 10 ,. ,,, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
to
~
0.5 - t 100 . G DISTANCE (MILES)
-- r _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . _ _ _ _
. '. . .~..s 5. ;- . . . .
A n, 'p- _
-' 'g d t
. Ik * { $,1 l Nt NIN $ Y$
- y j f,4
.'r:
) lm. g 3.3. s kkeuL -- O 4 Leh . 9
)
> .b f9 b
*4 v
e 6. e 0 0 9 4 t 9 O 9-g t* 4 9 a e
- ee .
, , m ,
~
e
. r k
g 3,3,% , . Time of Release of Severe Accident Sequences f The timing associated with severe accidental releases of radioactivity is
?. . ,n, important because it provides insight into the degree of urgency with which protective actions, such as evacuation or sheltering, need to be initiated to provide an effective response.
A major study which has investigated severe accident sequences, including
; ., their timing, is the Reactor Safety Study Methodology Applications Program 'T
( RSSi'AP) . This study, using the methodology amoloyed by the Reactor Safety
- Study (WASH-1400), examined the risk dominant accident sequences for four
~
specific light-water reactor (LWR) plants. These plants were Sequoyah Unit 1,
-. a pressurized water reactor (PWR) with an ice condenser containment and
'- ame.loying a Westinghouse-designed nuclear steam supply system (NSSS); Oconee Unit 3, a PWR employing a Babcock and Wilcox NSSS in a large dry containment; Calvert Cliffs Unit 2, a PWR with a Combustion Engineering NSSS in a large
,s dry contairinent; and Grand Gulf Unit 1 employing a General Electric designed boiling water reactor (BWR) NSSS and a GE Mark III pressure-suppression 1- contairunent. The RSSMAP study analyzed the probability of occurrence of key N core-melt sequences and also made use of the MARCH and CORRAL codes, developed from the Reactor Safety Study, to examine the timing of these sequences as well as the magnitude and type of radioactive fission products released. The results of the RSSMAP study have been published in four volumes as NUREG/CR-1659 from February 1981 to May 1982.
*e si
+
o- - . 2-
-^'
f 3 b- Results on the timing of severe releases for each of the four plants are a b} shown in the accompanying tables. The table lists for each plant the probabi-A 9 lity of core-melt squences which would lead to a severe radioactivity p[9 c release (taken as equivalent to an SST1 release, using the nomenclature of A..- NUREG/CR-2239, or a PWR 1, 2, 3 or a BWR 1 or 2 release, using the termino-l,fi logy of WASH-1400). Each table also lists the dominant accident sequences 1 i~
; for each plant, the estimated annual probability of occurrence for each
{:j sequence, the time after the sequence comences when the release begins, i and the relative contribution of each sequence to the total probability of .
- l i- a severe release. .
l
~
From these tables it can be seen that the time when release begins can range from values significantly less than one hour to times on the order of one day with.a large fraction of the sequences having release times of about two to three hours. Of interest also is the fraction of sequences where the time of release is less than two hours. These sequences are considered to be fast-developing. From the tables it can be seen that the fast-developing
; sequences are estimated to constitute about 3 percent of the total sequences
. for the Calvert C1 'fs plant and range to a high of about 30 percent for the Oconee plant, with the two other plants having values of about 15 percent.
'- Conclusions o The time of release for severe acciw requences ranges from values significantly less than one hour to times on the order of one day,
;. f with two to three hours being typical.
ll
--w ,-,- ,_ _
3 lli;
)[j o The probability of a sevGre sequence being a fast-developing one, w
hj . that is, where the time of release is less than two hours, ranges 9.c S.s from 3 percent to 30 percent, with about 15 percent being typical.
.I g ' '. j i **,;
- 4. 2 ak s
f & e a , d 0
-0 t
a 8g- !.g
- 4 1
J9 OA g. f .* l* i 1
-f j y ; y Q (, 'i= $5YERE "^ RELEASES ;. TO P.
ln.s '. T 3, Oc.oV E E v .. & ~ PROS AE IL IT >' 01= CORE- HELT S EQdtpces 8:yieg i.L:. i;!.
~
ll- 'R\ SE T~0 S G*1~ L
.
- ret EASES = 3 b 210 E $~YEUTS
'.... SEQUENCE pro B. TIHE 07 REtEASE ?N08. $NW (HsrJ.) . SST) 7Et2ASE TM KV -Y 3.9 xif' < 6o +,+ . o.I/ V H.O 1.li 6 7- mur . O.II SD-Y 2. Y A si' 7i e ,+ . o c6 c
~
'T M Qb '$ ~1. 5 x lo ' 71 m;m 0.0 20
~
~7" M L U -Y 7 . ') x.10 3. 0 ~2 m,y . O . 07 'l
~
- 0. IS'
~T*H Q - Ft 't S. S 2 lo ' > 7 0 *l. m om .
T HQ-FH-Y 3. E > ti" ') :' 0 2 m A o.06$
' -b 0.l37 SH-Y E.o x to '> >.o z m A SYP-Y c'L . I }. l 5 '> % 0 2. m ak 0. 0 Sit
-b '/ 9 0 2 M ,,9 0.00
'. T HLOO-Y ~7 4 .x to
- .soms: mets /ce_ uss I
%I,k 2,5 -1
m_ . Ti M IuG OF _ _}T V LE E_ EFA E ACE 1 F0 R-Q'. k!k C A L VER.T CLI FF S ig - r.i . '?N*
. . T903 ABILITY 0F GonE- HELT SEqaEpcEs Civi og
- .j .
.i 3 .y 'RiS E TO SGTL 'REL.E AS ES = l. S .<IO N' EVi?A)TS '! SEqoEscs Pitoa , 1'ist. or Retrass M 6Mi
( H IV.) 8bD i *
- g.
, 4,1 Xio 4 6 0 m ,+ .}
i T KH L T[ 'o.0A8 [ d ~D $ $.0 Yl0 l N M i% 0.05 Y T H Q - 14 s,[ A.3 x 10 1}0 m A 0. 016 .j , TH Q -TH V % . 4 x to' r i go mis o, os7
.'t 1' t 'i~ H L %T I
- l. Al XIO Idmik C.32 s.
2' TM L 00' [ l.0 X to
- 3i M,s 0.06f Scoue:Hverc/c.e-1651
% Lle 3.5 1
~'/N / Al f CF 8EVEhE 'R F4 F A6 FS ~
Fo R e GRhab CVLF N.
- .5
.j:l 'PR0 3h8IL sTY OF CofE- HELT SEQUENCES Civ / H C
> .g i ' RISE To SSTl REL EA.GE = 0. 0 X10 EV E HT.S
- . PRov, c,9rw
.. SEQQENCE PR D'$ . TIMt 0F'RELEME S STI EEL 1 E (Min . ) o -4
'i~C - 0 4*. t Xio 90 wir . C.lG 4
-TPQT-T 5.3 XIa 1190 m:4. O./G
# 13 fo m ,*
TRW- f l.f xti o.sf
', ST-5 4.b xt? ~ I400 mar . o.14 O
soeca.. vues/ce- us9 E e
^
N IM I h) G OF SE VE R E TfE L E ASES Foit j, d SEQ UOYA H i: 1 I.g W I l$ TR05 A5I L ITY CF CDRE- HE LT GEQUweES GivlNG -
- r.
i1 _s 1!. RISE To ssit EtLEASE = 3, b xto 1 '
.: 'EVEMT.S 'l ~PR03. CN E )
SEQ 0 sues TBo~5. Tnt or TELTASE gg7, pggyy y
- c s , a.) -- -
~b 32**,
V .f x to O. M
-g '
' 9. x to ( l o mix , O.CS QM -d'
%HF-Y ( x io 191 mia. 0.11
-0 o,08 f S, H F-8/ ~3 % to 919 m y,
'TML-[ 3 x to'b '). 3 % * .4 O. 0% 6 4
i 0% I o - I 1-
-fg l, le '3. 3 - +
r :
".E t, $.', 3.3.3 Time-Dose-Distance Relationships l:h In addition to the timing when a release of a severe accident sequence begins, y.
v. V.p already discussed in the previous section, one must also assess the cate at which an individual would accumulate a given radiation dose af ter a release !
- .?
"; connences, assuming a fixed location and release characteristics. This type of infonnation is displayed in a curve or a set of curves known as a time-dose-distance relationship since it shows time plotted along the ordinate vs. the observer's distance along the absicissa, with values of
- h. constant dose as a parameter. This information Wis not available from the II published literature for core-melt releases, and was therefore specifically developed for this stuoy.
ie : Sandia National Laboratory was requested t'. Yem . ' analysis to determine the cumulative ' hole-body dose vs. distance wiu, tra time from the beginning of the release shown as a parameter. . This information was generated for each of three core-melt releases, namely, SST1, SST2 and SST3, and for two constant weather conditions for each release: (1) a pasquill "D" stability with a 10 mph windspeed, which corresponds approximately to a 50 percentile atmospheric dispersion condition; and (2) a Pasquill "F" stability with a 5 mph windspeed, which corresponds to about the worst 15 percent in terms wrac ca*
' ~
3dtd of atmospheric dispersion. Parametric curves of dose vs. distance ba-- :1
. for times after release of 0.5,1.0,1.5, 2, 3, 5 and 10 hours. Th h, 3 7:::-r d 5: : n "';u :: 2.:.l' _ ..y ....,L l
I
. s ,
2 DII i' ;.
- n. .'- - s... n. . . , , , ~ , a ,- .n g o., _ ng -3 4,4 3 <n%,
f.I I.aesenmaadb,Te data were cross-plotted to show time from beginning of ' O . Jg release vs. distance with dose as a parametar. These curves, the time-dose- '? - 7.3-1 3,3-di
,j distance relationships, are presented in Figures 2.0.0 7 through 9,$s4=>l.
% Only one curve is shown for the SST3 release, since the reach of this . release, in terms of distance, does not extend beyond about 2 miles, even
. for the lower level PAG's and for adverse meteorology.
Results and Discussion
, An examination of the time-dose-distance relationships shown in Figures 3,3 - 1 3. 3 -5 weinM to 4uissWm1 indicate that, for a given dose, each of the curves displays a similar general characteristic in that the time to accumulate tt,at dose increases monstonically with distance, with the slope of the curve also increasing with distance. Ati some partic
- ular distance the slope of the curve becomes essentially vertical. The significance of that distance is that, beyond it, it becomes virtually impossible to receive a dose in excess 5 of the given amount, since a very long time would be required to receive it. '
With this general characteristic in mind, it becomes possible to reach some conclusions after examination of these figures. 3,'s -5' l From an examination of Figure , it is clear that for an S5T3 release.
,m
,3. g . ; . u . . . ,, 7 ;;7; =3 77 g ,n , that at distances beyond about 2 miles, times well in excess of 12 hours would be required before an individual receives a dose in excess of the lower level PAG U $ rs
, ms. A
<i r m hoie body), p ye<. m a m g e4
4 g i 4
. o. . .
c;
- l. 7,3- 3 Y From Figures 2.1 : 0 and' W, it can be seen that for an SST2 release, Si.} r:::- ' , & t 20 ;;r;;. Of th; . n ; - :: :-_ A that at distancos P ,;...
a. f.j. beyond about 1 mile, very long accumulation times would be required before
- a. :
ff.' an individual receives a life-threatening dose (200 rem or more, whole 13.; 7.. body). At distances of about 2 miles and beyond, an exposure time of 2
,-?:
.i hours or more from the beginning of the release is required to produce a dose sufficient to produce early injuries (50 ren or more, whole body).
.i
l , For the most severe core-melt releases (SST1) t- g == . -.3 _L; : ' O ;; r = t.
- p. B. S ~l 2
; g - _m1 m,--+.
Figures 3stuM and 8 show that individuals within 2
- \:
. miles can receive life-threatening doses within short time periods after the beginning of a release (time periods of 1 hour or less). Consequently,
. individuals in these locations are under the greatest degree of urgency, and protective actions,. particularly evacuation, should be commenced as early as practicable when a general emergency is declared to maximize the available time orior to the occurrence of a release.
For the most severe core-melt releases, the degree of urgency for individuals
. 7. 3 - 1 0 located from 2 to 5 miles away has eased somewhat. Figures 3 &,6=7 and 7 show that for average weather conditions, the time required to receive a life-threatening dose is from 3 hours to well beyond 12 hours after the
,' beginning of a release; while for adverse weather conditions an exposure
[, ' time of 1 to 3 hours after the beginning of release is required. s .-- - , ,. -
t l /.: . 1
- F 2.;
'T
,. Assuming the most severe core-melt releases, the time required to receive 4'; life threatening doses for individuals located from 5 to 10 miles away has a:.r
.t.0,P eased even more. For average weather conditions, times well beyond one day o
f'M are required; while for adverse weather conditions exposure times ranging +.. . f!! .3 from 3 to 10 hours after the beginning of release are required. e +
.s 0 9*
t
.Yg 4 'p d'
4 e 4 6 4 4 9 0 4 h 4** t G t 4 4 mn O e W n 8 4
~-
4 a 4 - e
^ ^ ' *
's
. -..': i- .
4 4. I" . . y,, p y -) . . . . . p .
. .rr. g i'.;,I.' /%
t.u r ig .
.' ,j (.l . ~. g 3.: d9 . ,,. . . ...
- f. . . . ..
u . . . . ... . k Ec. p m.. E tl, g$.e, op g s 7
.g .
.Q
;,,q . .o . . .
.h
.w ,
. _ T.
,i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,
p . .
.k .. . . . . . . . . .-
f....R. - j.
\g .
y . . . . . . 4 . .
'Q . . . . .. ... . . . . . .
5 g . . . . . v, . _ . . . . . O
.~ . o y . 5, g
i . . n . .. . . : g .A . . . ... . . E g Q m
) .
q, t .g . . . . 8 n h- . . . . ..
, n . . . . .
O. . .. .
.j .
d o , 4o n3 N 1'.. I
.p
.{
y, 4
.e.
~3 g
./R m
G
.j.
~.
y c M'. 4 . .
. g. y .
a g .
- 1. .
t.
.to v1
. . . d, 3
.s
.w)
.,,g.,
4 3 i. l, 4 .het V q 4 V s g . .. A L -. _ _.
- l. . . <'t .
s . . . p 1 . l 0 n aw
- d. m N
- e = t -
53coH '23Ya'7.tg 20 '3rrmen338 HH.d SHIL.
-:' .:i .~; , .: ; .
,: ; .. +
-~
. : ;(; *;: ,l:f.3:[. ; Vyg.;.gy;flg;y: .__
rnd de. 3.7:5t a -2. i o
*TI tvt E - poSl~ - hlSfA AIC E R M .A TI DA) S H ! P^ .
' Q I). . 5 ASSU H PTooNS c II ' g ,o SSTi Release, II2o Hwe 7edor- . w . . g . m A Lr Release brain . . . . . y9 . w ' D=2ooWo. k g c r+M tvectku: k F"SM.I.t,Eer4;,vhg g . 9 - Faelors Nor d Acle.lg . . . . 5 4eIJ,ag y&
~
Q wkok sig h e Mosso s . m tu g . D_ a poo % . po g y o 9 - x - w v=so 3 tu _ o- sk<s.- (2 O I 2 3 .
+ E .6 7 8 -
9 . e .
. .e . - e .e .
. g e .
Es+asce, Hilos Surae:1.%We M S % solsIsL s
..... ...y.
.. ...u; ..,c.. :., ,-. ..... .v. .:.-
. . . - - ; . -..c.-, . . . . _ . .. .. . . .
. i..
.......n..-
.. . . . . . .u.a I
1 F,'gaa. *:. : . : .
* ~*
- ~ lim E - DOSG - DISTAMC E R&LAT)DNSH1P ,
l s
; 12
- S t
li D = soo Remi D = 5 R s ,n s D=ls % 1 D =25%
-t y A SS U M PTI ONS
~
- ta .
% i Q D=56 % .
$8T2 Releas<Ar-ll2.0 Mwe Rese gg ,.
re '
. 2 kr Release]>arslion q y
, e . ConsAf IUca.fAer: e 4
.* D" Sidelsk, lannyk.
?
\
.I susandstv'd . .
V
$ 3* . .
5 je i Sreldon &for: . 4 .
. . norwr Aniow& :
x .
&3 WA,/< kly Dase 5A .
w. w 9, . .
~
I . . . Y . . .D = I Rem \ . . . . l =- . . i . ( .
=
8; ' Doshnee' niles
%eee.: b. Asp <H,t..%Rel;.
svivits_ .
r =.- ..- -
. ..m . .. .,_.. .v. ... ., .. u. ...u.a r.
...--- . . c. . ,
.. _m 2.
~
l-
- r. p :a.3-y -
TIH E - Dose-DISTAMa E RE&T1oNSHI P t 12 f N 11 b , s D=5a tem x D=25 %
~
~ . . . . . .
ASSU MPTIONS lb . ..
<9 l u, . . . . . . . .
s
. . . SST2. Reinase >
cg D=2co% D= loo % , . . , , , . : . l120 he . Resetor-l . K , . . ... . . g . . . l y . , . ... l
. . 1kr Release.kedtw 7 - ; -
cs
, 6 - - - - - - - - l - - - -
^
- foerta d k b fAert 2 . . .. . . . . . . . . i . . . **F" $ leis)nh; SefL R g . . . . . . . . . . i ide$JsFeJ
~ .
% Normal Ae-hvh w9 . . . .
N ^ . . , . , . . . . . iakole & J/Dese 8 - ' - - - - D
- 80 N'M 5 Io 3 M . l . . . .. . .
k I 2 - - '
- - I - ' -
W . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T . j . i .. pg . . . . . . . . o . I 2 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 .7. 8.. 9
= .
. 6 . .. . . . - . . . .
D85Yd AC'8 3 d I!d S i . .. . .
. . . Sov roc. :. b Ai de fo k-
r . .>
. 4 . , ;. : ss
- ~,.'.~',..-,,.,..,..._..s._.:
. . .~.,
' 4 s.o.s.
? .* . . . . . :1.= f..w;.
, . . . *.: 1
- l'.
,_ ;. , . ,. . ~
Fig 5.3-5 - - - -
* ~. .
~
TiHE - b oSE -hos TA uc E ITEl ATtoNSN
,1 . .. . . i .
- m sp
. . . . i . -
s
- 9. y . . . - - .
s ' . . .... Q y = l Rem . . , ... IO - . sis' n a .
- ASS UM pts p AIS . .
' R I kn 1 -
', SSf3. ' Release, . .
- nc ll9 o Mwe Resefor .
k 7 o ... . . . , ... . 4.hr. Relesse Darefses , .... g 4 . .. . . . > . . : . . . : i.. . A s . ,...
.i , , , . [0Ar.t*ad. idedier : . . . ,...
j $,S I i- -
. Y ' f " 'IY E f h; '* N W s g . . . . . . . . '
j un .
..j . i . . , . .
.S , .e Fh d. .. or: . .
'
- f ~
s . .FIwas A.d v. ..,. I 3 .' . . . .- . . . .......i.,: - i o w A . / e w J y D o r e . a .- _ . , , e . . . . .
- i .- - - - - --
2 - iu . ,
- j;i.. . . .
z . . . I
~
F l - I.l l l i i i . i i :
.......j....
i -. -
- .i... i . . .
i .0. 1ii;.2.iis ii4.. 5...C. 7;,i*i.' 9 . . l - . 4 . - g ? i . I i : . i i- . .: . , i . . I i ..,! . i
' i i j , i i .
i -
! i
. i i
. . . . 0,xta. ace, neles 'i . . , , ,. i . .- .
. ecce:...
. i : . i i, .i , . , i . . .
, tz b. les.
i . i :
- l l
. Ii.-.
i . . , .
; i . i
' . : . . . . e . .
a l I (h '
,a 3.3.4 Conclusions Yi An examination of the time of release for severe accident sequences as well ?:!
q.;. as the time required for an individual to accumulate a given dose at various [ distances leads to the following conclusions: 6.i
- t
; o The time of release, that is, the time between accident initiation and when the release comences for severe accident sequences ranges s- ,- frem values significantly less than one hour to times on the order of one day, with 2 to 3 hours being typical.
c{
. o The probability of a severe sequence also being a fast-developing one, that is, where the time of release is less than 2 hours, ranges
, from 3 percent to 30 percent, with about 15 percent considered to be
, typical. ,
.*4Ap o For i:' 1 ;;=t F core-melt releases (SST3) inoividuals located L beyond about 2 miles from the retetor would require an exposure time
-' after the beginning of the release of well in excess of 12 hours before f
,u receiving a-dose that exceeds the lower level PAG value (1 rem whole L body). Hence, short-term protective actions beyond about 2 miles cla ',tet' 1
.- appear to be warranted for - = 9 - 2 " - - - "
~
__ : :'". -tkes e. L events. 1. l .onost [. o For 2::t " ;.. xc.; e4 core-melt releases (SST2 and SST3), individuals J. f, located at about 2 miles and beyond would require an exposure time after f[.' the beginning of release of at least 2 hours before receiving a dose likely to produce early injuries (approximately 50 rem whole body).
*W
~
i
, x. !
,] o For the most severe core-melt releases (SST1),
p ----* a' "' nr; n't Pt. individuals within 2 miles can receive h.. i life-threatening doses (200 rem or more, whole body) within time
+I3 ;.
periods of 1 hour or less after the beginning of a release. Individuals l (.h in these locations are under the greatest degree of urgency, given this
!.N
!.. type of release, and evacuation should be consnenced as early as practi-j
- g. cable when a general emergency is declared to maximize the available
' I to 2
- . time prior to the occurrence of a release. Since about^186 percent of
,c', a et iJ fo20 all core-melt releases (or M percent of SST1 releases) are also fast-g 3 developing, an evacuation time of 2 hours for people within 2 miles can provide a high. ' r 2_ O degree of assurance that life-threatening Lvolkd
- doses would set be g n M ::f in the event of a core-melt.
o For the most severe core-melt releases, the degree of urgency for individuals located from 2 to 5 miles away has eased somewhat. For P average weather ennditions, the time required to receive a life-threatening dose is from 3 hours to well beyond 12 hours after the
.' Low.es
- beginning of a release; whee for adverse weather canditions an exposure time of 1 to 3 hours after the beginning of release is required.
o Assuming the most severe core-melt releases, the time required to 9 L receive life-threatening doses for individuals located from 5 to 10 miles away has eased even more. For average weather conditions, times y ~ well beyond 1 day are required; while for adverse weather conditions W exposure times ranging from 3 to 10 hours after the beginning of reletse l are required. l
L il f0 ~ [w 4.0 Protective Action Strategies hN 4.1 Selection of a Protective Action Strategy lf, Based on the preceding discussion of the variation of risk with distance as well as considerations of timing, it is possible to devise a reasonable '.t f E.7 protective action scheme that is capable of dealing both with relatively h probable small-scale accidental releases as well as with the more unlikely, / but large-scale releases. b . Because of the risk variation and timing considerations noted earlier, a 8.; distance of about 2 miles and a time frame of about 2 hours has significance, ,. for the taking of prompt actions for all core-melt events. Consequently, the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ should be divided into 2 zones. The first zone, referred to as the Prompt Action Zone (PAZ), should extend from the reactor out to about 2 miles. A design objective or g'oal should be to have
~
the capability to evacuate-essentially all persons within this area in abdut ~ 4Xc4 f f aC4d./ conditions, or other 2 hours, except underg conditions where road travel becomes temporarily delayed. The second zone is the remainder of the EPZ. The size (about 2 miles radius) of the prompt action zone (PAZ) is based
. primarily upon the following considerations:
o For Ncore-melt accidents W, projected doses would m, not exceed the Protective Action Guide (PAG) levels beyond this f, distance; 1 y .-
l.~, . 2- {V m os+ !! o For a4aseomm64 core-melt accidents 6stssam324, projected doses Wd would be unlikely to result in early injuries beyond this distance; ',?; x: :,
.; i se
{,', ' o Prompt evacuation of the population within this distance and imediate sheltering beyond would provide a large reduction in to
'["
risk de the highest risk group and would also provide additional V. , _: time to assess the developing situation further to decide upon and implement required protective actions, as necessary, beyond this
}'
di s tance . The design objective to have'the capability to evacuate essentially all persons within the proposed prompt action zone (PAZ) of about 2 miles radius, within approximately 2 hours is based upon the following considerations:
. o For dcore-malt accidents W, response times of about a day or more would be available before projected doses are expected to exceed the Protective Action Guide (PAG) levels.
wt ^ - 3 , an evacuation
., o For =W core-melt accidents ' ,- within this time would be unlikely to result in doses capable of producing early injuries.
b e eG* -
- 4. en e.. , ,
t.. i!'.1} o For the worst ' core-melt accidents, warning times (prior to (.f', 2,'[ release) of 2' hours or more are predicted for about 80% to 90% 1[) of severe accident sequences. (.;.h o An evacuation of the PAZ within this time frame is considered
?'.*ii
, achievable for almost all sites.
kf'-
.l > Since about 1% to 2% of all core-melt accidents (or 10% to 20% of SST1
'E ,. releases) are estimated to result in severe releases that will also be
.: fast-developing (warning times less than 2 hours), an evacuation time of 2 hours for individuals within the P.AZ can provide a high, but not absolute,
,- degree of assurance that life-threatening doses would not be received in the event of a core-melt.
This protective action strategy'is illustrated in the accompanying Table 4.1-1. 6 4 4 4 [* l: l'r.
.d*e ,
0*,g Il V '. ~' e l m . _
.- ,.~,; . ,. >, . 2 3. a; n.:. y?nl_::. ,, -
"I;A ^tf L 1- H. I - I ACTION (S) TO BE PLANNED DISTANCE IMPACT AND TIMING ANO RATIONALE 0-2 miles SST3 (70%) ACTION (S): Prompt evacuation (within 2 hours) upon declaration of a general o exceed lower level PAG (I resa) emergency in a complete circle within ,
2-12 hours after release 2 miles. (Expected to be carried out for all 4 SST2 (20%) core-melt events, SST1, 2 or 3.) Average dispersion:* RATIONALE: For most core-melt events, I have about 2 hours from accident initiatie - o no life-threatening doses to beginning of release. Difficult to distinguish between SST1, 2, or 3 at earl: o injury producing doses 1.5-8 hours stages of event. Want to start moving after release people as a precaution prior to release. ' This buys time to assess situation at Poor dispersion:** greater distances.
~
o life-threatening doses 2-8 hours after release o injury producing doses 0.5-2 hours - after release SST) (10%)
- Average dispersion taken as Pasquill "D" stability with 10 mph windspeed (50-Average dispersion:* percentile conditions).
O life-threatening doses 0.5-3 hours ** Poor dispersion taken as Pasquill "F" after release stability with 5 mph windspeed (90-o injury producing doses 0.25-1 hour after release Poor dispersion:'* o life-threatening doses 0.25-1 hour after release o injury producing doses 0.1-0.5 hours after release
- - .: . ; t . . y!.:V 't &.;,.4
.ft.y.;
,89.i: ,,
, , ..' .-/ .. ,* : '.. ea, ?-
.l ACTION (S) TO BE PLANNED 4 DISTANCE IMPACT AND TIMING AND RATIONALE- , 2-5 miles SST3 (70%) ACTION (S): o does not exceed lower level PAG I. Isunediate sheltering upon declaration ? - of general emergency. (Expected to * , ! SST2 (20%) be carried out for all core-melt ' ' events, SST1, 2 or 3.) Average dispersion:* II. Delayed evacuation, as necessary, for~ { o no injury-producing doses downwind sectors after assessment of - i situation. (Expected to be carried o exceeds upper level PAG (5 rem) out for 30% of core-melt events, SST) l-3 hours after release and 2.)
!, Poor dispersion:** RATIONALE: Have additional time to asses:
i! situation. o no life-threatening doses For SST3, no additional protective actioni
! O injury producing doses 2-12 hours needed.
i after release For SST) and 2 have about I hour after SST) (10%) release, or 3 hours after accident initia. tion, before serious effects experienced. Average dispersion:* For poor dispersion conditions, shorter response time is necessary. o life-threatening doses 3-12 hours . after release
' o injury producing doses 1-3 hours after release k
- Average dispersion taken as Pasquill "0"~
- Poor dispersion'** stability with 10 mph windspeed (50-o life-threatening doses 1-3 hours Percentile conditions).
a er release ** Poor dispersion taken as Pasquill "F" ' stability with 5 mph windspeed (90-o injury producing doses 0.5-1.2 hours percentile conditions). after release . i . 4
^ ~
.; .y:j,_: .g:,Qj;3 .fi,g ,
.> : - . }. y. ; . .y,Y. s - -
_ .ll.[. t. ACTION (S) TO BE PLANNED IMPACT AND TIMING AND RATIONALE DISTANCE
~
5-10 miles SST3 (70%) ACTION (S): o does not exceed lower level PAG I. Immediate sheltering upon declaration-of general emergency (expected to be' .s - SST2 (20%) carried out for all core-melt events, "" SST1, 2 or 3). Average dispersion:* - II. Delayed evacuation, as necessary, for o no injury producing doses downwind sectors after assessment of situation (expected to be carried o exceed upper level PAG (S rem) out for 10% of core-melt events, SST))~ 3-12 hours after release RATIONALE: Have still more time to assess Paor dispersion:** situation. O no injury producing doses For SST3, no additional protective action
~
needed. o exceed epper level PAG (5 rem) , l-3 hours after release - For SST2, sheltering provides significant , dose sayings. i SST) (10%),
' For SST1, have about 3 hours af ter release Average dispersion:* or 5 hours after accident initiation, befo serious effects experienced.
o no life-threatening doses , Tor poor dispersion conditions, shorter i o injury producing doses 3-11 hours _ response time is necessary. after release . Poor dispersion:**
- Average dispersion taken as Pasquill "D" o life-threatening doses 3-10 hours stability with 10 mph windspeed (50- ,
after release percentile conditions). o injury producing ooses 1-3 hours ** Poor dispersion taken as Pasquill "F" after release stability with 5 mph windspeed (90-percentile conditions). I
o..
-1 .
39' g.S 4.2 Estimated Consequences for Various Protective Action Stra.t..!gies
,:,. ;g' I. .'. 4.2.1 Introduction .
y-f'.Sa' Previous sections have suggested that a protective action stmtegy which
~': .
Jj;, incoroorates a prompt evacuation within about 2 miles, with imediate
- .y cs sheltering followed by relocation beyond 2 miles may be effective in consequence mitigation for a spectrum of severe accidents. In orde.r to test this as well as other alternatives, it was decided to examine the
,'. ;; calculated consequences for these strategies by use of the CRAC code.
t
' 'i The calculations as well as the results are discussed below. , me*
e-u t i i T, l Y l l
.. _. - .- . . . :-_. .. . ._= -.
~. ~ .
~f/fff i . ,
.f i cy.
t[p 4.2.2 Consequence Calculations 3 . .. e A number of calculations were perfonned to estimate the relative worth of D various shelter and evacuation emergency response strategies for a spectrum v:.
,.y of accidental release scenarios. The set of calculations will be described .Y/ in this chapter. The results are discussed elsewhere in this report.
BASIC ASStJMPTIONS Three accident source tenns were used for the calculations: SST1, SST2 and
; SST3. These cover the range of possible timings and release fractions of the 4
, core inventory to the atmosphere from the early, prompt release of major fractions of the core inventory of radionuclides (SST1) through the delayed melt-through release mode (SST2), to the relatively w' ell contained lengthy, slow release casehfTh Three estimates of the timing of evacuation initiation by the public were used for the calculaticas: 1/2 hcur after the beginning of the postulated release; at the beginning of the release (0 hr); and 1/2 nour before the beginning of the release. Initial scoping calculations had shown that the major perspectives to be brought forth regarding timing of response could be acequately scoped within this range. . Earlier evacuation provided little additional benefit, and N later evacuation will be shown to be clearly contra-indicated. Evacuation before a release would be dictated by in-plant Emergency Action Levels rather than ex-plant radiological measurements. [ Emergency responses were scoped by varying evacuation speed, distances within
? which evacuation would occur, and estimates of times spent in shelter before .
- v. .~ , . . . , f .
.'.g
. relocation. Evacuation speeds were varied from a walking speed of two miles yl per hour to ten miles per hour. These are not estimates of actual travel tf .
speed that could be accomplished. N1 Rather, it was recognized that at speeds
'l:)
- ,* ' greater than 10 mph evacuees could outrun most releases since wind speeds w.
,.4 average 5 to 10 moh. Also, speeds less than walking speed would be unrealistic,
. based on infomation from evacuations of historical record.
, ?.' r. A slightly modified version of the CRAC2 code was used for the calculations. This version provides for three emergency response zones rather than the two
- zones provided in earlier versions.
..g In this version, evacuation is modeled in ) the first zone, nearest the release point. The radius of this zone is an option of the user. In the second and third zones pecole are always sed to the full plume. In these two zones the user has control of both the time of exposure to ground n. f ae from deposited radioactivity and protection factors for' cloud [MWM o
gamma, inhalation and ground shine pathways. The washout coefficient for rainfall
-, in CRAC2 was changed frcun 10-3/sec per mm/hr of rain (for unstable meteorology sequences) to 10~4/sec per nin/hr of rainfall. The lower value was used in the ori nal CRAC code developed for the Reactor Safety Study; it was r_. !::i ' -"# -
o A. . d w concort' better with measurements pf this carar eter. This lowering A Le>results
= ud.isCkFCA of the washout coefficient in lower g)round level dose rate estimates for A
a given rainfall intensity. The lower value is much more realistic and still ] ,' could be conservative, i.e., on the high side of reality. f., No other revisions of the CRAC2 code were made. 2 e 5 t , e-
fi Protection factors for cloud gamma, inhalation and ground shine pathways, used j::h for the calculations, are realistic for evacuees in automobiles and somewhat W
.ly conservative for people in single wood frame houses without basements. These
, are listed in Table _,. It was recognized that sheltering protection factors would be greater in other types of buildings, but that single wood frame dwellings are abundant and are the nonn in the near vicinity of reactor sites. Thus, the calculations pertain to near worst case sheltering. Since the protection (l >
factors are relatively large (poorer protection), the risk estimates made would p not be grossly underestimated for persons without shelter.
," It is noted, however, that the potential exists for nuch better protection factors for most people. Future risk studies should include the most realistic factors available, where they can be justified. Since the purpose here is to investigate
, the relative worth of various evacuation and sheltering schemes, and since (as will be shown) timing of protective actions is the most important parameter, by
, far, the higher protection factors used should not warp the relatig perspectives to a ma,ior degree. The most pronounced effect of better protection factors would be in the reduction of the estimates of early fatalities, because of the high threshold of dose required to induce this consequence.
The . weather sequences used for these calculations is the New York City National t: Weather Service data set which is available with the ORAC2 code. This selection was somewhat arbitrary, but it has been used in the recent past for numerous 3, consequence calculations perfonned for the NRC, which have been widely reported. Thus, there is a tie point for previous consequence calculations. P. , l
s _ .. .
. . . ~ . .. .. :.. . .,. . . . . .~
4 *b f TABLE u
- a. 4 73.s. PROTECTION FACTORS USED IN N: THE CALCULATIONS 1.; .
Y:.' [;h' Cloud Ground Gamma Inhalation Shine 9.4. u, , 'h Autos 1. 1. 0.5 , m 1 ...s.
- Residences 0.9 0.75 0.43 0g
- ?.
l6 ... e* g ? a 8 , ,s A O . e e i3 e.* i -:; r* 4 4 a e,
' _ *m, b
y h
#3 g..,
448 9 5 4 4
^ ^
,yc -
L. l& Nf.} It is noted that the average ("expected" in the statistical sense) consequence M estimates are dominated by nomal daytime and nighttime wind speeds of 5-10 mph, g; which are the nom across the U.S. w probability "peak" consequence estimates h h are associated with rare weather sequences, which may be different in different climates and places. Thus, the selection of different weather tapes would lead lhh [ to significantly different estimates of peak consequences, both in tenns of magni-y tude and probability. In brief, there is much greater confidence in the average 0 result than in the peak of the calculated distribution of consequences, regardless c of which weather tape is used for the es timates, v. It is noteworthy, also, in this regard, that the New York City weather tape rc nt of the time. Rainfall has been associated very includes rainfall some /x strongly with peak consequence estimates. Tnus , the peak consequence estimates should be on the worst case side of the uncertainty bound. A fictitious population distribution was used for these calculations. A popula-tion distribution is required as input in order to run the revised CRAC2 code. Also required as input is a specification of distance intervals within which consequences are calculated. For the calculations in this report a fine grid was used for close-in distances, but a population distribution in the CRAC2 files. was arbitrarily selected for this grid. As a result, the population density in these calculations is extremely large. i 1 This does not affect the dose calculations perfomed, but it does affect the absolute values o - culateg that they are unrealistically
~, high. Thus, in the displays of results, where the relative worth of various l
l
N;)- n emergency response strategies are being investigated, consecuence estimates
,Y of other than dose are displayed on an arbitrary scale. Finally, in this regard, at least cne person was assumed to exist at each grid point in the
.' r. 's
.C population distribution, i .e., zeros in the CRAC2 population data set were .
,.h set to one for these calculations.
;l DETAILS OF PROTECTIVE ACTION ASSUMPTIONS Various assumptions were made regarding the timing and extent of evacuation and
,; . sheltering responses to accidental releases. In no case was it assumed that h people would not respond in some manner to a core melt accident, i.e., either I
evacuation or shelter was assumed. The distances within which the evacuation option was assumed to be exercised was varied from two to ten miles. Further, relocation of those 1,n shelter was varied from 2 to 24 hours af ter plume passage. It must be recognized at the outset that there is no attempt here to assign a probability to people's behavior, as ,would be necessary for a risk analysis. Rather, the perspective is that of the energency planner: what would be the 1 best reconnendation to be made amongst various rational and feasible options to
$ meet basic radiation protection objectives? Further, can a simple, rational and nomally feasible set of recommendations be predetemined for the early phase of a General Emengency response, which would be suitable for a spectrum of C
core melt acciden to satisfy basic radiation protection objectives? All at the W W same time in full recognition that at times and for some people the predetermined @ reconnendations would not be feasible in the early time frame, that some peoole would ignore or go against the recommendation, that site specific factors could , 1
)
\
' ~
, . . . . . =. -
_7 3 h]5 <r be extremely important, and that the cognizant authorities at'some future time t,Yi could countemand the predetemined recommendations. W:, 4!
$l.2 In all cases investigated, people were assumed to leave contaminated areas within
.c
.- a reasonable time af ter plume passage. This assumes that in the event of an Ej actual release of contaminating radionulcides, radiological monitoring teams
- J' e would locate areas of heavy contamination and people would relocate from such g..
. areas . The CRAC2 code does not include a provision for people to leave areas ,- contaminated to a chosen dose rate, e.g., where the dose rate would exceed one rem per hour. Because of th[ restriction, all persons within the 2000 mile radius of the calculation were removed from the problem af ter times . selected as input. This is unrealistic, but it would affect the colle:tive dose and economic calculations, predominantly. Thus, the calculations of chromic exposures, normally perfomed by CRAC2, were not perfomed. This ses not. affect the results for the early phase of a response, i.e. , the time of interest. The spectrum of emergency responses investigated ranged from a simple initial
. sheltering everywhere strategy to an extremely rapid, early evacuation of at least nearby areas, and shelt r elsewhere stragey. The set of calculations perfomed is listed in Table,_ through _. The schemes are explained with reference to the first line in Table _. This case involved an evacuation within ten miles, at a speed of ten miles pher hour, starting at 3 hours af ter the t
start of the release. Beyond ten miles people in shehlers (see Table _) were
',. exposed to the full plume (puff) plus an additional 8 hours of ground contaW-
~ination. Note that only two zones (of the three available) were used in this
.: - , . . l
' \
8 l (? i N LIk calculation--thus, there is' a dash (-) in the fourth column. The dash indicates n.; fjd that early evacuees were exposed to various portions of cloud and ground contami-(S nation depending on wind speeds and travel times. This calculation is perfonned q ,n . - QT, automatically in CRAC2 for all early evacuees. i- ?~'f. The first case, just described, is a baseline case. It corresponds to the Summary fs G' evacuation case in NUREG/CR-2239. ' A second baseline case is described in the
.s*-
- f. second line of Table _. Here, a shelter only option in the early time frame
. t,-
.- is modeled, where everyone is exposed to the full plume and either 4 hours of
# - ground exposure within ten miles, or 8 hours of ground exposure beyond ten This models the longer duration it would likely require to find areas
,; mil es .
of high contamination at longer distarces. Note that elapsed time from the start of an accident would be longer than 4 or 8 hours .due to delay before release and, especially, plume travel time to various distances. 'For eyampl e, for wind speeds of 5 mph, persons at 50 miles would leave no earlier than 18 hours after the release begins. Main, relocation at such distances was included because of certain restrictions of the CRAC2 code. Relocation at such distances
]
would nonnally not be warranted for even the worst case accidents postulated, but it is possible. The second block of three cases (third, fourth and fifth lines) were made to test the sensitivity of the results to the time before or after the release begins. Here, an evacuation within two miles, at 10 mph, is assumed, with initial egress e c. i beginning 1/2 hour before and af ter, and at the beginning of the release. People
- within ten miles are exposed to the full plume and an additional 4 hours of ground s
9 b
+.. e .
. .. ,~ . i l
-9 ,
l W 3 I ':.' . TABLE (/-$ i
*bg M9 EVACUATION AND SHELTER STRATEGIES fi'; ,
FOR SSTl ACCIDENT y. FVACUATION SHELTERING
- [ '
- u.? Del ay Early Mid-Zone Far Zone 7 w r.t. Evacuation Di stance Ground Ground Exposure f Start of Distance (mi) Exposure
- .- Release (mi) Duration Duration I{;, (hrs) (hrs) (hrs)
+3 10 10 - 8 L' , - - 10 4 8
- - - 10 8 24
+1/2 2 10 4 8
, 9 2 10 4 8 J -1/2 2 10 4 8
-- F f# 9 10 4 8
+1/2 3 g./i 9 3 10 10 4
4 8 8 _ -1/2 3 s
+1/2 - 5 10 4 8 9 5 10 4 8
-1/2 5 10 4 8 0 10 (5 mph 10 - 8 0 10 (2 mph 10 - 8 0 2(10 mph) 10 1 1
. 8 10 (10 mph) - 8 24 0 2 (10 mph) 10 6 24 P e 5 a:; i G 4
% 4
+ 0
.. s
@T$ contamination. People outside ten miles were exposed to the full plume and an
- additional 8 hours of ground contamination.
}l':i - - $,.b - p , In the next six cases, the same evacuation timing was investigated, but for three and five mile eva
;. i tions (shelter elsewhere). .
e.
.., The last group in Table _ are special cases examined to test other sensiti-
,:.1
,, vities. The first two assumed evacuation within ten miles' at two and five
', mph beginning at the start of the release. At two mph, about 5 hours would elapse 3.. '
;. to clear the ten mile EPZ; at five mph, 2 hours would be needed. These may not be realistic time.1 for some sites, but they could well be for low population
, density sites. Some low population zones extend to eight miles, for example.
The next case is for evacuation within two miles (at ten mph) and for i hour exposure to ground contamination elsewhere. This models very rapid relocation after plume passage, beyond two miles. The next case assumed evacuation within two miles at ten mph starting at the start of the release and a slower relocation elsewhere, i.e., after 6 hours ground exposure within tan miles and 24 hours beyond ten miles. Th'is was another test of the sensitivity to relocation time. _ two other cases, not listed in Table ,,,,, were examined. People in shelter were I exposed to 100 percent of the noble gases, only, and to the cloud gamma pathway, only, for all radionuclides. These tested the sensitivity to the single pathway. This could be an important perspective ,1ff, significant respiratory protection were used and ground deposition was not significant (e.g. , dry weather, very low , L dry deposition velocity). '"6 e m 4 4
ll - 7f. [S: I h)$ Finally, the effect of plume rises of 10, 30, 50 and 100 meters was examined for i t i. ' L'4 4 the case of an evacuation within two miles, at ten mph, and relocation within 4 %.h fv/2, hours within ten miles and 8 hours beyond ten miles. s
.e. ,
Yl This completes the description of the sensitivity test cases for SST1. I Fewer cases were e::amined for the SST2 and SST3 postulated accidents. For SST2
; all of the noble gases are released, but the release fractions of particulates are l t. reduced by almost two orders of magnitude. For this case PAGs and ground contami-
..e nation would be the major concerns beyond about two miles. Thus, the problems
- q. were oriented to test sensitivities to timing of evacuation within two miles and exposure time to ground contamination beyond two miles.
SST3 would be such a small releas'e (contained case) that even whole body PAGs would not k exceeded. Two tests were made to assess the results of a crecau-o tionary evacuation within two miles and long relocation times outside two miles.
, These cases are listed in Table .
t 9 w S h a D O 4 4
~- -
/
(9
- 5 ? Y (Nf.,
TABLEdl"k
'V' f/i EVACUATION AND SHELTER STRATEGIES J.; FOR SST2 AND SST3 ACCIDENTS r, ',,.
h;j$ EVACUATION SHELTERING l Delay Early Mid-Zone Far Zone p
'-'l1 Di stance Ground Ground w.r.t. Evacuation ': Start of Distance (mi)'
Exposure Exposure
?* Release (mi) Duration Duration (hrs) (hrs) (hrs)
):
SST2 (<-
, 9 2 10 4 8
+1/2 2 10 4 8
.. _ 9 2 10 1 1 -
9 2 10 8 24 9 2 10 12 24 SST3
+1/2 2 10 '12 24 ' ., . 9 2 10 12 24 b
o S . i Y4
. I
- l
.+ :
ig
, ;. 7,: . . - . . . . . .x +,
d,
/? Section*4.2.3 Results and 01,scossion
@ The results of the calculations have been plotted as whole body and thyroid pp y.; dose probability distributions for an individual; that is, the probability s.;;7 of an individual receiving a given dose vs. dose, conditional upon the S occurrence of an SST1, an SST2 or an SST3 release. The whole body dose
.b:
j'c distributions for an individual located at various distances between one mile and ten miles from the reactor, given an SST1 release, and assuming sheltering , .[' . in a one story wood-frame house without a basement and relocating after /'- expo Jre to the plume plus 4 hours of ground contamination, are shown in , Figure 4.2-1. As a control, the whole body dose distributions for an
." individual assumed to evacuate at an effective speed of 2 miles per hour starting at the time of the release are shown in Figure 4.2-2. For convenience, key values from these figures are also tabulated in Tables 4.:
and 4.2-2, ], for sheltering and. evacuation, respectively.
' Comparison of the dose distributions in these figures . indicate that ar.
evacuation, consnencing at the time of release and at an effective speed of 2 miles per hcur, results in lower individual doses at all distances,1both ; in tenns of mean or expected values, a3 well as lower values at comparable levels of probability, than sheltering in a one story wood-frame house and relocating after 4 hours. However, it is worth noting that the differences
; in do'se and, more importantly, differences in acute health effects, is greatest close-in to the reactor and diminishes with increasing distance. At a distance of 1 mile, for example, the dose differences are such that acute l-[ f atality would be expected for the sheltering followed by relocation strategy, r ,. but not for evacuation. However at distances of about 5 miles and beyond, the dose differences are such that acute fatality would be highly unlikely
~.
z.; .; . + . .
. . .s t
2 y yf
$.' for either response. Since the first priority in a release of this magnitude d
g would be to save lives, it is clear that either evacuation or sheltering h$f followed by relocation within about 4 hours would be about equally effective 3, d.)3 in this regard, even for the most severe releases, for individuals located
;A -
gp,i beyond about 5 miles. M p/ For individuals located at closer distances, and especially within about the
; first 2 miles, it is clear that evacuation is far more preferable to sheltering, m
j:, '
-It should be noted that even the evacuation strategy examined here cannot
{' provide assurance of no acute health effects. Since the time-dose-distance
' relationships discu'ssed in section 3.3.3 showed that the dose is accumulated very rapidly (of the order of hundreds of rem per hour) to individuals very close to reactor for an SST1 release, it is clear that to be effective, an evacuation of close-in individuals should commence prior to any release.
The thyroid dose distributions for an SST1 release, assuming sheltering and
-, relocation af ter 4 hours are shown in Figure 4.2-3, while those for evacuation
-9 at 2 miles per hour starting at the time of release are shown in Figure 4.2-4.
- Again, for convenience, key values from these figures are tabulated in Tables
- 7. . 4.2-3 and 4.2-4, for sheltering and evacuation, respectively. Comparison of I the thyroid dose distributions reveals once again that evacuation results in
$.. the lower thyroid doses, but that differences in acute thyroid effects, such D- as ablation of the thyroid (highly likely at doses in excess of about 3500 rem) become small for individuals located beyond 5 miles.
.7
?.1 c: t f
3-2 . In order to ascertain whether a shorter relocation time than 4 hours might
.f prove effective in mitigat,ing acute effects for distances less than 5 miles f/, for the most severe releases, a calculation was performed where an individual '/I at 3 miles was sheltered and then relocated after being exposed to the plume f,
45 plus I hour of ground contamination. The whole body and thyroid dose
.' distributions are shown in Figures 4.2-5 and 4.2-6, respectively. These results indicate that although both whole body and thyroid doses are reduced 15' somewhat, they are still higher than the doses where evacuation was performed.
n.
- f. Since sheltering followed by relocation after only 1 hour of ground exposure is virtually indistinguishable from evacuation, it is concluded that evacuation
. " . .{
is the strategy to be preferred for individuals located at less than 5 miles, in the event of an SSTl release. For an SST1 release, consequently, the major objective would be to avoid early f atal i ty. For individuals located from 0 to 5 miles from the reactor, the preferred response would be a prompt evacuation, which should commence prior
, to any release. For individuals located from 5 to 10 miles, either evacuation or sheltering followed by relocation within about 4 hours would be about
}
equally effective. Since doses in excess of the PAG levels can extend beyond 10 miles, protective actions for members of the public at distances beyond 10 7, ' miles should be taken in the event of a release of this magnitude. However, evacuation beyond ten miles is not recommended based on the relatively low doses that would be expected, as shown in Figures 4.2-1 and 4.2-2. These
.' ~
indicate that no acute health effects, either fatalities or injuries, would be
- { .. expected beyond 10 miles for individuals who take shelter and are relocated within about 4 hours.
~,
s b
ax c. ... 1.? c:,3 C. We will now consider the relatively smaller SST2 release. From Figures 3.2-2 [.i and 3.2-4, it is clear that the risk of early fatality to an individual shows a very rapid decrease with distance, with a value of about 10~4 at a distance 41 fi. of 1 mile. Similarly, the risk of early injury also shows a rapid falloff with y% (.N distance, although it displays a greater reach in tenns of distance. Figure
.I 3.2-4 shows that the risk of early injury, given an SST2 release, is very low I, beyond about 2 miles with a value of about 10-3 at this distance. Based on these individual risk variations, a prompt evacuation is considered to be the preferred response for individuals located from 0 to 2 miles from the neactor, j, in the event of an SST2 release. To examine the imoact to individuals beyond .
f 2 miles calculations were set up examining both evacuation vs. shelter of individuals beyond 2 miles. The whole body dose distributions for an individual located at var.ious distances from 2 to 10 miles, given an SST2 release, and
}
- assuming sheltering in a one story wood-frame hduse without a basement and b
relocating after exposure to the plume plus 4 hours of ground contamination, are shown in Figure 4.2-7. The whole body dose distributions for an individual assumed to evacuate at an effective speed of 2 miles per hour starting at the time of the release are shown in Figure 4.2-8. For convenience, key values
, from thesa figures are alsa tabulated in Tables 4.2-5 and 4.2-6, for sheltering and evacuation, respectively.
Comparison of these dose distributions indicate that an evacuation, commencing
- at the time of release and at an effective speed of 2 miles per hour, results
-. in lower individual doses at all distances, than sheltering in a one story
,[ wood-frame house and nelocating af ter 4 hours. However, the differences in l dose between these two strategies are such that acute health effects such as early injuries are unlikely for either strategy. Both strategies result in l l l l u
. ac c . :, -
i . N gi< $.l. individuals receiving doses above the PAG levels but below the level where any W However, sensitive elements of the population early injuries would be expected. b[y! (e.g., the fetus during the first trimester) might be affected by doses at these
.9 l@; levels. Hence, dile evacuation beyond 2 miles for an SST2 release may provide
- .y 9 no reduction in acute health risks for the general population, there could be
'. I.h. such benefits for special elements of the population.
The thyroid dose distributions for an SST2 release, assuming sheltering and
. 'v , ]..
relocation after 4 hours are shown in Figure 4.2-9, while those for evacuation are shown in Figure 4.2-10. For convenience, key values have been abstracted [ and tabulated in Tables 4.2-7 and 4.2-8, respectively. Comparison shows that evacuation results in the lower thyroid doses, but these differences are not
- s. significant for acute effects since both strategies yield thyroid doses above the PAG levels but well below the levels where thyroid ablation can occur, as was noted for the SST1 release.
It was also decided to evaluate the consequences of a delay in relocation, given an SST2 release. Consequently, the dose distributions were obtained for
', individuals beyond 2 miles who, given an SST2 release, were sheltered and relocated after 8 hours as well as 12 hours of ground exposure. The whole body -[
and thyroid dose distributions for sheltering with relocation af ter 8 hours of 2
/4 ground exposure, are shown in Figures 4.2-11 and 4.2-12, respectively. The le . corresponding dose distributions for relocation after 12 hours are shown in W" Figure 4.2-13 and Figure 4.2-14. From these curves it can be seen that there
) is a relatively small penalty, in tems of dose increase, if relocation is not accomplished within 4 hours. For example, for an individual located at 3 miles
(, the mean or expected whole body dose is increased from 11 rem to 13 rem if
.3 relocation is delayed from 4 to 8 hours, and increased to 15 rem for relocation l
L
7.,
- x. .--.. c e m . . . ..t _
b
;w m
- s. after 12 hours. Similar percentage increases are noted at the other distances.
4.': 61 as well. fil To summarize for an SST2 release, the major objective of any emergency response
- i. .
U would be to avoid acute health effects, including early injuries. For individuals O' J4 located from 0 to 2 miles from the reactor, the preferred response would be a M . j'4 prompt evacuation, which should commence prior to any release. For individuals
- 2. '.
' .9 located from 2 to 10 miles, either evacuation or sheltering followed by relocation 1,t within about 4 hours would be about equally effective. However, there would be y ,
[ a relatively small increase in dose, of no significance for early health effects,
.. if relocation is delayed up to 12 hours. For sensitive elements of the population g
; (pregnant women in the first trimester), evacuation out to about 5 miles may be
~ advisable, however. Since doses would not be expected to exceed the upper PAG . [i' levels beyond 10 miles, protective actions for members of the public beyond this
; distance would not be expected to be, recommended for a release of this. magnitude.
Finally, w also examined the SST3 release. From Figure 3.1-3, it is clear that the doses would not be expected to exceed the PAG 1evels at distances beyond about 2 miles, for this release. To evaluate this the whole body and thyroid / dose distributions for individuals located beyond 2 miles, are shown assuming
- , sheltering in a one story wood-frame house without a basement and relocating "O after exposure to the plume plus 12 hours of ground contamination, in Figures
.- 4.2-15 and 4.2-16. From these curves it is clear that the doses are well below the PAG values for this response strategy.
1..-
us - . . . AT A a s t y _. ~
, _ _ .OF.. A U TM b iv i 6U A'L
'PS!OB As iLITY W H OL.E Bo b >' bo4E IN Exegg
,. bi STAWcE REC Esv i9g A chow W , 0000 m ouw upou o ce v geruce M.F or rs e v wv s
- a O F W W) RELEhsw Adh SHEGYR* PLuf HRS, GN O, Gypofogg lY w
jh .
;!,' J. 7
'f.
- O l.:; .
" S*
.; R
- . g
),p . **. 1 4
i ' A b r.. d r i..- pmi L 4 .i
'; h 00m I ' CZ ll '
- -~Agji 1.1 =. +
i\:. it . 5' d. 1 w i. I'> > l- \;
- v. 7 .
t ' 18 ' i . ....,..i. . . . ...... . . . ..,... F 10 l00 1000, wHoLE eocv bosE , %
- l Wy Woeci-6x kvase,.u based
/- 4 9%QfBkITy0F A M Z A D l\l I b () h k A Y h S I V E N b l S l ~A h } 0 E A WHOL.E 20by base i h) E' ACES S OF THE VA w E R1~CElVIHG h., V PQ U 000 0 CAEMCE, C P Ag) QsTI REL EA SE Gllov)tJ, C.00b tTs oUht t' n.
AVb EVACU^TiOV AT 3. MPH AT Tt H E = 0 c:., .
.i l; i . :.,: 7 , .
i
-p 4.
s s: r q i
*. 3
. _ n-
- _s t
,.. m 2 e,
~
.. e
** , , l I<0
-. .= . ~,
/ i m,, . . s s s x . x X. ~ m
, s ,
N. ~
,x,x m
s, ., 1 s . . i . . . . . i 1,, 'i._ '- c
.. n, r; ax: 1
. m_ .x 1 , u, ' ' i _^ h 'm 1 ( b s - 1 ; ; ',- ' , . _
~ , , . 1 m s, . _ ,
n2?:;I i cs N X: %"r, \ 1
<e s n
a u n wm s. s i si
. ii
, i i i 4 i
. . g 0 g,.
i i
-o ; m . 1
.p i
. m ;3 -, a i ,
s, 's,. N ;
'4 ' " "E N \ ', ; \ ,
i I . b N. E *' -x i
~~
I< f. $ - 3 3. . . . y , , . 3 . . I ,
'. t -- ; i
'.' - i, i:
s. i
., ,6 i i 1 1 2
i i, i . 4 1, u . 1, > . .
. i c- p ,i . . . . r . . t.
i,
, . . 6 ....t. . i . r..a
- 10. 100. 1000.
W HO L E 130 bY DOSE, h Eetu.g 4.% t t %y wood -km koce p base"+4 - 1
Ta6/e 4.2- / . Tb) bl VI Dd A L. DOSE D I 5iK I~dd"TI O N
- Id e 3,
I CD M b ITI o U A L U PoH SSIl RELEAGE SHEL72R IHC \'.<.A p 2
;2- AMb TttLo c AT~t 0 M A FTE R. 4 h 00tLS CRoddb E4PosaAW
>.c
- t.2
- e. .
D l$D))CE WHoLE ' Bob'/ b os E (RENT
, (, H 1. Es) b M EAU gg{ @[e G q f,
'). e. - I f ro , I ro o . 3100 3000.
. : 2. 9.co. 1 00 loco (300 3 140 'too 6 oo Io oo S' 3 0.. I20 3 S'o 300 7 40. lIo I5"o J. A o .
l0 A T. 7f lOd 4fo 4 b i^-
*p
' )
, , . . ~ - ,- . .
Idbfd Y. A ~ 1 Qi' s i< r . fl.[],
;t',';
%M b I b' I bV A L bOSE 'D15NIEdTI OM *
- .~
iT,? 009blT10 W A L O Pop SSTI 3ELEASE Apb 19
!?;-
EV A 41 ATJ 0W Ar % MPH STARMMG AT Ti N E SJ: OF ' RELEASE it.;
.h 3Cby %CSE (Red ;: D \ $Yh td C5 w MOLE 'e (, MILE.C)
F eud 9 0), '19%
.q. -
9c].
', j i i 125'. 3 50 600 Joo
'~
2 80 9 50 3 50 C00 3 C7. IGc 3.1.0 3co > S 3t. loo. I40 3.00 .
- * *1 2 5. 26. 100 ISG
\O I C. 40 C5 10 6 *
}.
4 e t ". . ', i
- '. ~
i .o
-e ,
- - e 9
i
0 F AM DNY/ b UA L NT- A slVEM MYARE PRO'8F6 l L IT y I REC EWlpg A -TH/ RolD TO5E N Ey' CEC.f 0F 77/5 \/A L. t/ E l r, S HOW 9 , 00 U D ITI o HAL. L)poM 000 0 R R.DJC5 0F hA) 5? t 71 f
'it EL E A6 E Apb sH ELTEfl* PLOS Y #RS , 8M b, EX PC S 0 A E gn ,
N ' 0 '3 y$ +
- u. .
? ?."' , , 1 .,
~
S
.e--
O & c) i 1 . , , 1 1 , i 1 T b i I
- i e ys 1 i i _
! r r T i l t i l I t
- a 6 6 i I 6
m 'm - s -
'm w
's s
< * +
*. s, , s, s x-s x x .x __
- N N k T X N .
I 6
. N 1 ! A I T' i N I N 1 i I i 81 x i .
c. g 13 x g y 3 m s 4 m., 4 .,
,,, g s um w \I L m
u u X 1. M
' ^
i '. 'm . 'l O 1 a 't 's -
,. 's i - . . . . '1
'h .'s .
'; '{ .', , "J "2 '
Q.g!l i Ns 's t 's .
, "s! " ,u r
's s is , ,
. , , , i t#.__ 4 X N4 X 1i W i X i N d i1h. -
- e !
\ .i "P u e - %
- 1 \- i T i 8 i '
s h fg + I a ,
. . . m . .
83 's -, 1 ri
- 1, sx
'," 'I s 's
.g e , ,
s i
- f *3 7
t, t Sx .
\
i
. +
i i # i\ 1 i 1
.x
\
s fO S -, ._ __ ( rr-id
<=
g _ 2 .
=, m_
=
..a < . .
W 1 s si 1: i i 1 s 4 3
^
E g
- 1 1 i a i 5 1 n
; 's I
- i. t , ,
i, . . I \ E I I m-m i
$' )n h[. ,
'~~~
i o, i : . i e r a e to a a 4 i e r eio 2 4 i e risu loo. (000 t o,0x
, Thyme toss , b.
-6t g Story Wood free kous,.9 baseWJ
~
b]STAycE' 9% CBh'6)5. lT / 'O F hp' *EM b IV t BOA L AT A (,)VEy
'RTCEIV j ra g A thyro ib bOSE IN E/ CESS OF TBE V A L(# E c.hs SHow9,C090 m0phL dP09 DetJR.KEMCE. OP AM SST) RELEhEl A hab EUhc.o Art ou Ar g M PH AT TI H E* G F RELEAS5. -
i. r .- .
.w. .
.;v ,
. F, 1
- v. -..
,y.
.j l 6;
>4 3 - .__
t
. ,u m 3
.-- o, __
\
f% e, , , , gg_ . . . -
~
** . x, s, s, s.,x . s. ,
') Ae ! T i 4 U T 1 f I
, x_ y'-
s x_ s m , ., I, , , , u
.: ,.j g . .
- s. i xs s
~ .
's '.m ',
i 1
'x 1.L T
T . k .
-_ ; . 1 ,
., .. i K m s . . s _ _.
p
- 1. .. . 1 _ n'
- x. x x , u - '_ . '.
a
' ', '. x ' nx <'a 1
% s; m .
~
x
~ u_ .,
t
+ ,
1 m ., 1 s m, t , _ c-
- x,, 1 s
< ,, i
< s] -
.c t.
.; =.
v.-
~
s s ,s , , , 4, o %j p,
'. T 1 's ,
c e,--l r 'sx
, '. x s 1
( , , s, 1 t 1
,., 1, .,
l.
.p 5
-1 m
s - l ij -
'r
?. b, g . 1 . . .
. m . . . _
I I I L M f E 1 I v i -. __ , - - n
, 2 "m :
^
"1 i t i
{ r
, i 1 1 R 1 E
l., I, m. 1 l
, ,s) ! I- 1 I i
# 1 l E [- (
le i i~ i . . . r . . i. : . . . r . . i. a, . ..r..a
. 80 0. l 00 0. 10,000 T}r/ROID' Dose , %.
Ept 4.2 - 4
Tct, b Id M.% 3 e *
;q 3 Tb3 D IV i D 0 A L.
~
306 E~ 'P 167~8 / Ev7/ O N/
.9 y
i,f C 0 0 b I TI O U A L t) PO h) SGTI TELEA S E, SH EL.TEk.IM G jj:. . AMb ~dELc6AT 0 9 A FTrA 4 Ngs , ditc09b EX Fo s v 7 E
- p
?$! - li,
. QI6*lAMC,g THyROI b 'b'?SE(gew} ';: LH I L ES)
HEAQ 9 o), 9ff, 9 9 f.
\ l 4, LO 0, 20,000 42,. coo 90,000
- 2. b ,0 0 0 IS*, coo 13, coo 20,000 3000
- 3 3,30o. 13,000 16, coo S /500. 4100 fo S 0 6 10, 0 c 0 7 2 90- A&OO 3 80 7000 l0 S* 0. 1500 9100 %.0 0 S
;. w sincur uses nur .g*
4* e4 e
,4
'.1
- e O
.- =
p; . N " J. . . -
- ~, . ,
Ya a 4. a.- 4 m . S.!.' . T N DIVJbs) A L. TOS E Dl5TR / B VTl OM w c.,:. 9' SST) REL EA S E AUb >a ' C0 9 h 6TI Q U h u Q PO M
; SV Ac.C ATI OU KT L M PH STA stTI M& AT YIM E j.;j OF R ELEA SE Q '?.
f;' D157 Apcr Taygoin toss ( ga (, MILES) . . j.. Hsw 9 07, 957. TS 7.
- ) ,
l 1+ 9 0 0 . 11,000 14,000 30,0G0 2 & 200 fos'eo 10,000 I3,000 3 1100 4600 4 f oo 9,oco C i 0 00 SbGO %Qo bsco. l_ 7 (o (,0 . Iboo ).s c o 4 ';uo o 10 3 G 0. 100 l 't oo Soco e s- . c, e
.i ,
e 9 9
MOEhE l LITY OF AH TMbl\/IkvAL AT 8 H )LES } RECEW iWd A WHOA E TobY DOG IN EXGSS @F 7*VE
>.a
\)ALUE Cl40W9, CON b ITIo Al A L U Pop Odd UttrWAICE of AtJ (f?
SSTI 5ELEAS E huO SHELi"El PLUS } HR, SA)b. E4Po svEE lf. is l 8 [ ] , :. ..'- i ' t y
, ' W, .
3 :
>* s _
4 F [f. I I
=am.
S e, M 2 '
, i i 1 1 r i 1 1 1
. s . ,
?
L .l : :
'[:. j,,p - ,' ' s S ',
I % i i . i
. , , , , , , 1 1
- 4 _
4 ", h LN
'm 3 _
'm m i X
- j. 4 > '
x
] $$ ri d n v i .i ss- 's Z j' l i di i,ki 2'- , 1 l g J' *i,*
y 3 as 4 (. s S , ,
~_
f.. . o gg , .
.I e '.
NJ i 1 i t ga '
~
l _
' i
,i 1 i
- g. .
- . l i i '
i >
.L .
i ,. , I ! I jo , , 1 i i 8 4 5 6 7 8 9 to 4 3 4 4 4 7 8 910 3 3 4 5 6 7 4 9 It 1 3 l 0, 100, t000, Dose'i%. - 5p %-b
- l Wy Was d-fm konu, u Lue*e#
e - FR06AElLIT'/ Di: A9 DJ b i V l b U A L A T~ 3 M l L. E S - , T gecsN n uG A TH'lR0Ib DOSE ^.IA) EACESS CF "TH E v.
- j v A t e s. S Ho w rJ ) d0W 017i0 P ALU r o A>
0doORi2 W CE OF AL/
., 8 STI R El EASE AVb CHELTE1 ,. Plug I Htt. Gpb. EsMSJAt 1,
f .. Fx 1 m e- L v -
.f*
s
. d.1 I
. 1 I I I
')
2 m_= s.
- ~.. m O
s 1 i
.~I. .
e i , l.: 4
; ; ; :. 'i -
> ' 'v l ,9, m
- . x, s . .=
s _
. m x
3 -
=
\x s
s a , 1
'. Sa.s. .
V, , e
<q- ,
- i m
o. Is . i _. m_ g . 3,, .
- -=- --
x '
-=
0- U. ' . 1 s 1
- s -
.=
Hi
~
___..; 1 e::: 2 __..t_ r, i 1 z 1 t i
- , t . .
.t.
i i_ s, i
, 1 r
i i
' ' i < <
joi i i . i . r . 1. : i . ....i. , . i.,.a 10 0 . l000, 10,000 DOSE i RM Rgu.e t.1-b i
- i Ghry W J- b a hode>
- ka " **
s- , 4
. .. . v. .
P ROB AElk iT'/ OF A9 Iv biv)DU AL AT A GVW liSTAmr.
. ..: TRECEWlUC A 4 HOLE BOD') M$2 ~EN EXCESS OF THei VALuc s!n > 'G
- S }+0W td , Co M b 1 T*l 0 0 A L U P09 002 0it.REtJcE OF hM GST,:;l 5- RELEAsF Aub C H E L.TER* PL U.S S hrs . 8 RN D, E X P040 R.E 13 8
p . -*? g
.~
p
.)* * *=k 4(. s i -
.t.n. a d * .' g..
' th:
I - -
t M I a.
?
- , i f.*
r,.* e w . i 1
~
6 6 i 1 l
.- : lJ,h ~_
_ ~ - s' s 1% i x
'm s N s
% s ,
1 \ ' \ ' i I h 3 I 4 ,,o _. _
-.s l g I
_ l'._ W .'. ' y - -
= 1 - ,,
) -_ .a.
i,Q' i 2'_ 4 i , g m % % s 5 , m 't N 1 1
'x o 's 's.
! . Qe g: ,. ; s 1_ 1 x- s , , , , 1 -- i 1 i X tN i X 1 i i i i i i I
- i G
$ )q l ' mii\ \ i X 4 1- i I 6 i 6 x.
l , =3
. s x -
X. 1.
] ,, , . > >
i 13 x i, if i - h5 -
- i. . .
I l 1 1 v i _ e.' , , , I l : .. 'h \ \ ; , 1 ; r: . I ! ! i i . , foi i . i r i s is . i e r s s to a . i e r a s ic r \- l. 10 l00 DC,5 2 k F, ua. O. ~7 k \ $4acy wood Irm kode ;w haSGatN
^;* ' ' s
. .~.
. v:-
~
e i e5 o?.b
?
3;
- s. .
*e i,; - e
,. 4
,p f.1*l >.. h j P(gux af.:.
y e' l
}h,{ h)hf[ood; C04e bl$ -dd veu e :.
6' d k, O' 5573 4 l BuctA - e g
- e a
4 9 (- 4 l GP
. 1 t.
i 's4y
.* e t t J
^
4 , e i s, s
. .' i .
=4 4
'k www . n
p-
.~ ,_i.-u
. . . ... . .~ ..
\'$ Yghlg N,1-5 6 llSTR1G07 oAl jij TNDIV I D O A L '. DOS E Ti -u
!j C09b lT1oH A1 O PON SST1 ?ELEAge ) CH E.TER)w6 V;A:' kHb RELOCAT\ oN AFTER 4 Hod R.S GRc0Nb D PcSdAE 2.;
r.p%.
'1 h.f' DL STA90.iE. W Ho AE. ~doDY WE. @ea}
LHs Les ) ?l-l]- c '. MEAP 9$ 96% . 99 $ ( ~: - 2.
! 3 .t l . So. 4(. 7a.
s- 4 14. a.e. 32. 1 3.9 1I. l ~l . 23. 10 a.T ~7.5" 12. lle . 4 Stf 2L~i"ER t M G IN \ STOR '/ wcoh-FR.h Hg. tk.) C s g J W (1"l400T ~B A SE N EW'I' , D 4 r
.a 4
- 1. '
u n
-+
"s' ' e
g -
' * ~ .
1- , g h A%' * -e r+ - I** 8 *I s' 4 (e
- e I a' l 'I t' 7
~ -:. , L u QC.. a.- p& ~~ If_*#e I (k Q . k - f [..' - m> s
, j
.s . ,$ l y. W 10 e. dd 'Dne lisul.d, s ~ j5 ,
- l h '
i " . .: 55T1 ad hauuk l S. 60-, I
' I 9 +
4 4 4 9 4 i'.\ b. t u 4 s 1e g.: g:. . 4
.g
':~.
% O e
4 4
- - - - - a
O- .
. -- - ." t . ' .: ,i .
- P80Bh8)Lrri 0F AM TM blVlbvAL AT A GIVEW blSTANCE y g w ,uc & r m o:D 30SE IN EXCE.CS DF THE VA L J E
}Ii
... sHowp , cop b 17:0 9 4 L U PON Oco dTEREW C E OF AA> CIT.2
~ g O RELEME A9b SHELTEQ PLUS 4 HRS, BR'ub, E*Po& KE
- n. 1.
s
.f. , 3 y' y l-
.y. . '
' i =
4 ~
+ .*
'~
a-.
~
g =~ e' 1 I i 1 1 E . i p~g' t 1 IJ _ __ _ . _ ._ _ _ _ _ ___ _ m_ a _'8 m
._ _J s~ m u m I 'i i i i X. I
, s_ i 1 ix _ x_ i i i i
(
~
] $ _
'm i K .
. ', "m '.
{ i , . -= _ g
\ \
,J _ . _
% 2 __. . . -
Ib _ -- x g
< a x, _
o , m . s . M gi i 'ss 'st N s
', i i 1 i i
. n .e ,l I >
z X a . 6 !A i i i i i PW i. i i t A. 4 e b\ l' f i l M ' i 3 h g gg I i i I 4 I
- I i 'm
$a g 'a i 1 Mg 7 's i ', '
y i;
' ' ' ' ' x
, . e - Em 3
. , 1 v 3 -
. g M
I I I L
. , 1
- 1 , i i I i
., ' -2 i .
i t i t t i jo i i, i a : e ie r a s to a . i e r a s to a i e i a rasa I.0 to. I ca. .100 THY RQ l D D OS E > RM Y l bSOf'f NQQb- (p4 00 W ,*U N U \ W *
-}}