ML20236E254

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Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-57 & NPF-5,revising Tech Specs to Make Limiting Conditions for Operation & Surveillance Requirements Consistent W/Guidance in Generic Ltr 87-09
ML20236E254
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 03/17/1989
From: Hairston W
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML20236E257 List:
References
GL-87-09, GL-87-9, HL-313, NUDOCS 8903240037
Download: ML20236E254 (16)
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snor v,caremos nwear cuer, 5021Q-X7GJ17-H600 March 17, 1989-3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington,.D.C. 20555 ,

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PLANT HATCH, UNITS l, 2 NRC 00CKETS 50-301,'50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5 REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: >j '

-INCORPORATION OF GENERIC LETTER 87-09 '

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, as required by 10 CFR 50.59(c)(1),; Georgia Power Company (GPC) ' hereby proposes changes.

to the Plant Hatch ~ Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (15), Appendix A to Operating Licenses DPR-57 and NPF-5.

The proposed changes to the Unit -1 TS will-make the definitions of LIMITING CONDITIONS' FOR OPERATION. (LCO) and SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS consistent with the guidance provided in NRC Generic Letter 87-09.

The proposed changes to the Unit 2 TS will make the _ wording of Specifications 3.0.4, 4.0.3, and 4.0.4 consistent with the wording proposed 'in Enclosure 4 to Generic Letter 87-09. GPC also proposes to replace the -Bases for Unit 2 TS Sections' 3.0.1 through' 3.0.4 and Sections 4.0.1 through 4.0.5 with the revised Bases provided in Enclosure 5 of Generic Letter 87-09.

Enclosure 1 provides a detailed description of the proposed l changes. Enclosure 2 details the bases for GPC's determination that the proposed changes do not involve significant hazards considerations.

l-Enclosure 3 provides page change instructions for incorporating the y proposed changes. The proposed, revised TS pages follow Enclosure 3.

To allow time for procedure revisions and orderly incorporation into copies of the Technical Specifications, GPC ' requests the proposed -l' amendments, once approved by the NRC, be issued with an effective date to be no later than 60 days from the issuance of the amendments.

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 17, 1989 Page;Two l

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of- this  !

- letter and all applicable enclosures will be sent to Mr. J. L. Ledbetter q'

. of the Environmental. Protection Division of the Georgia Department of.

Natural Resources; Mr. H. G. Hairston, III states he is Senior Vice President of Georgia Power-Company and is authorized to execute this. oath on_ behalf of '

Georgia Power Company,. and to the best of his knowledge . and belief, the-facts set forth in this letter are true.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY By: bd.I Na<1 m--

H. G. Hairston, III Sworntoandsubscribed,beforemethis/[dayofMarch1989.

UAtn W l gNotaryPublic "Y CC.\% Ion txmtg gg .

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Enclosures:

1. Basis for Change Request. -
2. 10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation.
3. Page Change Instructions l c: Georgia Power Company Mr. H. C. Nix, General Manager - Hatch Mr. L~. T. Gucwa, Manager Nuclear Engineering and Licensing GO-NORMS U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.

Mr. L. P. Crocker, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II {

Mr. M. L. Ernst, Acting Regional Administrator Mr. J. E. Menning, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch State of Georgia l Mr. J. L. Ledbetter, Commissioner - Department of Natural Resources 5021Q

4 l ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT HATCH - UNITS 1, 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366 OPERAlING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5

, REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

l INCORPORATION OF GENERIC LETTER 87-09 BASIS FOR CHANGE Rr.0 VEST PROPOSED CHANGE 1:

The following changes will be made to Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS)

Section 1.0:

1. Definition M will be revised to read as follows:

M. Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) - The limiting conditions for operation specify the acceptable levels of system performance necessary to assure safe startup and operation of the Unit. When these conditions are met, the Unit can be operated safely and abnormal situations can be safely controlled. Entry into an operational condition (i.e., one of the conditions or modes specified in definitions B, F, G, Y, AA, CC, FF, and HH) or other specified condition shall not be made when the conditions for the Limiting Conditions for Operation are not met and the associated action requires a shutdown if they are not met within a specified time interval. Entry into an operational condition or other specified condition may be made in accordance with the action requirements when conformance to them permits continued operation i of the f acility for an unlimited period of time. This provision shall not prevent passage through or to operational conditions as required to comply with action requirements.

2. Definition JJ will be revised to read as follows:

JJ. Surveillance Requirements - The surveillance requirements are requirements established to ensure that the Limiting Conditions for Operation as stated in Section 3 of these Technical Specifications are met. Surveillance requirements are not required on systems or parts of systems that are not required to J be operable or are tripped. If tests are missed on parts not required to be operable or are tripped, then they shall be performed prior to returning the system to an operable status. J If tests are missed on parts which are required to be operable.,

the time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable at the time it is identified that a surveillance requirement has not ,

been performed. The ACTION requirements may be delayed for up l, 50210 El-1 HL-313

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)  !

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

INCORPORATION OF GENERIC LETTER 87-09 i BASIS FOR CHANGE REQUEST 1

PROPOSED CHANGE 1: (Continued) to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to permit the completion of the surveillance when the allowable outage time limits of the AC110N requirements are less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

The following changes will be made to Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 3/4.0:

1. Specification 3.0.4 will be revised to read as follows:

3.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL CONDITION or other applicability state shall not be made when the conditions of the LCO are- not met and the associated ACTION requires a shutdown if they are not met within a specified time interval. Entry into an OPERATIONAL CONDITION or other specified condition may be made in accordance with the ACTION requirements when conformance to them permits continued operation of the facility for an unlimited period of time. This

  • provision shall not prevent passage thru or to OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS as required to comply with ACTION requirements. Exceptions to these  !

requirements ara Lstated in the individual specifications.

2. Specification 4.0.3 will be revised to read as follows:

4.0.3 Failure to perform a Surveillance Requi remer.t within the allowed surveillance interval, defined by Specification 4.0.2, shall constitute noncompliance with the OPERABILITY . requirements for a LCO. The time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable at the time it is identified that a Surveillance Requirement has not been performed. The ACTION requirements may be delayed up to 24  !

hours to permit the completion of the surveillance when the allowable outage time limits of the ACTION reoutrements are less than 24 l hours. Surveillance requirements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment.  !

3. Specification 4.0.4 wili be revised to read as follows:

i 4.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL CONDITION or other specified applicable state shall not be made unless the Surveillance l Requirement (s) associated with the LC0 have been performed within the ]

l applicable surveillance interval or as otherwise specified. j 1

50210 El-2 HL-313

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL. SPECIFICATIONS:

0-' INCORPORATION OF' GENERIC LETTER 87-09 BASIS FOR CHANGE REQUEST

' PROPOSED' CHANGE 1: (Continued)

This ' provision shall not prevent passage through or to OPERATIONAL

. CONDITIONS, as required, to comply with ACTION requirements.

Backaround and Basis for Proposed Change 1:

Proposed Change One is the direct result of Generic Letter 87-09 which was : issued June 4, 1987.

The . Generic Letter and, consequently, this proposed change are- intended to address three specific problems relative to the ' applicability of Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and Surveillance' Requirements. Each problem, as it applies to the Plant Hatch Unit _'l and/or. Unit 2 TS, is discussed below.

l. , Unnecessary restrictions on mode changes.

The ' existing Unit 1 TS Definition M implies, and Unit 2 TS Section 3.0.4 states, that entry into an Operational Condition or mode is'not allowed if an'_LC0 is not cleared, even though the Action Requirements may permit continued operation of the . plant for an unlimited period of time. In the case of Unit 2, individual specifications having-Acticn Requirements L which allow continued operation generally. note that Specification 3.0.4 does not apply. However, exceptions to Specification 3.0.4 have not been consistently applied and their

~ bases are not well documented.

In the case _of Unit 1,:the situation is even more unclear due to the fact that there is no Specification 3.0.4 from which -to take exception. Some individual specifications contain notes stating that entry into an Operational Condition is allowed provided the requirements of the Action statement are satisfied. However, as with Unit 2, the application of such exceptions has been neither consistent nor well documented.

Both Unit 1 TS Definition h and Unit 2 TS Section 3.0.4 unduly restrict plant operations when conformance to LCO Action Requirements provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. l Entry into an Operational Condition or other specified conditions ]

while in an LCO should be permitted if the Action Requirements for the' LCO permit continued operation for an unlimited period of time.

This is consistent with the NRC's regulatory requirements for an LCO stated in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2).

50210 El-3 HL-313

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

INCORPORATION OF GENERIC LETTER 87-09 BASIS FOR CHANGE RE0 VEST Background and Basis for Proposed Change 1: (Continued)

The restriction on a change in an Operational Condition or other specified condition should apply only when the LCO Action Requirements establish a specific time interval in which the LCO must be cleared or a shutdown of the f acility is required. Consequently, a statement will be added to Unit 1 TS Definition M and Unit 2 TS Section 3.0.4 to allow entry into an operational condition in accordance with action requirements when conformance to them permits operation for an unlimited period of time.

Furthermore, the Unit 1 definition is being further clarified to explicity state that entry into an Operational Condition is not permitted if the conditions for an LCO are not met and the associated action requires a shutdown if the LCO is not cleared within a specified time interval.

These changes in wording are consistent with the guidance provided in Generic letter 87-09. I

2. linnecessary shutdown requirements imposed when a surveillance interval is inadvertently exceeded.

Unit 1 Definition JJ and Unit 2 Section 4.0.3 currently imply that the failure to perform a surveillance within the specified time interval constitutes a failure to meet the LCO's operability i requirements. Therefore, at the time it is discovered that a j surveillance test was not performed within the required time  !

interval, the subject system or component must be declared inoperable )

and the LCO Action Requirements must be met just as if the test had i been performed and actually demonstrated the system or component to be inoperable.

Generally, the Action Requirements include a specified time interval (i.e., allowable outage time limit) that permits corrective action to be taken to satisfy the LCO. When such a specified time interval is included in the Action Requirements, the completion of a missed surveillance within this time interval satisfies either Unit 2 Specification 4.0.3 or Unit 1 Definition JJ.

Some Action Requirements, particularly those pertaining to instrumentation, have allowable outage time limits of only 1 or 50210 El -4 HL-313

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

INCORPORATION OF GENERIC LETTER 87-09

j. BASIS FOR CHANGE REQUEST l

Background and Basis for Proposed Change 1: (Continued) i 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and do not establish a practical time limit for the completion of a missed Surveillance Requirement. If surveillance cannot be completed within these time limits, a plant shutdown is usually required. Even if the Action Requirements include remedial measures permitting continued operation, they may be stated such that the performance of the required surveillance could be prevented. A plant shutdown may also be required if the missed surveillance applies to more than the minimum number of systems or components required to be operable for operation under the allowable outage time limits of the Action Requirements. In this case, the individual specification or Specification 3.0.3 requires a shutdown.

If initiation of a plant shutdown is required due to a missed surveillance test, the surveillance would likely be conducted while the plant is being shut down, because satisfactory completion of a l missed surveillance terminates the shutdown requirement. This is 4 undesirable for the following two reasons: l

a. The plant would be in a transient state involving changing plant I conditions that offer the potential for an upset which could lead to a demand for the system or component being tested. This would occur when the system or component is either out of service to allow performance of the surveillance test or there is a lower level of confidence in its operability because the normal surveillance interval was exceeded. If the surveillance  !

demonstrates the system or component is inoperable, restoring the  !

system or component to operable status rather than making a major  !

change in plant operating conditions is usually preferable,

b. A shutdown increases the pressure on the plant staff to expeditiously complete the required surveillance so the plant can be returned to power operation. The potential for a plant upset is increased when both the shutdown and surveillance activities place a demand on the plant operators. l It is overly conservative to assume systems or components are inoperable when a surveillance requirement has not been performed because the majority of surveillance demonstrates systems or components are operable. When a surveillance is missed, it is primarily a question of operability that has not been verified by 50210 El-5 HL-31_

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

INCORPORATION OF GENERIC LETTER 87-09 BASIS FOR CHANGE REQUEST Background and Basis for Proposed Change 1: (Continued)'

the performance of the required surveillance. Since some Action Requirements. do not provide an appropriate time limit for performing a missed surveillance before shutdown requirements may apply, the TS should include a -time limit that would allow a delay of' the required actions to permit the performance of the missed surveillance.

This time limit should be based on considerations of plant conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the surveillance, as well as the safety <

significance of the delay in completing the surveillance.

Furthermore, consideration has been given to situations where declaring a component inoperable as the result of a missed surveillance requires unnecessary challenges to other plant systems.

For example, a missed , surveillance on the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system could require immediate testing of the automatic depressurization (ADS), residual heat removal (RHR), core spray, and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems.

It. should also be noted that missed surveillance occur very infrequently. During the period January 1987 through February 1989, Plant Hatch performed approximately 28,000 TS surveillance. Of that total, 8 missed surveillance were reported (i.e., 99.97 percent of

.the required surveillance were performed on time). All surveillance tests performed late in 1987, 1988, and 1989 were completed with satisfactory results.

Therefore, based on the historical low probability that a surveillance will be missed and the low probability that the  !

surveillance results will not be acceptable, combined with the low probability that an accident will occur during the time that a surveillance is overdue, c

GPC has concluded that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is an acceptable time limit for I completing a missed surveillance before the Action Requirement must ,

be met.

Even though an additlonal 24-hour time limit may apply for missed surveillance, another consideration is the possibility that plant conditions may preclude the performance of the specified requirements. If a surveillance, which is required to be performed j when the reactor is shut down, is missed and can be performed only j when the plant is shut down, only two options are available if it is 5021Q El-6 HL-313 l

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

INCORPORATION OF GENERIC LETTER 87-09 i BASIS FOR CHANGE REQUEST l Background and Basis for Proposed Change 1: (Continued) discovered during power operation and continued operation is not allowed under the Action Requirements. The options are: I

a. Shut down the plant and perform the required surveillance .
b. Seek relief from the Surveillance Requirements.

The provision of a 24-hour delay in the application of the Action Requirements for completing a missed surveillance provides time to request a temporary waiver of a Surveillance Requirement that could 3 not otherwise be completed because of current plant conditions.

Based on the above discussion, Unit 1 TS Definition JJ and Unit 2 TS Section 4.0.3 will be modified to state that following identification  !

of a missed surveillance, the Action Requirements may be delayed for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to perm't completion of the surveillance when the allowable outage time limits of the Action Requirements are less than .

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Unit 2 TS Section 4.0.3 will also be reworded to state I that failure to perform required surveillance testing constitutes 1 noncompliance with the operability requirements of an LCO.

These wording changes are consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 87-09.

3. A conflict between mode change limitation and surveillance requirements. ,

Unit 2 TS Section 4.0.4 prohibits entry into an Operational Condition I' or other specified applicable state when Surveillance Requirements are not performed within the specified surveillance interval. A l conflict with this TS exists when: (1. a mode change is required as j a consequence of shutdown Action Requirements, and (2. the applicable l Surveillance Requirements have not been performed within the j specified surveillance interval. For instance, the plant could ,

previously have been in a mode for which the Surveillance Requirements were not applicable, and, therefore, the surveillance may not have been performed within the specified time interval.

! 5021 El-7 HL-3g3 l

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

INCORPORATION OF GENERIC LE1TER 87-09 BASIS FOR CHANGE REQUEST Background and Basis for Proposed Change 1: (Continued)

Consequently, the Action Requirements of the LCO associated with these Surveillance Requirements apply, and the unit may have to be  ;

placed in a lower mode of operation than required by the original Action Requirements if the surveillance cannot be completed within i This problem has been mitigated by the the specified time limits.

change in Specification 4.0.3 to permit a delay of up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in I the applicability of the Action Requirements, thereby placing an appropriate time limit on the completion of Surveillance Requirements that become applicable as a consequence of mode changes to comply with Action Requirements.

The potential for a plant upset and challenge to safety systems is heightened if surveillance are performed during a shutdown to comply with Action Requirements. GPC believes Specification 4.0.4 is not intended to prevent passage through or to operational Conditions to comply with Action Requirements and should not apply when mode changes are imposed by Action Requirements. Accordingly, Specification 4.0.4 will be modified to note that its provisions shall not prevent passage through or to Operational Conditions, as required, to comply with Action Requirements.

This wording is consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 87-09.

i PROPOSED CHANGE ~2:

This change will replace the existing Bases for Unit 2 TS Section 3/4.0 with the Bases provided in Enclosure 5 to Generic Letter 87-09. The change does not apply to the non-STS Unit 1 T S, since the Definition section does not have associated Bases.

Basis for Proposed Change 2:

The existing Bases for Unit 2 TS Sections 3.0 and 4.0 are little more J

than restatements of the associated specifications and do not clearly  !

indicate the intent of the specifications. This presents a situation j where licensed personnel I;.a y have to interpret the Technical  ;

Specifications.  ;

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.4 ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

INCORPORATION'0F GENERIC LETTER 87-09' BASIS FOR CHANGE REQUEST

.1

, The Bases- ~ f or - TS Sections _ 3.0 and 4.0, which were issued as part of' Generic Letter 87-09, provide clear insight into the meaning and intent' of -the associated specifications. Furthermore, the Bases provided in '

Generic Letter: 87-09 resolve several long-standing interpretation l

issues.

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l ENCLOSURE 2 PLANT HATCH - UNITS 1, 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5 REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

INCORPORATION OF GENERIC LETTER 87-09 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION ,

PROPOSED CHANGE 1:

This change will modify the wording of Unit 1 TS Definitions M and JJ, as well as Unit 2 TS Sections 3.0.4, 4.0.3, and 4.0.4 to be consistent with the guidance provided in Enclosure 1 to Generic Letter 87-09.

Evaluation of Proposed Change 1:

Proposed Change 1 does not involve a significant hazards consideration for the following reasons:

1. It does not involve a significant increase-in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because neither plant operation nor design is affected by the proposed change. The proposed change is administrative in nature and primarily serves to provide plant operating personnel with clearer guidance regarding compliance with LCOs and Action Requirements under all operating conditions.
2. It does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident f rom any previously evaluated, because no new modes of operation or design configuration are introduced. The proposed change serves to strengthen the existing Technical .

Specifications requirements by eliminating some areas of confusion and interpretation, and providing a clear statement of l the specification's intent.

3. It does not involve a reduction in the margin of safety, because the proposed change does not impact any numerical value in the Technical Specifications. The change serves to strengthen the philosophy of compliance with the Technical Specifications.

PROPOSED CHANGE 2:

Proposed Change 2 will replace the entire Bases section 3/4.0 of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications with the 3/4.0 Bases provided in Enclosure 5 '

to Generic Letter 87-09.

5021Q E2-1 HL-313

4 ENCLOSURE 2 (Continued)

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

INCORPORATION OF GENERIC LETTER 87-09 l 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION j Evaluation of Proposed Chanae 2:

Proposed Change 2 does not involve a significant hazards consideration for the following reasons:

1. It does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated,. because the proposed change only serves to provide background information and . explain the intent of Section 3/4.0. The proposed change does not in any way adversely af fect the design, operation, or testing of the plant.
2. It-does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated, because the proposed change is administrative in nature and does not introduce any new modes of operation or design configuration.
3. It does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety, because the proposed change provides explanatory information and does not impact any safety analysis.

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I 50210 E2-2 HL-313 t 1

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ENCLOSURE 3 PLANT HATCH - UNITS 1, 2 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5 ,

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL ~ SPECIFICATIONS:

INCORPORATION OF GENERIC LETTER 87409  ;

PAGE CHANGE INSTRUCTIONS ,

.1 The' proposed changes to the Unit"1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications

( Appendix A to Operating Licenses DPR-57 and NPF-5) would be incorporated I as follows:

Remove Pace Insert Page UNIT.1 : 1.0-3 1.0-3

-1.0-6 1.0-6 UNIT 2: 3/40-1 3/40-1 3/4 0-2 3/4 0-2 l 3/4 0-3. 3/4 0-3 B3/4 0-1 B3/4 0-1 B3/4 0-2 B3/4 0-2 83/4 0-3 B3/4 0-3 B3/4 0-4 B3/4 0-5 B3/4 0-6 B3/4 0-7

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K. Instrument Check - An instrument check is the qualitative determination of acceptable operability by observation of instrument behavior during operation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the instrument with other independent instruments measuring the same variable.

L. Instrument Functional Test - An instrument functional test means the injection of a simulated signal into the instrument primary sensor to verify the oroper instrument channel response, alarm and/or_ initiating action.

M. Limitina Conditions for Operation-(LCO) - The Limiting Conditions for Operation specify the acceptable levels of system performance necessary to assure safe startup and operation of the Unit. When these conditions are met, the Unit can be operated safely and abnormal situations.can be safely controlled. Entry into an i operational condition (i.e., one of the conditions or modes j specified in definitions B, F, G, Y, AA, CC, FF, and HH) or other specified condition shall not be made when the conditions for the

' Limiting Conditions for Operation are not met and the associated  ;

action requires'a shutdown if they are not met within a specified "

time interval. Entry into an operational condition or other specified condition may be made in accordance with the action requirements when conformance to them permits continued operation j of the facility for an unlimited period of time. This provision i shall not prevent-passage through or to operational conditions as '

required to comply with action requirements.

N. Limitina Safety System Settino (LSSS) - The limiting safety  !

system settings are settings on instrumentation which-initiate the automatic protective action at a level such that a Safety Limit will not be exceeded. The region between the Safety Limit and these settings represents margin with normal operation lying on the conservative side of these settings. The margin has been established so that with proper operation of the instrumentation the Safety Limits will never be exceeded.

O. -Logic System Functional Test - A logic system functional test means a test of all relays and contacts of a logic circuit from sensor to activated device to insure that components are operable per design intent. Where practicable, action will go to completion; e.g., pumps will be started and valves opened.

P. (Deleted)

Q. Operable - A system or component shall be considered operable when it is capable of performing its intended function in its required manner.

R. Operatina - Operating means that a system or component is performing its intended functions in its required manner.

HATCH - UNIT 1 1.0-3 Proposed TS/0256q/038-27

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  • -; i GG. Simul'atid Automatic Act'uation'- Simulated' automatic' actuation means applying a simulated signal to the sensor to actuate the circuit-'in.

question. l t

i HH. Start & Hot Standby Mode - The reactor. is in the Start & Hot Standby.  !

Mode when the. Mode Switch is in the START & HOT. STANDBY position. In j this mode the reactor protection system is energized with IRM and APRM i

-(Start & Hot Standby Mode) neutron monitoring system trips and control rod withdrawal inter-locks in service.

I

-II. Surveillance Freauency - Periodic' surveillance-tests, checks, calibrations, and examinations;shall be performed within the specified )

surveillance intervals. These intervals may be; adjusted plus or minus '

25 percent. The operating cycle interval is defined as 18 months. In the case where the elapsed interval has ' exceeded 100 percent of the specified-interval, the next surveillance interval shall commence at-the end of the original specified ' interval.

JJ. Surveillance Requirements - The' surveillance requirements are requirements established to ensure that the Limiting Conditions for Operation as stated in Section~ 3 of these Technical Specifications are met. . Surveillance requirements are not required on systems or parts-of systems that .are ,not required to be operable or are tripped. If tests are missed on-parts not required to be operable or'are tripped, then they shall be performed prior to returning the system to an operable status. If tests are missed on parts which are required to be operable, the time limits ~ of the ACTION requirements are applicable at the time it is identified that a.. surveillance requirement has not been performed. The ACTION requirements may be~ delayed up to 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s-to permit the completion of the surveillance when the allowable outage

' time limits of'the ACTION requirements are less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

KK. -Total Peakina Factor (TPF[- The total peaking factor is the highest product of radial, axial, and local peaking factors simultaneously operative at any segment of fuel rod.

LL. Transition Boilina - Transition boiling is the boiling that~ occurs between. nucleate and film boiling. Transition boiling is manifested i by an unstable fuel cladding surface temperature, rising suddenly as steam blanketing of the heat transfer surface occurs, then dropping as the steam blanket is swept away by the coolant flow, then rising  !

again. l i

{

l HATCH - UNIT 1 1.0-6 Proposed TS/0256q/344-103

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