05000249/FIN-2014005-02
From kanterella
Revision as of 19:51, 20 February 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Ensure Continued Operability of Unit 3 Electromatic Relief Valve 302033E Following Implementation of Extended Power Uprate Plant Conditions |
| Description | An apparent violation (AV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, having a preliminary low to moderate safety significance, was self-revealed on November 6, 2014, following the discovery that one of the Unit 3 electromatic relief valves (ERVs) would not have performed its intended safety function. Increased vibrations experienced while operating at extended power uprate (EPU) power levels resulted in the degradation of multiple ERV actuator components which rendered the valve inoperable. The inspectors determined that the licensee fully implemented the Unit 3 EPU following a main generator rewind in November 2010, but failed to verify that the ERV actuator design was suitable for operation at the continuously increased vibration levels experienced at EPU power levels. This finding does not represent an immediate safety concern in that the licensee has replaced all four Unit 3 ERV actuators with a hardened design successfully utilized at the Quad Cities Generating Station, which also experienced significant steam line vibrations post EPU. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to ensure the continued operability of the Unit 3 ERVs following the establishment of EPU plant operating conditions was a performance deficiency warranting a significance evaluation. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attributes of design control and equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. A Significance and Enforcement Review Panel (SERP), using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, preliminarily determined the finding to be of low to moderate safety significance (White). The inspectors determined that this finding has a cross-cutting aspect of operating experience in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, since it involves the failure to implement relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. |
| Site: | Dresden  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000249/2014005 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2014 (2014Q4) |
| Type: | Violation: White |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Shaikh B Bartlett C Khan D Lords E Sanchez-Santiago G Roach J Cameron J Mancuso M Porfirio R Jicklin T Goj Cameronr Ruiza Shaikhb Bartlett C Khan D Lords E Sanchez-Santiago G Roach J Cameron J Mancuso M Porfirio R Jickling T Go |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Dresden - IR 05000249/2014005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Dresden) @ 2014Q4
Self-Identified List (Dresden)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||